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Humberto Dalla Bernardina de Pinho
Juliana Loss de Andrade
Mediation is not a trend in non-common law countries anymore: it is a 
reality. Almost seven years have already passed from the Directive 52/2008/
CE, which established a communitarian framework for mediation in civil and 
commercial matters in the European Union and required the member States 
to adapt their legal systems to contemplate this sort of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR). Many important economies followed the same path in 
different countries in Asia, Russia and Latin America. Mediation became an 
important tool in different fields and notably in conflicts concerning family, 
civil and commercial law as well as restorative justice. 
In countries like United States, England and Canada, where mediation 
flowered before, the past decade represented also an important growth with 
new rules and maturity in the literature and practice. In those systems, com-
plex conflict have reached mediation as the Canadian case of ADR and Ab-
original-Crown Conciliation articulated in this book in the contribution of 
Roshan Danesh and Jessica Dickinson. Applying mediation to sophisticated 
conflicts and improving techniques help the field to become more solid and 
known in the hard mission to promote conflict resolution and peace based on 
interest-based models. On the other hand, in the international scenario, me-
diation progresses call the attention because of its new impact and interfaces 
in traditional dispute resolution means as arbitration and new technologies 
prospering also in online dispute resolution.
Accordingly, the context was never so fruitful for exchanging experiences 
and theoretical points of view. The globalization accelerates reciprocal influ-
ences in different legal systems and facilitates the understanding between 
scholars and practioners from all over the world. Therefore, the purpose of 
this book was to create a channel to assemble some of these exchanges.
From the conflict view, a Brazilian scholar José Paulo Marinho faces in his 
text the limitations of ADR methods. His approach can be elucidating in the 
legal moment for mediation in Brazil, since it has its first signs of mediation 
regulation approved in the New Procedural Code and runs to a specific new 
framework for civil and commercial mediation in a Bill of Law still pending of 
9
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legislative approval. Humberto Dalla Bernadina de Pinho traverses these new 
perspectives in his article and demonstrates many legal concerns with these 
future changes. 
Escaping from the legal field and connecting the theoretical and practi-
cal aspects, Andrea Maia and Elton Simões propose different and interesting 
lenses to assess the interaction between conflict and the approach chosen to 
deal with it by the mediator. Actually, observing the behavior of the facilitator 
may illustrate how this kind of professional faces some decisions. This dis-
cussion is equally important in the practical and the legal scenario, inspiring 
concerns related to deontology, as well expressed in the text architected by 
Nuria Belloso Martin. 
Besides the experience of developing mediation is still ongoing for some 
countries as many continental european and latin examples, it is very well 
developed in others. An interesting scene in between the latin influences and 
the pillars of North American legal culture, the court-connected mediation 
experience in Puerto Rico is spotlighted by Jacqueline Font-Gusmán, who 
concentrate her analysis in the referrals of cases, an important step on the 
achievement of any mediation program.
Comparatively, the European mediation “boom’’ – emerged within the 
new legal system of the European Union anchored in the mentioned direc-
tive and impacted by the recommendations of the Council of Europe – also 
illustrates different and positive perspectives. In this book, some European 
perceptions are related in different articles by Neil Andrews, Isabelle Hering 
and Giovanni Mateucci in England, Switzerland and Italy respectively. The 
difficulties of institutionalization of mediation in different cultures still imply 
some already known but still very relevant questioning and Giuseppe de Palo 
propose some adjustments in the mediation implementation in the legal sys-
tems, notably in the European landscape. Finally, the same continent shows 
interesting recent practices concerning restorative justice, as described by 
Helena Soleto Muñoz, who detects signs of development and resistance in 
south Europe.
Still, amplifying from the communitarian to the international legal con-
text, Juliana Loss de Andrade examines the legal environment for interna-
tional commercial mediation settlement agreement and consequent argu-
ments for the task of harmonization of normative framework. 
Finally, Lela P. Love and Joseph B. Stulberg didactically touch relevant 
practical aspects of the use of mediation and Paul Mason brings the focus to 
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the multi-dimensional mediation, considering the method beyond the limited 
two parties’ scenario. 
In this book, it is clear that, differently from the usual legal discussions, 
mediation is conflict resolution language understandable in different legal 
cultures. The multifaceted character of mediation emphasized in the texts is 
an invitation of interconnected contributions between different perspectives 




1. The landscape of commercial mediation in England
Most commercial mediators aim to act as facilitators. As such, their role 
is to act as an independent and disinterested third party and encourage the 
parties to talk and to move towards a possible agreed settlement. Within me-
diation the parties have ultimate control over whether the case ends. Parties 
have the opportunity to determine their outcome, rather than have it imposed 
by a judge or arbitrator. The mediator is not a decision-maker. Nor is it the 
aim of mediation to compel people to reach a compromise. The predominant 
style of mediation in the United Kingdom, at least concerning mainstream 
civil disputes, involves the mediator assisting the parties to gain an outcome. 
Such influence as the mediator does acquire is the result of gaining the par-
ties’ confidence.
It is best, indeed almost essential, that parties attending the mediation 
should have authority to settle.
It is estimated3 that circa 65 to 70 per cent of London commercial or civil 
mediations settle on the day of the session. A further 15 per cent settle within 
a week or a month.
There is no need for the mediator to have a legal training or qualification. 
However, in England many commercial mediators are ‘lawyers’: former bar-
risters, solicitors, or judges, or current lawyers. 
Many UK mediators are ‘accredited’, having received professional training 
from various private organisations.4 Mediation is not yet a feature of most law 
degrees. Nor is it an aspect of professional training as a lawyer. In 2008 the 
1  Leading up-to-date works are: Andrews on Civil Processes (vol 2, Arbitration and 
Mediation ) (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2013); Tony Allen, Mediation Law and Civil Prac-
tice (Bllomsbury, London, 2013); S Blake, J Browne, S Smie, The Jackson ADR Handbook 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
2  University of Cambridge.
3  Tony Allen, Cambridge seminar, February 2012.





European Commission issued a directive on the topic5 and a Code of Conduct 
for mediators.6 There is (as yet) no formal system of centralised regulation of 
mediators. 
The rise of mediation, not just in England, is largely attributable to six 
factors: (1) the perception (and nearly always the reality) that court litiga-
tion is unpredictable; (2) the court-based adjudicative process (and extensive 
preparation for the final hearing) is a source of expense, delay, and anxiety; 
(3) court litigation offers little scope for direct participation by the parties, as 
distinct from legal representatives; (4) final judgment normally awards victo-
ry to only one winner; (5) trial is open-air justice, visible to mankind in gen-
eral; (6) litigation is private war—even if judges pretend that it is governed by 
elaborate rules and conciliatory conventions designed to take the sting out of 
the contest. 
The pre-action protocols (applicable to all prospective claims, even where 
there is no specific protocol tailored to the specific type of prospective litiga-
tion) state:7 
‘Starting proceedings should usually be a step of last resort, and proceedings should 
not normally be started when a settlement is still actively being explored. Although ADR 
is not compulsory, the parties should consider whether some form of ADR procedure 
might enable them to settle the matter without starting proceedings. The court may re-
quire evidence that the parties considered some form of ADR.’8 
Mediation is now better understood by businesses and organisations. In 
England resort to mediation has increased, including within the heartland of 
commercial disputes.9 The Ministry of Justice for England and Wales (2010) 
5  Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.
6  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2004/com2004_0718en01.pdf; for the 
European Code of Conduct for Mediators: http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/
ejn/adr/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.htm
7  For an empirical study, T Goriely, R Moorhead and P Abrams, More Civil Justice? 
The Impact of the Woolf Reforms on Pre-Action Behaviour (Law Society and Civil Justice 
Council, 2001).
8  Practice Direction-Pre-action Conduct, para 8.1.
9  K Mackie, D Miles, W Marsh, T Allen, The ADR Practice Guide (3rd edn, 2007), espe-
cially ch’s 5, 6, 7; Neil Andrews, The Modern Civil Process (Tübingen, Germany, 2008), ch 
11; Neil Andrews, Contracts and English Dispute Resolution (Tokyo, 2010), ch 22.
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reported on this:10 ‘There is evidence…that the market for mediation in the 
UK continues to grow. A recent mediation audit carried out by the Centre 
for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) showed that there had been nearly 
6,000 civil and commercial mediations carried out in 2009.11 Based on the 
outcome of the 2007 Mediation Audit, the 2009 figure showed there was 
a doubling of mediation activity since 2007.’ At the same time, in his 22 
March 2012 speech on ‘The Reform of Clinical Negligence Litigation’, Sir 
Rupert Jackson noted the unfortunate resistance to mediation in this field, 
and on the systemic phenomenon of late settlements.12 And in his 26 March 
2012 lecture on ‘Reforming the Civil Justice System—the Role of Information 
Technology’, Sir Rupert Jackson has said that ‘ADR, particularly mediation, 
has a vital role to play in reducing the costs of civil disputes, by fomenting 
the early settlement of cases. ADR is, however, under-used and its potential 
benefits are not as widely known as they should be’,13 citing an example of 
expensive litigation, in which the Court of Appeal suggested that a dispute 
between neighbouring leaseholders in a London mansion block, taken on ap-
peal from the county court to the Court of Appeal (legal costs in the litiga-
tion totalling c £140,000), might have been compromised.14 A major driving 







14  ibid at 2.2 citing Faidi v. Elliot Corporation [2012] EWCA Civ 287; [2012] HLR 
27 (leaseholder complaining about noise from defendant’s uncarpeted flat; landlord had 
given permission for defendant to install expensive wooden flooring; claimant’s action 
against defendant neighbour failing because landlord’s consent was held to have waived 
relevant provision in lease requiring wall-to-wall carpeting and underlay (Jackson LJ said 
at [35]: ‘Of course there are many cases where a strict determination of rights and lia-
bilities is what the parties require. The courts stand ready to deliver such a service to 
litigants and must do so as expeditiously and economically as practicable. But before 
embarking upon full blooded adversarial litigation parties should first explore the possi-
bility of settlement. In neighbour disputes of the kind now before the court (and of which 
I have seen many similar examples) if negotiation fails, mediation is the obvious and 
constructive way forward.’ And suggesting that use of rugs, providing partial sound in-
sulation, the wooden flooring being partially visible, might have been a satisfactory inter-
mediate solution, avoiding cost of litigation). However, the suggested compromise here---
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factor in mediation’s expansion is wish of disputants to escape the crippling 
expense of formal court litigation, or of complex arbitration. Both forms of 
dispute-resolution, court litigation and arbitration, remain expensive, and of-
ten slow, means of resolving many types of civil dispute. Certainly, costs and 
expense are in the forefront of most people’s minds whenever litigation be-
comes even a remote prospect. Indeed even Bill Gates, and other modern-day 
descendants of Croesus, would hesitate to run the risk of engaging in pro-
tracted and complicated claims heard by the High Court (curiously, Russian 
oligarchs are not put off and some even seem to relish London High Court 
litigation). Sir Rupert Jackson has said that ‘ADR...is a tool which can be used 
to reduce costs...It is a sad fact that many cases settle at a late stage, when 
substantial costs have been run up.’15
Furthermore, Government recognises that ADR permits disputes to be 
resolved less expensively than civil litigation. The Government (Ministry of 
Justice, for England and Wales) announced in February 2012,16 following a 
consultation exercise (2011),17 that it would like to introduce automatic re-
ferral to mediation for all small claims within the county court system (from 
1 April 2013, the upper limit is raised from £5,000 to £10,000, but there 
is no change to the £1,000 limit for personal injury and housing disrepair 
claims).18. The Senior Judiciary, in its response to the earlier consultation, 
had emphasised19 that this should not be a compulsory system of mediation, 
but merely a system requiring litigants to make contact with (‘engage with’) 
which the court was powerless to impose--is debatable: some noise would still be suffered 
below; and the offending leaseholder would be denied the aesthetic benefit of a complete 
expanse of wooden-flooring. 
15  ‘The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Furthering the Aims of the Civil 
Litigation Costs Review’ (RICS Expert Witness Conference, 8 March 2012), at 3.1: http://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lj-jackson-speech-elev-
enth-lecture-implementation-programme.pdf 
16  ‘Solving Disputes in the County Courts...’ p 11, recommendation 24 (February 
2012) http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm82/8274/8274.pdf
17  ‘Solving disputes in the county courts: creating a simpler, quicker and more pro-
portionate system’ (CP 6/2011: Ministry of Justice: Cm 8045) (29 March 2011).
18  CPR 27.1(2); PD (27).
19  ‘‘Solving disputes in the county courts....Response of the Lord Chief Justice and the 
Master of the Rolls on Behalf of the Judiciary’ (2011), 14-15 (http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/
NR/rdonlyres/CCA63782-89BA-49D4-8543-63C16397DB73/0/lcjmrresponsesolving-
disputescountycourt.pdf).
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the mediation service in order to consider the possibility of mediation in re-
spect of their dispute. In short, England is going down the path of mandatory 
exploration of mediation in all small claims litigation. Fortunately, the me-
diation service within the small claims system is free. Furthermore, commu-
nication will not require face-to-face meetings, because telephoning20 will be 
the usual form of communication.
In fact the court system already directly encourages litigants to pursue 
mediation in appropriate cases. Sue Prince has made a study of various 
schemes.21 There has been recent expansion of mediation within the appeal 
system. 
2. Mediation agreements22
Ramsey J in Holloway v. Chancery Mead (2007) identified three ele-
ments: (a) absence of further negotiation on the appropriateness of media-
tion; (b) agreement on how the mediator should be selected; and (c) the main 
mediation process should be spelt out or an institutional set of mediation 
rules nominated:23
The Court of Appeal in Sulamerica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa 
Engenharia SA (2012) made clear that the mere fact that the parties’ contract 
refers to mediation as a desirable mechanism is not the same as a clear and 
20  ‘Solving Disputes in the County Courts...’ para 164 (February 2012) http://www.
official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm82/8274/8274.pdf
21  S Prince, ‘ADR after the CPR…’, in D Dwyer (ed), The Civil Procedure Rules: Ten 
Years On (Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 17; M Ahmed, ‘Implied Compulsory Media-
tion’ (2012) 31 CJQ 151.
22  H Brown and A Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice (3rd edn, 2011), 26-033 ff; D 
Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (2nd edn, 2010); 
K Mackie, D Miles, W Marsh, T Allen, The ADR Practice Guide (3rd edn, 2007), ch 9; Red-
fern and Hunter’s International Arbitration (N Blackaby and C Partasides, eds) (5th edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.83 ff; Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution at: www.
cedr.co.uk/library/documents/contract_clauses.pdf; D Spencer and M Brogan, Media-
tion: Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch 12 for Australian material.
23  [2007] EWHC 2495 (TCC), [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 653, at [83] (for similar anal-
ysis in Australia, Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v. Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236, at 
[69]; and Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty v. Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 36 




binding contractual commitment to engage in mediation.24 If the agreement 
is void for uncertainty that is the end of the matter. Uncertainty is fatal: it is 
not enough that the parties intended to create such a binding commitment.25 
The core portions of clause 11 (mediation) were: 
‘the parties undertake that, prior to a reference to arbitration, they will seek to have 
the Dispute resolved amicably by mediation’; 
‘If the Dispute has not been resolved to the satisfaction of either party within 90 days 
of service of the notice initiating mediation, or if either party fails or refuses to partici-
pate in the mediation, of if either party serves written notice terminating the mediation 
under this clause, then either party may refer to the Dispute to arbitration.’
Furthermore, Moore-Bick LJ referred to the (implicit) need for the clause 
to nominate an established mediation provider (whose institutional rules 
would supply all necessary details) or to fashion expressly a mediation pro-
cess.26 This statement echoes Ramsey J’s analysis in Holloway v. Chancery 
Mead (2007) (also cited above), who referred to the need that: the process 
or at least a model of the process should be set out so that the detail of the 
process is sufficiently certain. 
No problem of certainty should arise if the mediation clause refers to a 
well-established institutional ‘model’ set of mediation rules. This was in fact 
the position in Cable & Wireless v. IBM United Kingdom Ltd (2002) where 
the mediation clause incorporated an institutional set of mediation rules,27 
24  ibid.
25  ibid, at [35], per Moore-Bick LJ: ‘I have little doubt that the parties intended con-
dition 11 to be enforceable and thought they had achieved that objective. In those circum-
stances the court should be slow to hold they have failed to do so. However, in order for 
any agreement to be effective in law it must define the parties’ rights and obligations 
with sufficient certainty to enable it to be enforced.’
26  ibid, at [36]: ‘...The most that might be said is that [condition 11] imposes on any 
party who is contemplating referring a dispute to arbitration an obligation to invite the 
other to join in an ad hoc mediation, but the content of even such a limited obligation 
is so uncertain as to render it impossible of enforcement in the absence of some defined 
mediation process.’
27  [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 1041; [2002] CLC 1319; 
[2003] BLR 89, at [21] per Colman J: ‘the parties have not simply agreed to attempt in 
good faith to negotiate a settlement. In this case they have gone further than that by 
identifying a particular procedure, namely an ADR procedure as recommended to the 
parties by the Centre for Dispute Resolution to which I refer as ‘CEDR’. That is one of the 
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
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containing a detailed process,28 and enabling the court to monitor contractual 
compliance.29
Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution Clauses: Many corporations now prefer to 
use international arbitration in combination with other ADR mechanisms. 
Such a combination of techniques will be specified in a ‘multi-tiered’ or ‘es-
calation’ dispute resolution clause.30 These are now common-place in com-
mercial agreements. They specify a ‘step-by-step’ approach, negotiation and 
mediation, which must be exhausted before the parties can commence court 
or arbitral proceedings.
Judicial Remedies to Uphold Mediation Clauses: The leading English de-
cision on this aspect of mediation clauses31 is Cable & Wireless v. IBM United 
best known and most experienced dispute resolution service providers in this country....
[A]t the time when the [agreement] CEDR had [already] published the 6th edition of its 
Model Mediation Procedure and Agreement.’
28  ibid: ‘This document sets out a model procedure which specifies the terms upon 
which the parties may proceed with a reference to mediation. This identifies (i) the func-
tions of the mediator, including his power to chair, and determine the procedure for, 
the mediation, his attendance at meetings, his assistance in drawing up any settlement 
agreement; (ii) the duties of the participants, in particular that of providing to CEDR at 
least two weeks before the mediation a case summary and all documents referred to in 
it and others to be referred to; (iii) the entitlement of each party to send in confidence to 
the mediator documents or information which it wishes the mediator to have but not to 
disclose to the other party. There are also express provisions about the confidentiality of 
the proceedings and about how the fees, expenses and costs are to be borne.’
29  ibid, at [24]: ‘Thus, if one party simply fails to co-operate in the appointment of 
a mediator in accordance with CEDR’s model procedure or to send documents to such 
mediator as is appointed or to attend upon the mediator when he has called for a first 
meeting, there will clearly be an ascertainable breach of the agreement in cl 41.2.’ Add-
ing at [29]: ‘Accordingly, in the present case I conclude that cl 41.2 includes a sufficiently 
defined mutual obligation upon the parties both to go through the process of initiating a 
mediation, selecting a mediator and at least presenting that mediator with its case and 
its documents and attending upon him. There can be no serious difficulty in determining 
whether a party has complied with such requirements.’
30  The School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary, University of London, re-
port (2005), available on-line at: http://www.pwc.com/Extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/
docid/0B3FD76A8551573E85257168005122C8 
The author is grateful to Stephen York for this reference. 
31  D Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (2nd 
edn, 2010); K Mackie, D Miles, W Marsh, T Allen, The ADR Practice Guide (3rd edn, 2007), 
ch 9; Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution at: www.cedr.co.uk/library/documents/
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Kingdom Ltd (2002).32 In this case, Colman J insisted that mediation should 
be tried (on those facts as a mandatory stage before litigation), in accordance 
with the resolution clause, although in fact mediation did not work in this 
case.
The ‘multi-tier’ clause in Cable & Wireless v. IBM United Kingdom Ltd 
(2002)33 initially required the parties to endeavour to negotiate a resolution 
by considering the relevant dispute within their own organisations. The clause 
stated that mediation would be obligatory if these negotiations collapsed.34 
Thereafter, the parties to this clause contemplated that, if the dispute were 
still unresolved, proceedings before a court could take place. After negoti-
ation had failed, one party, by-passing the stipulated stage of mediation, 
prematurely brought a claim before the English High Court. The other party 
challenged this. Colman J found that there had been a breach of the dispute 
resolution agreement, because a party had ‘jumped’ the mediation stage and 
proceeded straight to litigation. To remedy this, the judge placed a ‘stay’ upon 
those formal court proceedings. The stay would be lifted if a party returned to 
court and demonstrated that the mediation attempt had been unsuccessful. 
3. Judicial encouragement of mediation and costs sanctions
English judges do not themselves conduct mediation during the course of 
pending court litigation. For the most part, English judges wait for a party 
to suggest that the dispute should be referred to an external mediator. The 
contract_clauses.pdf; D Spencer and M Brogan, Mediation: Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), ch 12 for Australian material.
32  [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 1041; [2002] CLC 1319; 
[2003] BLR 89, Colman J.
33  [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 1041; [2002] CLC 1319; 
[2003] BLR 89, Colman J.
34  Clause 41 stated: ‘41.1 The parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any dis-
pute or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or any local services agreement 
promptly through negotiations between the respective senior executives of the parties 
who have authority to settle the same pursuant to clause 40. 41.2 If the matter is not re-
solved through negotiation, the parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve the dispute 
or claim through an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure as recommended 
to the parties by the Centre for Dispute Resolution. However, an ADR procedure which 
is being followed shall not prevent any party or local party from issuing proceedings.’
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court might then endorse this as appropriate for this particular case. If so, the 
court can place a case in suspense (a ‘stay’) while that alternative process is 
pursued. The court can also issue a recommendation that mediation be con-
sidered. Each party will then have a duty to consider mediation. Occasionally, 
however, a judge might spontaneously recommend to both parties that medi-
ation should be attempted. 
The English position involves selective judicial recommendation of me-
diation.35 The starting point is that the English courts’ overall responsibility 
to administer civil justice includes ‘helping the parties to settle the whole or 
part of the case’36 and ‘encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate.’37 In addition to 
the ‘tick box’ mechanism contained in the Allocation Questionnaire, resort to 
mediation is a question of direct communication between a judge? (notably 
during the pre-trial stages, but occasionally after judgment during the pro-
cess of giving permission to appeal). 
Sir Rupert Jackson, drawing on his experience when he was a first instance 
judge in the Technology and Construction Court has noted (i) the court’s ca-
pacity (and responsibility) during a first case management conference to re-
view ‘what steps the parties have taken and propose to take to seek to resolve 
the dispute by ADR’; and (ii) the court can ‘require an explanation from the 
party who declines to mediate, such explanation not to be revealed to the 
court until the conclusion of the case’; and the court can (as he puts it, perhaps 
too robustly) ‘penalise in costs parties which have unreasonably refused to 
mediate‘.38 The better view is that such costs sanctions are not punitive, but 
merely disciplinary. Thus a party whose costs are augmented to reflect un-
reasonable failure to mediate is not being required to pay more than the op-
35  For sceptical discussion of any form of mandating or coercing resort to mediation, 
Matthew Brunsdon-Tully ‘There is an A in ADR but Does Anyone Know What it Means 
Anymore?’ (2009) CJQ 218-36; for a survey and analysis of English courts encouragement 
of extra-curial mediation, M Ahmed, ‘Implied Compulsory Mediation’ (2012) 31 CJQ 151.
36  CPR 1.4(2)(f).
37  CPR 1.4(2)(e); The Chancery Guide (2005), ch 17; The Admiralty and Commercial 
Courts Guide (9th edn, 2011), section G and appendix 7 (available on the CPR webpage 
under ‘Guides’).
38  ‘The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Furthering the Aims of the Civil 





ponent’s actual legal costs, and so there is no element of non-compensatory 
‘punishment’. Conversely, when (as will seldom occur) the victorious party is 
‘denied’ his ordinary entitlement to costs, this species of costs forfeiture is not 
punitive. Denial of usual costs because of failure to respond adequately and 
reasonably to mediation opportunities is a procedural ‘sanction’ consistent 
with the general aims of the CPR system, reflecting the flexible approach to 
costs allocation. It does not appear analytically convincing to treat this form 
of procedural sanction as a ‘penal’ judicial response.
Even in the absence of a mediation agreement, an English court can direct 
that the proceedings be stayed for a month at a time39 while the parties pursue 
ADR or other settlement negotiations.40 A stay merely places the proceedings 
in a state of suspense. Proceedings can be resumed when this becomes appro-
priate. The matter is subject to the court’s discretion. There is no automatic 
right to a stay. 
In Cable & Wireless plc v. IBM United Kingdom Ltd (2002) Colman J 
explained:41
‘The [mediation agreement] is analogous to an agreement to arbitrate. As such, it 
represents a free-standing agreement ancillary to the main contract and capable of be-
ing enforced by a stay of the proceedings or by injunction absent any pending proceed-
ings. The jurisdiction to stay, although introduced by statute in the field of arbitration 
agreements, is in origin an equitable remedy. It is further a procedural tool provided for 
under CPR, r. 26.4 to encourage and enable the parties to use ADR... However, the avail-
ability of the remedy whether of a stay or an adjournment or other case management 
order must be a matter for the discretion of the court.’
So-called mediation orders, issued by the court, are merely robust recom-
mendations to mediate. 
English courts are prepared, where appropriate, to register censure of a 
party’s unreasonable refusal to engage in mediation. That refusal might be 
failure to accede to the opponent’s call for mediation, or the court’s own sug-
gestion that mediation be contemplated. 
PGF II SA v OMFS Co (2013)42 the Court of Appeal held that silence in 
the face of an invitation to participate in ADR was itself unreasonable, irre-
39  CPR 26.4(3).
40  CPR 3.1(2)(f); CPR 26.4(1)(2).
41  [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); [2002] CLC 1319, 1327.
42  [2013] EWCA Civ 1288.
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spective of the merits of refusing to engage in ADR (although there might be 
rare cases where ADR was so obviously inappropriate that to treat silence as 
unreasonable would be ‘pure formalism’, or where the silence resulted from 
an error). Silence was inimical to open negotiation with a view to settlement. 
Accordingly the court said that any difficulties or reasonable objection to a 
particular ADR proposal should be discussed, so that the parties could nar-
row their differences.
Apart from the special case of total silence, in determining the unrea-
sonableness of a party’s refusal to pursue mediation, the Court of Appeal 
in Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust (2004) listed the following 
criteria43 ‘… the nature of the dispute; the merits of the case; the extent to 
which other settlement methods have been attempted; whether the costs of 
the ADR would be disproportionately high; whether any delay in setting up 
and attending the ADR would be prejudicial; whether the ADR had a rea-
sonable prospect of success.’ 
Sir Rupert Jackson, in a speech, has noted criticism of these criteria:44 
nature of the dispute: sceptical response, that ‘there are no categories of case which 
are not capable of mediation, although there are some cases where it is reasonable not to 
settle in mediation’; 
the merits of the case: sceptical response, that ‘there are many cases where a party may 
reasonably believe that it has a watertight case but they are settled at mediation’; 
other settlement methods have been attempted: sceptical response, ‘in principle this 
should allow the parties to refer to “without prejudice” negotiations to take account of 
settlement offers made and rejected; 
the costs of mediation would be disproportionately high: sceptical response, the costs 
of mediation are significantly less than litigation, although it must be accepted that those 
costs may be wasted if mediation fails’; 
delay: sceptical response, ‘whilst late mediation is to be avoided, it should not delay 
any trial’; 
whether mediation has a reasonable prospect: sceptical response, ‘experience shows 
that many mediations have a reasonable prospect of settling, regardless of the initial attitude 
43  [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 WLR 3002, at [16] ff; for a strong application of 
this costs regime, in which the Halsey criteria were fully considered, P4 Ltd v. Unite Inte-
grated Solutions plc [2006] EWHC 2924 (TCC), Ramsey J.
44  ‘The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Furthering the Aims of the Civil 





of the parties, but whether they will settle is a matte for agreement between the parties.’ 
But he then notes that the Halsey case had a salutary effect, contending that it stim-
ulated a new pattern of behaviour. Under the post-Halsey practice, litigators were aware 
of the new costs risk, if they were seen to have inflexibly spurned mediation overtures by 
the opponent, even if the ‘spurner’ ultimately defeated the ‘spurnee’. To reduce this risk, 
‘mediation offerees’ carefully present written reasons in so-called Halsey letters sent to 
the opponent, in which they purport to justify a refusal to accept the opponent’s offer to 
mediate, and the mediation offeror responds by listing reasons for picking holes in the 
mediation offeree’s Halsey letter.45 
A defendant’s pre-action unwillingness to mediate can be entirely reasonable if the 
opponent has failed to particularise and clarify his claim, despite the defendant’s ‘requests, 
as Ward LJ noted in S v. Chapman (2008).46 Furthermore, HH Judge Coulson QC held in 
Nigel Witham Ltd v. Smith (2008)47 that a party’s very late acceptance of the opponent’s 
offer to mediate might be equivalent to an absolute refusal to mediate. And (as noted by 
Sir Rupert Jackson, in a speech)48 in PGF II SA v. OMFS Company (2012),49 a defendant 
suffered a costs sanction when it unreasonably refused to accept the claimant’s offer to 
mediate; and the sanction was applied even though the defendant had made a Part 36 
offer which the claimant later failed to beat; dis-applying the default rule50 applicable in 
45  ibid, at 3.9.
46  [2008] EWCA Civ 800, at [49]; noted J Sorabji (2008) 27 CJQ 427.
47  [2008] EWHC 12 (TCC), at [36]; noted on this point by J Sorabji (2008) 27 CJQ 427.
48  ‘The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Furthering the Aims of the Civil 
Litigation Costs Review’ (RICS Expert Witness Conference, 8 March 2012), at 3.9: http://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lj-jackson-speech-elev-
enth-lecture-implementation-programme.pdf 
49  [2012] EWHC 83 (TCC); [2012] 3 Costs LO 404, at [42] (decision of Deputy High 
Court judge, First QC): ‘it was unreasonable of the Defendant not to respond to the sug-
gested mediation and therefore not to agree to mediate this dispute. I agree with the 
Claimant that the factors considered in Halsey making it unreasonable to refuse to take 
part in a mediation are present here, including the consideration that there was a rea-
sonable prospect that the mediation would be successful. Whilst the burden of establish-
ing this latter factor rests on the Claimant in this case, it is not an unduly onerous burden 
given that it does not need to show that the mediation would have been successful, merely 
that it had a reasonable prospect of success.’
50  CPR 36.10(5)(b) provides, that, normally (unless the court considers this would be 
unjust on the facts of the case), the Part 36 settlement offeree (here the claimant) ‘will be 
liable for the offeror’s costs for the period from the date of expiry of the relevant period 
to the date of acceptance.’ CPR 36.10(4) applies that default rule where: a) a Part 36 offer 
that was made less than 21 days before the start of trial is accepted; or b) a Part 36 offer 
is accepted after expiry of the relevant period, if the parties do not agree the liability for 
costs, the court will make an order as to costs.
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this context, the defendant (the mediation offeree) was not entitled to costs in respect of 
the period after the expiry of that offer. 
As for costs sanctions against a party who has clearly won the relevant 
court proceedings, the ‘mediation offeror’ (who has lost the case) will bear the 
burden of showing on the balance of probabilities that the mediation would 
have had a reasonable prospect of success, assuming the mediation offeree 
(who eventually won the case) would have participated in the mediation in a 
co-operative manner.51 Satisfying this burden of proof will be an uphill task. 
For example, in Swain Mason v Mills & Reeve (2012) the Court of Appeal 
held that if a party reasonably believed that he had a watertight case, that 
might well be a sufficient justification for a refusal to mediate, and this was so 
even if on some issues the defence did not succeed.52
Adverse costs decisions (‘sanctions’) can be issued if, in particular, a party 
fails to satisfy the duty to consider a judicial recommendation or ‘order’ that 
mediation be considered.. Such a costs sanction is justified only if a party has 
failed, for objectively unsatisfactory reasons, to consider properly the oppor-
tunity for mediation. 
An example of such a mediation ‘order’ is the recommendation made by 
Commercial Court judges (a branch of the High Court) under Appendix 7 to 
Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide (for details), which was drafted by 
Colman J and which Dyson LJ in the Court of Appeal in the Halsey case said53 
were acceptable.
In the Halsey case (2004), Dyson LJ explained:54
‘An ADR order made in the Admiralty and Commercial Court in the form set out in 
Appendix 7 to the Guide is the strongest form of encouragement. It requires the parties 
to exchange lists of neutral individuals who are available to conduct ADR procedures”, 
to endeavour in good faith to agree a neutral individual or panel and to take such se-
rious steps as they may be advised to resolve their disputes by ADR procedures before 
the neutral individual or panel so chosen”. The order also provides that if the case is not 
settled, the parties shall inform the court … what steps towards ADR have been taken 
51  Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 WLR 
3002.
52 [2012] EWCA Civ 498; [2012] S.T.C. 1760; [2012] 4 Costs L.O. 511.
53  Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 





and (without prejudice to matters of privilege) why such steps have failed”. It is to be 
noted, however, that this form of order stops short of actually compelling the parties to 
undertake an ADR.’
And so the question of a costs sanction against a victorious party is more 
likely to arise when the party to be sanctioned has rejected a judicial recom-
mendation for mediation (as distinct from a suggestion made by the other 
side). 
Robust costs sanctions are likely to be applied if the court (notably the 
Court of Appeal), when granting permission to appeal, has simultaneously 
indicated that the parties should consider mediation. If one party fails to re-
spond positively to such a judicial recommendation, the appeal court, when 
considering the question of costs at the conclusion of the appeal, might deny 
that party the costs of the appeal even if he has been successful on the merits 
of the appeal. 
Indeed in the Court of Appeal in the McMillan case (2004) said that if both 
parties to an appeal spurn the judicial recommendation that mediation be 
considered, and instead they proceed straight to appeal without attempting 
mediation, each party will bear its own costs for that stage of the proceeding, 
with no opportunity for cost-shifting in favour of the victorious party to the 
appeal.55
Dyson LJ in the Halsey case (2004) also noted the special status of a judi-
cial recommendation:56 
‘Where a successful party refuses to agree to ADR despite the court’s encouragement, 
that is a factor which the court will take into account when deciding whether his refusal 
was unreasonable. The court’s encouragement may take different forms. The stronger 
55  McMillan Williams v. Range [2004] EWCA Civ 294; [2004] 1 WLR 1858, per 
Ward LJ: ‘[29] Tuckey LJ gave this [direction] to the parties when he granted permis-
sion to appeal: “The costs of further litigating this dispute will be disproportionate to the 
amount at stake. ADR is strongly recommended.” …The parties should have written to 
each other along the lines that, “Lord Justice Tuckey has very sensibly suggested ADR. 
My client thinks that is a splendid idea. Please can we get on with it as soon and as 
cheaply as possible?”...[30]... In my judgment this is a case where we should condemn 
the posturing and jockeying for position taken by each side of this dispute and thus direct 
that each side pay its own costs of their frolic in the Court of Appeal. I would allow the 
appeal with no order for costs.’
56  Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 WLR 
3002, at [29].
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the encouragement, the easier it will be for the unsuccessful party to discharge the bur-
den of showing that the successful party’s refusal was unreasonable.’
In both Dunnett v. Railtrack plc (2002)57 (discussed in text below) and 
McMillan Williams v. Range (2004)58 a member of the Court of Appeal 
(Schiemann LJ in the Dunnett case, and Tuckey LJ in the McMillan case) 
issued an unsolicited recommendation that, instead of proceeding straight to 
appeal, both parties should pursue mediation. 
But the party who lost the appeal in Dunnett v. Railtrack plc (2002)59 did 
succeed in persuading the court to disallow the victorious party its costs in the 
appeal. Or, rather, the Court of Appeal in that case spontaneously imposed a 
robust costs sanction based on its own impression of the perceived ‘tactical 
merits’ of the contest. The court held that the twice victorious rail track com-
pany (which had successfully defended the claim, both at trial and on appeal) 
should be denied its costs from Mrs Dunnett. It appears that this denial was 
confined to the costs of the appeal; and the costs decision stopped short of 
requiring the defendant company to pay the claimant’s costs—in fact she was 
not legally represented, and was a ‘litigant-in-person’. 
One senses that this expression of disapproval was driven by the Lords Jus-
tices’ vague sense that mediation should expand whenever there is a remote 
chance of its success. But such a discretionary and unconvincing use of judicial 
sanctions runs contrary to the voluntary basis of mediation. That technique is 
a settlement tool. There was no agreement to mediate obliging Mrs Dunnett 
and Railtrack to use that technique. The judicial recommendation to mediate, 
made when granting permission to appeal, was not an order to enter into me-
diation sessions. As discussed, ‘orders to mediate’ can only be rationalised as 
orders requiring disputants to consider carefully the merits of mediation as a 
possible means of enabling them to achieve a consensual resolution of their 
dispute. But Railtrack seems to have discharged that limited duty to consider 
was a duty which. If so, there was no legitimate scope for a sanction. 
It is submitted that costs sanctions are unjustified if the relevant party to 
the appeal convinces the court that he has considered properly the opportu-
nity to mediate but he has then chosen to bring or respond to the appeal for 
objectively satisfactory reasons. Once the court is satisfied that the party did 
57  [2002] 1 WLR 2434, CA, at [13] ff.
58  [2004] EWCA Civ 294; [2004] 1 WLR 1858, at [29], [30].
59  [2002] 1 WLR 2434, CA, at [13] ff.
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properly consider the mediation option, there should be no scope for sanc-
tions. The party who succeeds in the appeal (the appellant if the appeal is 
successful, or the respondent if the appeal fails) should receive the costs of 
that appeal from the defeated opponent, in accordance with the costs-shifting 
principle: to ‘sanction’ him for failure to attend or participate in a media-
tion is both heavy-handed and unprincipled. Similarly, the defeated oppo-
nent should be ordered to pay costs on the standard basis, and not (by way of 
‘sanction’) on the higher indemnity basis.
Shirley Shipman has considered the difficult issue whether the threat of 
an ‘adverse costs award’ for ‘unreasonable refusal’ to accede to an opponent’s 
mediation suggestions might be contrary to the right of access to court im-
plicit within Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Her 
tentative suggestion is that this is no more than a possibility.60
4. Concluding reflections
1. The process of mediation has become popular in England, and this is 
likely to increase for two reasons. 
2. First, many disputants now recognise that mediation is often more at-
tractive than the formal processes of court adjudication or arbitration. These 
are the private vectors which drive demand for mediation. Because these are 
spontaneous responses by disputants, based on their private assessment of 
the merits of this style of dispute resolution, these factors have been called 
‘organic’ in this paper. 
3. Civil proceedings before the courts are becoming a system of last resort 
to be pursued only when more civilised and ‘proportionate’ techniques have 
failed or could never be made to work.
4. Many corporations now prefer to use international arbitration in com-
bination with other ADR mechanisms, as specified in a ‘multi-tiered’ or ‘es-
calation’ dispute resolution clause. These prescribe a ‘step-by-step’ approach, 
negotiation and mediation, which must be exhausted before the parties can 
commence court or arbitral proceedings.
5. Government, which has a strong interest in promoting ADR because it 
60  S Shipman, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Threat of Adverse Costs, and the 
Right of Access to Court’, in D Dwyer (ed), The Civil Procedure Rules: Ten Years On (Ox-
ford University Press, 2010), ch 18, especially at 353-4.
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is less expensive than civil litigation, is now actively promoting mediation. 
6. However, mediation should not be imposed on parties if it is evident 
that there is insufficient shared willingness to engage in constructive discus-
sion. 
7. There is a fundamental difference between a duty to consider mediation 
(in the sense of a responsible and measured assessment by each party of the 
chances of its success) and a duty to enter upon and then participate in medi-
ation before a neutral. The parties should be free —until a binding settlement 
is made— to withdraw from the mediation process even if they have passed 
through the door (subject only to the possibility of specific contractual terms, 
consistent with the doctrine of contractual certainty, such as agreed duties to 
exchange specific items of information).

UN RETO PARA LA MEDIACIÓN:
EL DISEÑO DE SU CÓDIGO DEONTOLÓGICO1
Nuria Belloso Martín2
Introducción
A pesar de que la cultura de la transacción está cada vez más presente en 
la sociedad española, no se ha visto reflejada en la formación de los estudian-
tes universitarios españoles. Asignaturas relacionadas con los mecanismos 
extrajudiciales de conflictos apenas han encontrado hueco en los planes de 
estudio de las Facultades de Derecho3. Nuestro propósito es poner de ma-
nifiesto que se ha abierto una vertiente más para las profesiones jurídicas, 
principalmente para quien ejerce la abogacía4. Su formación en mediación le 
permitirá incluir nuevas formas de gestionar el conflicto5 que no sean exclu-
1  Una versión preliminar de este trabajo ha sido publicada en BELLOSO MARTÍN, N., 
“La deontología profesional de ¿una nueva profesión jurídica?: la mediación”, en Josefa 
Dolores Ruiz (Coord.), Política, Economía y Método en la investigación y aprendizaje del 
Derecho, Madrid, Dykinson, 2014, pp. 261-304.
2  Nuria Belloso Martín es Catedrática Acreditada de Filosofía del Derecho en la Uni-
versidad de Burgos (España). Es Directora del Departamento de Derecho Público. Es Co-
ordinadora del Máster en Derecho de la Empresa y de los Negocios. Es Directora del Curso 
de Especialista en Mediación Familiar. Es Directora del Curso de Especialista en media-
ción Civil, Mercantil y Concursal.
3  En otras titulaciones, como en Grado en Criminología de la Universidad de Sala-
manca, han incorporado esta asignatura, con una carga de 6 créditos. En los países latino-
americanos (México, Salvador, Argentina) es común que estas asignaturas formen parte 
de los planes de estudio. Esto puede obedecer a una influencia más cercana de la cultura 
anglosajona, como Estados Unidos, donde se lleva trabajando desde hace años en estos 
sistemas alternativos de resolución de conflictos. 
4  Sin embargo, no hay que llamar a engaño prometiendo que la mediación va a ser 
una nueva cantera de trabajo para los egresados de las Facultades de Derecho. Es una 
vertiente más que se deberá de simultanear con otras porque, actualmente, la mediación 
sigue estando poco difundida y son muy pocos quienes pueden vivir exclusivamente del 
ejercicio profesional de la mediación. Por otro lado, aquí estamos haciendo referencia 
exclusivamente a quienes han cursado estudios jurídicos. Sin embargo, no sólo quienes 
tienen formación jurídica pueden ser profesionales de la mediación. 




sivamente las del proceso. Los Cursos de formación en mediación (Máster y 
Cursos de Experto) a lo largo de estos años, han venido cubriendo esta caren-
cia de formación, a la vez que la legislación reguladora de la mediación cada 
vez era más abundante6. 
La tipología del rol de mediador es variada: facilitator mediator, interven-
cionist (negociador, formulador) o expert (experto en conflictos). Esta tipo-
logía es consecuencia de que, en el contexto anglosajón, quienes se forman 
en mediación, optan después por especializarse en las técnicas propias de un 
modelo concreto (modelo Harvard, modelo circular-narrativo, modelo trans-
formativo u otros). Sin embargo, en España hemos observado que no hay una 
especialización en un determinado modelo sino más bien en un área temática 
concreta (civil, mercantil, concursal, penal, laboral, familiar, etc.). Principal-
mente, para quienes se hayan formado en Derecho7, a partir de la promulga-
Ley 5/2012, han visto ampliadas sus funciones con la mediación intrajudicial. De ahí que 
hayan proliferado los cursos de formación en mediación para notarios y operadores jurídi-
cos, y que los jueces y magistrados sean llamados a participar en Cursos y Congresos que 
versen sobre la mediación.
6  En 1997, el Libro Blanco sobre la Justicia, preparado por el Consejo General del 
Poder Judicial en España, ya reconoció la importancia de la mediación familiar. Las for-
mas alternativas de resolución de conflictos –negociación y mediación- han ido cobrando 
protagonismo desde el año 2001, a partir de la promulgación de primera Ley de Mediación 
en una Comunidad Autónoma, la Ley 1/2001, de 15 de marzo, de Mediación Familiar de 
Cataluña (posteriormente derogada por la Ley catalana 15/2009), seguida después por 
las de otras Comunidades Autónomas. El mayor impulso ha venido dado por la Directiva 
2008/52/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 2008, sobre cier-
tos aspectos de la mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles La transposición de esta 
Directiva a España se ha llevado a cabo mediante la promulgación de la Ley 5/2012, de 6 
de julio, de Mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, que ha supuesto un espaldarazo 
decisivo para la mediación. Un ejemplo de este protagonismo de la mediación en el ám-
bito de las profesiones jurídicas ha sido el III SIMPOSIO “MEDIACIÓN Y TRIBUNALES. 
Balance de un año de vigencia de la Ley 15/2012”, organizado por el Grupo Europeo de 
Magistrados por la Mediación en España –GEMME- celebrado en Madrid, entre los días 
26 y 27 de septiembre 2013, en el que una mesa plenaria se centró en “Las aportaciones a la 
mediación desde el ámbito de las profesiones jurídicas”. http://mediacionesjusticia.com/
jornadas-y-congresos/ (Acceso el 10-02-2014).
7  Hasta la promulgación de la Ley 5/2012, de mediación en asuntos civiles y mer-
cantiles, las Leyes de las diversas Comunidades Autónomas que regulaban la mediación 
familiar, abrían la mediación a diversas titulaciones (prácticamente, todas del campo hu-
manístico-social). Sin embargo, a partir de la Ley 5/2012, quienes con mayor competencia 
van a poder ejercer como mediadores civiles y mercantiles van a ser los Licenciados/Grad-
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ción de La Ley 5/2012, de Mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, se ha 
abierto una nueva vertiente en su trabajo profesional, la mediación. Indepen-
dientemente del perfil concreto de mediador de que se trate y del ámbito al 
que se aplique la mediación, como en toda profesión, el mediador, además de 
las normas legales establecidas en el estatuto del mediador, que establecen sus 
deberes jurídicos, también precisa de una ética profesional y un código deon-
tológico, donde se plasmen sus deberes morales. En el ejercicio de las profe-
siones jurídicas, hay necesidad de instaurar en la praxis, junto a los compor-
tamientos jurídicos, también comportamientos éticos, que pueden encontrar 
su expresión en los Códigos deontológicos. A esta vertiente es a la que vamos 
a referirnos en las páginas que siguen en relación a la profesión de mediador.
1. La deontología profesional
El término deontología procede del griego “deon” que significa debido y 
“logos” que equivale a ciencia o tratado. Así, desde una perspectiva termino-
lógica, “deontología” sería la ciencia o tratado de los deberes8. Este término 
“deontología”9 tiene una serie de connotaciones de carácter muy difuso e im-
preciso tanto en el aspecto práctico como en el teórico. “Deontología” que 
etimológicamente y, en oposición a la “ontología”, significa tratado del deber 
ser, ayuda poco a disipar ambigüedades. De ahí que el término “deontología 
profesional” sea aún más impreciso. La deontología se desarrolla más bien en 
el campo filosófico (de lo debido) y en contraste con el carácter descriptivo y 
explicativo (óptico) de la ciencia, y hay un cierto consenso en entender que 
se hace referencia al “deber” derivado de unos principios éticos, morales, de 
honra, de dignidad, etc.10. 
uados en Derecho. En relación a la mediación concursal, tanto abogados como economis-
tas podrán desarrollarla adecuadamente.
8  MARTÍNEZ MORÁN, N., Ética aplicada y Deontología: los Códigos deontológicos” 
en R. Junquera de Estéfani (Coordinador), Ética y Deontología públicas, Madrid, Editorial 
Universitas, 2011, p.193.
9  J. Bentham es quien populariza este término en 1834 (BENTHAM, J., Deontology 
or the Science of Morality. London, Editorial Elibron Clasics, 1834; Vid. APARISI MI-
RALLES, A., y LÓPEZ GUZMÁN, J., “Concepto y fundamento de la Deontología”, en Ética 
de las profesiones jurídicas. Estudios sobre Deontología. T.I. Murcia, Universidad Católica 
San Antonio, pp.73-107).
10  Como acertadamente subraya M. Otero, sería deseable que no fuera preciso esta-
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La deontología profesional se relaciona simultáneamente con la técnica y con 
la ética. En cuanto el operador de la mediación es un profesional que aplica sus 
conocimientos a una praxis, su deontología se relaciona con la técnica, ya que su 
primera obligación profesional es trabajar con perfección, dentro de lo huma-
namente exigible. Sin embargo, la deontología no pretende conseguir sin más la 
perfección técnica –para lo que bastaría la observancia formal de las leyes- sino 
la licitud moral del trabajo realizado11. El reto es el de diseñar estructuras orga-
nizativas que favorezcan o sean propicias al comportamiento ético. 
Casi todos los profesionales que tienen una mayor relevancia social, cuen-
tan con códigos deontológicos que regulan el ejercicio de sus profesiones12. 
Principalmente aquellas que están relacionadas con la consecución de deter-
minados valores y con la jerarquización de los mismos, y no tanto con aquellas 
otras de carácter más técnico y, por consiguiente, más neutro. La profesión de 
la medicina, de la farmacia, de la abogacía y del notariado han sido, sin duda, 
las más relevantes en este campo, y por ello, todo lo relacionado con la vida, 
con la salud y la enfermedad, con la búsqueda y la administración de justicia, 
con la fe pública, etc. son campos en los que la deontología profesional ha 
tenido una mayor presencia13.
Las normas deontológicas explícitas o implícitas en profesiones tradicio-
nales y liberales son muy antiguas14. La deontología profesional está directa-
blecer normas de conducta, fiándose únicamente de la moral y el buen hacer de cada uno, 
pero lo cierto es que la realidad no sigue esta línea y, por ello, hay que postular la necesidad 
de unos códigos de deontología profesional y dotarlos de fuerza jurídica y moral (OTERO 
PARGA, M., “La Ética del mediador”, cit., Ibidem).
11  VÁZQUEZ GUERRERO, F.F., Ética, deontología y abogados. Cuestiones generales 
y situaciones concretas, 2ª ed., Navarra, Eiunsa, 1997.
12  Vid. BELLOSO MARTÍN, N., “Algunas proyecciones de la autorregulación: códigos 
de conducta y códigos éticos en el comercio electrónico como instrumentos dinamizadores 
de la resolución electrónica de controversias (REC)”, en Vázquez de Castro, E., y Fernán-
dez Canales, C., (Coordinadores), Estudios sobre Justicia online, Granada, Comares, Col-
ección Derecho de la información, Vol. 22, 2013, pp. 83-138.
13  MARTÍNEZ ROLDÁN, L., “Deontología notarial: corporativismo o regulación 
jurídica”, en Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, Madrid, Nueva Época, Ministerio de Justi-
cia-BOE, T. XXV, 2008-2009, p.37.
14  En Estados Unidos la medicina fue pionera en los años 60 en establecer unas nor-
mas éticas de referencia para el ejercicio de la profesión. El primer texto de ética médica 
en dicho país es de 1966. Después del asunto Watergate de 1974, los profesionales del 
derecho elaboraron su propio código deontológico; posteriormente son los ingenieros el 
colectivo que opta por la autorregulación, y es en los años 80 cuando la Ética, expresada 
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mente relacionada con la ética de las profesiones jurídicas de manera que no 
se puede tratar de deontología sin ética. Deontología es la ciencia o tratado de 
los seres humanos pero considerados en su conjunto, en otras palabras, es la 
ciencia que se ocupa de determinar las formas de comportamiento que debe 
seguir un ser humano en el ejercicio de su actividad profesional dentro del 
grupo que se integra15.
Los códigos deontológicos representan el apoyo grupal tan necesario ante los conflic-
tos morales, y suponen también una defensa de la autonomía profesional por cuanto que 
como señalábamos, cada sujeto ha de tomar en consideración cada una de las opciones 
de actuación que se le muestran, decantándose por aquella que considere más oportuna. 
El código no podrá aportarle una solución concreta, que queda a la responsabilidad de 
cada uno, pero sirve de guía.
No han faltado voces contrarias a los códigos deontológicos. Sin descono-
cer la posible influencia del factor ético, se prescinde de él por el subjetivismo 
de los valores, por la generalización de la doble moral y porque la ética se ha 
refugiado en la privacidad, en una cuestión íntima, en una elección indivi-
dual que no debe trascender a la sociedad. Ello lleva a cuestionar el carácter 
jurídico de las normas deontológicas o la ayuda que éstas puedan prestar al 
cumplimiento de la legalidad vigente. Incluso, se puede tener la tentación de 
pensar si, por el contrario, no serán esas normas deontológicas auténticos 
obstáculos para el cumplimiento de las normas jurídicas, interesadamente 
orientadas a no renunciar e incluso a reforzar ese corporativismo profesional. 
1.1. Códigos de la profesión del origen del mediador: especial referencia a 
la Abogacía
La formación y las profesiones de origen del mediador pueden ser muy 
variadas: abogado, psicólogo, trabajador social, graduado social, educador 
social, economista y tantas otras, generalmente del campo humanístico. Ini-
cialmente hay que partir de los principios de que se haya dotado cada una 
de estas profesiones. Cualquier mediador parte, de entrada, de cuantas pre-
y formulada en códigos de conducta, llega al mundo de la empresa. En Estados Unidos 
actualmente se imparten más de 500 cursos de Ética de empresa (LABRADA RUBIO, V., 
Ética en los negocios, Madrid, ESIC, 2010, p.108).
15  Cfr. OTERO PARGA, M., “La Ética del mediador”, en H. Soleto Muñoz (Directora), 
Mediación y resolución de conflictos: técnicas y ámbitos, en Madrid, Tecnos, 2011, p.88.
NURIA BELLOSO MARTÍN
36
cisiones éticas y morales hayan quedado establecidas en la profesión de ori-
gen. No obstante, principios y normas previos no son suficientes por cuanto 
que la mediación presenta sus propios matices. Pero sí que pueden suponer 
una base desde la que iniciar el acercamiento a la mediación.
Quien interviene desde cualquier profesión, no puede en ningún caso vio-
lentar la esencia ética que trae de partida cuando llega a la mediación. Se 
actúa como mediador y no como miembro de ésta o aquella profesión de 
base pero no deja de ser trabajador social, abogado u otra profesión porque 
esté ejerciendo la mediación en un determinado momento16.
Aquí vamos a limitarnos a los estudios jurídicos como formación de origen 
(es decir, no nos ocuparemos de otras Titulaciones como Psicología, Educa-
ción Social, Trabajo social y tantas otras que pueden constituir el sustrato 
formativo del mediador). El jurista –bien sea un abogado, un juez, un fiscal 
o un notario- suele tener la creencia de que el ejercicio de su profesión es 
esencialmente honesto, algo vinculado a las reglas de la moral dominante en 
su comunidad. Como en todas las profesiones, se podrán encontrar algunos 
profesionales disolutos y tramposos, capaces de mentir y engañar a sus clien-
tes, principalmente si hay una razón económica por medio. Pero estos casos 
son la excepción y no la regla. 
También abundan los escépticos o, simplemente, los realistas que, como 
buenos conocedores de las exigencias del Derecho, se plantean incluso si el 
Derecho no será una profesión inmoral. 
“Muchas de las recomendaciones de la deontología jurídica conducentes 
a elaborar, en términos bien abstractos, algún perfil del buen jurista son bá-
sicamente ingenuas, pero sobre todo inútiles. Ellas suelen partir de un doble 
prejuicio, muy arraigado en la actualidad: a) por un lado, de que es posib-
le enseñar moral a cualquier profesional –en este caso, al jurista ya forma-
do- para lo cual se suelen implementar simplemente unos códigos de ética 
e impartir unos cursos deontológicos (¡de fin de semana!) al respecto; y, b) 
16  Si dirigiéramos nuestra mirada hacia el Código Deontológico de la Abogacía 
en España (2001), por ejemplo, veríamos que en sus principios se habla de igualdad 
de las partes, justicia, confidencialidad. Si tomáramos como referencia la profesión de 
psicología, encontraríamos la afirmación de que su ejercicio se ordena a una finalidad 
humana y social, rigiéndose por principios comunes a toda deontología profesional: re-
speto a la persona y protección de los derechos humanos. Con las demás profesiones con 
capacidad mediadora obtendríamos igual resultado. Los principios en los que se inspi-
ran son similares en ambas profesiones; las normas, en cambio, pueden conllevar unas 
singularidades concretas para cada una de esas profesiones.
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por otro lado, de que la profesión legal se puede ejercer de conformidad con 
parámetros estrictamente morales”17.
Abundando en esta opinión, M. Salas es de la opinión de que el Derecho es 
una profesión esencialmente inmoral:
“Por ‘esencialmente inmoral’ quiero decir, tratando de ser lo menos ambi-
guo, que su ejercicio cotidiano en los foros judiciales, administrativos y priva-
dos conlleva, a pesar de la buena voluntad de quienes laboran allí, conductas 
que atentan contra algunos preceptos de la moral pública dominante. De no 
aceptarse –a veces de manera colectiva- esas pequeñas (o grandes) inmorali-
dades, entonces la práctica de la profesión se haría muy difícil y acaso hasta 
imposible. De allí que para ingresar al juego denominado Derecho es ineludi-
ble respetar las reglas y códigos implícitos que se imponen en esa profesión”18.
Por ello, Salas se muestra crítico con los códigos éticos, cursos de deonto-
logía y manuales para el jurista ideal19, a la vez que también advierte de que 
un exceso de moral puede acabar desencadenando una ausencia de moral y 
que la moral profesional, al igual que la moral general, no puede simplemente 
“enseñarse” (al menos, una vez que el adulto ha desarrollado sus hábitos y 
conductas personales). 
“Un curso de ética, a lo más que puede aspirar es a esclarecer algunos 
problemas, a hacernos ver mejor dónde están las dificultades y, así, llegado el 
momento, a aplicar de mejor forma aquellas reglas morales que ya cultivamos 
en nosotros. Es decir, de lo que se trata es de estar alerta contra los peligros 
que acechan en este campo” 20.
La asignatura de “Deontología profesional para la abogacía”21 se ocupa de 
17  SALAS, M., “¿Es el Derecho una profesión inmoral? Un entremés para los cultores 
de la ética y la deontología jurídica”. En DOXA. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, 30, 
2007, p. 581.
18  SALAS, M., “¿Es el Derecho una profesión inmoral?, cit., p.583.
19  Sostiene Salas que sólo sirven para engañarse a sí mismo o para engañar a los 
demás. Mediante esos códigos y cursos nos repetimos a nosotros mismos lo que queremos 
escuchar y le decimos también a la gente lo que quiere oír Confundimos los deseos con 
las razones y motivaciones verdaderas. Afirmamos que procedemos de una cierta manera 
para lograr unos determinados fines, cuando en realidad lo hacemos por razones perso-
nales o por comodidad (SALAS, M., “¿Es el Derecho una profesión inmoral?, cit., p.598).
20  SALAS, M., “¿Es el Derecho una profesión inmoral?, cit., p.599.
21  En España, a partir de la Ley 34/2006, de 30 de octubre, sobre el Acceso a las 
Profesiones de Abogado y procurador, que entró en vigor cinco años después, así como 
del Real Decreto 775/2011, de 3 de junio, que desarrolló esta denominada “Ley de acceso”, 
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temas tales como los principios básicos de la ética profesional del abogado 
(obrar según ciencia y conciencia)22, la deontología profesional del abogado, 
los Colegios profesionales y la potestad disciplinaria, los códigos deontológi-
cos de la profesión y las relaciones profesionales del abogado23. Algunos auto-
res sostienen que el obrar de los juristas podría estar condenado al anatema 
de la inmoralidad. 
Otros autores elevan a decálogo máximas como las siguientes: 
-“Ningún abogado aceptará la defensa de casos injustos porque son perni-
ciosos a la conciencia y al decoro”; 
-“Tu deber es luchar por el Derecho; pero el día que encuentres en conflic-
to el Derecho con la Justicia, lucha por la justicia”;
- “Mantén siempre, desde la normativa y las tradiciones de tu profesión, 
y conforme a la ley, el sagrado derecho/deber del secreto profesional, y con-
forme a la ley, el sagrado derecho/deber del secreto profesional, con sólo las 
excepciones, muy limitadas, que se justifiquen moral o legalmente”; 
-“No tergiverses los hechos o hagas argumentaciones inexactas, tendentes 
a confundir al juez alejándolo de la verdad, aunque con ello creas mejorar la 
posición jurídica de tu defendido”; 
-“No pases por encima de un estado de tu conciencia”; 
-“No hagas uso de la inmoralidad o injusticia de la ley, sino cuando te lo 
exijan ineludiblemente la fuerza de las cosas o las necesidades imperiosas de 
la defensa”.
la deontología profesional ocupa un lugar importante en la materia de evaluación. Ello 
pone de manifiesto que, junto al interés por la formación técnica de los futuros abogados, 
la formación deontológica resulta también imprescindible para su actividad profesional. 
La asignatura de la “Deontología profesional para el abogado” forma parte de los diversos 
Master de acceso a la abogacía que han comenzado a implantarse en las Facultades de 
Derecho. (vid. APARISI MIRALLES, A., Deontología profesional del Abogado, Valencia, 
tirant lo blanch, 2013). 
22  El Estatuto General de la Abogacía, en su artículo 1, establece: “es una profesión 
libre e independiente que presta un servicio a la sociedad en interés público y que se ejerce 
en régimen de libre y leal competencia, por medio del consejo y la defensa de derechos 
e intereses públicos o privados, mediante la aplicación de la ciencia y la técnica jurídica, 
en orden a la concordia, a la efectividad de los derechos y libertades fundamentales y a la 
Justicia” (artículo 1).
23  Relaciones abogado-cliente (deber de conocimiento; deber de fidelidad; deber de 
igualdad de trato; deber de información; deber de buscar la mejor solución; deber de dili-
gencia en la tramitación de la causa), Relaciones del abogado con los tribunales de Justicia 
y Relación del abogado con la parte contraria. 
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Estas máximas no son más que tópicos controvertidos susceptibles de nu-
merosas interpretaciones, según el significado que obtengamos de los mismos 
para un caso concreto. Como acertadamente sostiene G. Lariguet, la ética -la 
ética jurídica en especial-, no debe ser una ética de dogmas o ingenuidades o 
reductible a la simple formulación de códigos o decálogos. Se trata de poner 
de manifiesto cuáles son los problemas o los obstáculos que existen en el ca-
mino de la moralidad24.
En el ámbito de la abogacía, junto a códigos deontológicos de ámbito in-
ternacional25 hay que prestar especial atención a los nacionales, como el Có-
digo Deontológico de la Abogacía Española26; junto a estos hay que tomar en 
consideración los códigos de ética que suelen tener cada uno de los Colegios 
de Abogados del Estado español. 
Todos estos códigos deontológicos de la abogacía se basan en principios 
básicos tales como independencia, secreto profesional y lealtad al cliente o 
evitación de conflictos de interés:
a. Independencia: significa no estar sometido. Los jueces han de ser inde-
pendientes e imparciales. Los abogados han de ser independientes pero par-
ciales porque se deben a la defensa de los intereses de sus clientes. En algu-
24  Cfr. LARIGUET, G., Virtudes, Ética profesional y Derecho. Una introducción fi-
losófica. Montevideo-Buenos Aires, Editorial IB de F, 2012, p.19; también, vid. AA.VV., 
Ética de las profesiones jurídicas, (dos Vol.), Murcia, Universidad Católica de Murcia- AE-
DOS, 2003.
25  Pueden diferenciarse tres grandes códigos internacionales para la abogacía: 1) el 
Código de Conducta del Consejo de los Colegios de Abogados de Europa; 2) las Model 
Rules de Professional Responsibility publicadas por la American Bar Association, que 
son leyes modelo y que no rigen directamente, pero que los Estados copian o adaptan a 
cada uno de los Estados; y, finalmente, 3) el Internacional Code of Ethics de la internacio-
nal Bar Association (IBA). Estos códigos tienen como principal finalidad establecer unas 
normas básicas de actuación, para fijar las garantías mínimas exigibles en la práctica de 
la Abogacía, teniendo principalmente en cuenta –como en el Código de Deontología de la 
Abogacía Europea- el ejercicio profesional transfronterizo. 
26  En 1982, se aprobó, mediante el RD 2090/1982, de 24 de julio, el Estatuto General 
de la Abogacía (EGA). Posteriormente, en 1987, se promulgaron la denominadas Normas 
Deontológicas de la Abogacía Española, aprobándose en 1995, el primer Código Deonto-
lógico de la Abogacía Española, en el año 2000, un segundo Código Deontológico de la 
Abogacía española y, en 2002, el actual Código Deontológico de la Abogacía Española 
(CDAE) (adaptado al Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española, aprobado por Real De-




nas situaciones resulta más complejo analizar el grado de independencia. Un 
abogado de empresa, ¿se debe a las instrucciones de su empresa ciegamente?
b. Secreto profesional, en virtud del cual un abogado no puede revelar lo 
que le ha dicho el cliente. Los abogados tienen más obligaciones éticas que 
los profesionales de otras profesiones liberales, porque participan de una fun-
ción pública como es la administración de justicia. Y esa administración de 
justicia implica una serie de privilegios, como el secreto profesional (ningún 
juez puede obligar a un abogado a declarar lo que le ha confesado el cliente). 
A cambio de esos privilegios tienen unos deberes que no acompañan a otros 
profesionales. 
c. Conflicto de interés, que se producen entre los intereses del despacho, 
de clientes y otros actores implicados. 
1.2. La deontología de la profesión del mediador
La mediación es una forma de gestión positiva de los conflictos, que se 
rige por principios propios, y se hace efectiva a través de un procedimiento 
no formal, combinando técnicas multidisciplinares, por un profesional con 
formación específica en este campo, con la finalidad de alcanzar acuerdos du-
raderos27. El mediador no decide, no impone la solución. Es un facilitador que 
ayuda a las partes enfrentadas a comunicarse y a gestionar positivamente su 
conflicto. 
Junto al estatuto legal aplicable al ejercicio de la profesión también se hace 
necesario un código deontológico (de conducta, de buenas prácticas, etc.), 
que establezca los compromisos éticos y morales para el correcto y adecuado 
desempeño de la praxis de la profesión28. Hace casi tres décadas, la Recomen-
27  En Brasil, vid. las publicaciones y trabajos sobre mediación de Humberto Dalla 
Bernardina Pinho, entre los que cabe destacar: “Mediação: a redescoberta de um velho 
aliado na solução de conflitos” en Acesso à Justiça: efetividade do processo, organiza-
do por Geraldo Prado, Rio de Janeiro, Lumen Juris, 2005, pp. 105-124. (Disponible en 
<http://www.humbertodalla.pro.br/arquivos/mediacao_161005.pdf>; también, “Media-
ção no Brasil: uma forma de negociar baseada na abordagem de ganhos mútuos” en co-au-
toria com Yann Duzert, Barreiras para Resolução de Conflitos, ARROW J. Kenneth et alt. 
[orgs.], São Paulo, Saraiva, 2001, pp. 327-349.
28  Entre la escasísima bibliografía sobre la ética del mediador, destacamos: MERI-
NO ORTIZ, C., “La calidad de la mediación”, en Practicum. Mediación 2014. Edición de 
E. Vázquez de Castro. Coordinada por C. Fernández Canales Madrid, Thomson Reuters 
Aranzadi, pp.366-368. 
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dación (86) 12 del Consejo de Ministros a los Estados miembros del Conse-
jo de Europa respecto a medidas para prevenir y reducir la carga de trabajo 
excesiva en los Tribunales, recomendaba promover la solución amistosa de 
los conflictos29. La utilización de las técnicas de resolución de conflictos alter-
nativas al Poder Judicial –conocidas como ADR, terminología que deriva de 
su denominación en inglés, Alternative Dispute Resolution- se ha ido exten-
diendo cada vez más30. 
Los mediadores deben poseer cualidades que les capaciten para admin-
istrar un proceso de mediación. La formación de origen del mediador es di-
versa pues puede provenir de diferentes áreas aunque en general suelen ser 
las relacionadas con las ciencias humanas. Además, es necesario que el me-
diador domine nociones básicas de esos diferentes campos de conocimiento 
para que pueda comprender las diversas situaciones que se presentan en el 
conflicto, es decir, todo lo que está en juego, tanto desde el punto de vista 
jurídico, económico, psicológico y social como desde el punto de vista religio-
so, emocional, cultural y otros. Teniendo estas nociones, el mediador deberá 
saber reconocer sus propios límites, buscando profesionales especializados 
para hacer un trabajo interdisciplinar si fuera el caso –en co-mediación- o 
derivando a las partes a otros profesionales –psicoterapuetas-, e incluso, in-
terrumpir el proceso de mediación si se considerara necesario, siempre por 
causas justificadas. El mediador debe ser esa tercera persona que coordina 
el proceso de mediación, quien dicta las reglas del juego a la hora de realizar 
la mediación. Junto a esa formación de origen se debe sumar una formación 
específica de los mediadores, mediante los correspondientes cursos31.
29  Recomendación (86) 12 del Consejo de Ministros a los Estados miembros del Con-
sejo de Europa respecto a medidas para prevenir y reducir la carga de trabajo excesiva en 
los Tribunales (Adoptada por el Consejo de Ministros de 16 de septiembre de 1986, duran-
te la 39ª reunión de los Delegados de los Ministros).
30  La evolución de las ADR ha dado lugar a un desarrollo progresivo de su propia 
concepción y, de formas “alternativas” de resolución de conflictos hemos optado por utili-
zar la de formas “complementarias” hasta llegar en la actualidad a preferir la terminología 
de “gestión positiva del conflicto”, que representa mejor el espíritu de estas ADR. 
31  A esa específica formación de los mediadores ya hacía referencia el primer Código 
de conducta europeo para los mediadores, de 2004. En su art-1.1. establece que los me-
diadores serán competentes y tendrán que conocer el proceso de la mediación, para lo 
cual será necesario que tengan la formación apropiada y actualicen constantemente sus 
competencias teóricas y prácticas, teniendo en cuenta las normas o sistemas vigentes de 
acreditación; Esta misma exigencia se contempla en la Directiva 2008/52 CE. En su fun-
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Los mediadores suelen ejercer otras profesiones32, por lo que también 
quedan sometidos a sus respectivos códigos éticos, procurando que en su in-
terpretación no se entre en competencia con la deontología de la profesión 
de mediador. Por ello, se podrá alegar que los mediadores también tienen 
obligaciones con respecto a otros códigos éticos relacionados con su forma-
ción universitaria de origen. Pero la interdisciplinariedad que caracteriza al 
profesional mediador no debe ser obstáculo para configurar un código ético 
del mediador33.
2. Un marco ético para la mediación
El estatuto del mediador podría definirse como el conjunto de derechos y 
obligaciones de carácter ético y jurídico que configuran de modo particular 
una profesión. El estatuto del mediador, además de definir jurídicamente su 
posición (no como privilegio injustificado, sino como forma de protección del 
profesional y de la profesión) determina la que podemos llamar “lex artis”, 
un modelo o parámetro con el cual han de ser contrastadas las actuaciones 
profesionales para poder determinar si son o no adecuadas y fijar, por tanto, 
si de ellas se genera o no responsabilidad (ética o jurídica-).
Muchas de las obligaciones pueden tener a la vez una naturaleza ética y 
jurídica, es decir, que su contenido es idéntico en ambos casos y se recoge 
damento jurídico 16 establece que los Estados miembros tienen que promover, por los me-
dios que consideren adecuados, la formación de mediadores y el establecimiento de me-
canismos eficaces de control de calidad relativos a la prestación de servicios de mediación.
32  La Ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, en su 
artículo 11.2, dice:“El mediador deberá estar en posesión de título oficial universitario o 
de formación profesional superior y contar con formación específica para ejercer la media-
ción, que se adquirirá mediante la realización de uno o varios cursos específicos imparti-
dos por instituciones debidamente acreditadas, que tendrán validez para el ejercicio de la 
actividad mediadora en cualquier parte del territorio nacional.”
33  Existen algunas obras que se ocupan de la ética de las profesiones jurídicas pero 
ninguna de ellas menciona la ética del profesional mediador (Vid. GRANDE YAÑEZ, M.; 
ALMOGUERA PÉREZ, J., y JIMÉNEZ GARCÍA, J., Ética de las profesiones jurídicas, Bil-
bao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2006; también, FERNÁNDEZ FERNÁNDEZ, J.L. y HORTAL 
ALONSO, A. (compiladores), Ética de las profesiones jurídicas, Madrid, Universidad Pon-
tificia de Comillas, 2002; por último, THOMPSON, D. F., La ética política y el ejercicio de 
cargos públicos, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1998). 
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tanto en los códigos éticos como en las disposiciones legales. Por tanto, el 
incumplimiento de esas obligaciones llevará, en su caso, una responsabilidad 
que juega en ese doble plano: ético (exigible por el colegio profesional corres-
pondiente o institución que cumpla sus funciones) y jurídico (eventualmente 
ante los tribunales).
Los artículos 11 a 15 de la Ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de Mediación en asun-
tos civiles y mercantiles en España regulan el estatuto del mediador34. Esta 
regulación se refiere únicamente a las condiciones para ejercer como me-
diador (art. 11), a la calidad y autorregulación de la mediación (art. 12), a la 
actuación del mediador (art. 13), y a la responsabilidad de los mediadores 
(art. 15). Estas especificaciones son importantes. Sin embargo, se esperaba 
una mayor concreción por parte del Reglamento de desarrollo de la Ley35. Sin 
embargo, no ha sido así36. Transcurridos unos meses desde que se promulgó 
el texto del Reglamento, Real Decreto 980, de 13 de diciembre, por el que se 
desarrollan determinados aspectos de la Ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de Media-
ción en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, las sombras y dudas que deja el texto 
son cada vez mayores. El Real Decreto 980 se ha limitado a regular cuatro as-
pectos: la formación del mediador37, su publicidad a través de un Registro de-
34  Los deberes a los que alude la Ley 5/2012 de mediación son derechos y deberes 
que se refieren al mediador-persona física, sin perjuicio de que, si se ejerce como equipo o 
institución, se deban cumplir, además, otros que la Ley imponga.
35  Pascual Ortuño subraya que la Ley 5/2012 es una norma de mínimos en cuanto 
se ha optado por dejar sin definir cuestiones como la formación, la habilitación, el con-
trol de la práctica profesional y los recursos públicos. Ello lo atribuye a la flexibilidad que 
caracteriza a la mediación. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, ha ido más lejos de lo que 
estrictamente requería la Directiva (CE) 52/2008, puesto que ésta circunscribía su oblig-
atoriedad a la regulación de la mediación en conflictos transfronterizos (ORTUÑO, P., 
“Apuntes críticos sobre la ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de mediación civil y mercantil” en L. 
García Villaluenga y E. Vázquez de Castro (Directores), Anuario de Mediación y Solución 
de Conflictos, Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Mediación y Solución de conflictos, Reus, 
2013, p.48).
36  El día 13 de Diciembre de 2013 el Consejo de Ministros aprobó el Real Decre-
to 980, de 13 de diciembre, por el que se desarrollan determinados aspectos de la Ley 
5/2012, de 6 de julio, de Mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles. Se centra en cuatro 
aspectos con los que se pretende configurar un modelo en el que figura el mediador, como 
responsable de dirigir un procedimiento cuyo propósito es facilitar el consenso en situa-
ciones en conflicto es una pieza esencial de ese instrumento complementario de la Admin-
istración de Justicia, como lo ha calificado el propio Ministerio de Justicia.
37  En cuanto a la formación del mediador, se limita a establecer la duración mínima 
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pendiente del Ministerio de Justicia, el aseguramiento de su responsabilidad 
y la promoción de un procedimiento simplificado de mediación por medios 
electrónicos para la reclamación de cantidades inferiores a seiscientos euros. 
Desde el punto de vista ético, para enumerar los aspectos que integran el 
“deber ser” del mediador, a falta de un código ético común38, se puede recurrir 
a los principios recogidos en la Recomendación R (98) 1 del Comité de Minis-
tros del Consejo de Europa, adoptada el 21 de enero de 1998 que, a pesar de que 
se refieran a un tipo concreto de mediación, como es la familiar, sin embargo 
han servido de base e inspiración para la elaboración de muchos otros códigos:
I.- El mediador es imparcial en sus relaciones con las partes;
II.- El mediador es neutral respecto al resultado del proceso de mediación;
III- El mediador respeta los puntos de vista de las partes y preserva su 
legalidad en la negociación;
IV.- El mediador no tiene poder para imponer una solución a las partes;
V.- Las condiciones en las cuales se desarrolla la mediación familiar deben 
garantizar el respeto a la vida privada;
VI.- Las discusiones que tienen lugar durante la mediación son confiden-
ciales y no pueden ser posteriormente utilizadas, salvo acuerdo de las partes 
o en el caso de estar permitido por el derecho nacional;
VII.- El mediador debe, en los casos adecuados, informar a las partes de 
la posibilidad que tienen de recurrir al consejo conyugal o a otras formas de 
consejo como modos de regular los problemas conyugales o familiares;
VIII.- El mediador debe tener especialmente en cuenta el bienestar y el in-
terés superior del niño debiendo alentar a los padres a concentrarse sobre las 
necesidades del menor y debiendo apelar a la responsabilidad básica de los 
padres en el bienestar de sus hijos y la necesidad que tienen de informarles y 
consultarles;
IX.- El mediador debe poner una atención particular a la cuestión de saber 
si ha tenido lugar entre las partes o es susceptible de producirse en el futuro, a 
los efectos que de puede tener sobre la situación de las partes en la negociación, 
y a examinar si, en estas circunstancias, el proceso de mediación es adecuado;
de los cursos de formación, que será de cien horas, con una parte teórica y otra práctica, 
que supondrá la menos un 35% del total. También incluirá los requisitos mínimos para 
asegurar la actualización del conocimiento.
38  Hace tiempo que se viene reivindicando la conveniencia de un código ético o de 
conducta, acorde a la actividad profesional del mediador (Vid. BELLOSO MARTÍN, N., 
“Una propuesta de código de ética de los mediadores”, en Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filo-
sofía del Derecho, nº15, 2007, pp. 1-10 <http://www.uv.es/CEFD>.
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X.- El mediador puede facilitar informaciones jurídicas, pero no debe dar 
consejo jurídico. Debe, en los casos apropiados, informar a las partes de la 
posibilidad que tienen de consultar a un abogado u otro profesional compe-
tente.
La mayor parte de los códigos y estándares de ética establecen que los 
mediadores tienen obligaciones éticas hacia las partes, hacia la profesión y 
hacia sí mismos. Deben ser honestos y sin prejuicios, actuar en buena fe, ser 
diligentes, y no buscar el avance de sus propios intereses al costo de los inter-
eses de las partes.
2.1. Las principales responsabilidades de los mediadores 
Cabe destacar las siguientes obligaciones de los mediadores:
1. Obligación de permanecer imparcial e independencia de favoritismo 
o preferencia hacía alguna de las partes, un compromiso de servir a todas por 
igual.
2. Obtener el consentimiento informado de las partes, para garantizar 
que ellas entiendan la naturaleza del proceso, los procedimientos, la persona 
del mediador y la relación de las partes con el mismo.
3. Deber de confidencialidad y un compromiso de mantener secreto de 
lo oído. 
4. Evitar conflictos de interés, o la mera apariencia de ellos. 
5. Implementar el procedimiento en el tiempo debido. 
6. Asistir a las partes en un procedimiento que puedan percibir como 
propio y un acuerdo que van a sostener como propio.
7. En casos especiales, se espera que el mediador sepa considerar y po-
ner a consideración de las partes los intereses de partes que no están repre-
sentadas en la mesa de mediación, pero que deben ser incluidas. 
8. También es importante que el mediador acepte solamente aquellos 
casos para los cuales esté preparado, en términos de conocer tanto el proce-
dimiento como la sustancia del caso; que se preocupe por aumentar su capa-
cidad profesional, mediante cursos periódicos de formación. 
9. Se requiere de los mediadores que planteen, al principio del procedi-
miento, cuál es la base para su compensación u honorarios. No se debe reci-
bir compensaciones monetarias por la derivación de clientes a la mediación. 
Cuando hay varios mediadores involucrados, deben mantenerse al tanto con 
la información necesaria y tratarse con cordialidad. Se puede hacer alguna 
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publicidad de los servicios de mediación ofrecidos, pero no se puede prome-
ter ningún resultado a ninguna de las partes. 
10. El mediador debe tener la suficiente fuerza de voluntad como para con-
tener la necesidad de atribuirse el mérito del acuerdo logrado por las partes. 
Una buena resolución del conflicto nunca es el trabajo de una sola persona. 
Los grupos de trabajo de los denominados Puntos Neutros Promoción de 
la Mediación –PNPM-39 han realizado un estudio cuidadoso sobre la media-
ción en España, al hilo del primer año de vigencia de la Ley 5/2012. El resul-
tado se presentó en tres documentos finales40: 1) Protocolos de derivación a 
la mediación; 2) Calidad y buenas prácticas en la mediación, y 3) Acciones de 
promoción y fomento de la mediación. Seguidamente, vamos a destacar algu-
nas de las recomendaciones que llevaron a cabo. El primer grupo de trabajo se 
centra en la materia de “Protocolos de derivación a la mediación” y pretende 
ofrecer pautas para la indicación de esta metodología en los diversos estadios 
en que la controversia se manifiesta antes de acudir a Tribunales o una vez 
que se ha judicializado. Asimismo, pone de manifiesto la profunda interrel-
ación entre la profesión de abogado y/o operador jurídico y la de mediador41:
[…] 2. Se recomienda que las partes sean asesoradas por los abogados de parte durante 
el proceso de mediación, en el momento de su redacción y también con carácter previo a 
la firma de los acuerdos. 
[…] 4. Sería deseable que se promoviera la visibilidad de los abogados que recomien-
den mediación como valor añadido y de calidad en el ejercicio de su actividad profesional. 
[…] 6. Se recomienda que cuando el deudor se vea incapaz de cumplir con sus obliga-
ciones acuda a los servicios de mediación, de igual manera que los abogados consideren 
39  Las Instituciones que, desde su creación en marzo de 2012, participan e impulsan 
la iniciativa de los Puntos Neutros para la Promoción de la Mediación en toda España 
son, principalmente: GEMME – España; Consejo General del Poder Judicial; Consejo 
General de la Abogacía Española; Consejo General del Notariado; Consejo General de 
Procuradores; Consejo Superior de Cámaras de Comercio; Ilustres Colegios de Abogados, 
Procuradores y Notarios de Madrid.
40  Estos Protocolos se presentaron en el III Simposio “Mediación y Tribunales. Ba-
lance de un año de vigencia de la Ley 15/2012”, ya citado. Los documentos finales ín-
tegros, así como los trabajos complementarios realizados por los diferentes grupos que 
han trabajado a nivel de cada una de las Comunidades Autónomas están disponibles en: 
<www. mediacionesjusticia.com> 
41  La coordinación estatal de los grupos del PNPM sobre esta materia ha sido realiza-
da por Montse Purtí. Sin embargo, han trabajado en los documentos más de cien profesio-
nales de los diversos ámbitos. 
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como mejor oportunidad acudir a un servicio mediación y, si se ha iniciado el proceso 
judicial, que sea el Juez quien derive a mediación o a un servicio de información de la 
mediación. 
[…] 8. La práctica totalidad de las demandas judiciales relativas a propiedad industrial 
van acompañadas de un requerimiento previo, debería recomendarse a los abogados en 
este ámbito, sustituir dicho requerimiento con la derivación a mediación. 
[…] 10. Se debería introducir un formulario específico para la derivación a mediación 
en prácticamente todas las resoluciones judiciales para que las partes sepan que en cual-
quier momento del proceso pueden acudir a esta alternativa y que la derivación no supon-
dría un retraso en el procedimiento. 
El segundo grupo de trabajo, cuya finalidad era ofrecer un código de bue-
nas prácticas para la mediación, “Calidad y buenas prácticas de la media-
ción”42, en relación a los principios y valores fundamentales para la práctica 
del mediador, destaca los siguientes:
1. Voluntariedad y Libertad. La mediación es un proceso voluntario y co-
laborativo de resolución de conflictos. 
2. Carácter personalísimo. Como criterio general, las partes y el mediador 
asistirán personalmente a las diferentes sesiones que se lleven a cabo durante 
el proceso de mediación. 
3. Imparcialidad y Equidad. El mediador será imparcial. Ello implica que 
prestará la ayuda a ambas partes en la resolución del conflicto y al proceso de 
toma de decisiones, dirigiendo las sesiones de mediación sin tomar partido 
por ninguna de las partes. 
4. Neutralidad. Durante el proceso de mediación, el mediador respetará 
42  La coordinación estatal de los grupos del PNPM sobre esta materia ha sido real-
izada por Thelma Butts. Este documento está destinado a ser una herramienta útil para la 
práctica de la mediación que se derive de iniciativas intrajudiciales de resolución de con-
flictos. Se trata de un código de conducta y, a través de la adhesión al mismo, a sus princip-
ios y valores, el mediador obtendrá la credibilidad, autoridad, confianza y prestigio en una 
mediación de calidad. Este Código abarca dos Secciones: La I Sección comprende las bue-
nas prácticas del mediador, tanto en relación propiamente con el mediador (voluntariedad 
y libertad, carácter personalísimo, imparcialidad y equidad, neutralidad, confidencialidad, 
flexibilidad, inmediatez y celeridad, buena fe, independencia, conflicto de interés, trans-
parencia, equilibrio e igualdad entre las partes), como a la Formación y la Acreditación. La 
Sección II se refiere a la práctica en relación con las partes y el proceso (Principios Funda-
mentales para la práctica de la mediación, Responsabilidades y obligaciones del mediador 





las posiciones de las partes, así como las soluciones que ellas planteen sin 
imponer criterios propios en la toma de decisiones. El mediador no tendrá 
relación con las partes, el asunto en mediación, o el resultado, que compro-
meta o ponga en duda los principios de la mediación. 
5. Confidencialidad. El mediador tiene el derecho y el deber de guardar 
confidencialidad de todos los hechos y noticias que conozca por razón de su 
actuación profesional en el proceso de mediación43. 
6. Flexibilidad. El mediador dirigirá las sesiones de mediación de forma 
flexible, atendiendo a las necesidades particulares del caso a resolver. 
7. Inmediatez y Celeridad. El mediador programará de manera rápida 
la mediación, o informará a las partes de la imposibilidad de atenderles de 
manera inmediata. El mediador desarrollará el proceso en aras que las partes 
resuelvan el conflicto planteado en el menor tiempo posible. 
8. Buena Fe. Tanto el mediador como las partes que se someten a este 
43  La confidencialidad alcanza a toda la información obtenida en el proceso y a la 
información relativa al proceso mismo. El deber de confidencialidad exige del mediador: 
• La no revelación de hechos, datos, contenido de las sesiones, que haya obtenido por 
razón del ejercicio de la mediación, así como los posibles acuerdos que se alcancen durante 
el proceso. Dicha obligación subsistirá incluso tras el cese de sus servicios. 
• Exigir el deber de confidencialidad a cualquier persona que participe o colabore con 
él profesionalmente. 
• El deber de informar a las partes que no podrán proponerlo como testigo o perito en 
procedimiento judicial. En el caso en el que la mediación se haya recomendado u orde-
nado por un magistrado o autoridad competente, la responsabilidad de informar si se ha 
alcanzado un acuerdo, y el contenido del mismo, reside en las partes o sus letrados, no en 
el mediador. 
• La necesidad de obtención del consentimiento previo y explícito de las partes en el 
supuesto de grabación de las sesiones de mediación. 
• La necesidad de obtener la autorización previa y explícita de las partes para la pres-
encia de terceras personas durante el desarrollo del proceso. En caso de intervención de 
terceros a éstos les será de aplicación el presente código deontológico. 
- El mediador queda exento de la obligación de confidencialidad por la presencia de un 
interés superior como en los siguientes casos: 
• Cuando conlleve una amenaza para la vida o la integridad física o psíquica de una 
persona. 
• En aquellos casos contemplados por la ley, como es el caso de la obligación de denun-
ciar determinadas situaciones que constituyan a su entender posible delito. 
Información de mediación se puede utilizar con fines estadísticos, de formación y de 
investigación, si las partes así lo autorizan, y sin revelación de datos personales.
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procedimiento, deben actuar conforme a las exigencias de buena fe, principio 
general que impone el deber de obrar correctamente, con honradez y la dil-
igencia debida tendente a conseguir el objetivo de alcanzar una solución al 
conflicto planteado. 
 9. Independencia. El mediador mantendrá la independencia durante el 
desarrollo del procedimiento y no permitirá influencia o presión de ninguna 
de las partes o de terceros. 
 10. Conflicto de interés. El mediador se abstendrá de intervenir cuando 
concurra conflicto de interés con cualquiera de las partes, o en relación con el 
asunto de la mediación. Se presupone conflicto de interés si se puede generar 
duda de la actuación del mediador en relación con el asunto, o si se da la exis-
tencia de relación personal o profesional con alguna de las partes que pudiera 
afectar al proceso de mediación, así como la existencia de lucro o provecho 
económico o de otro tipo para el mediador, de forma directa o indirecta, más 
allá de los honorarios derivados únicamente de su actuación como mediador. 
 11. Transparencia. El mediador debe informar a las partes sobre los 
términos del proceso de mediación así como su desarrollo y consecuencias de 
los acuerdos alcanzados 
 12. Equilibrio e Igualdad entre las partes. El mediador promoverá el 
equilibrio y el principio de igualdad de oportunidades en la participación de 
las partes en la mediación. 
 
En la sección II de ese protocolo, “Contenido relativo a las partes y al pro-
ceso” contempla cuatro apartados. El I apartado es el de los “Principios fun-
damentales para la práctica de la mediación”:
1. La mediación es una actividad con responsabilidades y deberes éticos. 
Quienes emprenden la práctica de la mediación como actividad profesional 
deben tener en cuenta el derecho a la autodeterminación de las partes que se 
encuentran en conflicto. 
 2. Tanto el mediador como las partes deben actuar conforme a la buena fe. 
 3. La misión del mediador será ayudar y facilitar a las partes en conflicto a la 
obtención por sí mismas de un acuerdo satisfactorio para ambas. El mediador, 
en su actuación, debe estar sujeto a unas directrices encaminadas a garantizar 
su integridad, profesionalidad, neutralidad e imparcialidad respecto a las partes. 
El II apartado es el de las “Responsabilidades y obligaciones del media-
dor respecto a las partes”:
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1. La elección del mediador presupone una relación de confianza person-
alísima, solamente transferible por un motivo justo y con el consentimiento 
expreso de los mediados. El compromiso adquirido, desde el encargo de 
mediación, hacia las partes, implica que los mediadores tengan una impor-
tante responsabilidad con respecto a ellas, siempre entendido desde la libre 
voluntad del mediador de aceptar la mediación. 
2. La aceptación de la mediación obliga a los mediadores a cumplir fiel-
mente el encargo, incurriendo, si no lo hicieren, en responsabilidad profe-
sional. 
3. Los mediadores informarán debidamente a las partes de los gastos de 
la mediación antes de empezar. En ningún caso los honorarios quedarán 
condicionados al resultado del proceso. 
4. En las entrevistas preliminares, el mediador debe explicar el desarrollo 
del proceso y de sus diversas fases, y el alcance y las consecuencias del pro-
cedimiento a fin de obtener el consentimiento informado de las mismas. 
5. El mediador utilizará la prudencia y la veracidad, absteniéndose de 
promesas y garantías con respecto a los resultados. 
6. Es responsabilidad del mediador asistir a las partes para que alcancen 
un acuerdo siendo el conductor del diálogo. 
7. El mediador podrá entrevistarse separadamente con cada parte cuando 
este lo valore oportuno. 
8. En ningún momento el mediador debe ejercer coacción sobre las par-
tes para que se llegue a algún acuerdo y no tomará decisiones en su nombre. 
En ningún caso el mediador debe forzar a las partes a aceptar un acuerdo o a 
tomar decisiones. 
9. El mediador velará para que los acuerdos alcanzados en la mediación 
se realicen de forma voluntaria por las partes en conflicto. 
 El III apartado establece las “Responsabilidades y obligaciones del medi-
ador respecto al proceso de mediación”:
1. El mediador es el garante del desarrollo del proceso y ello conlleva re-
sponsabilidades específicas derivadas de las obligaciones que le vinculan en 
su actuación. 
2. El mediador velará para que las partes en el proceso no utilicen la coac-
ción, el insulto, la presión o se encuentren incapacitados para la toma de de-
cisiones. 
3. Siendo la mediación un proceso participativo, el mediador debe procu-
rar que las partes en conflicto se integren en igualdad al proceso. 
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4. La información que recibe un mediador durante las sesiones conjuntas 
o privadas es confidencial. La información que una parte revele al mediador 
en una sesión privada (caucus) no podrá ser compartida con la otra parte si 
no existe expreso consentimiento de la primera. El mediador velará por la 
confidencialidad de los procedimientos, incluso en lo concerniente al cuidado 
tomado por el equipo técnico en el manejo y archivo de los datos. 
5. El mediador está obligado a guardar secreto profesional sobre los te-
mas en los que intervenga. De igual forma el mediador no podrá utilizar en 
beneficio propio o en el de terceros, la información que pudiera obtener en el 
procedimiento de mediación en el que intervenga. 
6. El mediador se abstendrá de mediar cuando pudiera tener un interés 
directo o indirecto en el proceso o cuando existiere vínculo de amistad o par-
entesco con alguna de las partes. 
7. El mediador velará por la calidad del acuerdo. Ello implica que este sea 
consensuado e informado y que las partes estén lo suficientemente asesora-
das. 
8. Cuando las diferencias entre las partes se manifiesten como insalvables, 
el mediador deberá considerar la posibilidad de finalizar el proceso de medi-
ación e informar a las partes. 
 9. El procedimiento de mediación derivada de juzgado concluye con el 
acta final. En el caso de acuerdo, el documento puede reflejar los acuerdos, o 
puede simplemente decir que se ha llegado a acuerdo y que este va anexo al 
acta final, dependiendo de la voluntad de las partes. El acta final debe respe-
tar el principio de confidencialidad y no divulgar nada sin el expreso consen-
timiento de las partes. 
 10. Los acuerdos han de ser los deseados por las partes, sin ser ilegales. 
El IV apartado establece las “Responsabilidades y obligaciones de las in-
stituciones de mediación”, sobre el que no vamos a extendernos44. En el Real 
Decreto 980, de desarrollo de la Ley 5/2012 de Mediación, entre otras cues-
tiones, se contempla que se autorice al Ministro de Justicia a diseñar las me-
didas oportunas para que se establezca, bien normativamente o bien en los 
Códigos de Conducta de los Colegios profesionales de Abogados, la obligación 
de informar a los clientes de la posibilidad de acudir a una mediación, sus 
características y coste aproximado. 





Es imposible tener reglas para todos los casos y hay veces en que inevita-
blemente surge alguna tensión. Hay dos criterios que se oponen de manera 
que, si uno es respetado, el otro debe ceder. Si un mediador se atiene a la con-
fidencialidad más estricta, entonces no podría proteger a partes no represen-
tadas de algunos riesgos. Estas dudas tienen que ser resueltas privadamente 
aplicando el buen juicio. Seguidamente, vamos a examinar, más detenida-
mente, algunos deberes éticos principales.
2.2.1. Equilibrio de poderes 
Todas las partes en la disputa deben tener un mínimo de poder, necesario 
como para no ser ignoradas o eliminadas por la parte o partes más poderosas. 
La resolución de disputas a través de una mediación de buena fe solo puede 
llevarse a cabo si existe un grado proporcional de poder. Una disputa que sea 
adecuada para mediación tiene que tener las siguientes características45: 
1. Que sea esencialmente una disputa privada entre partes de poder re-
lativamente parejo; 
2. Que haya un marco legal apropiado que sea explicado a las partes;
3. Que todas las partes necesarias estén presentes, con voluntad de en-
tenderse con las otras de buena fe y capaces de participar efectivamente en el 
proceso. 
2.2.2. La neutralidad46
La Recomendación Nº R (98) 1 dedica el punto III a los procesos de me-
diación, adoptando como eje cardinal de los mismos la figura del mediador 
y destacando, a través de nueve puntos, los principios rectores de su actu-
ación47. Libertad de las partes en conflicto y del mediador para participar 
45  FEMENIA, N., “Un marco ético para la mediación”, <http://www.mediate.com/
articles/un_marco_etico.cfm.>.
46  Vid. BELLOSO MARTÍN, N., “La Formación en mediación: algunas perplejidades e 
inquietudes de los alumnos que se forman en los Cursos de Mediación”. En L. García Villaluen-
ga, J. Tomillo Urbina, E. Vázquez de Castro (CoDirectores), Mediación, Arbitraje y resolución 
extrajudicial de conflictos en el siglo XXI), Madrid, Universidad Complutense-CRV-Cáte-
dra Euroamericana-GC-, 2010, T.I, pp. 121-147.
47  Así, la R (98) vincula la imparcialidad del mediador a su relación con las partes y a 
la obligación de preservar la igualdad de éstas en la negociación, y circunscribe la neutral-
idad a la “resolución del proceso de mediación”, manifestando que “el mediador no tiene 
poder para imponer una solución a las partes”. Llama la atención que en otros instrumen-
tos internacionales, como es el Código de Conducta Europeo para los Mediadores, de 
2004, no se contemple expresamente el principio de neutralidad. Es más, parece quedar 
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en los procedimientos de mediación, igualdad de las partes, imparcialidad, 
neutralidad, principio de legalidad, deber de no imposición, confidencialidad, 
protección del bienestar e interés del menor y personas con discapacidad, 
competencia y ética del mediador, buena fe de las partes en conflicto y del 
mediador, sencillez y rapidez del procedimiento y otros que, junto con los 
deberes del mediador familiar en el ejercicio de su profesión, perfilan una 
actuación reglada de la mediación. 
La neutralidad se perfila como un deber del mediador. La Ley 5/2012 de 
Mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, en el artículo 8, establece el prin-
cipio de neutralidad:
“Las actuaciones de mediación se desarrollarán de forma que permitan a las partes 
en conflicto alcanzar por sí mismas un acuerdo de mediación, actuando el mediador de 
acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 13”. 
El acuerdo obtenido a través del proceso de mediación, mal llamado “acu-
erdo de mediación” en el citado artículo 8, lo han de “alcanzar las partes por 
sí mismas”, teniendo que desarrollar el mediador, por mandato legal, “una 
conducta activa tendente a lograr el acercamiento de las partes, con respe-
to a los principios recogidos en esta ley” (ex. Art.13.2). Sin embargo, como 
subraya García Villaluenga, esto no debe llevar a suponer que la Ley atribuya 
al mediador funciones de “promotor” de acuerdos entre las partes, en una 
línea más próxima a los modelos anglosajones que no tienen antecedentes en 
nuestro país48. 
La imparcialidad ayuda a complementar la neutralidad. Es decir, la neu-
tralidad se presenta directamente relacionada con la actitud del mediador 
frente al posible resultado del procedimiento de mediación. Por su parte, la 
imparcialidad se refiere a la actitud del mediador con respecto a las partes que 
participan en el procedimiento de mediación. Un mediador debe permanecer 
imparcial con respecto a todas las partes. Esto significa no tener favoritismo 
o tendencia, ya sea por palabras o hechos, hacia un lado y un compromiso de 
cuestionado al recoger, en su apartado 3.2 relativo a “la imparcialidad del procedimiento”, 
la obligación del mediador de poner fin a la mediación “cuando considere que es improba-
ble que la continuación de la mediación dé lugar a un acuerdo” (GARCÍA VILLALUENGA, 
L., “Artículo 8. Neutralidad”, en L. García Villaluenga y C. Rogel Vide (Directores), Media-
ción en asuntos civiles y mercantiles. Comentarios a la Ley 5/2012. Madrid, Reus, 2012, 
p. 121).
48  GARCÍA VILLALUENGA, L., “Artículo 8. Neutralidad”, cit.
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servir a todas las partes y al proceso, en vez de servir los intereses de una sola 
de las partes. 
 Uno de los requisitos que más preocupan a los alumnos que están formán-
dose en mediación es el de cómo conciliar imparcialidad49 y neutralidad50 con 
la posibilidad de hacer sugerencias a las partes mediadas, de ofrecerles un 
abanico de posibles actuaciones a llevar a cabo, principalmente cunado las 
partes se bloquean o no tienen iniciativa. Es decir, cómo hacer para que el 
mediador no se limite a ser una figura rígida, pasiva, por ese temor a perd-
er la imparcialidad y neutralidad pero sin que esto constituya un obstáculo 
para llevar a cabo su papel de facilitador. Son las partes las que deciden en 
última instancia la solución, si bien es posible distinguir distintos grados de 
intervención del tercero o mediador, llegando a alcanzar en ciertos ámbitos 
un grado muy próximo a la función de decisión, pero sin que pueda llegar a 
serlo51.
2.2.3. El derecho individual a la autodeterminación 
Se expresa diariamente a través de sostener la posibilidad de elegir en-
tre varias opciones, aquella que mejor represente los intereses y deseos del 
individuo. Para lograr esto, se asume que la persona hará una búsqueda in-
teligente y concienzuda de los costos y beneficios de cada opción. Constituye 
una proyección del derecho de las personas a escoger sus propias opciones. 
Para que una decisión sea informada deben recibir previamente toda la infor-
49  El apartado III-I de la citada Recomendación establece que “el mediador debe ser 
imparcial en su relaciones con las partes”. Por ejemplo, no podrá intervenir como persona 
mediadora familiar aquel que haya ejercicio profesionalmente contra alguna de las partes 
y se considera como hecho constitutivo de infracción el incumplimiento del deber de im-
parcialidad.
50  En el apartado III-II de la Recomendación se exige que el mediador sea neutral. 
Es decir, debe ayudar a conseguir acuerdos sin imponer ni tomar parte por una solución o 
medida concreta, sin imponer su propia jerarquía de valores o su ideología. 
El apartado III-IV de la Recomendación impone al mediador el deber de abstenerse de 
imponer una decisión a las partes. No debe confundirse este deber con el de neutralidad. 
El deber de no-imposición trata de salvaguardar la libertad de las partes de manera que, 
a la hora de adoptar un determinado acuerdo, lo hagan haciendo uso de su autonomía de 
la voluntad.
51  Habría también que diferenciar la mediación de la conciliación (judicial o extra-
judicial), evitar la confusión entre mediación y arbitraje informal, y con figuras de otros 
terceros (el mediador no es un corredor, no es un juez, no es un árbitro, no es un amigable 
componedor).
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mación necesaria. De aquí surge el derecho a la información pertinente para 
que las partes que se han sometido a un procedimiento de mediación puedan 
hacer las propias elecciones. 
Siendo el mismo individuo quien pagará los costos de una decisión equiv-
ocada, tiene derecho desarrollar un proceso personal de decisión independi-
ente hasta las últimas consecuencias. Se asume que el individuo, recibiendo 
la información adecuada, está en condiciones de hacer sus propias elecciones 
sin necesidad de tutelaje. La mediación respeta escrupulosamente la auto-
determinación y es congruente con los valores sociales. Se supone que, así 
como la disputa es de las partes, también la solución pertenece a las partes. La 
decisión de mantener parte de la información reservada, o la más extrema de 
abandonar el proceso se incardina en el marco de las libertades del individuo. 
Lo que acabamos de afirmar no significa sin embargo que “cualquier acu-
erdo al que lleguen los ciudadanos es perfectamente válido”. Porque no todo 
es posible52. Primero, porque los acuerdos que adopten las partes no pueden 
vulnerar, en ningún caso, la legalidad. Y segundo, porque además, el media-
dor debería de incentivar a que las partes adopten acuerdos que sean justos y 
no sólo legales. El logro de soluciones justas se debe sustentar en una concep-
ción prudencial de la justicia. Ello permite diferenciar la justicia valor como 
algo distinto de la justicia administración, de la justicia derecho subjetivo, de 
la justicia principio y de la justicia virtud del operador jurídico. El mediador 
tiene que saber que su función radica en que las partes lleguen a un acuerdo 
que sea justo, además de que debe de tomar en consideración una estimación 
consensuada de los afectados y de las leyes en que convive el grupo social en 
que se insertan. No se debe echar en saco roto esta afirmación pues lo cierto 
es que las leyes y la normativa reguladoras de la mediación en general, no 
hacen referencia al valor justicia como criterio elemental del acuerdo final, 
contentándose sólo con mencionar que los acuerdos deben respetar la legal-
idad vigente. Si se pretende que la mediación resulte de verdad efectiva, ese 
fallo debe ser corregido53.
52  PRIETO, F., «¿Una mediación diferente para nuestro sistema jurídico?», en LAW-
YERPRESS, 02/10/2014 http://www.lawyerpress.com/news/2014_10/0210_14_009.
html). El trabajo de Prieto constituye una réplica al publicado por F. Conforti. 
(Franco Conforti «La Tutela Judicial Efectiva como artesana del modelo de Medi-
ación en España» en LAWYERPRESS, 05/09/2014 http://www.lawyerpress.com/
news/2014_09/0509_14_010.html)
53  BELLOSO MARTÍN, N., “Epílogo” a Ponce Alburquerque, j., “El valor justicia. Eje 
de la mediación escolar” (en prensa).
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2.2.4. La confidencialidad 
Asegura que toda la información procesada quedará en secreto. El medi-
ador no puede revelar las particularidades del proceso de mediación a na-
die54. La excepción puede ser la obligación de declarar a las autoridades infor-
mación acerca de casos de violencia o abuso contra menores55. En estos casos, 
la obligación del mediador es advertir a las partes que su confidencialidad no 
podrá ser mantenida.
3. Códigos éticos 
Los códigos éticos ofrecen un plus con respecto al Derecho, que cubren 
áreas, conductas y situaciones a las que el Derecho no ha dado respuesta. En 
los múltiples dilemas éticos que se presentan en el desempeño de nuestras 
actividades profesionales, en los diversos órdenes de la vida social llega un 
momento en que el ciudadano, o bien se queda sin norma en la que buscar la 
solución, o bien, pretende precisamente burlar la norma, interpretar la nor-
ma en otro sentido que se ajuste a sus intereses. 
Hasta ahora, en Europa apenas se han redactado Códigos éticos de la me-
diación. El Código de Conducta europeo para mediadores, de 2004, fue pro-
movido por la Comisión de la Unión Europea en una conferencia organizada 
en Bruselas en ese mismo año, con motivo de su puesta a disposición para las 
organizaciones profesionales que se dedican a la mediación56. En el ámbito 
54  Vid. MORETÓN TOQUERO, Mª. A., “El secreto profesional y el deber de confiden-
cialidad del mediador”, en Belloso Martín, N. (Coordinadora), Estudios sobre mediación: 
La Ley de Mediación Familiar de Castilla y León, Consejería de Familia e igualdad de 
oportunidades, Junta de Castilla y León, 2006, pp.209-236.
55  Como ejemplo cabe citar la Ley 1/2006, de 6 de abril, de Mediación Familiar de 
Castilla y León que, en el artículo 10, donde se regulan los deberes del mediador familiar, 
en el punto 14, dice: “En cualquier caso, la persona mediadora está obligada a informar a 
las autoridades competentes de los datos que puedan revelar la existencia de una amenaza 
para la vida o la integridad física o psíquica de una persona”.
56  Los aspectos que se regulan en el Código de Conducta Europeo para mediadores 
son los siguientes: 1) Competencia, designación y honorarios de los mediadores y promo-
ción de sus servicios; 2) Independencia e imparcialidad; 3) Acuerdo de mediación, pro-
cedimiento y resolución del conflicto; 4) Confidencialidad. (Puede consultarse en la página 
web <http://eurpa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ejn/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.htm.>); 
Vid. también, MARTIN DIZ, F., La mediación: sistema complementario de Adminis-
tración de Justicia. Madrid, CGPJ, 2009, pp.186-190.
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internacional tampoco abundan estas normas éticas en relación a la media-
ción57.
En lo que se refiere a España, el Reglamento de desarrollo de la deroga-
da Ley catalana de Mediación Familiar –Decreto 139/2002, de 14 de mayo-, 
contiene una serie de normas deontológicas58. El resto de la normativa au-
57  En Derecho comparado se puede tomar como referencia el Código de conducta pro-
fesional para la mediación, elaborado por R. Calvo Soler y J. Malem Seña, para México D.F. 
En este último texto se destacan como principios generales la independencia, la neutralidad, 
la imparcialidad, la autodeterminación, las incompatibilidades, la capacidad, la confiden-
cialidad y, por último, la publicidad. Valoramos muy positivamente la inclusión del tema 
de la publicidad pues precisamente, los alumnos de los Cursos de formación en mediación 
suelen interesarte por la posibilidad de publicitar los servicios profesionales de mediación. 
En general, no es bien vista, al igual que tampoco lo es la publicidad de los servicios que of-
recen abogados o psicólogos, que suelen limitarse a colocar una placa en el portal donde se 
ubica su despacho o, como mucho, insertan un anuncio en las “páginas amarillas”. No está 
prohibido ni es competencia desleal, pero no se considera “decoroso”. Tampoco resulta ético 
el hecho de ofrecer precios competitivos para “arreglar conflictos”, anunciarse como mejor 
profesional de la mediación que la competencia, revelar asuntos anteriores o dar pistas sobre 
clientes que han solicitado sus servicios –queda prohibido el dar los nombres de los clientes 
que han acudido a mediación, amparado por el deber de confidencialidad y secreto profe-
sional-, prometer resultados satisfactorios que no dependan exclusivamente de la actividad 
del mediador , realizar una promesa profesional que garantice la obtención de un resultado 
–son las partes las protagonistas de la gestión del conflicto- u otros. 
58  El Decreto 139/2002, de 14 de mayo, que aprobaba el Reglamento de la derogada 
Ley 1/2001, de 15 de marzo, de Mediación Familiar en Cataluña, contenía en su Capítulo 
VI, artículo 22, las normas deontológicas por las que debía regirse la conducta de las per-
sonas mediadoras. Entre estas normas deontológicas se hace referencia a que la persona 
mediadora ha de velar para no influenciar a las partes, cuidar de que no se produzca de-
sequilibrio entre las partes y priorizar el interés de los menores o personas con discapaci-
dad, mantener la imparcialidad y, si no se pudiera –por razones de parentesco, amistad o 
enemistad manifiesta- informar a las partes de este hecho y dejar la mediación. La persona 
mediadora no puede aceptar una mediación en que su intervención sea incompatible con 
sus intereses. Ha de respetar el carácter de confidencialidad, a excepción de algunos ca-
sos –finalidades estadísticas o cuando conlleve una amenaza para la vida o la integridad 
física o psíquica de una persona-. Asimismo, las personas mediadoras no pueden percibir 
ni ofrecer ninguna remuneración relacionada con la derivación de clientes, y en ningún 
caso pueden requerir ninguna cantidad a las partes que tengan reconocido el derecho de 
asistencia gratuita. Entendemos continúan vigentes en la medida en que la nueva regula-
ción (Ley de la Generalidad de Cataluña, 15/2009, de 22 de julio, de Mediación en ámbito 
de D. Privado) en su disposición final primera, remite a un desarrollo reglamentario por 
realizar, sin que aún se haya procedido expresamente a derogar el anterior.
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tonómica española sobre mediación, no regula tal código deontológico de la 
profesión del mediador. 
La Ley 5/2012, de mediación en asuntos civiles y mercantiles, en el Título 
III, que regula el Estatuto del mediador, en su artículo 12 se ocupa de la cali-
dad y autorregulación de la mediación. Concretamente establece:
“El Ministerio de Justicia y las Administraciones públicas competentes, 
en colaboración con las instituciones de mediación, fomentarán la adecuada 
formación inicial y continua de los mediadores, la elaboración de códigos de 
conducta voluntarios, así como la adhesión de aquéllos y de las instituciones 
de mediación a tales códigos”.
Las esperanzas que se habían depositado en la promulgación del Regla-
mento 980 de desarrollo de la Ley de mediación, en orden a una profundi-
zación en los aspectos éticos de la profesión de mediador, no se han visto 
cumplidas. Se confiaba en una regulación amplia del estatuto del mediador, 
donde se regularía el código ético de los mediadores. Sin embargo, sólo se 
refleja una lacónica referencia a “ética de la mediación”, en el artículo 4.1, al 
regular el contenido de la formación del mediador:
“La formación específica de la mediación deberá proporcionar a los mediadores cono-
cimientos y habilidades suficientes para el ejercicio profesional de mediación, compren-
diendo, como mínimo, en relación con el ámbito de especialización en el que presten sus 
servicios, los aspectos psicológicos, de ética de la mediación, de procesos y de técnicas de 
comunicación, negociación y de resolución de conflictos” 59.
Al diseño de este marco ético sin duda le resultará de gran ayuda las pro-
puestas realizadas por especialistas en la materia, principalmente a través de 
los Códigos de Buenas Prácticas que se vienen desarrollando. Recordemos 
el ya citado Código de Buenas Prácticas para la mediación, diseñado por lo 
59  También hay que destacar el impulso que desde las Universidades se ha dado a la 
mediación, impulsando cursos de formación y erigiéndose la calidad de esos cursos como 
uno de los principales objetivos. En esta línea, el junio de 2012, en la sede de la Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid, se constituyó la Conferencia de Universidades para el Estudio de 
la Mediación y los Conflictos (CUEMYC). Esta plataforma, integrada por la mayoría de los 
responsables de formación de Posgrados y Másters en Mediación, así como los Directores de 
Institutos de Investigación  de las Universidades españolas, ha nacido con el objetivo de ser 
un referente nacional e internacional en la consecución de calidad en la mediación (http://
cuemyc.org/.). En el mes de junio de 2014 CUEMYC celebrará su IV Asamblea (organizada 
en la Universidad de León).
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PNPM-60. También conviene reseñar el Código Deontológico de la persona 
del Mediador61, elaborado por la Federación Española de Mediadores. Otra 
aportación a la materia ha sido El Código de Buenas Prácticas en Mediación 
del Club Español del Arbitraje que, elaborado por la Comisión de mediación, 
establece las buenas prácticas tanto del mediador, como de las instituciones 
de mediación, como del abogado en una mediación62. Asimismo, merece de-
stacar el Código de Conducta de los mediadores del Centro de Mediación del 
Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Valencia63, en cuya Introducción se indica 
que:
“La experiencia demuestra que la sociedad necesita y exige que los profe-
sionales sometan su actuación no sólo a la Ley sino también a unos principios 
éticos y morales, cuyo no cumplimiento puede dar lugar a sanciones de tipo 
disciplinario”.
60  Documento accesible en <www.mediacionesjusticia.com>. <http://me-
diacionesjusticia.us7.list-manage.com/unsubscribe?u=ef4ed58e60f365855104f-
b09a&id=097e8ac559&e=0b9fc77dbd&c=4b9795a0bc>.
61  El 25 de noviembre del 2010, a iniciativa del Centro de Mediación de la Región 
de Murcia y de la Universidad de Murcia, se reunieron los profesionales de la mediación 
de diversas Comunidades Autónomas y constituyeron la Federación Nacional de Asoci-
aciones y Profesionales de la Mediación. < http://www.centrodemediacionmurcia.es/
fed_es_de_mediadores_12.html>.
62  En cuanto a las prácticas del mediador como tal, enumera las siguientes: indepen-
dencia e imparcialidad, neutralidad, competencia, información a las partes sobre la me-
diación, diligencia, honorarios, obligación de confidencialidad y renuncia del mediador. 
Como buenas prácticas del abogado en una mediación, establece las siguientes: buena fe 
y respeto mutuo, colaboración en la mediación, confidencialidad, información sobre el 
procedimiento de mediación, asistencia al cliente en la mediación, redacción del contrato 
que incorpore el acuerdo de mediación y deber de información al mediador (www.clubar-
bitraje.com).
63  Este Código de Conducta destaca las obligaciones generales del mediador, la re-
sponsabilidad del mediador con respecto a las partes, la responsabilidad del mediador con 
respecto al proceso de mediación, la responsabilidad del mediador respecto a los otros 
mediadores y a la mediación en general, la responsabilidad del centro de mediación del 
Colegio de Abogados hacia las Administraciones Públicas y las partes no representadas en 
el proceso, y el régimen disciplinario <www.mediacion.icav.es/archivos/contenido/361.




La mediación y su relación con las profesiones jurídicas, principalmente 
con la de abogado, ha sido objeto de largas discusiones. Hasta hace pocos 
años, una buena parte de los abogados veían con cierta suspicacia la media-
ción. Las diversas Leyes autonómicas han impulsado la formación de media-
dores familiares que han acabado captando clientes que, en otro caso, habrían 
tenido que recurrir al abogado. Ello ha derivado en la acusación a los media-
dores de intrusismo profesional. Por otra parte, los abogados hacen gala de 
venir desarrollando la mediación desde hace muchos años. No cabe duda de 
que un abogado habrá utilizado la negociación entre las partes en numerosas 
ocasiones, culminado el litigio con un acuerdo. Pero eso no puede llevar a 
confundir lo que es una actividad de mediación o negociación, inherente a 
la forma de actuar de un profesional de la abogacía, con el procedimiento de 
mediación en el que, en su desarrollo, el abogado también puede asistir a su 
cliente –aunque no sea directamente en las sesiones de mediación-. Incluso 
el mediador puede aconsejar y llegar a requerir la colaboración del abogado, 
en orden a dar forma jurídica al acuerdo final o para resolver dudas jurídicas 
de la parte/es mediada/s.
Además de que los profesionales de la abogacía y de la mediación se pue-
dan complementar, también la propia profesión de abogado puede comple-
mentarse con la de mediador. Ejercer como abogado y, además, estar forma-
do en mediación, conlleva una clara ventaja para el cliente. El abogado, según 
el tipo de conflicto o litigio que le presente el cliente, podrá aconsejarle si le 
conviene más recurrir a la mediación o le conviene seguir otras vías. Incluso 
al abogado se le puede abrir una nueva línea de negocio, principalmente en 
aquellos casos en que con pruebas débiles o con escaso amparo legal, resulta-
ría inviable o poco recomendable la vía judicial. Como mediador, el abogado 
podrá velar mejor por los intereses de su cliente, conociendo en profundidad 
los procedimientos para utilizar la mediación intrajudicial.
Las ventajas que puede conllevar la formación en mediación para el profe-
sional de la abogacía están lejos del móvil meramente económico y mercan-
tilista que está provocando la formación en masa de numerosos profesionales 
en el ámbito de la mediación64. Y ello por dos razones principales. La primera, 
porque hay entidades que se han sumado a impartir cursos de formación en 
64  CEBALLOS PEÑA, D., “La insoportable levedad de la mediación” <http://www.
diariojuridico.com/la-insoportable-levedad-de-la-mediacion/> (Acceso el 26.04.2014).
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mediación, “piratas formadores”65 que se están lucrando a base de vender 
cursos no presenciales. En segundo lugar, porque no se prestan al reclamo de 
definir y ensalzar la actividad del mediador como “una nueva oportunidad de 
incorporación al mundo laboral”, “una actividad en auge” –como han hecho 
muchos a raíz de la promulgación de la Ley 5/2012 de Mediación en asuntos 
civiles y mercantiles-. 
Todos estos son aspectos que ponen de manifiesto que la ética de la medi-
ación va más allá de la conducta que se pueda exigir al profesional mediador. 
La ética es exigible a todos los agentes implicados en la mediación (forma-
dores, operadores jurídicos, mediadores y partes que acuden a mediación66). 
El diseño de un marco ético para la mediación no está exento de dificultades. 
Los dilemas éticos67 a los que se deben de enfrentar los profesionales de la 
mediación en el desarrollo de su trabajo son numerosos. Muchos mediadores 
experimentan una tensión entre mantener la actitud de imparcialidad que 
permite a las partes adoptar sus propias decisiones y el deseo de intervenir 
directamente y de manera sustancial en el proceso. ¿Debería el mediador ser 
más directivo en algunos casos? Dentro de una cultura autoritaria, que no ten-
ga establecido el valor de la autodeterminación, ¿se aceptaría que el mediador 
pueda o deba arrogarse la posibilidad de decidir por las partes, o permitirse 
ofrecer consejo profesional? Las mismas partes ¿considerarían natural pedir 
esta intervención? Un estudio detallado de todas las implicaciones éticas del 
proceso de mediación revela el intrincado proceso de adoptar decisiones en 
65  Así los califica A. Criado Inchauspé, “Los mediadores no existimos”, Madrid, 21 
de enero de 2013, en Lawyerpress <www.lawyerpress.com/news/2013_01/2101_13_001.
html>. 
66  La responsabilidad ética también debe exigirse a las partes que acuden a media-
ción. Los acuerdos derivan de la práctica dialógica. Lo que en cierta manera obliga a los 
participantes a que reflexionen sobre los valores que sustentan las normas que formu-
lan, la legitimidad de las mismas y el alcance que puedan tener. La mediación entra en la 
cuestión de la justificación de las normas resultantes de los acuerdos alcanzados. El inter-
cambio dialógico con el otro desemboca en la responsabilidad, como si se tratara de una 
respuesta. Es decir, situarse ante el otro implica responder y esto, a la vez, conlleva rendir 
cuentas de nuestras acciones (Cfr. NADAL SÁNCHEZ, H., “El lugar de la mediación en el 
Estado democrático de Derecho”, en GORCZEVSKI, C. y OLIVEIRA, F. (Orgs.), Opinio 
Iuris. Curitiba, Multideia, 2012. Vol. I, pp. 113-135. (Documento disponible en <2012-08-
27-el_lugar_de_la_mediación_en_el_estado_democrático_de_derecho>.




libertad. Navegar en estas sutilezas es el único modo de garantizar la mayor 
precisión ética posible, dentro de las normas de transparencia del proceso. 
El gran reto es el de configurar la mediación como una profesión indepen-
diente, con su propio colegio profesional. El Real Decreto 980 ha perdido 
la oportunidad de establecer un corpus legislativo y un marco deontológico 
propios, que habría facilitado que la mediación pudiera ser considerada como 
una profesión en sí misma, distinguiéndose de la de otras profesiones tanto 
jurídicas –como la de abogado- como otras -economista, psicólogo y profe-
siones afines-. 
La ética es la gran olvidada o marginada en la sociedad postmoderna. Se ha 
sustituido la ética por la estética. Como diagnosticara G. Lipovetsky, parece 
que nuestra conducta se ha liberado de los últimos vestigios de los opresivos 
“deberes infinitos”, “mandamientos” y “obligaciones absolutas” 68. La medi-
ación, precisamente por estar dirigida al otro, por volcarse en la alteridad, 
precisa de una ética y de unos códigos éticos que permitan al mediador ir más 
allá de la “estricta legalidad” y de lo “estéticamente agradable” en el ejercicio 
de su profesión. Este es uno de los grandes retos que tiene ante sí la media-
ción. Posiblemente, una vez la mediación supere la fase de despegue, entre en 
una etapa de madurez que la permita acoger los deberes éticos y apuntalar su 
orientación a hacer realidad la justicia.
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ABORIGINAL-CROWN 
RECONCILIATION IN CANADA
Roshan Danesh and Jessica Dickson
The achievement of reconciliation between the Aboriginal peoples1 of Can-
ada and the Crown, and more broadly between the Aboriginal and non-Ab-
original populations, is one of Canada’s central legal, social, political and eco-
nomic challenges. When the Constitution Act of 1982 was passed it included 
in section 35(1) an affirmation of the collective rights of Aboriginal peoples: 
“The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
are hereby recognized and affirmed.” This recognition of Aboriginal rights 
has been followed by a legal revolution, in which the meaning and content of 
Aboriginal rights has become a central focus of the legal system. At the heart 
of this element of the Canadian constitutional order is the project of “recon-
ciliation” between the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples who were here be-
fore the arrival of Europeans with the assertion of sovereignty by the British 
Crown. (Haida, para 20)
The legal focus on the project of reconciliation, and the implications of 
collective Aboriginal rights as enshrined in the Constitution, are broad and 
extensive. The number of legal cases that touch on this topic have grown ex-
tensively over the last few decades, and there are few signs of this growth 
abating. These cases are relatively complex, and routinely take years to work 
their way through the legal system. The prospects for the future are for con-
tinued judicial focus on the project of reconciliation. Recently the Chief Jus-
tice of Canada, the Honorable Beverly McLachlin, commented that despite 
thirty years of case law on Aboriginal rights “we’re in the very early days of 
that saga” and predicted a deepening of involvement of the courts on the proj-
ect of reconciliation. (Brean) In another recent speech she commented on 
how the affirmation of reconciliation is one of the defining moments of the 
Canadian legal and constitutional history:
1  Three distinct groups of Aboriginal peoples are recognized in Canada. The term Ab-
original is used to refer to First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples recognized as Aboriginal 
people under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. First Nation is the term used by the 
Government of Canada in reference to communities of people designated as both Status 
and non-Status “Indians” according to the Indian Act.
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Reconciliation recognizes the reality that Canada is made up of people of First Nations 
descent but also people who are descended, not just from European forbears, but from 
people from all parts of the globe. Whatever our views about that, it is a reality and we 
must accept it. As Chief Justice Lamer put it, “Let us face it, we are all here to stay.”
Reconciliation takes a hard look at what Canada is, divisions and all, and says, for the 
good of us all, we need to make peace and build a better future.
The project of reconciliation, while our best way forward, is not an easy way. It is not 
a finite task but a process. Reconciliation requires openness of spirit, endurance and great 
patience. But I believe that it is worth the effort. (McLachlin)
The placement of the project of reconciliation at the heart of the public or-
dering and constitutional jurisprudence of the Canadian legal system would 
seem to be fertile ground for the deep development and use of methods of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Indeed, at the heart of the jurispru-
dence has been a plea from the Courts for First Nations and the federal and 
provincial governments to recognize the institutional limits of the legal sys-
tem – that Courts are fundamentally unsuited to the project of reconciliation. 
Rather, they have actively encouraged negotiations, and developed the re-
quirement for honourable processes aimed at advancing reconciliation.
Despite this, the Courts have remained a central pathway for resolution 
of disputes over Aboriginal rights. And surprisingly, despite many useful and 
sometimes quite productive efforts, the use of ADR has relatively speaking 
remained somewhat constrained. While negotiations are relatively common-
place at various levels, the use of mediation, arbitration and other forms of 
ADR, particularly on land and resource matters, is rare. Indeed, currently one 
might say that in Canada an experiment is taking place in trying to achieve 
reconciliation through adversarial litigation. Not surprisingly, that experi-
ment is being met with quite limited success.
This paper explores the question of why ADR, and mediation in particular, 
is not being used more in the quest for reconciliation in Canada. We particu-
larly focus on issues related to reconciliation regarding lands and resources 
– as distinct from the many other social, cultural, and economic dimensions 
of reconciliation. Our analysis reveals two types of answers. First, there are 
particular factors regarding the challenge of reconciliation itself – including 
its nature and meaning in cross-cultural contexts – that complicate and chal-
lenge the use of ADR. Second, are the limits of how ADR, and mediation in 
particular, is often conceived and constructed. This case study illustrates a 
need to re-examine the fundamentals of what ADR does and might mean for 
major societal projects, such as advancing reconciliation.
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Part 1 – The Legal Challenge of Reconciliation – A Brief Overview
It is important to identify the lineage and potential meanings of the term 
reconciliation as it is used in reference to the history, present, and future of 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
Viewed from the perspective of the history of European settlement of Can-
ada, and the relationship between the original inhabitants of these lands with 
the settlers from Europe, reconciliation is a very new and contemporary ex-
pression. While there are complex and multi-faceted layers of relations be-
tween these populations, a central thrust of the story, which aligns with the 
founding of Canada in the later 1800’s, is the foundational cornerstone of the 
twin, overtly racist, legal and policy frameworks of assimilation and denial.
Assimilation targeted the culture, social structure, way of life, and spiri-
tuality of Aboriginal peoples, and explicitly sought to eradicate those. As has 
been described:
For years after the arrival of Europeans, in both British Columbia and elsewhere in the 
country, it was assumed by many non-Aboriginal people that First Nations people would 
eventually be absorbed into the European-based Canadian society. A concerted effort 
was made to ensure that this process took place, including policies and legislation which 
banned traditional ceremonies, forbid celebrations, prohibited the wearing of traditional 
costumes, and silenced spiritual leaders. This effort to impose unfamiliar traditions inten-
sified into a sustained effort toward the assimilation of First Nations people into non-Ab-
original society. (First Nations Summit, 9) 
A central vehicle for this assimilation was the residential school system, 
which systematically removed children from their families, sought to break 
cultural patterns and the transmission of knowledge, and “to kill the Indian in 
the child”. The residential school system endured for more than one hundred 
years, and only in recent years have the gross wrongs of the system been ac-
knowledged and begun to be redressed through legal settlements and the es-
tablishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It was not until 2008 
that the Canadian government apologized for this particularly egregious as-
pect of the assimilation policy:
Two primary objectives of the residential school system were to remove and isolate 
children from the influence of their homes, families, traditions and cultures, and to assim-
ilate them into the dominant culture. These objectives were based on the assumption Ab-
original cultures and spiritual beliefs were inferior and unequal. Indeed, some sought, as it 
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was infamously said, “to kill the Indian in the child.” Today, we recognize that this policy of 
assimilation was wrong, has caused great harm, and has no place in our country. (Harper)
The assimilation policy was an effort to advance the social, cultural, and 
spiritual oppression of Aboriginal peoples by non-Aboriginal peoples. Its 
companion policy – which has yet to meet with the same fate as the assimi-
lation policy – is that of denial, and specifically denial that organized Aborig-
inal societies owned and occupied lands and resources before the arrival of 
European settlers. Stated another way, the denial policy holds the view that 
when settlers arrived in the lands that were to make up Canada they found a 
terra nullius, an empty land belonging to no one.2 
Informing and legitimizing this denial policy is the doctrine of discovery, 
which had impacts in many parts of the globe. As has been described:
As with the discredited notion of “terra nullius”, the doctrine of “discovery” was used 
to legitimize the colonization of Indigenous peoples in different regions of the world. It 
was used to dehumanize, exploit and subjugate Indigenous peoples and dispossess them 
of their most basic rights.
Central to the survival of Indigenous peoples everywhere is the issue of land and re-
sources. Based on such fictitious and racist doctrines as “discovery” and “terra nullius”, 
European nations were relentless in their determination to seize and control indigenous 
lands. Papal bulls, such as Dum Diversas (1452) and Romanus Pontifex (1455) called for 
non-Christian peoples to be invaded, captured, vanquished, subdued, reduced to perpetu-
al slavery, and to have their possessions and property seized by Christian monarchs. Such 
ideology led to practices that continue unabated in the form of modern day laws and poli-
cies of successor States (Atleo,1).
While obviously intertwined with the assimilation policy, the policy of de-
nial served as a foundation for the economic domination of these lands. It 
reflected itself in the establishment of the Indian reserve system by which Ab-
original peoples were placed on small tracts of land held in trust by the feder-
al government, the promulgation of the Indian Act, the systematic violations 
of the historic Treaties that had been entered into between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples over most of Canada, and the relatively unfettered taking 
up of land by governments and settlers. Parallel with this was the further 
2  In the seminal Tsilhqot’in decision from the Supreme Court of Canada on June 26, 
2014, the Court importantly re-iterated that as a matter of law terra nullius never had a 
place in Canada: “The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to Euro-
pean assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada….” (para 45).
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interference with and eroding of Aboriginal systems of law and governance. 
Today, the reserve system, with all of its destructive legacies and racist impli-
cations, remains alive and well.
It is the denial policy that more specifically engages the question of Ab-
original peoples’ relationship to lands and resources, and the contemporary 
challenge of reconciliation in that context. Until the 1950’s, it was prohibited 
in Canada for an Aboriginal person to retain legal counsel to raise the issue of 
Aboriginal rights over lands and resources. In 1961, the first modern case in 
the evolution of jurisprudence regarding Aboriginal rights – R. v. White and 
Bob - was brought in Nanaimo regarding a hunting charge. In defence to the 
charges, a pre-confederation treaty protecting the right to hunt was cited, and 
a parallel defence was advanced that there were unextinguished Aboriginal 
rights that had never been ceded or surrendered by the Aboriginal people in 
question. Ultimately, in 1963, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that a 
treaty existed and must be respected. Thus was born the modern era of Ab-
original rights jurisprudence in Canada.
In 1982, the adoption of section 35 of the Constitution led to a major ac-
celeration in the use of the Courts to try to address matters of Aboriginal 
rights, particularly in the Province of British Columbia. British Columbia is in 
a somewhat distinct position from the rest of Canada, in that historically very 
few Treaties were entered into. As such, there was, and is, a fundamentally 
unresolved conflict about the authority and ownership of lands and resources 
over the vast majority of the Province. Regrettably, but perhaps unsurprising-
ly, a centrepiece of Crown positions in these court cases has been to maintain 
the denial policy. So, while section 35 granted protection of “existing” Ab-
original and treaty rights, the Crown maintained that no Aboriginal rights, 
other than treaty rights, were existing – they all had been either extinguished 
by Crown action, or surrendered by First Nations. This position was soundly 
rejected by the Courts. The Courts affirmed that these rights had not been 
extinguished, and that the purpose of section 35 of the Constitution was to 
effect a reconciliation between the prior sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples 
and the assumed sovereignty of the Crown.(Haida, para 20) Stated another 
way, section 35 of the Constitution was a promise, grounded in the history of 
the founding of Canada, that a fair and just resolution to the rightful claims 
of Aboriginal peoples to the lands and resources of their Territories would be 
advanced and ultimately achieved. In the seminal Delgamuukw decision in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada fully rejects the idea of extinguishment 
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or surrender, the Court concluded with words meant to evoke the spirit of 
reconciliation that must infuse that area of work “Let us face it, we are all here 
to stay.” (Delgamuukw, para 186)
One would think that the affirmation of the continued existence of Aborig-
inal rights, and the identification of reconciliation as the very purpose of the 
law, might have been the impetus for transformative shifts from a context of 
denial to one of recognition in which negotiated resolutions could rapidly ad-
vance. However, this has largely not been the case. While the Court’s require-
ment for reconciliation was always accompanied by pleas for negotiation, 
the reality is that litigation has expanded exponentially while negotiations 
– though common – have proven quite slow and have not been delivered in 
a manner that would see the courts slowly decrease as a venue for the critical 
work of reconciliation. Indeed, the Delgamuukw decision did not result in 
any fundamental shifts in Crown policy or activity, as the Crown emphasized 
that while Aboriginal rights may exist, they had not been proven in respect to 
any particular resource or place, and that they would not shift their conduct 
until they were proven. It was business as usual.
In 2004 another seminal case - the Haida decision - took issue with this 
Crown inaction, by stating that even prior to proof of Aboriginal rights, the 
Crown owed constitutional obligations to consult and accommodate First Na-
tions about any decisions or actions that might infringe asserted Aboriginal 
rights. Stated another way, reconciliation is dynamic and iterative, and it re-
quires that real steps be taken to protect the interests and values that at are at 
the heart of advancing reconciliation. Reflecting the principle of the honour 
of the Crown, which is an overarching constitutional principle with duties 
owed by the Crown to First Nations, the Court stated that:
The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal in-
terests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of 
treaty negotiation and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. 
The Crown is not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in question 
pending claims resolution. But, depending on the circumstances, discussed more fully be-
low, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate 
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a claimed re-
source during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that resource, 
may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. 
That is not honourable. (Haida, para 27)
While the Haida decision arguably led to some shifts in Crown conduct, 
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particularly in British Columbia, as well as some diversification of forums and 
avenues for negotiation, the primary response to the decision was again in the 
Courts. Massive amounts of litigation now take place challenging the Crown’s 
failure to consult and accommodate First Nations. In all of these court cas-
es, the fundamental underlying question is whether the Crown did what was 
necessary – procedurally and substantively – to advance reconciliation with 
respect to that particular action or decision.
On June 26, 2014 in the Tsilhqot’in decision, the Supreme Court of Canada, 
for the first time in history, issued a legal declaration that Aboriginal title exist-
ed over part of Canada. After a 25 year battle over a portion of central British 
Columbia, the Tsilhqot’in People are now recognized as having a sui generis 
property interest over an area that is approximately 1700 square kilometres 
in size. In this seminal decision, the Supreme Court appears to be significantly 
raising the stakes for achieving a meaningful reconciliation, as the economic 
consequences of Aboriginal title on the investment climate and the prospects 
for the governments’ resources development plans could be significant.
What does reconciliation mean in this evolution of the law? The Courts 
have not provided much substantive guidance on this question. It is clear 
that reconciliation “is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense” (Haida, 
para 32); rather it is a process that must engender a “mutually respectful 
long-term relationship” between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
(Little Salmon, para 10) We know as well that it requires the Crown to do 
certain things – like consult and accommodate, negotiate resolution, and dil-
igently implement treaties – but the Courts have not provided a detailed or 
substantive vision of what a reconciled Canada might look like. Rather, one 
might think of their jurisprudence as a blueprint that shows structures and 
elements that will be needed to move towards reconciliation. But bringing 
reconciliation into being – giving it life – is not something the courts can do. 
It is this challenge, of bringing reconciliation to life, that brings into focus the 
role that ADR might, and could, play.
Part 2 –The Challenge of Contemporary ADR Processes in Advancing the 
Goal of Reconciliation
Alternative Dispute Resolution is well established in Canada. The Canadi-
an legal system, as with other common law systems, has been the focus of a 
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number of criticisms over the past three decades that have helped bring ADR 
to the mainstream. These criticisms include that the legal system is too con-
frontational, too complex, too time consuming and too expensive to provide 
satisfactory results to Canada’s culturally and ethnically diverse population.
The repatriation of the Constitution of Canada in 1982 and the entrench-
ment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms brought with it a heightened 
responsibility for the courts to prioritize the rights of the accused to a trial 
without reasonable delay. (Dickson) The streamlining of criminal matters ul-
timately led to delays in cases in other areas of the law. In response, the courts 
began in earnest to consider alternative forums for certain cases in which 
the setting would be better suited for dealing with the issues at stake. (Dick-
son) The result was the institution of court-annexed ADR processes utilizing 
techniques of mediation, neutral evaluation and arbitration. The first court 
annexed ADR program was instituted in 1994 on a trial basis in Ontario as 
an alternative for settling civil disputes. This program continues to operate in 
Ontario, and was followed by other similar ADR processes now operating in 
jurisdictions across the country. 
In some areas, such as labour relations, the law requires binding arbitra-
tion on the disputing parties. Arbitration has also become widely reflected 
within contracts by the business community. Through enabling legislation, 
the provincial and federal governments have created a number of special tri-
bunals and commissions to address matters of public interest. These forums 
are designed to be less expensive, often informal systems, that run parallel to 
the courts. There are currently dozens of active tribunals across Canada rang-
ing from administrative tribunals that deal with claims of discrimination and 
harassment to those that deal with grievances related to government policies 
and programs. 
The use of arbitration to resolve issues of Aboriginal rights has been limit-
ed, as governments tend to avoid committing themselves to binding decisions 
in this often complex and evolving area of law. One area where the Crown has 
shown deference to arbitration is with respect to monetary damage claims 
made by First Nations against the federal government regarding breaches of 
treaties, fraud, illegal dispositions, or inadequate compensation related to 
Indian reserve lands. (“Frequently Asked Questions”) In 2008, following a 
mounting backlog of cases within the government agency previously respon-
sible for administering claims, and criticisms of acting in a conflict of interest 
(with Canada in the role of party, adjudicator and process administrator), the 
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government passed the Specific Claims Tribunal Act which gave life to a new 
arbitration process for addressing claims. 
Criticism of the Tribunal by First Nations has largely centered on the ad-
versarial nature of the process. In its five-year review of the Tribunal, the 
Assembly of First Nations found that “Canada no longer seems to be evaluat-
ing claims in an impartial manner as a fiduciary, but instead is taking an ad-
versarial approach to claims resolution.” (Assembly of First Nations, 4) The 
report further states: 
[Canada], in a manner that has never been announced or acknowledged, turned the 
federal processing stage into an arena where Canada appears to be no longer acting in 
good faith as a fiduciary, but instead is taking every opportunity to merely minimize its 
liabilities. This approach is inconsistent with the principle of reconciliation that was ex-
plicitly embedded into the Specific Claims Tribunal Act. (5–6) 
The characterization of the Tribunal as adversarial is further highlighted 
in the testimony of the Tribunal Chair, Justice Harry Slade, to the Commons 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in 2011: 
A well-founded concern in response to our first draft, was that the rules were too court-
like and contemplate an adversarial process rather than a reconciliatory negotiated pro-
cess. […]. In the specific claims branch process, of course, the crown is obliged to disclose 
nothing, whereas the claimant has to disclose virtually his whole case. (Standing Commit-
tee on Aboriginal Affaris and Northern Development)
Recently, the Federal Court was asked what “negotiations” mean in the 
context of the Tribunal process. The Court highlighted that elements of Cana-
da’s approach to negotiations “is, frankly, paternalistic, self-serving, arbitrary 
and disrespectful of First Nations. It falls short of upholding the honour of the 
Crown, and its implied principle of “good faith” required in all negotiations 
Canada undertakes with First Nations.” (Aundeck Omni Kaning, para. 89)
Beyond the court annexed and quasi-judicial systems described above, 
non-judicial ADR systems are gaining traction in community justice settings 
around the country. Often geared towards conflict prevention and restorative 
justice, these systems involve a broad spectrum of ADR processes. 
Amidst a plethora of ADR models and techniques developing in the field, 
interest-based negotiation and mediation, often referred to as the “Harvard” 
or “problem solving” model, has been the most widely instituted, practiced 
and taught in Canada and other countries of the global “West”. The model 
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was born in the 1920’s and 1930’s through the writings of American organi-
zational theorist Mary Parker Follett. Follet’s ideas about organizational con-
flict centered on the premise that organizations, as social institutions, could 
achieve progress by rejecting compromise and concession as the primary 
technique for resolving disputes. For Follet, “the only way to resolve a conflict 
is not victory, nor compromise [….] it is integration of interests. (Druker, 4) 
She thought, “a better way is to find the integrative solution, the approach 
that solves a conflict by accommodating the real demands of the parties in-
volved.” (Graham, 21) Decades later, the model was modified by Fisher and 
Ury in their celebrated 1981 book “Getting to Yes” and subsequently gained 
significant traction in legal and business circles throughout Canada. The 
model is based on the premise that disputing parties will tend to take extreme 
and rigid positions in order to counteract their competitors and achieve the 
settlement they desire. The goal of the interest-based model is to move dispu-
tants away from adversarial positions and the emotions that fuel the dispute, 
towards an understanding of the issue as being shared, and something to be 
addressed through collaborative problem solving. In the mediation context, 
to move the parties in this direction, a neutral third supports the disputants 
to identify their underlying interests in the dispute - their hopes, needs, val-
ues, beliefs, and expectations – as the basis for developing mutually satisfac-
tory or “win-win” agreements. 
The influence of the model in Canada was not lost on governments who, 
following the consistent directives of the courts to find alternatives for ad-
dressing issues of Aboriginal rights and title, turned to the growing field of 
ADR for guidance. A well-known example is the establishment of the inter-
est-based inspired British Columbia treaty process. The process, discussed 
in the case study below, is the single process for negotiating modern treaties 
with approximately 200 First Nations of British Columbia.
Part 3 - Case Study: The British Columbia Treaty Process
Following the conclusion of the Calder litigation in 1973, in which the Su-
preme Court of Canada confirmed the existence of Aboriginal title as a con-
cept, the government of Canada introduced a policy for negotiating modern 
treaties throughout the country. The earliest version of the policy was intend-
ed to exchange claims of undefined Aboriginal rights for a clearly defined 
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package of rights and benefits set out in agreements protected by section 35 of 
the Constitution. The policy was amended in 1986 to allow for the negotiation 
of resource revenue sharing and Aboriginal self-government. 
Facing a potential floodgate of claims and uncertainty of ownership and 
access to the resource rich lands throughout the province, and a failed law-
suit launched by British Columbia to have the Nisga’a Treaty – the first mod-
ern treaty in British Columbia - declared unconstitutional, the government 
of British Columbia joined the federal government negotiations with Nisga’a 
in 1990. The following year, the government of British Columbia, the federal 
government and the First Nations - represented by the First Nations Sum-
mit - established a taskforce to develop a treaty negotiation framework to be 
applied province-wide. On June 28, 1991, the Task Force delivered its final 
report to the governments and First Nations that called for the establishment 
of a made in British Columbia process. 
In its introductory statement, the Task Force described the conflict about 
the rights of Aboriginal people in British Columbia as one that “speaks to the 
difficulties in reconciling fundamentally different philosophical and cultur-
al systems. Historically, the conflict has focused on rights to land, sea, and 
resources. However, the ultimate solution lies in a much wider political and 
legal reconciliation between aboriginal and non-aboriginal societies”. (Brit-
ish Columbia Claims Task Force 1991, 4) In sketching a political process for 
negotiating treaties, the Task Force provided implicit support for treaties as a 
suitable pathway for achieving broad reconciliation. 
The report from the Task Force, consisting of 19 recommendations, set out 
the general framework for the negotiations including a six-stage process and 
a Commission to facilitate and oversee the process. 
Recommendations #3: A British Columbia Treaty Commission be established by 
agreement among the First Nations, Canada, and British Columbia to facilitate the pro-
cess of negotiations. 
Recommendation #5: A six-stage process for negotiating treaties, as follows:
Stage 1: Submission of Statement of intent to negotiate a treaty;
Stage 2: Preparations for negotiations
Stage 3: Negotiations of a Framework Agreement 
Stage 4: Negotiations of Agreement in Principle
Stage 5: Negotiations to finalize a treaty
Stage 6: Implementation of the treaty
Following the acceptance of the recommendations of the Taskforce by 
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Canada, British Columbia and the First Nations a new Treaty Commission 
opened its doors in May of 1993. More than two decades have passed since 
negotiations began. There are currently 60 First Nations in the process. To 
date, only a few First Nations are implementing their treaties. Among those 
First Nations still in active negotiations, the majority have been in Stage 5 of 
the process for more than a decade. Overall, the process to date has cost hun-
dreds of millions dollars.
In reflecting on the progress of negotiation in a review of the process, the 
Treaty Commission reported “Treaty negotiations use an interest-based ne-
gotiation model where negotiators spend time exploring individual First Na-
tions’ interests in economic and social development, implicitly supporting the 
assumption that treaty offers will reflect those interests.” (British Columbia 
Treaty Commission 2001, 17) However, the review of the process identified a 
number of challenges to the negotiations that have substantially gone unad-
dressed, and bring to light questions about the appropriateness of the process 
and its interest-based underpinnings to the project of reconciliation.
Pursuant to the goal of achieving outright certainty from treaties and con-
sistent with its 1973 Land Claims Policy, the Government of Canada previous-
ly required BC First Nations to “cede, release and surrender” their Aboriginal 
rights in exchange for treaty rights. Generally referred to as the “extinguish-
ment model” First Nations in BC rejected this approach because they did not 
want to be required to give up rights as part of a treaty. Seeking to satisfy First 
Nations concerns, Canada shifted its language to one where Aboriginal rights 
are “converted, modified, or transformed” into treaty rights. From the per-
spective of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, the new certainty provision does 
little to ensure that Aboriginal title and rights not enshrined in the written 
agreement will survive post treaty. As such: 
The Crown gets complete recognition of its sovereignty, its underlying title to our lands 
and the supremacy of its laws over our governments and People. Indigenous groups get lim-
ited recognition of title to reduced pieces of land, the right to co-manage resources (along 
with government and third parties interests) and self-government which is subject to Ca-
nadian and provincial laws. (“Certainty: Canada’s Struggle to Extinguish Aboriginal Title”)
From a broader perspective, the focus on certainty through the contain-
ment of Aboriginal rights within a written agreement speaks to the import-
ant question about the capacity of the BC treaty process to result in stable, 
healthy and long-term government-to-government relationships post treaty.
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In its 2001/2002 review, the Treaty Commission found that “offers made 
to date points to a population-based format as the primary basis for the cal-
culations by the governments of Canada and BC.” (British Columbia Treaty 
Commission 2001, 17) This finding speaks to a recurring failure of govern-
ments to recognize the unique circumstances of individual First Nations in 
the process, choosing instead to promote a one-size fits all approach regard-
less of a First Nations culture, history, geography and size and prospect for 
attaining full self-sufficiency once the treaty is concluded. This one-size fits 
all approach is typically a narrow conception of treaties as simply another 
program or service the government is required to deliver under the Indian 
Act, section 35 and to fulfill its fiduciary obligations. 
Throughout the history of negotiations, BC and Canada have struggled to 
arrive at the table with a mandate to negotiate on subject matters of impor-
tance to the First Nations. For example, “It has been six years since there 
was a fish mandate. This long delay for a s.35 rights issue of critical impor-
tance to First Nations in BC needs to be addressed.” (British Columbia Treaty 
Commission 2013, 29) From the perspective of First Nations, government’s 
unwillingness to negotiate rights-based issues translates into a lack of com-
mitment to reconsider the structure of the relationship. 
Further, the Treaty Commission reviews claims on a first-come-first-serve 
basis. This has resulted in a number of disputes among First Nations who may 
have historically shared areas of a territory or whose territorial boundaries 
were reconstituted through the process of colonization and the establishment 
of reserves. Failing to consider these relationships and the potential impacts 
on governance landscape after the treaty is concluded has been highlighted as 
a major drawback to the treaty process.
Debates about the place of compensation within the negotiation frame-
work has also been a challenge within the process. First Nations argue that 
financial compensation for the history of unjustified infringements of their 
Aboriginal rights is an issue significant to reconciliation that should be ad-
dressed at the treaty table. Canada and BC argue, however, that compensa-
tion is a legal concept and therefore has no place in a political negotiation 
process about a future relationship between First Nations, the Crown and 
Canadian society. 
At the end of Stage 4 (ratification of an Agreement in Principle) and 5 
(ratification of a Final Agreement) First Nations members are called upon to 
decide whether to accept the terms of the agreement, and provide a mandate 
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to the First Nations’ negotiators to move forward into the next stage of the 
process. Low voter turnout, limited information about the specifics of the ne-
gotiation has resulted in handful of failed votes of an Agreement in Principle 
or final treaty. Much like conventional interest-based processes, treaty nego-
tiations in BC have largely taken place behind closed doors and only recently 
is emphasis being placed on information sharing with members as negotia-
tions proceed to ensure “yes” or “no” votes are based on informed consent. 
The challenges above have created significant delays, limited progress in 
negotiations and a significant amount of loans to First Nations. According 
to the BCTC, “Since opening its doors in May 1993, the Treaty Commis-
sion has allocated approximately $471 million in loans to First Nations.” 
(British Columbia Treaty Commission 2013, 25) In consideration of these 
and other challenges, a number of First Nations have disengaged from the 
process, choosing instead to pursue more tangible opportunities to assert 
their rights and increase capacity and economic development within their 
communities.
The question of whether the treaty process provides a suitable frame-
work for addressing Aboriginal lands and resource issues was recently 
considered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. On May 
10, 2007, the Hul’quimi’num Treaty Group (HTG) filed a petition with the 
Commission claiming that the government of Canada had violated the hu-
man rights of the Hul’quimi’num people by granting a significant portion of 
its traditional territories to private land owners without compensation or 
offer of restitution.
In ruling HTG’s petition as admissible, the Commission waived the nor-
mal requirements under international law and its own rules and regulations 
that a petitioner must exhaust all available domestic remedies before a case 
can be admissible to the Commission. 
Canada subsequently argued that a treaty negotiated through the British 
Columbia treaty process, in which the HTG was a participant, could provide 
HTG with a remedy. In considering the argument, the Commission found:
The BCTC process has not allowed negotiations on the subject of restitution or com-
pensation for HTG ancestral lands in private hands, which make up 85% of their tradi-
tional territory. Since 15 years have passed…the IAHCR notes that by failing to resolve 
the HTG claims with regard to their ancestral lands, the BCTC process has demonstrated 
that it is not an effective mechanism to protect the right alleged by the alleged victims. 
(Hul’quimi’num Treaty Group v. Canada, para 37)
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Looking back, the choice of building the BC treaty process in the spirit of 
interest-based negotiation and mediation may have seemed like an obvious 
fit for establishing treaties. At the time of its construction, no other model 
was as widely promoted and used in Canada. One point of confusion that has 
plagued this process, however, is one between rights and interests. Aboriginal 
rights are not merely interests. Unlike interests - hopes, needs, values, beliefs, 
and expectations – Aboriginal rights are sui generis and include a continua-
tion of the laws and social norms of the Indigenous people of Canada. Given 
their unique place within the Canadian legal framework, it is perhaps an un-
usual expectation that a process that seeks to align interests could achieve the 
goal of reconciling issues of Aboriginal rights. 
Part 4 – Re-introducing ADR and Reconciliation
Why has the project of reconciliation not made more use of ADR process-
es? Why have efforts that have been made, such as the British Columbia trea-
ty process, not proven widely successful? What possible directions might be 
explored in the future? And what does this limited use of ADR tell us about 
the potential and limits of ADR?
One set of answers to these questions, which has been relatively well ex-
amined in scholarly literature and research on ADR, is the relationship be-
tween culture and conflict. 
In considering whether interest-based ADR processes are appropriate for 
disputes regarding Aboriginal rights, there is a general concern that western 
models, specifically the interest-based model, are not designed to take into 
account differences in worldviews that are major drivers of conflict. For Ba-
ruch Bush and Folger, western ADR models are too firmly rooted in the ide-
ology of individualism, which characterizes human nature as primarily com-
petitive and self-interested. They argue that the model does not go far enough 
to consider alternative worldviews and modes of relating, rather, it promotes 
conflicting parties to seek to satisfy their individual needs and desires. ( Ba-
ruch Bush and Joseph Folger) In considering the application of mainstream 
ADR models to disputes involving Indigenous Peoples: 
The worldviews that underlie Western and Indigenous cultures are starkly different 
from one another. For example, Indigenous approaches to addressing conflict are more 
accurately described as conflict transformation in that they seek to address the conflict in 
ROSHAN DANESH AND JESSICA DICKSON
82
ways that heal relationships and restore harmony to the group. In contrast, Western con-
flict resolution methods prioritize reaching an agreement between individual parties over 
mending relationships that have been damaged by the conflict (Walker, 528) 
Western ADR models have what Lederach calls a “prescriptive modality” 
where conflict intervention is reduced to a single set of techniques and skills, 
which become key aspects of the training and subsequent application of the 
model. (Lederach 1995) For Lederach, these skills often lack the capacity to re-
spond to cultural differences and worldviews that bring these differences to life. 
The interest-based model’s focus on problems, not relationships; outcomes, not 
process; and, objective criteria of success versus value-based decision-making 
makes it problematic for implementing in cross-cultural settings. (Osi; Walker)
The goal of “separating people from the problem”, which essentially dis-
misses the emotional aspects of the conflict, may be antithetical to the goal of 
resolution in cross-cultural settings as it is this very aspect of the conflict in 
which “sustained progress in conflict can be made”. (Lebaron and Pillay, 21) 
The goal of separation may result in overlooking the key to unlocking change 
in a cross cultural conflict. Individual and group identity is often tied to cul-
ture, and may be the underlying key to disputes over land, resources and many 
other types of conflicts. Although the assumptions and skills associated with 
the interest-based approach may help to reduce tensions and form agreements 
that address the surface issues of a dispute, the approach does not guarantee 
sustained peace or continuing relationships between conflicting parties.
Strongly rooted in western notions of neutrality and justice, western ADR 
processes also come under fire from critics who see the model simply as new 
packaging for age-old-processes by which the Crown seeks to assert its sov-
ereignty over Aboriginal peoples and their lands. This view is steadfastly re-
flected by Kahane:
The dominant western political vocabulary has a readily available story about how to 
resolve disputes between groups over perceived conflicts of interests, aspirations, or ac-
cess to resources: let each side make its case before a neutral third party, who will decide 
objectively on a just settlement. This common-sense story of adjudication has deep roots 
in western cultural, legal, and philosophical traditions, and is closely tied to accounts of 
political legitimacy. In its common-sense version, this story about neutrality and justice 
has tremendous currency in North America: it is seen as describing not only the aspira-
tions of our legal and political systems, but even their typical operation. Seen from the 
standpoint of Aboriginal struggles for survival, equality, and self-determination, however, 
the dominant western account of justice looks deeply corrupt. (6) 
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As a central driving force of conflict, worldview should be a major con-
sideration in both the design and application of an ADR process in which 
questions of rights, justice and reconciliation are the focus. The imposition 
of any ADR model in cross-cultural contexts, regardless of its theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings, is unlikely to make a profound contribution to 
the project of reconciliation in Canada until Aboriginal peoples are directly 
involved in the early stages of its development. 
In addition to the relationship between culture and conflict, we think there 
are additional issues and challenges that have perhaps stemmed the turn to-
wards ADR in resolving land and resource disputes in the Aboriginal context, 
and more broadly achieving reconciliation. We briefly highlight two of these 
in particular: the understanding and meaning of reconciliation; and the re-
lationship between worldviews and dispute resolution. Taken together these 
examples illustrate some of the limits of ADR, and potential directions for 
future development.
a. Understandings and Meanings of Reconciliation 
Understandings of the meaning, vision and goals of reconciliation in the 
context of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples, governments and 
non-Aboriginal people vary widely. In the broadest sense, the term is used to 
suggest what processes and changes must occur to improve the structure of 
the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, and the relation-
ship between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
As we have seen, the Courts have provided the dominant frame within 
which the governments’ and First Nations’ meanings and goals of reconcil-
iation have evolved. They have talked about it in two ways. First, the Court 
has used the term reconciliation to give guidance to the government with 
respect to what constitutes a justified infringement of Aboriginal title and 
rights. Second, the Court has used reconciliation to define the very purpose 
and goal of the recognition and protection of Aboriginal title and rights in the 
Constitution. In highlighting reconciliation as a fundamental constitutional 
purpose, they are trying to lay the groundwork for negotiated and consensual 
agreements, including contemporary treaties, and implementation of historic 
treaties.
In its interpretation of the guidance given by the Courts, the Government 
of Canada has tended to view reconciliation as a process taking place along 
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two separate streams with two separate goals. 1) reconciliation between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples and; 2) reconciliation by the Crown of Aborig-
inal and other societal interests, particularly with respect to land. The first 
goal has been taken up by the work of the Truth Reconciliation Commission 
which supports truth telling and information sharing about past injustices 
and collateral harm inflicted on Aboriginal peoples by residential schools. 
The second goal of reconciliation is pursued through the fulfillment of its 
common law duty to consult and possibly accommodate First Nations whose 
s.35 rights may be adversely impacted by conduct the Crown is contemplat-
ing, such as the issuing of permits to resource developers. Echoing the Haida 
decision, the government’s 2011 guidelines to federal officials to fulfill the 
duty to consult states: 
The duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate is part of a process of fair 
dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown and 
continues beyond formal claims resolution through to the application and implementation 
of Treaties. The Crown’s efforts to consult and, where appropriate accommodate Aborig-
inal groups whose potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights may be adversely 
affected should be consistent with the overarching objectives of reconciliation. (6)
These goals are far from consistent with First Nations’ visions of reconcili-
ation. In their 2013 report “Advancing an Indigenous Framework for Consul-
tation and Accommodation”, the Leadership Council – a collective comprised 
of the BC Assembly of First Nations, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs and the 
First Nations Summit - focused their definition of reconciliation as a process 
rooted in the recognition of a more meaningful role for Aboriginal govern-
ments in decision-making about their traditional territories: 
Reconciliation in the context of the relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Crown is about sovereignty. It involves reconciling the reality “of prior occupation of North 
America by distinctive aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over 
Canadian territory” (Van der Peet). This reconciliation is of sovereignties, with its ultimate 
expression being in developing shared and collaborative patterns of how sovereigns will 
interact with each other with respect to governing and making decisions. Reconciliation of 
this nature and scope is not a mere adjustment to processes of Crown decision-making, or 
a mechanistic and forumulaic exchange of information. It is much broader, extensive, and 
complex than this. (The First Nations Leadership Council, 11)
With government and First Nations’ visions of reconciliation seemingly at 
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odds, it makes sense that ADR processes designed to advance reconciliation 
between them have not been more successful. In thinking about the role of 
ADR in creating shifts in the relationship between distinct societies who have 
experienced protracted and deep-rooted conflict over land, Herbert Kelman’s 
conception of peacemaking processes provides a useful frame for analysis of 
the situation in Canada.
Kelman categorizes peacemaking processes into three distinct yet inter-
connected groups : conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict rec-
onciliation.
Conflict settlement refers to the negotiation of a political agreement where 
the relationship between the parties is narrowly defined by their respective 
roles as set out in an agreement and compliance is carefully monitored by both 
sides. (Kelman) While negotiated settlements may be constructed around the 
political interests in both societies, they are often imposed by third parties 
and not designed to change the quality of the relationship between them. The 
resulting relationship is likely to be short-term, and potentially unstable with 
little or no change in attitude or perceptions each society holds toward the 
other. 
In contrast to conflict settlement, conflict resolution refers to the achieve-
ment of agreements that engender long-term cooperative relationships and 
address the fundamental needs, fears and sense of justice of both sides. 
Conflict resolution goes beyond the realist view of national interests. It explores the 
cause of conflict, particularly causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs for identity, 
security, recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions responsive to the needs 
of both sides through active engagement in joint problem solving. Hence, agreements 
achieved through a process of genuine conflict resolution – unlike compromises achieved 
through a bargaining process brokered or imposed by third parties – are likely to engender 
the two parties’ long-term commitment to the outcome and to transform their relation-
ship. (Kelman, 1)
Unlike conflict settlement, agreements arising from conflict resolution are 
not imposed by third parties as would be the case in the use of arbitration. 
Rather they are arrived at “interactively”, moving beyond an interest-based 
settlement and expressed in the shared belief that cooperation and peace are 
in the best interest of both societies. Thus, successful conflict resolution rep-
resents a shift in the relationship based on trust in the other’s interest in sus-
taining a partnership (Kelman, 10). While the quality of the relationship is 
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stronger than what might be expected from a process of conflict settlement, 
this relationship may also have its limits and be vulnerable to changes in in-
terest, circumstance and leadership. For in this new relationship, “new at-
titudes develop alongside old ones, but are not necessarily integrated with 
one’s pre-existing value structure and belief system – with ones’ worldview. 
This means that old attitudes – including attitudes of fundamental distrust 
and negation of the other – remain intact even as new attitudes, associated 
with the new relationship, take shape.” (Kelman, 11) 
The above conception of conflict resolution can be likened in many ways 
to the British Columbia treaty process. With its design rooted in the inter-
est-based model, the process involves a level of “interactivity” between Ab-
original leadership and the Crown to explore their interests with the objective 
of arriving at agreements that outline both individual and joint responsibili-
ties under a new government-to-government partnership. Through a formal 
process of ratification by the Aboriginal group and royal assent by govern-
ment, the agreements are brought permanently under the umbrella of section 
35(1), making the new partnership long-lasting. Constitutional protection of 
the agreement further supports a shift from a historically power-over rela-
tionship to one where the decision-making authorities of each government, 
whether separate or shared, must be respected. 
Within Kelman’s three categories of peace-building, reconciliation rep-
resents a distinct process, qualitatively different from conflict resolution. He 
says, 
Reconciliation is obviously continuous with and linked to conflict resolution and it 
certainly is not an alternative to it. But whereas conflict resolution refers to the process of 
achieving a mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between two societies, rec-
onciliation refers to the process whereby societies learn to live together in the post-conflict 
environment. (Kelman, 3) 
Kelman goes further to suggest the result of a conflict reconciliation is the 
expression of a shared value system that distinct individuals and groups in-
ternalize and becomes fully integrated into the political cultures and belief 
systems of once conflicting societies. 
We noted above that the Government of Canada predominantly views 
reconciliation over lands as achievable through the establishment of treaty 
agreements and other agreements that result from its consultation efforts. 
Yet Kelman suggests that reconciliation should be a driving force in shaping 
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the relationship of the negotiating societies, and begin at much earlier stages 
of the negotiation process. He says “reconciliation is, after all, a process as 
well as an outcome; as such, it should ideally be set into motion from the be-
ginning of a peace process and as an integral part of it.” (Kelman, 2)
From this perspective, ADR has a potentially important place in the broad-
er project of reconciliation in Canada. Legal adversarialism is inconsistent 
with this vision of reconciliation. ADR contains the potential to contribute 
to the design and implementation of processes that are capable of making 
progress in this dynamic and diverse context. However, the limited focus of 
conventional ADR on achieving political and economic certainty gives rise to 
a context where the Crown and Aboriginal people value the process different-
ly and have competing expectations of the outcomes. From this perspective, 
the process of reconciliation and the work of aligning ADR with the goal of 
creating large-scale shifts in the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and 
the rest of Canada has only just begun. 
b. The Role of Worldviews
The relationship between worldviews and dispute resolution has been ex-
plored in various ways, including, as discussed earlier, in relation to culture 
and conflict. Generally speaking worldviews might be understood as the ‘lens’ 
or ‘frame’ through which an individual understands and interprets the world. 
As Clarke-Habibi describes:
Worldviews reflect the way an individual or group perceives reality, human nature, 
the purpose of human life and the laws governing human relationships (Danesh, 2004). 
For the most part, we are only partially conscious of the worldviews we hold. Neverthe-
less, worldview determines where we see ourselves going, what we understand to be the 
processes taking place around us, and what we believe our role in these processes can and 
should be.
Worldviews develop in the contexts of family, religion, culture, and school; and are 
additionally shaped by the political environment, the media and our life experiences. Dis-
cussed in their various aspects as “social representations” (Moscovici, 1993), “dispositions” 
(Brabeck, 2001) “cultural fabric” (Hägglund, 1999) and “collective narratives and beliefs” 
(Salomon, 2003), worldviews “are constructed, transmitted, confirmed, and reconstructed 
in social interactions, and they mediate social action”. In other words, worldviews influ-
ence everything we think, feel and do. (41)
As noted earlier, in one set of application, the concept of worldview can be 
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used to understand the relationship between culture and conflict. As Lebaron 
writes:
Our cultures exist within larger structures called ‘worldviews’. In her new book In 
Search of Human Nature, Mary Clark defines worldviews as “beliefs and assumptions by 
which an individual makes sense of experiences that are hidden deep within the language 
and traditions of the surrounding society.” These worldviews are the shared values and 
assumptions on which rest the customs, norms, and institutions of any particular society. 
Clark tells us that these worldviews are tacitly communicated by “origin myths, narrative 
stories, linguistic metaphors, and cautionary tales”, and that they “set the ground rules for 
shared cultural meaning.” (LeBaron)
This understanding of the relationship between culture and worldviews 
has significance for conflict and conflict resolution in a range of ways, includ-
ing for communication styles and how meanings are conveyed, assessing how 
individuals and groups may impose their worldviews on others, the need to 
understand cultures in order to work effectively across cultures, as sources 
for analyzing and understanding conflicts, and as a frame for understanding 
how shared meanings may be built. (LeBaron)
In addition to the important and clear connection to culture, the concept of 
worldview has also been used to identify an individual’s orientation towards 
conflict, behaviours in situations of conflict, and to the meaning and purpose 
of resolution. From this perspective, one finds discussions of how certain 
worldviews might be more prone to conflict – or conflict-oriented – while 
other worldviews might be more, for example, unity or peace-oriented. For 
example, writing in the context of peace education, Clarke-Habibi observes:
Most of the peoples of the world live with conflict-oriented worldviews (Van Slyck, 
Stern and Elbedour, 1999). Indeed, conflict-oriented worldviews are so firmly positioned 
as the norm in our societies that they pass undetected even when interwoven into peace 
education lessons, let alone other issues, discussions and activities that occupy us on a 
daily basis. The result is a perpetuation of cultures of conflict in which people feel them-
selves to be conflicted, engage in conflicts at home and at work, prepare themselves and 
their children for future conflicts, and recount their past conflicts in cultural and historical 
narratives. (41)
Relatedly, worldviews have been used to describe certain conflict resolu-
tion models as well as individual orientations towards situations of conflict. 
Perhaps most famously, Baruch Bush and Folger, in the development of their 
model of transformative mediation, drew a distinction between a relation-
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al worldview and a problem-solving worldview. Processes and practices in-
formed by a relational worldview are fundamental to overcoming the limits of 
the problem-solving approach, which typically have an end result that “is not 
more satisfaction and justice but less.” (74) In another application, Danesh 
and Danesh draw a direct correlation between worldviews and the approach-
es to conflict and conflict resolution that individuals may take. Certain worl-
dviews may align with authoritarian and force-based coercion, others with 
competitive power-struggle approaches, while others may tend towards being 
more relational and unity-centered. Danesh and Danesh make three main 
arguments:
(1) that conflict resolution practices reflect particular worldviews; (2) that worldviews 
exist in a gradual, evolutionary process; and (3) that some worldviews are more prone to 
conflict and violence, while others to unity and peace. (Danesh and Danesh)
All of these approaches to the relationship between worldview, conflict, 
and conflict resolution zero in on the reality that approaches to conflict res-
olution must be understood and analyzed from much more than a process 
lens, and indeed an over pre-occupation on process itself reflects a particular 
cultural and worldview lens. From this perspective, to achieving reconcilia-
tion, for example, requires not only a particular process that is conducive to 
that objective, but the process itself and those involved in the process must 
also be informed by a particular worldview. To use the language of Baruch 
Bush and Folger, it might be said that problem-solving processes that reflect 
a problem-solving worldview implemented by parties with problem-solving 
worldviews, are not conducive to advancing reconciliation between Aborigi-
nal and non-Aboriginal peoples. Such reconciliation requires engaging across 
cultures and building new relationships that speak to the past, present and 
the future. Similarly, to employ the model of Danesh and Danesh, a con-
flict-oriented worldview and processes that reflect such a worldview and may 
be authoritarian and competitive in nature, are fundamentally ill-suited to 
the project of reconciliation. Rather, the project of reconciliation by necessity 
requires an orientation towards relationships and unity, and a process design 
that reinforces that orientation.
While the need for processes, and individuals engaged in efforts at rec-
onciliation, to reflect particular worldviews may appear quite obvious and 
straightforward, it does have potentially far-reaching implications. For ex-
ample, Danesh and Danesh suggest that challenging worldviews requires 
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critically examining our most basic assumptions about conflict – including 
assumptions that underlie the major models of ADR that are employed. For 
example, they discuss the potential implications of the assumption that con-
flict is an inevitable and innate dimension of human existence – something 
that is assumed in most predominant models of mediation and negotiation 
– and challenge scholars and practitioners to examine more deeply the con-
structed nature of conflict at both the psychological and social levels.
This is all to suggest that the relative lack of success in the use of ADR 
in the Aboriginal context in Canada, such as in the British Columbia treaty 
process, is because it attempts to achieve reconciliation through processes 
and individual orientations that are not consciously reflective of the goal it 
is setting out to achieve. At the same time, the relative lack of use of ADR 
to advance reconciliation reinforces the observation that a worldview con-
ducive to reconciliation is not predominant in this context, and hence the 
decision-makers involved have been hesitant to move in the direction of ADR 
processes that might be more suitable than the courts for achieving that goal. 
Stated another way, we don’t use ADR very much in this context because a 
conflict-oriented worldview continues to predominate, and when we do use 
ADR we use it badly for the same reason. 
Part 5 - Conclusion
In an age of intensifying social integration, when human beings are expe-
riencing and interacting with each other in an increasingly regular and varied 
manner, for ADR to remain continually responsive and relevant we need to 
be open to dynamically explore the fundamental purposes of ADR and what it 
may represent, and be ready to look beyond process, and towards underlying 
worldviews and orientations, to be successful in ADR’s use. On the surface, 
the issue of Aboriginal reconciliation in Canada seems an ideal context for the 
use of ADR. But the reality is that predominant constructions of ADR do not 
fit the challenge of reconciliation. When one peels away the layer of process, 
one finds that ADR processes are imbued with cultural norms and worldviews 
that don’t match with the purpose of reconciliation. Reconciliation is not just 
a problem to be solved. Efforts to align “interests” do not easily succeed in a 
context where the purpose of the process deals with matters of the past, pres-
ent, and future, engages issues of trust, respect, and understanding, demands 
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multiples forms of redress, compensation, and recognition, and demands 
that parties, through healing, build a different future together. 
Importantly, this mis-fit between many predominant forms of ADR and 
the project of reconciliation, highlights two discourses within the field of ADR 
itself. The first discourse might be labeled as one about the move towards pro-
active processes. The majority of ADR processes are designed and developed 
as methods to resolve conflicts once they have arisen – to provide an alterna-
tive to how they are resolved. The proactive shift is to highlight how we may 
focus work in this field to create dynamics and conditions where the intensity 
and incidences of conflict are lessened. There are many different approaches 
to this proactive theme, whether it is in terms of taking a systems approach, 
building in an “educative” dimension into conflict resolution processes, or 
turning an inward focus on the orientation an individual has to situations of 
conflict. (Danesh and Danesh) It might be said that if we are to get serious 
about ADR being an agent of reconciliation, such as in the Aboriginal context, 
then it demands we take a more proactive approach that is at once focused 
on creating conditions that lessen future conflict, while actively working to 
redress past and present challenges.
The second discourse relates to how we teach ADR. By far the predomi-
nant pedagogical model has been a highly prescriptive one – where individu-
als are trained in steps, stages, and skills, often in a mechanistic or formulaic 
manner. While such an approach has its merits – including that of transfer-
ability of skill and technique – it is increasingly unsuited to contexts and en-
vironments where forces of social integration have created layers of diversity 
and complexity that do not align easily with a predetermined model of resolv-
ing conflict. Similarly, where the underlying purpose is a comprehensive and 
overarching one, such as reconciliation, prescriptive formulas are often far 
too narrow to address the tangible and intangible dimensions that must be 
addressed. One counter to the prescriptive model is an iterative one, or what 
Lederach refers to as an “elicitive approach” to teaching peace-building skills. 
(Lederach 1995)
Lederach’s approach to teaching ADR is rooted in his particular approach to 
peacebuilding – which is widely referred to as conflict transformation. Lederach 
describes conflict transformation “as a set of lenses that combine to create a way 
to look at social conflict and develop responses”. (Lederach 2003) In his early 
writings, he summarizes the concept of transformation in conflict as follows: 
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Transformation as a concept is both descriptive of the conflict dynamics and prescrip-
tive of the overall purpose that building peace pursues, both in terms of changing de-
structive relationship patterns and in seeking systemic change. Transformation provides 
a language that more adequately approximates the nature of conflict and how it works 
and underscores the goals and purpose of the field. It encompasses a view that legitimizes 
conflict as an agent in relationships. It describes more accurately the impact of conflict 
on the patterns of communication, expression and perception. Transformation suggests a 
dynamic understanding that conflict can move in destructive and constructive directions, 
but proposes an effort to maximize the achievement of constructive, mutually beneficial 
processes and outcomes. (Lederach 1995, 18–19)
For Lederach - methods for teaching ADR should be thought of as trans-
formational or opportunities for discovery, creation, and solidification of 
models that emerge from the resources present in a particular conflict set-
ting and in response to the specific needs of that context. Conflict interven-
tion, and the teaching of conflict intervention models, does not happen in a 
straight line, rigid methodology or step-by-step guide. Rather, the teaching 
of conflict intervention, like the act of conflict intervention itself, takes place 
within its proper context and builds the skills of individuals to articulate a 
positive sense of identity and relationship to one another . 
This is all to suggest that practitioners, researchers, and scholars of ADR 
need to continue to foster, and deepen, the development of ever-more re-
sponsive processes that are capable of meeting the complexity of the contem-
porary world. The Aboriginal-Crown context in Canada illustrates the types 
of challenges to ADR in a world of social integration where conflicts at once 
engage historical wrongs, complex legal processes, diverse populations, and 
contemporary economic and social realities. ADR has a potentially significant 
contribution to make in such contexts, but currently that potential is relative-
ly untapped. In order to rise to meet this challenge, there is a responsibility to 
think in new, creative, and expansive ways about the underlying foundations 
of ADR and how to develop processes, and practitioners, that navigate and 
reflect this contemporary complexity.
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A FALSE ‘PRINCE CHARMING’ KEEPS ‘SLEEPING BEAUTY’ IN A COMA: 
ON VOLUNTARY MEDIATION BEING THE TRUE OXYMORON OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
Giuseppe de Palo
The recent publication of a study conducted for the European Parliament 
on Mediation 1  has contributed to the ongoing international debate about 
effective mediation policy. 2 I am the coordinator of that 230+ page study, 
whose results were based on 816 questionnaires completed by respondents 
coming from the 28 member states of the EU and the majority views reflected 
in those responses. 
The Rebooting study determined, in essence, that mediation in the EU is 
still the “Sleeping Beauty” I first heard about when I decided to enter into this 
field exactly 20 years ago, after shadowing a mediation at JAMS in San Fran-
cisco.  Indeed, in light of many decades of stagnation, and despite the gener-
ous injection of enthusiasm and repeated efforts to revive her, the consensus 
seems to be that our princess is, unfortunately, more than just asleep. The 
Rebooting study ultimately concluded that unless “elements of mandatory 
mediation” are introduced by law, Sleeping Beauty will not wake up, ever, at 
least on the EU side of the Atlantic Ocean.
In a thought-provoking article authored for Mediate.com, “What Went 
Wrong With Mediation”, my long-time friend and esteemed colleague Adi 
Gavrila discussed, amongst other things, the methodology, findings, and rec-
ommendations of the European study. In this little article, I would like to 
correct Adi’s errors on some material aspects of the study and, using his com-
ments about the study, address other arguments he makes. My discussion, I 
hope, will explain the title for my article, which I devote to all those who – in 
my view – are placing their hopes on a false Prince Charming.
Adi is correct in pointing out that the number of cases being mediated 
1  Rebooting the Mediation Directive: Assessing the Limited Impact of Its Implemen-
tation and Proposing Measures to Increase the Use of Mediations in the EU – hereafter, 
the ‘Rebooting study’ or ‘study’.
2  The study can be downloaded at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
etudes/join/2014/493042/IPOL-JURI_ET(2014)493042_EN.pdf; its official presenta-





remains disappointing, both in the US and the EU. The very low number of 
mediations taking place was the very reason the European Parliament com-
missioned the Rebooting study in the first place. However, in my view Adi is 
not correct in identifying the four major areas that cause the “EU Mediation 
Paradox” 3 he refers to. Let’s take these four areas into consideration one by 
one. While I will refer specifically to the EU, I presume that these consider-
ations are in good part applicable to other jurisdictions.
1. Policies. What Went Wrong is correct that promoting mediation solely 
by endorsing it as an alternative to overcrowded courts and expensive law-
suits is the wrong approach. Certainly though, mediation has been proven, 
over and over again, to save time and money (the Rebooting study, for exam-
ple, showed that close to 20 billion euro per year could be saved in the EU if 
mediation were used all the time, even with only a 50% success rate.) What, 
then, should legislators do, especially at a time of economic downturn?  How-
ever, the article’s contention that “introducing mediation as a way to ease the 
load of courts has backfired” seems unproven, especially if one considers the 
following: systems where lots of mediations take place (normally because of 
“mandatory elements” in the regulatory framework) see no increase in prob-
lems, or are even seeing improvement, while in systems where mediations 
are not happening people continually debate whether, and if so how, stronger 
incentives, or mandatory elements, should be introduced.
In addition to that, while easing the strain on overcrowded and overbur-
dened courts is clearly one of many valid reasons to promote mediation, it is 
not, and has never been, the only reason provided or recognized. The readers 
of Mediate.com need not be told, by me or anyone else, about the many indi-
vidual and societal benefits an increased use of mediations would bring. Still, 
if the issue here is one of “marketing”, as the articles points out, one should 
promote the message that is the most likely to prompt politicians to act, given 
the lack of spontaneous embrace of mediation by its users.
But the argument I find most unconvincing is that “simply increasing the 
number of judges to deal with the extra load” would be the best policy to 
address the litigants’ concerns. My colleague here seems to overlook that, as 
an economist would put it, “justice is a superior good”, ie, something that 
3  This expression was coined by my colleague Leonardo D’Urso and, to my knowl-
edge, is now common in EU circles since a presentation I did at the 2012 Fundamental 
Rights Conference (http://fra.europa.eu/en/event/2012/fundamental-rights-confer-
ence-2012-0#workinggroup5).
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the richer a society gets, the more it demands. From this point of view, an 
increase in the number of disputes signals that a given society is richer. More 
disputes are thus a good sign – I repeat – from that point of view.  And even 
if one were to add more judges (assuming, that is, that the economy was the 
opposite of what it is nowadays), very likely there would continue to be even 
more disputes. An analogy I find useful to explain this concept comes from 
traffic. Increased traffic is a drag, but it normally means increasing business. 
The issue, then, is not to hope that there would be fewer cars on the street (or, 
fewer people litigating), but to govern traffic, incentivizing certain avenues 
and de-incentivizing others, at least on an experimental basis. If one just adds 
more streets or parking spaces, more cars will hit the road.
Adi Gavrila goes on to note “that satisfaction with mediation is not con-
sistently greater when compared to satisfaction with courts.” Although this 
might hold true with parties at the beginning of the court process, most 
people ultimately come to regret, at times profoundly, their day in court. 
Indeed, I do not think it was a self-interested mediator, or a lawyer, who 
first said “a bad settlement is better than a good trial” or, going way back to 
Latin, “summum ius, summa iniuria”.  I am positive that saying this first or 
more often are the litigants themselves, and often both winner and loser in 
court.
I also disagree with Adi where, in reference to the Rebooting study, he 
states that supporters of mandatory mediation are self-interested mediators 
themselves. First of all, a large number of study respondents were not media-
tors. Second, several respondents were against mandatory mediation. Third, 
those who favored it pointed out the potential push-back mandatory medi-
ation could confront. Fourth, and most importantly, the EU study does not 
support mandatory mediation. Rather, the study maintains that “mandatory 
elements” are necessary for the success of mediation in the EU and, nota-
bly, that the best system (both in terms of actual performance and support 
expressed by the respondents) is one of mandatory mediation with the pos-
sibility of an unrestrained (and cheap) opt-out at the first meeting with the 
mediator.  In short, the study suggested a “smarter” form of the increasing-
ly common mandatory mediation information meetings. Such information 
meetings, based on an “opt-in” model to participate in mediation, are simply 
proving to be of little effectiveness. Strikingly, this model, not promoted by 
the study, is used in Adi’s own country (don’t forget, we are not just good 
friends, but mediators, too; hence, I of course reached out to him before pub-
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lishing this article, to learn more about “What Went Wrong … With Him and 
His Country’s Mediation Law”!)
Adi goes on to say that “mandatory mediation is a sort of oxymoron – 
nobody can force people to negotiate.”  Here my disagreement with him is 
greater, as a matter of both law and practice. First, laws requiring litigants to 
exhaust pre-litigation processes have existed in the US for over 100 hundred 
years, and passed Supreme Court scrutiny (if I remember correctly, the US 
leading case is Capital Traction, of 1899). The European Court of Justice, 
too, held in its “Alassini” case 4 that mandatory mediation is consistent with 
EU law so long as it serves a general purpose and does not make access to the 
judicial system too burdensome.  Second, as a matter of practice, what is a 
heavier and more legally intolerable obligation to negotiate: being “forced” 
by law to sit down and talk with a mediator (with the possibility of opting 
out at little or no cost), or being “de facto” obliged to settle right way to avoid 
spending a fortune in legal fees, and waiting for years, as happens in coun-
tries where fewer than 5% of the civil disputes get to trial? Third, and most 
fundamentally, requiring people to think about the possible benefits of nego-
tiating is different from requiring them to negotiate. 
I would add a note here about an epiphenomenon of mandatory mediation 
demonstrated in my home country of Italy. As some people know, media-
tion has quite a history here. After decades of negligible annual numbers of 
mediations, the switch turned ON in 2011, when mandatory mediation came 
into force for certain civil actions. From virtually one day to the next, media-
tions increased to over two hundred thousand annually. At the end of 2012, 
though, the switch turned OFF, overnight, when the Italian Constitutional 
Court ruled that the legislative process that had introduced mandatory me-
diation was faulty. (In other words, the Court did not address the issue of the 
constitutionality ‘per se’ of mandatory mediation – it only ruled that man-
datory mediation should have been introduced with a parliamentary act, not 
the governmental regulation that was used.)  The switch went back ON when 
the mandatory requirement was re-installed, this time with parliamentary 
approval, in September 2013.  The most interesting bit is this: 20% of the 
200,000+ mediations initiated before the Italian Court quashed the manda-
tory mediation requirement were voluntary. Right after that decision, ALL 
kinds of mediations stopped. And now, with the return of mandatory media-
tion, BOTH voluntary and mandatory mediations are being started again at a 
4  Http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-317/08&language=en.
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very high rate. In short, at least in Italy, requiring mediation for some cases 
tends to promote voluntary use of mediation for others.
Going back to What Went Wrong, , my colleague argues there that poli-
cymakers and mediators are conspiring: they “have made an unholy alliance 
to force people into using a service they haven’t particularly liked or found 
useful.” I have no evidence of this plot, but certainly that is not the mediation 
model the Rebooting study recommends: if parties do not find mediation use-
ful, or they do not like it for whatever reason, they are free to opt-out and seek 
recourse through the court system. But at least they have to give the process 
serious consideration by just showing up. Is that too much to ask of citizens 
who do not want to pay extra taxes and, at the same time, want access to a 
better dispute resolution system?
About lawyers being reluctant to use mediation on a grand scale, I only 
partially agree with Adi. That is, there is resistance by lawyers to elements 
of mandatory mediation, especially in the beginning; however, given time, 
many lawyers have become the greatest supporters even of “very mandato-
ry” (ie, without easy opt-out) forms of mediation. Argentina, is one example. 
Italy, another.  Let me be clear on this, at least about my own country. There 
are still opponents to the current model of mandatory mediation with easy 
opt-out, but the majority of lawyers are now in favor, and they actually began 
creating the busiest mediation centers when “very mandatory mediation” was 
the law. Lawyers are still almost exclusively trained in the adversarial model, 
and there is certainly an “adversarial self-selection” factor in those choosing 
law school in the first place.  So resistance, even strong resistance, by the legal 
profession should be neither a surprise, nor a reason to be fearful of advocat-
ing for a better model.
Having spoken with Adi at various international conferences about this 
very aspect, I am a bit puzzled when his article seems to suggest that I would 
be satisfied by the large number of mediations, as if settlement rate and, even 
more, user satisfaction would not count. But I guess we mediators experience 
every day, perhaps more than anyone else, the difference beween written and 
oral communication. Anyway, even aside from the discussion as to what real-
ly is a “failed mediation”, amongst others I would like to remind us all of the 
Australian experience. There, mandatory and voluntary models co-exist and 
the success and user satisfaction rates are comparable. What is not compara-




I have been using the seat belt or helmet law example for quite some time 
now, to explain why it is naïve – in my view – to keep on blaming the “lack of 
culture” for the limited use of mediation. Based on the definition of justice as a 
superior good, which I alluded to above, and on the well-known “fight or flight” 
animal response to an attack, I argue that the human being’s initial, natural re-
sponse to a legal conflict (or the threat of it) is not mediation, but litigation--de-
spite the fact that, overall, the better approach, at least in the vast majority of 
the cases, is an amicable process. My point is the following: people know that 
wearing a seat belt or a helmet is good for them (and society); still, we have laws 
compelling that behavior.  A “culture of safe driving” alone won’t do it.
Similarly, human beings suffer from well documented biases (“optimis-
tic overconfidence” comes quickly to mind) that would lead the majority of 
them not to insure their vehicles, even if that is an economically irrational 
choice, both for the individual and the society. Well, Adi says that my analogy 
compares things that are not comparable, because people have the choice to 
litigate or not, but not that of buying insurance (or wearing a helmet on mo-
torbike) or not. I think it is plain that people do have a clear choice in both 
cases, and it is actually very similar: taking the risk of losing in court, or that 
of being caught and fined by the police. 
In my view, What Went Wrong takes at times the wrong perspective. Just 
as the article focuses on the problem of mandatory mediation encountering 
initial opposition, and not on what happens later, it also considers the in-
dividual case when it states that there are no advantages to mediation over 
litigation, and not at the big (policy) picture. Of course, if a person faces liti-
gation once in a lifetime, is obliged to mediate first, and the mediation “fails” 
(once again, depending on what that really means), that person might be un-
happy with mandatory mediation. But policy is not about one individual, but 
the majority of people. To explain this, to the author of ‘What Went Wrong’ 
and those still sitting tiredly on the old adage “you can lead a horse to the 
river, but you cannot make it drink” (ie, you can force people to enter the 
mediation room, but not to settle), please allow me to resort to the example I 
used presenting the Rebooting study before the European Parliament: “lead 
millions of horses (ie, all your civil disputes, or categories of them) to the riv-
er, calculate the benefits resulting from those that drink and the losses from 
those that did not, and then decide what’s best for the majority”. And don’t 
forget, at least in the Rebooting study recommendation, all horses are free to 
turn away (‘opt out’) once they are at the river!
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I would add another piece on the Rebooting study, which is the recom-
mendation on experimenting with “mitigated mandatory mediation” (the 
study’s phrase for “mandatory mediation with an easy opt-out system”) by 
not introducing it full scale right way. This approach is already being used 
in diverse locations. The Italian law I have mentioned foresees only a 4 year 
trial (with a pit stop after two years). Most interestingly, I understand that 
a similar trial, though of 18 months only, is taking place at this time in the 
Manhattan Commercial Court of New York State.
2. Marketing mediation. Adi’s second argument is that mediation is not 
being used enough because mediators have failed to market it correctly. He 
states that “as taxpayers in a democratic society, [it] is [the parties’] right to 
unrestrained access to justice.” I disagree on two counts. First, access to jus-
tice is not unrestrained, nor is it fully sustained by the litigants’ own money 
as is claimed. In Adi’s country Romania, for instance, according to the 2014 
CEPEJ report 5, the state only receives 13% of court costs from litigants. The 
remaining 87% of the costs are born by those who do not litigate. When the 
EU is looked at as a whole, the average amount received from litigants does 
increase, but to cover only 30% of the costs. Would Romanian citizens prefer 
an increase of about 800% of the court fees, so as to pay in full for the ser-
vice they get, or would they rather try a (smart) form of mitigated mandatory 
mediation? In addition to that, would Romanian lawyers be more opposed to 
this particular form of mediation, or to almost tripling the current court fees, 
so as to reach the EU average?
My colleague goes on to state that “promoting mediation as cost-effective 
is also risky,” and that the mediation approach relegates disputes to an inferi-
or quality process and fails to understand the importance of a dispute for par-
ties. But for those parties concerned that mediation is of an inferior quality, 
the opt-out approach preserves their concerns and allows them to “opt-out” 
of mediation and seek resolution via the court system. 
Adi next states “that, if people really want something, they are ready to pay 
the price for that.” The very high premium, over actual production costs, that 
consumers pay for certain consumer products is his example. This statement 
seems to assume, with “neoclassical economics’, that human beings are per-
fectly rational resource “optimizers”. Behavioral economics first, and neuro-
science more recently, have shown us that this isn’t the case at all. Translated 




were in fact perfectly rational, as Adi assumes, why would people “forced” to 
mediate settle one out of 2 cases (as it is the case in Italy today)? Or why in the 
US would otherwise similar foreclosure mediations programs register 25% 
take-up, when the system is “opt-in”, and over 70% when it is opt-out?  And 
please, let’s stop with phrases such as forcing “mediation down the throats of 
users.” Limited or free opt-out always exists, where mediation is mandato-
ry at some level; moreover, although mediation or mediation consideration 
might be mandatory, the outcome is always voluntary.
3. and 4. Mediators’ behavior and practice, and mediation regulation. Ac-
cording to What Went Wrong, there is no universal definition of mediation, 
and this is why the process is not embraced widely, because promoting a trade 
lacking a very definition is nonsensical. I am not convinced by this statement 
for three reasons. First, many fields and professions lack a universally ac-
cepted definition or standard, but that does not seem to affect their credibil-
ity. Second, does a universal definition even matter as long as mediators are 
solving problems and resolving disputes? Third, at least the Rebooting study 
seem to indicate the contrary; indeed, the view of the majority of the study 
respondents, asked about the usefulness (on a scale of five, from very negative 
to very positive) of a number of measures to promote mediation in the EU, 
listed a standard certification of mediators as the very last one. 
Mediation has fallen short of expectations in the EU and the US, and in 
that much Adi and I agree. I know this is a strong criticism of his article, but I 
have tried to explain here the reasons why, and I have conveyed them to him 
first. Consequently, also strong is my answer to the question of “What Went 
Wrong”. I believe that is the mediators who (rightly) claim that the “media-
tion romance” is over, but, jaded by the failure of their romantic vision, wish 
to keep the princess in the coma, or even entomb her, rather than wake her. 
They are (wrongly) unwilling, or incapable, to accept reality that efforts such 
as the EU Rebooting study, and others before, have been presenting for a 
number of decades now: the voluntary approach is a false Prince Charming, 
as far as dispute resolution policy is concerned. People are not enchanted by 
the vision of mediation, and the princess must be awoken by other, real-world 
means. Smart forms of mandatory mediation—a more flexible approach than 
most recognize—increase the number of mediations. Rejecting that reality, 
and wishing that a more idealistic approach would work, is the fairy-tale, ide-
alistic vision that has kept us in the situation we confront today for too long.
In the end, Adi himself admits that “it would be really insulting to suppose 
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users can’t understand the obvious advantages [that] mediation brings.” If 
the users are not the ignorant ones, the only ones left to blame are the me-
diators.  But I do not think that mediators are ignorant, either. I am simply 
convinced that instead of hoping that a marketing guru will enlighten them 
(and perhaps the users, too) at the ‘Global Pound Conference6, the mediators 
should speak directly to policy makers and legislators, presenting numbers, 
admitting mistakes, making and asking commitments. Besides, in the true 
spirit of mediation’s efficiency, if marketing and mediators taking notes is all 
there is to make mediation happen, why not pulling together all the money 
needed to organize such a conference to retain--right now--the world’s fore-
most marketing expert for our industry?
Adi and I discussed this at length by now, and we do fully agree on some-
thing. Sleeping Beauty needs eventually her magic kiss, and the mediation 
world needs a tournament of all its best knights, that is, discussing new ideas, 
no matter how diverse. Let’s make the new Pound Conference the place where 
all those knights work together to wake the princess up … there will be plenty 
of mediators there to settle the issue of who should then marry her. 
6  The idea of a new ‘Pound Conference’ is brilliantly presented in a recent article 
written by Michael Leathes and Debbie Masucci. See Http://www.imimediation.org/glob-
al-pound-conference.

PROGRAMA DE DERIVACIÓN JUDICIAL EN PUERTO RICO
DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DE LA MEDIACIÓN
Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán, M.H.A., J.D. Ph.D.1 
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
El propósito de este escrito es discutir las experiencias de Puerto Rico con 
la mediación intrajudicial y compartir algunas de mis vivencias como abo-
gada, profesora, y conflictóloga con programas de mediación. En las últimas 
décadas la práctica de la mediación intrajudicial se ha incrementado en el 
mundo. El uso de la mediación intrajudicial ha sido muy popular y a la misma 
vez sumamente controversial. Muchos jueces, abogados, y participantes en 
estos procesos de mediación le dan la bienvenida a métodos alternos que le 
permitan resolver las disputas de manera rápida y eficiente a un costo razon-
able. Otros argumentan que la mediación intrajudicial priva a las partes de su 
derecho constitucional a tener su día en corte y podría fomentar acuerdos in-
justos o contrarios a derecho. A pesar de estas preocupaciones, la mediación 
intrajudicial parece haber llegado para quedarse. 
En Latinoamérica y el Caribe se han importado los modelos de media-
ción estadounidenses. Esta situación como discutiré más adelante, puede ser 
un arma de doble filo. En Puerto Rico se ha logrado establecer un programa 
de mediación intrajudicial en el cual se integran varias técnicas y principios 
anglosajones, atemperándolas a las idiosincrasias caribeñas. Para explicar 
cómo se ha logrado este proceso, ofrezco un breve trasfondo del programa 
de mediación intrajudicial en Puerto Rico, la adaptación cultural de modelos 
estadounidenses, y lecciones aprendidas de estas experiencias.
Antes de proceder con esta discusión me es imperativo compartir algu-
nas premisas de la cuales parte mi análisis y discusión. Como muy bien di-
1  Catedrática Asociada, The Werner Institute for Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, 
Creighton University. Este capítulo es una versión editada de un capítulo publicado en Me-
diación y Resolución de Conflictos: Técnicas y Ámbitos, Helena Soleto Muñoz, Emiliano 
Carretero Morales y Cristina Ruiz López (Eds.), Madrid, España: Editorial Tecnos, 2011. 
Agradezco al Negociado de Métodos Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos del Tribunal 
Supremo del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, en particular a su Directora la Sra. 
Ana E. Romero Velilla, por suministrarme la data estadística de los centros de mediación 




jera RicoueR, “uno siempre filosofa desde algún sitio.”2 Primeramente, como 
abogada soy de la creencia que el desvío de casos a métodos alternos debe 
siempre tener como fin impartir justicia. Los métodos alternos de resolución 
de conflicto en muchas ocasiones descongestionan los tribunales y aceleran 
la tramitación de los casos. Sin embargo, desde mi punto de vista la rápida 
tramitación de casos no es un fin en si mismo, sino más bien una consecuen-
cia positiva de la eficiente tramitación de la justicia lograda por medio de 
los métodos alternos. Comparto la opinión del Profesor Muñiz ARguelles, “La 
justicia lenta no es justicia, pero la adjudicación acelerada y forzada puede no 
serlo tampoco.”3 
Segundo, mis experiencias a través de los años me han convencido de la 
necesidad de adoptar modelos interdisciplinarios en el desarrollo y la imple-
mentación de programas de métodos alternos de resolución de conflictos. 
La interdisciplinaridad “integra conocimiento y maneras de pensar de dos o 
más disciplinas […] para generar avances cognitivos y prácticos (e.g., expli-
car un fenómeno, crear un producto, desarrollar un método, encontrar una 
solución, crear una interrogante) que no sería posible si utilizamos una sola 
disciplina.”4 Los conflictos con los que se lidia en el ámbito judicial son de-
masiado complejos para pretender que por medio del narcisismo disciplinar-
io se puede llegar a soluciones justas y holísticas. A tales efectos, me parece 
imprescindible que en el proceso de desarrollar programas de métodos alter-
nos se solicite de manera proactiva el insumo de profesionales, no tan sólo 
en el área del derecho, sino también de profesionales en disciplinas como 
conflictología, psicología, antropología, y sociología, entre otros.
Tercero, mis pasadas experiencias también me han convencido que en 
el mundo globalizado en que vivimos es de suma importancia nutrirnos y 
aprender de las experiencias de cómo otros países han establecido programas 
de métodos alternos conectados con el tribunal. Aunque hay varios elemen-
tos culturales que nos separan, también hay varios que nos unen como seres 
humanos. Un padre luchando por la custodia de su hijo, una madre batal-
2  RICOEUR, Paul. Reply to David Steward, En Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.) The Philoso-
phy of Paul Ricoeur. USA: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1995, p. 443.
3  MUÑIZ ARGUELLES, Luis. La Negociación & La Mediación. San Juan, Puerto 
Rico: Ediciones Situm, 2006, p. 5.
4  STROBER, Myra H. Interdisciplinary Conversations: Challenging Habits of 
Thought. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 15-16, citando a MAN-
SILLA, Veronica Boix. Assessing Expert Interdisciplinary Work at the Frontier: An Empir-
ical Exploration. Research Evaluation, 2006, 15(1), p. 17-29.
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lando en los tribunales por la pensión alimenticia de sus hijos, un empleado 
tratando de reivindicar su derecho al trabajo, y un prisionero tratando de 
reclamar sus derechos civiles no son experiencias foráneas para la gran may-
oría de los tribunales en el mundo. Todos estos individuos reclaman justicia. 
Por supuesto, hay variaciones en cómo cada cual define estos conceptos, pero 
todos terminan inmersos en la cultura judicial. Por lo tanto, soy de la opinión 
que se puede, y se debe, ampliar nuestros conocimientos compartiendo las 
distintas experiencias y métodos alternos establecidos en distintos tribunales 
alrededor del mundo. Estados Unidos es uno de los países que usualmente es 
catalogado como uno de avanzada en métodos alternos y muchas veces sus 
programas son objeto de estudios para ver cómo implementar sus modelos 
en otros países. Sin embargo, recomiendo ejercer gran cautela y evitar copiar 
modelos importados a ciegas. Debemos recordar que los conflictos surgen en 
contextos socio-culturales y los mecanismos para resolver los mismos deben 
ser culturalmente sensitivos a estos contextos. 
II. PROGRAMA DE MEDIACIÓN EN PUERTO RICO: MIRANDO AL 
NORTE SIN OLVIDARNOS DEL SUR 
1. Breve trasfondo histórico del desarrollo del poder judicial en Puerto Rico
El poder judicial en Puerto Rico está íntimamente ligado al poder judicial 
de Estados Unidos a pesar de que Puerto Rico no es un estado de dicha na-
ción. En 1898 a raíz de la Guerra Hispanoamericana y la firma del Tratado de 
París entre España y Estados Unidos, España cede a Estados Unidos a Puerto 
Rico. El Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos ha descrito esta nueva rel-
ación con Estados Unidos de la siguiente manera, “Puerto Rico pertenece a, 
pero no es parte de” los Estados Unidos.5 
Para el 1952, Puerto Rico desarrolló su propia Constitución bajo lo que 
se conoce como el Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. Este cambio no in-
corporó a Puerto Rico a los Estados Unidos, pero tampoco convirtió a Puerto 
Rico en una nación soberana. Por ejemplo, bajo el sistema de gobierno actual 
los puertorriqueños no pueden votar por el Presidente de los Estados Unidos 
5  Downes v. Bidwell 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901). En el mismo sentido, Balzac v. Peo-




y no tienen representación en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos, a pesar que 
muchas leyes federales de dicho país aplican en Puerto Rico.6  
Sin embargo, la Constitución del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico 
creó un Tribunal General de Justicia con jurisdicción sobre toda la isla. Con-
forme a la Ley de la Judicatura de Puerto Rico, el sistema judicial de Puerto 
Rico está compuesto de un Tribunal Supremo, el Tribunal de Apelaciones, y 
el Tribunal de Primera Instancia.7 El Tribunal Supremo es el foro de última 
instancia en todo asunto judicial y sus decisiones no son revisables, excepto 
cuando la decisión afecta un derecho bajo la Constitución de los Estados Uni-
dos o una ley federal en cuyo caso se puede acudir en alzada a la jurisdicción 
federal. El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico es un tribunal colegiado y está 
compuesto del Juez Presidente y seis Jueces Asociados. El Tribunal de Apel-
aciones es un foro intermedio entre el Tribunal Supremo y el Tribunal de Pri-
mera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones también es un tribunal colegiado 
que funciona en paneles de no menos de tres y no más de siete jueces. Fi-
nalmente, el Tribunal de Primera Instancia es de jurisdicción original y para 
fines administrativos está dividido en trece regiones judiciales.
Según discutido anteriormente, debido a la relación político-legal entre 
Estados Unidos y Puerto Rico ciertas decisiones del Tribunal Supremo de 
Puerto Rico, pueden ser revisadas por los tribunales federales de los Esta-
dos Unidos. La Constitución de EEUU y las leyes federales estadounidenses 
tienen primacía sobre la Constitución y las leyes del Estado Libre Asociado. 
Es precisamente debido a esta relación, que podría ser beneficioso explorar 
la manera en que la judicatura de Puerto Rico desarrolla un modelo de me-
diación intrajudicial adaptando los modelos estadounidenses a las realidades 
culturales de los puertorriqueños.
2. Desarrollo de los centros de mediación de conflictos adscritos al poder 
judicial de Puerto Rico y su base jurídica
En el 1980 el Secretariado de la Conferencia Judicial del Tribunal Supre-
6  El Congreso de los Estados Unidos también controla en Puerto Rico el servicio mil-
itar, las leyes de cabotaje, la moneda, el espacio aéreo, el comercio externo e interno, e 
inmigración, entre otros. Para una discusión más a fondo véase, FONT-GUZMÁN, Jac-
queline N. y ALEMAN, Yanira. Human rights violations in Puerto Rico: agency from the 
margins. Journal of Law & Social Challenges, 12, 2010, p. 107-149. Disponible en http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2121735. 
7  Ley de la Judicatura de Puerto Rico Núm. 201 del 22 de agosto de 2003.
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
111
mo de Puerto Rico propuso la implantación de métodos alternos no adversa-
tivos para resolver conflictos.8 La intención era agilizar los procedimientos 
judiciales ya que el informe del Secretariado concluyó que la litigación iba 
en aumento y había atrasos en el manejo de los casos ante el tribunal.9 A raíz 
de dicha Conferencia y las recomendaciones que surgieron de la misma, la 
legislatura de Puerto Rico aprobó fondos para establecer el primer centro de 
mediación intrajudicial en el centro judicial de San Juan.10 El objetivo princi-
pal de este primer centro fue evitar que los casos llegaran a los tribunales; el 
servicio era alternativo y no un mecanismo de desvío.11 Las personas acudían 
directamente al centro sin necesidad de tener que presentar una demanda 
ante el tribunal. Este primer centro de mediación fue evaluado en los años 
1983, 1987, y 1988; las evaluaciones arrojaron resultados tan positivos que 
comenzaron a establecerse centros a través de todas las regiones judiciales 
en Puerto Rico.12 Actualmente de las trece regiones judiciales, nueve tienen 
centros de mediación. 
El éxito con la mediación llevó al Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico a 
añadir el arbitraje y la evaluación neutral como métodos alternos adicionales 
al de la mediación.13 Además, el 25 de junio de 1998 fue aprobado el Regla-
mento de Métodos Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos por el Tribunal 
Supremo de Puerto Rico (en adelante, Reglamento de Métodos Alternos).14 
Este Reglamento tiene como propósito principal establecer las reglas que 
aplicarían a todos los casos que el tribunal refiera a los métodos alternos y 
estableció el Negociado de Métodos Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos 
8  GATELL GONZÁLEZ, Manuel y NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred. La mediación de 
conflictos: su desarrollo y su aplicación en Puerto Rico. Forum, Vol. 7, n0 . 2, 1991, p. 20-
26, 23.
9  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación. San Juan, Puerto Rico, Lexis-Nexis de Puerto Rico, Inc., 2001, p. 17. 
10  Ley Número 19, de 22 de septiembre de 1983, 4 L.P.R.A. §532 y ss. (en adelante, 
Ley de Mediación)
11  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y ROMERO VELILLA, Ana Elena. Justicia Alterna desde un Esce-
nario Judicial. Revista Interamericana de Psicología, Vol. 36, n0 .1 & 2, 2002, p. 299-310, 
309.
12  Ibidem., p. 303. 
13  Ibidem., p. 305.
14  El Reglamento de Métodos Alternos fue enmendado el 4 de marzo de 2005 
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(en adelante, Negociado). Con la aprobación del Reglamento de Métodos Al-
ternos, los métodos alternos no tan sólo son procedimientos alternos, sino 
también complementarios al proceso judicial ya que los casos pueden ser 
desviados a los centros de mediación.15 En mi opinión la creación del Nego-
ciado evidencia el compromiso del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico con los 
métodos alternos. El Negociado es dirigido por un Director nombrado por el 
Juez Presidente.16 Entre las funciones más importantes del Negociado están 
fomentar la utilización de los métodos alternos, servir como recurso y su-
pervisar todos los centros del tribunal, proveer adiestramiento, y certificar y 
supervisar a todos los interventores neutrales (estos incluyen, mediadores, 
árbitros, y evaluadores neutrales).17
Como dijera anteriormente, el presente escrito se circunscribe a la me-
diación. A tales efectos, dirijo la discusión específicamente a los centros de 
mediación conectados con el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico. Los objetivos 
principales de estos centros son:
(1) Fomentar la participación de las personas en la búsqueda de alternativas para el 
manejo de sus controversias; (2) Ayudar a las personas en controversia a llegar a acuerdos 
que consideren justos y razonables; (3) Atender controversias en forma sencilla, rápida, 
y económica; (4) Facilitar el desvío del proceso adversativo de ciertas controversias de 
tipo civil o criminal menos grave; y (5) Servir como fuente de información, orientación y 
referidos.18
Procedo a discutir como el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico, logró desar-
rollar e implementar un modelo efectivo de mediación conectado con el tri-
bunal nutriéndose y adaptando modelos de otros países incluyendo a Estados 
Unidos.
3. Desvío a métodos alternos para la solución de conflictos
Contrario a la tendencia de muchos centros de mediación homólogos en 
Estados Unidos que limitan sus servicios a una o dos especialidades, en Puer-
15  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y ROMERO VELILLA, Ana Elena. Justicia Alterna… cit. p. 310.
16  Reglamento de Métodos Alternos, según enmendado…, cit., Regla 2.01.
17  Ibidem., Regla 2.01.
18  GATELL GONZÁLEZ, Manuel y NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred. La mediación de 
conflictos… cit. p. 24.
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to Rico se optó por ofrecer servicios en varias áreas, incluyendo controver-
sias de familia, comunales, comerciales, escolares, casos criminales menos 
grave, y casos de menores.19 Como puede notarse, tanto casos civiles como 
criminales son elegibles para mediación. Algunos ejemplos de casos civiles 
que se ven en los centros de mediación son los siguientes: cobros de dinero, 
relaciones maternas y/o paternas filiales, quejas por animales, conflictos en-
tre arrendador y arrendatario; conflictos referentes a pensiones alimenticias 
(incluyendo casos donde ha habido violencia doméstica), conflicto entre ve-
cinos, e incumplimiento de contratos, entre otros. Los casos criminales son 
mediables cuando el delito incurrido es menos grave y sean casos que puedan 
transigirse conforme a las reglas de procedimiento civil.20 Algunos ejemplos 
de casos criminales que se atienden en los centros son la agresión simple, 
alteración a la paz, y daños a la propiedad. Los casos que impliquen la rec-
lamación de derechos civiles o asuntos de alto interés público sólo podrán 
mediarse cuando las partes y sus representantes legales den su consentimien-
to explícito y el tribunal dé su anuencia.21
En el proceso de seleccionar qué casos son referidos a mediación el tribu-
nal tiene la obligación de considerar los siguientes factores: (1) la naturale-
19  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación…, cit., p. 20. En una decisión reciente del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico 
(Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. En interés del menor C.L.R.) emitida el 17 de febrero de 2010, 
el tribunal resolvió que la mediación no está disponible para casos iniciados al amparo de 
la Ley de Menores. La opinión mayoritaria interpretó el Reglamento de Métodos Alternos 
de manera restrictiva e indicó que los métodos alternos sólo están disponibles para casos 
civiles y criminales y que no se hace mención expresa de su aplicación a la Ley de Menores. 
Además, arguye que el Negociado no tiene un adiestramiento especializado para atender 
casos de menores. La opinión disidente, suscrita por 3 de los 7 jueces del Tribunal Supre-
mo de Puerto Rico, argumentó que la lista de casos mediables en los centros de mediación 
conforme a las discusiones que se llevaron a cabo en el Secretariado de la Conferencia Ju-
dicial dejó establecido que la enumeración de casos en el Reglamento de Métodos Alternos 
era ilustrativa y no taxativa. Más aún, los Centros han estado mediando este tipo de casos 
desde su establecimiento. Este caso es de particular importancia por ser la primera vez 
que el Reglamento de Métodos Alternos es interpretado. Los centros continúan mediando 
casos de menores referidos directamente por el Procurador de Menores, escuelas, y enti-
dades comunitarias. Sin embargo, a raíz de la decisión en cuestión, los jueces no pueden 
desviar a los centros casos al amparo de la Ley de Menores. 
20  Reglamento de Métodos Alternos, según enmendado, Regla 7.02
21  Ibidem., Regla 7.03.
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za del caso; (2) la relación entre las partes; (3) la disposición de las partes 
para negociar; (4) la posibilidad de que la mediación afecte adversamente la 
relación; (5) los riesgos a la integridad física de los participantes o de los in-
terventores neutrales; (6) la posibilidad de proveer remedios de emergencia 
antes del referido; y (7) los costos y riesgos de la litigación.22 
Si el juez así lo ordena, las partes están obligadas a acudir a una sesión 
inicial de orientación ante un mediador del centro, pero no están obligados 
a someterse al proceso de mediación; en Puerto Rico la mediación intrajudi-
cial es voluntaria. Si las partes no cumplen con la orden del juez de acudir a 
la sesión inicial, podrían ser encontradas incursos en desacato.23 Cuando el 
juez emite una orden para que las partes acudan a la sesión de orientación, 
las partes deberán haber completado este proceso dentro de 60 días a partir 
de la fecha de notificación; el tribunal tiene discreción para ampliar o acortar 
este término.24 
Requerir la asistencia a la sesión inicial de orientación so pena de desacato, 
pero dejar a la voluntad de las partes si se someten al proceso de mediación 
es, a mi juicio, una manera excelente de intentar institucionalizar la media-
ción intrajudicial, pero a la misma vez respetar el ejercicio de autodetermi-
nación de las partes y no privarlas de su derecho a tener su día en corte, si así 
lo desean. Históricamente, los programas de mediación voluntarios tienden 
a no tener mucha demanda.25 Algunas de las teorías esbozadas para que las 
partes no asistan a programas voluntarios de mediación incluyen las siguien-
tes: que las partes no entienden los posibles beneficios de la mediación; las 
partes y sus abogados prefieren seleccionar un proceso más conocido como 
litigación; cuando las personas están molestas entre sí prefieren un proceso 
adversativo a uno colaborativo; ciertas culturas promueven una sociedad liti-
giosa; percepción que los mediadores pueden no ser competentes o neutrales 
porque están asociados con el tribunal; y las partes y sus abogados no quieren 
dar la impresión que tienen un caso débil.26 La sesión de entrevista inicial 
obligatoria le permite al mediador orientar a las partes y sus abogados sobre 
22  Ibidem., Regla 3.01
23  Ibidem., Regla 3.05.
24  Ibidem., Regla 3.06.
25  VARMA, Arupa y STALLWORTH, Lamont. Barriers to Mediation: A Look at the 
Impediments and Barriers of Voluntary Mediation Programs that Exist Within the EEO. 
Dispute Resolution Journal, Vol. 55, 2000, 32-43.
26  SENFT, Louise Phipps y SAVAGE, Cynthia A. ADR in the Courts: Progress, Prob-
lems, and Possibilities. Penn State Law Review, vol. 108, N0 1, 2004, p. 327-348, 329.
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qué es la mediación, posibles ventajas de la misma, y aclarar cualquier duda 
que tengan.
El tribunal tiene discreción para referir el caso a mediación  en cualquier 
etapa del procedimiento judicial, pero el tribunal podrá denegar una pet-
ición de referido si determina que no beneficiará a las partes o dilatará los 
procedimientos.27 Esta discreción asignada al juez permite que se fomente 
la utilización de métodos alternos al sistema adjudicativo y simultánea-
mente evita que las partes utilicen la mediación como una táctica dilatoria. 
Además, el mediador tiene la facultad de evaluar el referido y determinar si 
el caso es mediable. El mediador es quien tiene la última palabra en cuanto 
a si el caso es mediable y los jueces tradicionalmente han tenido gran defer-
encia al criterio profesional de los mediadores de los centros de mediación 
del Negociado. 
En los centros de mediación del Negociado el proceso de mediación es 
confidencial y privilegiado.28 La protección de la confidencialidad y el privi-
legio es un principio fundamental de la mediación. Las partes están más dis-
puestas a dialogar entre sí cuando las conversaciones se mantienen en confi-
dencia y la comunicación es privilegiada. Además, en las Reglas de Evidencia 
de Puerto Rico, según enmendadas, se añadió la Regla 516 la cual establece 
que, “Se considera privilegiada y confidencial cualquier información ofrecida 
y los documentos y expedientes de trabajo referentes a un proceso de método 
alterno para la solución de conflictos…”.29 
Recientemente, el Negociado añadió a la lista de sus servicios la mediación 
en casos de ejecución de hipotecas. La Ley para Mediación Compulsoria y 
Preservación de tu hogar en los Procesos de Ejecuciones de Hipotecas de 
una Vivienda Principal (en adelante, Ley de Mediación de Ejecución de Hi-
potecas) aprobada por la legislatura de Puerto Rico el 17 de agosto de 2012, 
estableció el deber del tribunal de referir a mediación lo casos de ejecución 
de hipoteca de una propiedad residencial que constituya la vivienda principal 
del deudor hipotecario.30 El propósito de estas mediaciones es que el acreedor 
y el deudor hipotecario puedan llegar a un acuerdo, se puedan modificar las 
condiciones de pago, o considerar otras alternativas que permitan al deudor 
27  Reglamento de Métodos Alternos, según enmendado…, cit., Regla 3.03
28  Reglamento de Métodos Alternos, según enmendado…, cit., Regla 6.01.
29  Reglas de Evidencia de Puerto Rico del 9 de febrero de 2009, Regla 516.
30  Ley Núm. 184-2012, Artículo 2 (b).
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no perder su vivienda principal.31Aunque la sesión inicial de mediación es 
compulsoria, las partes no están obligadas a lograr un acuerdo.32 
El proceso de mediación en casos de ejecución de hipoteca se rige por la 
Ley de Mediación y sus Reglamentos. A tales efectos, el Tribunal Supremo por 
medio del Negociado requiere que para mediar casos de ejecución de hipote-
ca referidos por el tribunal los mediadores tendrán que tener su certificación 
de mediador vigente y tomar un curso de educación continua aprobado por el 
Negociado que incluyan una discusión de la Ley de Mediación de Ejecución 
de Hipotecas, fundamentos legales de la hipoteca y el proceso de ejecución, 
terminología relevante en el contexto del derecho hipotecario, alternativas a 
la ejecución de hipoteca, documentos necesarios para la ejecución de hipote-
ca, y aspectos éticos.33
4. Obligaciones y responsabilidades del mediador
Bajo el modelo de mediación del Negociado, el mediador es considerado 
un experto y profesional en su área. Tradicionalmente ha habido una gran de-
ferencia por parte de los jueces hacía su peritaje en el área de la conflictología. 
El mediador tiene la obligación de citar a las partes a la mediación, orientar a 
las partes sobre el proceso de mediación, y conducir la sesión. En los casos re-
feridos por el tribunal, el mediador tiene la obligación de informar por escrito 
al juez si se logró un acuerdo, si alguna de las partes no compareció, y si a su 
juicio el proceso no es idóneo para mediación.34
Si las partes llegan a un acuerdo, los términos específicos del mismo de-
berán ser notificados por escrito al juez. Las partes pueden pactar lo contra-
rio y no informar al juez sobre el contenido del acuerdo. Sin embargo, si el 
asunto en controversia es de alto interés público las partes estarán obligadas 
a divulgar al juez el contenido del acuerdo.35 El mediador, tanto los emplea-
31  Ibidem.,
32  Circular Núm. 30, Año Fiscal 2012-2013, 11 de junio de 2013, Estado Libre Asocia-
do de Puerto Rico, Tribunal General de Justicia, Oficina de Administración de Tribunales.
33  Aviso General para Proveedores de Servicios de Adiestramiento Certificados Sobre 
las Condiciones para presentar Propuestas Relacionadas a los Cursos de Educación Con-
tinua en Casos de Ejecución de Hipotecas del 17 de junio de 2013, Negociado de Métodos 
Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Tribunal 
General de Justicia, Oficina de Administración de Tribunales.
34  Reglamento de Métodos Alternos, según enmendado…, cit., Regla 7.11.
35  Ibidem., Regla 5.01.
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dos de los centros de mediación en los tribunales como los mediadores acti-
vos en el registro del Negociado, deberán cumplir con el código de ética en 
el Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua Relacionado con los 
Métodos Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos (en adelante Reglamento 
de Certificación y Educación Continua) aprobado el 15 de junio de 1999 por 
el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico.36 Entre otros, se requiere mantener su 
certificación vigente para lo cual es necesario cursar 21 créditos de educación 
continua cada 3 años.
5. Participación de abogados y terceros en la mediación
En las mediaciones intrajudiciales en Puerto Rico las partes pueden estar 
acompañadas por sus respectivos abogados durante la entrevista inicial y la 
sesión de orientación individual que se lleva a cabo por el mediador. Sin em-
bargo, en las sesiones conjuntas sólo se permitirá la participación de aboga-
dos si ambas partes tienen abogados, ambas partes desean que sus abogados 
estén presentes, los abogados estén en una actitud de aportar a la solución del 
conflicto de manera colaborativa, los abogados deben limitarse a asesorar, y 
el mediador consiente a la presencia de los abogados.37 
Una de las razones para no fomentar la presencia de abogados en las ses-
iones conjuntas de mediación es que de esta manera las partes pueden conver-
sar entre sí y resolver sus propios problemas sin que haya un tercero hablando 
por ellos. En la gran mayoría de los casos ante el Negociado, los abogados no 
comparecen. Prima facie, excluir a los abogados aparenta ser consistente con 
los valores adoptados por los mediadores del Negociado. Algunos  de estos 
valores son la autodeterminación (que las personas tienen la capacidad para 
tomar sus propias decisiones), responsabilidad (las personas pueden asumir 
responsabilidad sobre sus actos y decisiones, participación activa, racionali-
dad, y reciprocidad).38 Por otro lado, privilegiar la participación de las partes 
en el proceso de la mediación y limitar la de los abogados promueve que las 
partes puedan narrar su perspectiva y que su voz sea escuchada. Conforme a 
36  Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua Relacionado con los Métodos 
Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico del  15 de 
junio de 1999. 
37  Ibidem., Regla 7.12
38  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación…, cit., p. 30.
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varios estudios empíricos, esta participación favorece que la parte sienta que 
ha habido justicia procesal durante la mediación.39
En mi opinión, aunque ciertamente excluir a los abogados logra una par-
ticipación más activa y directa de las partes, también podría coartar el ejerci-
cio de su autodeterminación en la medida en que el mediador tenga la última 
palabra en cuanto a si los abogados comparecen o no. Habiendo dicho esto, 
tengo el privilegio de conocer a muchos de los mediadores en los centros de 
mediación, y éstos tienen un gran compromiso con el proceso de mediación y 
empoderar a los participantes en el proceso de toma de decisiones. Además, 
los abogados pueden participa en la entrevista inicial, los clientes pueden 
consultar con sus abogados antes de suscribir un acuerdo, o si desean pueden 
hacerle una consulta durante la sesión conjunta de mediación. Otra preocu-
pación con la exclusión de los abogados del proceso es que podría hacer más 
cuesta arriba la institucionalización del proceso de mediación intrajudicial. 
Eso podría ser una de varias razones por lo cual para el año fiscal 2005-2006, 
del total de casos atendidos en los centros de mediación, el 81.7% (11,123) 
fueron referidos de la comunidad (e.g., agencias públicas, organizaciones 
privadas, personas por cuenta propia) y tan sólo el 18.3% (2,488) fueron 
referidos del tribunal de primera instancia.40 Por otro lado, es necesario re-
cordar que los centros de mediación fueron creados en sus orígenes como una 
alternativa real al litigio y no para desviar casos del tribunal. 
Las partes también pueden estar acompañadas por peritos, intérpretes, 
familiares u otras personas si así lo desean durante la entrevista inicial.  Para 
la participación de éstos terceros en la mediación aplican los mismos prin-
cipios que para la participación de abogados, excepto que no todas las partes 
tienen que también tener un perito, interprete, o familiar.41 Esta adaptación 
es importante porque en la cultura puertorriqueña el concepto de familia ex-
tendida es más prevalente que en Estados Unidos y a veces las partes solicitan 
la presencia de un familiar o amigo durante la sesión de mediación. Mi expe-
riencia conduciendo mediaciones en Puerto Rico ha sido que la petición de 
39  WELSH, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do 
With It? Washington University Law Quarterly, vol. 79, 2001, p. 787-861.
40 Datos Agregados de los Centros de Mediación de Conflictos Para el Año fiscal 
2005-2006. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Negociado De Métodos Alternos Para la Solución de 
Conflictos, Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico. 
41  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación…, cit..., p. 68.
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que un familiar u otra persona de apoyo estén presentes no es inusual. El Ne-
gociado también permite la participación de observadores o investigadores 
en el proceso de mediación siempre y cuando todas las partes consientan a 
su presencia y completen un formulario aceptando las normas del Negocia-
do y protegiendo la confidencialidad de las partes.42 Esta disposición no tan 
sólo permite la participación de investigadores, sino que también permite que 
mediadores en proceso de adiestramiento puedan observar las mediaciones 
como parte de su proceso de aprendizaje.
6. Modelo de mediación
En Estados Unidos existe un gran debate que gira en torno a los distintos 
modelos de mediación y cuál es el que deben adoptar los tribunales. La gran 
mayoría de los tribunales han optado por el modelo evaluativo o el modelo 
facilitativo de mediación los cuales están centrados en la toma de decisiones a 
base de intereses. Debido a que el modelo a base de intereses es el que usual-
mente se importa a Latinoamérica y el Caribe, es esencial definirlo e indicar, 
por qué a mi juicio, es un error el adaptarlo sin hacer las debidas modificacio-
nes culturales. 
El modelo de mediación a base de intereses surge del modelo de nego-
ciación desarrollado por Fisher y Ury (1991) en el Proyecto de Negociación 
de Harvard y tiene como objetivo integrar las técnicas de negociación cola-
borativas con las posicionales/agresivas.43 Este modelo se guía por los si-
guientes principios: a) separar a las personas del problema; b) enfocarse 
en intereses, no posiciones (qué es lo más importante para el negociador); 
c) buscar opciones de ganancias mutuas; e, d) insistir en utilizar criterios 
objetivos.44 Este modelo es integrativo y se fundamenta en un sistema de 
valores que enfatiza la cooperación y acuerdos que son convenientes para 
todas las partes.45 Este modelo ciertamente es una mejoría a los modelos de 
42  Manual de Normas y Procedimientos de los Centros de Mediación de Conflictos, 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Tribunal General de Justicia, Oficina de Adminis-
tración de los Tribunales, Negociado de Métodos Alternos para la Solución de Conflictos 
de mayo de 2004, Norma 2.05.
43  FISHER, R., URY, W. y PATTON, B. Getting to Yes. New York, New York, Penguin 
Books, 1999.
44  Ibidem.
45  LEWICKI, R. J., SAUNDERS, D.M., y MINTON, J.W. Negotiation Reading Exer-
cises, and Cases. New York, NY, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 1992, p. 226.
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negociación basados en el uso del poder, pero no es un modelo universal 
aplicable a todas las culturas.
El modelo de negociación a base de intereses está basado en el positivismo 
cuyas premisas son las siguientes: a) la experiencia humana es universal; b) 
el conocimiento se adquiere observando las experiencias que ocurren en el 
mundo real; c) es posible lograr la objetividad plena o la separación de los 
objetos y las personas que nos rodean; y d) la ciencia debe ser neutral/objeti-
va; e) las teorías son instrumentales, las teorías son los instrumentos que nos 
ayudan a entender el mundo; f) el tecnicismo (i.e., las técnicas usadas) tiene 
primacía sobre el desarrollo del conocimiento.46 Este modelo a base de inte-
reses presupone una racionalidad y realidad objetiva que desde una perspec-
tiva de constructivismo social deben ser producto de nuestras interacciones 
sociales y dista mucho de ser universal. Por ejemplo, el énfasis en satisfacer 
intereses individuales y aferrarse a una ilusión de objetividad no es efectivo 
en ciertas comunidades caribeñas en las cuales el énfasis es en tradiciones 
culturales que valoran una visión comunitaria. De igual manera, el énfasis 
en el presente y el futuro del modelo a bases de intereses, choca con culturas 
como la puertorriqueña en la cual el pasado siempre está presente por medio 
de tradiciones orales.  Los intereses de las partes no surgen en el vacío; son 
parte de procesos sociales, culturales e históricos.
En Puerto Rico, se optó por desarrollar un modelo híbrido el cual toma en 
cuenta prácticas en otros contextos culturales (e.g. Estados Unidos, Canadá, 
y Europa) pero las adaptó al contexto cultural puertorriqueño.47 Además, el 
modelo se aleja de una visión positivista al utilizar como base las siguien-
tes premisas: 1) los conflictos son productos sociales que son dinámicos y se 
transforman dentro de un contexto social e histórico; 2) la mediación es una 
intervención social y por lo tanto las intervenciones del mediador son parte 
de un sistema social de relaciones existentes que trascienden al individuo o 
intereses individuales; y 3) la mediación es una actividad social influenciada 
por los valores de los mediadores y los participantes.48 El modelo desarrolla-
do por el Negociado está basado en el modelo facilitativo y por ende incorpo-
46  DELANTY, G. y STRYDOM, P. (Eds.). Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic 
and Contemporary Readings. Maidenhead, England, Open University Press, 2003, p. 14.
47  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación…, cit., p. vii-viii.
48  Ibidem., p. 29-30
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ra unas etapas secuenciales específicas (identificación de asunto, negociación 
asistida, y cierre) a seguir las cuales progresan de forma cualitativa.49 Además, 
durante la mediación el mediador se enfoca en identificar los intereses de las 
partes y ayuda a las partes a buscar opciones para resolver la controversia. 
Tomando en cuenta nuestras tradiciones orales, para identificar los intereses, 
los mediadores del Negociado incorporan refranes populares o utilizan como 
parte de sus técnicas de restructuración relatos de historias.50 
El modelo del Negociado incorpora además técnicas de la mediación 
evaluativa. Consistente con el modelo de mediación evaluativa, el mediador 
puede ofrecer posibles soluciones a las partes. La experiencia de los media-
dores en los centros de mediación del Negociado es que como regla general 
las partes ven al mediador como un “experto” y muchas veces solicitan de 
manera vehemente la opinión del mediador.51 Los mediadores sólo recurren 
a sugerencias como último recurso para poder permitir a las partes ejercer su 
autodeterminación. 
El modelo del Negociado también incorpora las técnicas de apoderamien-
to y reconocimiento, provenientes de la mediación transformativa. Apode-
ramiento es cuando las partes en el conflicto retoman su fortaleza y su ca-
pacidad para tomar sus propias decisiones.52  Reconocimiento es el proceso 
mediante el cual las partes en conflicto toman conciencia, entendimiento, o 
empatía con respecto al conflicto que están viviendo y la percepción de la 
otra parte.53 El elemento primordial para que ocurra  apoderamiento y reco-
nocimiento, es que el mediador pueda identificar los momentos en que estos 
cambios se dan durante el proceso de la mediación.54 Los mediadores del Ne-
gociado como parte de su adiestramiento aprenden a identificar oportunida-
des durante el proceso de mediación en el cual las personas en controversia 
puedan conocer y entender la percepción que cada uno tiene con el objetivo 
de desarrollar ‘fortaleza’ y ‘compasión’ hacia la otra parte.55 Consistente con 
49  Ibidem.,  p. 32.
50  Ibidem.,  p. 99-100.
51  Ibidem.,  p. 60-61.
52  BUSH, Baruch R.A. y FOLGER, Joseph P. The Promise of Mediation. San Francis-
co, California, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2005, p.22
53  Ibidem., p.22
54  Ibidem., p. 22
55  NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred, VÉLEZ FERNANDES, Lilyana, GATELL 
GONZÁLEZ, Manuel, y SANTIAGO TORRES, Lester Caleb. Un Modelo Puertorriqueño 
de Mediación…, cit., p. 23
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el modelo transformativo, el Negociado ha adoptado como uno de sus valores 
en la mediación la autodeterminación: si se dan las condiciones propicias, 
las partes en conflicto tienen la capacidad de tomar sus propias decisiones y 
manejar sus conflictos de forma efectiva y satisfactoria.56
7. Proceso de certificación y código de ética
Una de las principales funciones del Negociado es la de supervisar la cer-
tificación de individuos como interventores neutrales y certificar entidades 
que puedan proveer adiestramiento de excelencia en métodos alternos. Estas 
entidades (conocidas como ‘proveedores’) ofrecen cursos de educación conti-
nua y los programas de adiestramiento necesarios para capacitar y certificar 
a interventores neutrales.  
   Los mediadores de los centros de mediación son seleccionados por el 
Negociado y son empleados a tiempo completo de la rama judicial. Por su parte, 
las personas que quieran pertenecer al registro de interventores del Negociado 
tienen que pasar por un proceso riguroso y comprensivo de adiestramiento. Ser 
mediador certificado por el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico se considera un 
privilegio. Las personas interesadas en certificarse deben ser mayores de edad, 
no tener antecedentes penales, poseer un bachillerato (licenciatura) de un cole-
gio o universidad acreditada (en ausencia del grado universitario puede ofrecer 
evidencia de experiencia profesional y cualificaciones), no estar descalificado 
por una autoridad licenciadora para ejercer su profesión o tener sanciones dis-
ciplinarias pendiente, y completar satisfactoriamente 60 unidades de adies-
tramiento en destrezas básicas de mediación, 16 unidades de adiestramiento 
en la práctica de la mediación, 8 unidades de adiestramiento sobre manejo en 
casos de violencia doméstica (si desean mediar casos de familia) y 6 unidades 
de adiestramiento sobre el sistema judicial de Puerto Rico para un total de 90 
unidades de adiestramiento.57 Este último adiestramiento no es requerido si la 
persona está autorizada a ejercer la profesión de la abogacía en Puerto Rico, es 
un ex-juez, o un ex-mediador del Negociado.  En mi opinión, el Negociado tiene 
uno de los programas de certificación más riguroso y comprensivo al compa-
rarse con otros programas de mediación intrajudicial en los Estados Unidos. 
Por ejemplo, la gran mayoría de los programas de certificación en Estados Uni-
dos usualmente requieren entre 24 y 30 unidades de adiestramiento.
56  Ibidem., p. 30
57  Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua…, cit., Reglas 3.02 y 3.05.
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 Este programa de certificación es ofrecido por proveedores de servi-
cios que a su vez han sido certificados por el Negociado. Estos programas de 
certificación exigen como mínimo ejercicios escritos, discusión de casos, jue-
go de roles, y demostraciones. El contenido del currículo de estos programas 
debe ser sometido al Negociado para su aprobación. El Negociado tiene unos 
requisitos mínimos en cuanto a temas que deben cubrirse que van más a allá 
de lo normalmente exigido en muchos de los programas en Estados Unidos. 
Por ejemplo, además de los temas tradicionales como identificar casos nego-
ciables de los no negociables y técnicas a utilizar en el proceso de la media-
ción, también se incluyen otros como las formas efectivas de referir un caso 
a servicios gubernamentales o de consejería; aspectos sociales, psicológicos, 
y económicos que inciden en la dinámica de las familias con una estructura 
tradicional y no tradicional; asuntos de diversidad cultural; y asuntos de gé-
nero.58 
La certificación como mediador tiene una vigencia de tres años. A los tres 
años si el mediador desea recertificarse deberá presentar una solicitud de re-
certificación y evidencia de haber completado 21 horas de educación conti-
nua. De esta manera se trata de garantizar que los mediadores se mantengan 
al día sobre lo que está ocurriendo en el área de la conflictología. 
Además, mantener las destrezas al día y participar de actividades educa-
tivas que promueven los métodos alternos es uno de los estándares éticos 
establecidos por el Negociado.59 Otros estándares éticos con los cuales tiene 
que cumplir el mediador bajo el código de ética del Negociado son: evitar 
dilaciones en la tramitación del caso; mantener una conducta profesional 
y de respeto hacia los participantes; mantener imparcialidad; revelar cual-
quier posible conflicto de interés; preservar la confidencialidad; orientar a los 
participantes a buscar consejo legal si entiende que el acuerdo puede afectar 
adversamente a una de las partes y ésta no está representada por abogado; 
redactar el contrato de servicios profesionales de manera clara; no cobrar ta-
rifa contingente ni condicionarla al resultado de la intervención; y respetar y 
colaborar con otras disciplinas como derecho, contabilidad, salud mental y 
servicios sociales.60
58  Ibidem., Regla 4.09.
59  Ibidem., Regla 6.01.
60  Ibidem., Capítulo VI.
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8. Resultados en Puerto Rico
A base de las estadísticas del Negociado, los programas de mediación co-
nectados con el tribunal han sido exitosos en implantar su política pública 
de fomentar el uso de los métodos alternos con la finalidad de impartir jus-
ticia de manera rápida y económica.  Las partes consistentemente expresan 
una gran satisfacción con el proceso de la mediación y los acuerdos a los que 
se llegan.61 A manera de ejemplo, en el centro de mediación de la región de 
Bayamón, se realizó una encuesta entre personas que participaron en proce-
sos de mediación y el hallazgo fue el siguiente: 92% estuvieron satisfechos 
con el proceso, 78% entendían que el acuerdo fue justo, y 94% indicaron que 
regresarían al centro. 
Entre los años fiscales 2000-2013 el Negociado ha atendido un total de 
163,468 casos para un promedio por año de 12,574.62 Del total de 163,468 
casos atendidos, 68,106 fueron aceptados para mediación y 95,362 fueron 
aceptados para orientación. Entre 2000-2013 hubo un promedio anual de 
5,238 casos aceptados para mediación y un promedio anual de 7,335 casos en 
el cual se proveyó el servicio de orientación. El servicio de orientación consis-
te en reunirse privadamente con las partes y con sus abogados (cuando estos 
estén presente) con el fin de sugerirles posibles alternativas a su conflicto. Al 
finalizar la orientación, el caso es referido a mediación o a algún otro servicio. 
De los 68,106 casos aceptados para mediación, 39,051 (57%) fueron media-
dos (96% con acuerdo y 4% sin acuerdo) y 29,055 (43%) fueron archivados. 
En los centros de mediación, un caso es archivado cuando la mediación no se 
completa porque una de las partes no comparece, una de las partes no acepta 
la mediación, o cualquier otro motivo que impida que la mediación pueda 
realizarse.
Los servicios de mediación para casos de ejecución de hipoteca comenza-
ron a prestarse el 1 de julio del 2013. Para el periodo del 1 de julio de 2013 al 
31 de marzo de 2014, los centros de mediación atendieron 1,459 casos cor-
respondientes a la subcategoría de ejecución de hipoteca.63 Del total de 1,459 
61  GATELL GONZÁLEZ, Manuel y NEGRÓN MARTÍNEZ, Mildred. La mediación de 
conflictos… cit. p. 25.
62  Resumen de Datos Estadísticos de los Centros de Mediación de Conflictos 2000-
2013. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Negociado De Métodos Alternos Para la Solución de Conflic-
tos, Tribunal Supremo del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. Las estadísticas discuti-
das en este párrafo provienen de la fuente aquí citada.
63  Casos de Ejecución de Hipoteca, Negociado De Métodos Alternos Para la Solución 
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casos atendidos, 936 (64%) fueron aceptados para mediación y 523 (36%) 
fueron aceptados para orientación. En estos ocho meses hubo un promedio 
mensual de 117 casos aceptados para mediación y un promedio mensual de 65 
casos en el cual se proveyó el servicio de orientación. De los 936 casos acep-
tados para mediación, 213 (23%) fueron mediados con acuerdo, 113 (12%) sin 
acuerdo, 254 (27%) fueron archivados, y los restantes 356 (38%) son casos 
que están pendientes de mediarse.
III. ¿QUÉ PODEMOS APRENDER DE LAS EXPERIENCIAS DE PUERTO 
RICO?
1. Control judicial y política pública
Primeramente, es recomendable que el tribunal establezca una política 
pública clara y los valores que van a regir la mediación intrajudicial. Articu-
lar las razones para establecer un programa de mediación intrajudicial sirve 
como punto de referencia futuro contra el cual se evalúan los programas du-
rante su desarrollo y una vez ya estén establecidos. El proceso de institucio-
nalización de la mediación intrajudicial y el nivel de confianza que los poten-
ciales participantes van a depositar en estos procesos, es más eficiente cuando 
los posibles usuarios participan de las discusiones que conducen a crear estos 
programas. Jueces, abogados, estudiantes de derecho, personal de los tribu-
nales, y miembros de la comunidad pueden hacer grandes aportaciones en el 
proceso de desarrollar objetivos y valores. 
Los objetivos y los valores son la base sobre los cuales se desarrollan los 
modelos de mediación que eventualmente se adoptan. Por ejemplo, un estu-
dio realizado en los servicios de mediación ofrecidos en el estado de Florida de 
los Estados Unidos demostró que algunos centros de mediación se “asimilan” 
al tribunal y adoptan las normas y valores de los tribunales.64 Los mediadores 
de estos centros tienden a utilizar lenguaje más formal, muchas veces están 
ubicados en el tribunal, se enfocan en número de casos resueltos, y tienden 
de Conflictos, Tribunal Supremo del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. Las estadísti-
cas discutidas en este párrafo fueron suministradas el 13 de mayo de 2014 y provienen de 
la fuente aquí citada
64  NOCE DELLA, Dorothy, J., FOLGER, Joseph P., y ANTES, James R. Assimilative, 
Autonomous, or Synergistic Visions: How Mediation Programs in Florida Address the Di-




a ser más evaluativos. Otros centros son “autónomos” y establecen su propia 
identidad separada del tribunal, crean sus propios folletos de mercadeo, y 
los mediadores  hacen referencia a los conflictos de las personas y no a casos 
legales.65 Otros centros de mediación intrajudicial adoptaban una visión de 
“sinergismo”  y tratan de balancear  las normativas y visión del tribunal con 
la de la conflictología.66 Es recomendable además que la terminología esté 
claramente definida. Por ejemplo, ¿Qué es mediación? ¿Cuál es la diferen-
cia entre un modelo facilitativo, transformativo, y evaluativo? Clarificar estos 
conceptos ayuda a los participantes y jueces a entender que se espera de ellos 
en estos procesos.
El tribunal debe exigir que los programas o centros de mediación intraju-
dicial recopilen data estadística que permita evaluar si se está cumpliendo con 
los objetivos establecidos. De una lectura de los estudios realizados, puede 
observarse que una queja y preocupación que surge reiteradamente es la falta 
de fondos para recopilar data para evaluar los programas de mediación. En 
mi experiencia, la inclusión de académicos e investigadores para diseñar la 
metodología e instrumentos a utilizarse para identificar qué data y cómo se 
va a recopilar debe ocurrir muy temprano en el proceso. Además, algo que me 
parece sumamente necesario es incorporar métodos cualitativos en el pro-
ceso de evaluación de programas de mediación. La gran mayoría de la data 
recopilada en los centros de mediación tiende a ser cuantitativa. Incorporar 
métodos cualitativos puede ofrecer información en cuanto a las experiencias 
de los participantes (abogados, jueces, partes) y cómo le asignan significado 
a sus experiencias. Esto último no es posible lograrlo con data cuantitativa.
Conforme a las experiencias en Puerto Rico, es recomendable que el tribu-
nal designe a una persona para supervisar y administrar los centros de medi-
ación conectados con el tribunal. En Puerto Rico la Directora del Negociado 
es la encargada de supervisar el los centros de mediación, el personal, y los 
mediadores en los registros del Negociado. Además, es la persona encargada 
de investigar cualquier querella que surja en una mediación.
El tribunal debe velar porque los servicios de mediación estén disponibles 
para todo el mundo por igual y que sean accesibles. En el caso de Puerto Rico, 
los centros están abiertos durante el mismo horario que el tribunal. Sin em-
bargo, si es necesario realizar una mediación fuera de horas laborables, la 
misma puede ser coordinada. Además, es recomendable que aquellos que no 
65  Ibidem., p. 24.
66  Ibidem., p. 25.
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puedan pagar el servicio puedan obtenerlo sin costo alguno. El tribunal debe 
tener control sobre qué tipo de caso se refiere a mediación y en qué momento 
se refiere el mismo. Las guías en cuanto a qué casos son mediables deben ser 
claras y específicas. 
Como parte de su política pública el tribunal debe educar a la población, a 
los jueces, a los abogados, y estudiantes de derecho sobre los métodos alternos 
de resolución de conflictos. Esto puede lograrse mediante charlas, talleres de 
adiestramientos, coloquios, programas radiales, redactando artículos cortos 
o editoriales en periódicos o revistas, y publicando artículos académicos. A 
manera de ejemplo, el Negociado apoya y fomenta que sus mediadores (tanto 
los que son empleados, como los mediadores activos en el registro) particip-
en activamente en las actividades antes descritas. Además, estás actividades 
están incluidas en el Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua como 
parte de los estándares éticos con los que debe cumplir un mediador certifi-
cado.67 
Usualmente los mediadores que prestan servicios a programas conectados 
con el tribunal proveen mecanismos para proteger a los mediadores de im-
pericia profesional cuando están prestando servicios de mediación en casos 
que han sido referidos por el tribunal. Por ejemplo, en el caso de Puerto Rico 
a los mediadores se les concede la misma inmunidad contra reclamaciones 
civiles que se le reconoce a un juez por acciones u omisiones en el desempeño 
de sus funciones, siempre  y cuando el mediador no incurra en dolo o fraude.68
2. Confidencialidad y privilegio
Es recomendable que los tribunales tengan normas escritas relacionadas 
a las comunicaciones orales, verbales, y documentos compartidos durante 
la mediación. Entre los aspectos a considerar es si las comunicaciones están 
protegidas por normas de confidencialidad y privilegio, quien puede reclamar 
la confidencialidad, a quien pertenece el privilegio, y excepciones a la confi-
dencialidad y al privilegio. En la gran mayoría de los estados en los Estados 
Unidos, las mediaciones son confidenciales pero siempre hay excepciones. 
Por ejemplo, usualmente en casos de alto interés públicos, la confidencialidad 
del acuerdo cede ante el interés público y el juez tiene la obligación de revisar 
el mismo. Un ejemplo de lo anterior, son los casos de pensión alimenticia 
67  Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua…, cit., Capítulo VI
68  Reglamento de Certificación y Educación Continua…, cit., Regla 4.06
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de un menor ya que el tribunal tiene la obligación de velar por el interés del 
menor y por ende revisar el acuerdo final. Sin embargo, el proceso de cómo 
se llega al acuerdo y las comunicaciones entre las partes como regla general 
se  mantienen confidenciales. De esta manera se preserva la integridad del 
proceso de mediación.
3. El proceso de mediación y de desvío
La experiencia en Estados Unidos parece indicar que el proceso de insti-
tucionalizar la mediación es más cuesta arriba cuando la mediación es vol-
untaria. Sin embargo, esto no necesariamente se traduce en más acuerdos. 
En mi opinión, es un contrasentido ‘obligar’ a las partes a participar en una 
sesión de mediación. A largo plazo me parece más efectivo educar a la comu-
nidad, abogados, y jueces sobre las posibles ventajas de los métodos alternos.
4. Credenciales del mediador y adiestramiento
Las credenciales de los mediadores varían significativamente en los cen-
tros de mediación conectados con el tribunal alrededor del mundo. Un factor 
a decidir es si los mediadores tienen que ser abogados. A base de mi experien-
cia, los programas de mediación son más robustos cuando se abre la puerta a 
que diversos profesionales puedan servir como mediadores. Los conflictos no 
son unidimensionales. Los conflictos que llegan a los tribunales ciertamente 
tienen un elemento legal, pero, a manera de ejemplo, también pueden tener 
un elemento social, psicológico, o económico. A tales efectos, limitar los reg-
istros de mediación únicamente a abogados me parece que limita innecesar-
iamente las opciones a la comunidad. De igual manera, es importante tener 
diversidad en género, edad, raza, y cultura en los registros de mediadores.
Usualmente los mediadores de los tribunales intrajudiciales tienen que 
pasar por algún tipo de adiestramiento o proceso de certificación. Este proce-
so garantiza que los mediadores tengan un adiestramiento mínimo en medi-
ación. Para garantizar ciertos estándares mínimos, las entidades que ofrecen 
estos adiestramientos deben estar también certificadas por el tribunal. Los 
currículos y la capacidad de los adiestradores deben ser revisados por la per-
sona encargada (o quien ésta designe) de administrar los centros intrajudi-
ciales. Además, se debe exigir un proceso de re-certificación cada cierto tiem-
po para que los mediadores se vean en la obligación de mantenerse al día por 
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medio de educación continua. El Negociado de Métodos Alternos ha tenido 
un gran éxito permitiendo a mediadores que vienen de distintas profesiones 
y disciplinas mediando en sus centros. 
Como parte del adiestramiento de candidatos a certificarse como media-
dor, se debe requerir que éstos observen mediaciones y tengan la oportuni-
dad de mediar bajo la supervisión de un mediador con experiencia. Varios 
estudios indican que hay una correlación positiva entre la experiencia de un 
mediador y la cantidad de acuerdos logrados en mediación; a mayor experi-
encia, mayor número de acuerdos logrados.69
5. Código de ética
Es altamente recomendable que se redacte un código de ética para medi-
adores y establecer un proceso de cómo manejar violaciones a dicho código. 
Entre los asuntos a considerar se sugieren los siguientes: neutralidad/impar-
cialidad, conflicto de interés, publicidad, contrato de servicios profesionales, 
conducta de los mediadores durante la sesión de mediación, educación con-
tinua, y honorarios.
IV. CONCLUSIÓN
Los programas de métodos alternos para la solución de conflictos conect-
ados con el tribunal comenzaron a institucionalizarse bajo la premisa que era 
posible resolver casos de una manera más eficiente y menos costosa que el 
proceso litigioso en el tribunal. La premisa no articulada parecía ser que justi-
cia tardía no era justicia. De los métodos alternos conectados con el tribunal, 
en Puerto Rico la mediación es la más popular
De la data estadística compartida en este capítulo puede inferirse que 
como regla general los centros de mediación del Negociado en Puerto Rico 
son exitosos. La mayoría de las personas que acuden a una sesión de medi-
ación quedan sumamente satisfechas con el proceso y el trato que reciben. 
Aquellos que logran llegar a un acuerdo como resultado de una mediación, 
suelen estar satisfechos con el acuerdo y piensan que el mismo es justo.
El Negociado ha logrado aprender de los modelos extranjeros e integrar/
69  WISSLER, Rosselle L. The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
in Civil Cases. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 22, N0 1, 2004, p. 55-88, p. 68.
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adaptar técnicas de resolución de conflictos foráneas al contexto socio-cultur-
al puertorriqueño. En ese sentido ha creado un modelo híbrido de mediación 
en el cual se preserva las idiosincrasias puertorriqueñas sin ser víctima del 
insularismo. Sin embargo, quedan muchos retos por delante y mucha infor-
mación que recopilar. Algunas de estas interrogantes son: ¿Cuándo es el me-
jor momento para desviar un caso a mediación? ¿Cuál debe ser el rol de los 
jueces y cuánto deben intervenir en el proceso de mediación? ¿Son los méto-
dos alternos un foro en el cual se ofrece justicia de inferior calidad comparada 
con los tribunales? ¿Cómo podemos garantizar mediadores de excelencia? 
Todas estas interrogantes deben tomarse en consideración al desarrollar e 
implementar un programa de mediación conectado con el tribunal. 
En el caso de Puerto Rico, los Centros de Mediación vinculados al Tribunal 
han logrado articular de manera clara sus objetivos y desarrollar un sistema 
efectivo para el contexto socio-cultural en que se encuentran. Por lo tanto, a 
pesar del camino que falta por recorrer creo que es posible lograr justicia ráp-
ida, económica, y eficiente a través de centros de mediación conectados con el 
tribunal. Reconozco que suena utópico, pero como dijera Eduardo Galeano: 
“La utopía: ella está en el horizonte. Me acerco a ella dos pasos; ella se aleja 
dos pasos. Camino diez pasos y el horizonte se corre diez pasos más allá. Por 
mucho que yo camine, nunca la alcanzaré. ¿Para qué sirve la utopía? Para eso 
sirve: para caminar…”
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“It takes a very long time to become young”…  
(Pablo Picasso)
I. Introduction
We seem to have the perfect place, - Switzerland is well known for its 
implication in international mediation between states, for its neutrality and 
its confidentiality rules, – we have very good professionals, we offer sever-
al alternative dispute  resolution (ADR) trainings, and we have some legal 
tools… 
In this environment, how is mediation contemplated and used in Switzer-
land? Is the legal system in favour of such a process? Is mediation practice 
encouraged? 
Mediation has been mentioned in the Federal Constitution (FC) since 
1979, at the time when Jura was admitted as a canton in Switzerland2. Article 
44 al. 3 FC stipulates that “disputes between Cantons or between Cantons 
and the Confederation shall wherever possible be resolved by negotiation 
or mediation”. Article 28 FC concerning the right to form professional asso-
ciations provides that “Disputes must wherever possible be resolved through 
negotiation or mediation.”
Mediation is also promoted in cantonal constitutions such as in the Con-
stitution of the Canton of Geneva3, the Constitutions of the Canton of Vaud4, 
1  Isabelle Hering is a Swiss attorney as well as a CEDR mediator. She holds a LL.M in 
International Business Law from the London School of Economics and a LL.M in Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement from the Graduate Institute, Geneva. She practices in her own 
law firm (Etude Hering, www.heringavocats.com) in Nyon Switzerland. She offers services 
in IT, IP, data privacy, contracts and dispute resolution.
2  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, Survol de la pra-
tique suisse, Jean Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011, p. 32.
3  Art. 120 Constitution Genevoise: L’Etat encourage la médiation et les autres modes 
de résolution extrajudiciaire des litiges.
4  Art. 43 Constitution Vaudoise:
1 L’Etat institue un service de médiation administrative indépendant. La médiatrice 
ou le médiateur responsable est élu par le Grand Conseil.




the Canton of Neuchatel5 or the Canton of Fribourg6.
Mediation is definitively an institution that is known and offered in Swit-
zerland. It is used during judicial processes and also out of courts, for family 
matters, for labor and schooling disputes and for commercial and criminal 
matters7. 
With mediation incorporated in 2011 in the new Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code (CPC), what may have been considered as a psycho-therapeutic alterna-
tive8 has now entered the judicial system at the federal level. 
However, although tools are provided to judges and lawyers to promote 
mediation, and numerous trainings and workshops are offered throughout 
Switzerland, it seems this process has difficulty to find its place not only 
among the legal practitioners, but also in the business world9.  
Some judges still hesitate to suggest mediation10, as they lack time or trust 
in the process or sometimes do not completely understand the mechanisms. 
Lawyers are not inclined either as some might lack knowledge and fear to lose 
their clientele or possibly control of their file11. 
5  Art. 27 Constitution Neuchâteloise:
1 Les travailleuses et les travailleurs, les employeuses et les employeurs, ainsi que 
leurs organisations, ont le droit de se syndiquer pour défendre leurs intérêts, de créer des 
associations et d’y adhérer. Ils ne peuvent pas y être contraints.
2 Les conflits collectifs de travail sont, autant que possible, réglés par la négociation 
ou la médiation.
6  Art. 27 Constitution Fribourgeoise:
1 Les travailleurs, les employeurs et leurs organisations ont le droit de se syndiquer 
pour la défense de leurs intérêts, de créer des associations et d’y adhérer ou non.
2 Les conflits sont, autant que possible, réglés par la négociation ou la médiation.
7  Jean A.Mirimanoff, in La Médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, Survol de la pra-
tique suisse, Jean Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011, p.39
8  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, La médiation civile dans le code de pro-
cédure civile unifié, in Revue de l’Avocat, n° 8/2010, p. 327, quoting Diana Murnier, Ge-
richtsnahe Zivilmediation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Vorentwurfs für eine 
Schweizerische ZPO.
9  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article, p. 1
10  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article, p. 6
11  Isabelle Bieri, Compte rendu du colloque de 29 mai 2013 de Gemme, in www.
gemme.ch/gem_contributions; Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans 
de Gemme, 2014, forthcoming article, p. 6
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Such statement is surprising as it is in clear contradiction with the fact 
that, when mediation takes place, it has a lot to offer. It lasts on average 3 to 
5 meetings and the success rate is very high - parties settle in 70.6%12 of the 
cases. 
This article aims at giving a brief overview of the current role of mediation 
in Switzerland. 
It focuses on federal laws, particularly the new unified civil procedure code 
(CPC) and criminal procedure code (CrimPC). It may however refer to can-
tonal laws (from western Switzerland) when appropriate and for illustration 
purposes.
The use of the masculine gender throughout this document and in relation 
to any physical person shall be understood as including the feminine gen-
der. An English translation of the federal and cantonal laws is provided when 
available.
II. Conciliation and Mediation
Both conciliation and mediation are offered in Switzerland. 
It is interesting to recall the differences between both processes as these 
are often mixed up. Some pretend that the process of conciliation is not dif-
ferent from that of mediation, as both terms tend to be used interchange-
ably13.  The difference may indeed be minimal if the distinction is made on 
the directive/non-evaluative/evaluative/facilitative criteria. For instance, the 
differences fade away when the mediator becomes evaluative and directive.
However, both processes are dissimilar from their settings. It is confirmed 
by the fact that the law differentiates both and allows conciliation to be re-
placed by mediation in certain circumstances. Mediation has a subsidiary 
role with regard to conciliation14, at least in the judicial civil process. 
A. Conciliation
Conciliation is neither defined by the CPC, nor by any other laws.
12  First Survey by the Swiss Federation of mediation associations, 2009 http://www.
infomediation.ch/cms/index.php?id=229&L=1 
13  Daniel Girsberger/Nathalie Voser, International Arbitration in Switzerland, §50, 
Schulthess, 2008; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Antonio Rigozzi, Arbitrage International: 
droit et pratique à la lumière de la LDIP, § 28, Ed. Schulthess § and Weblaw, 2006 
14  Christine Guy –Ecabert, Conciliation ou Médiation? Guider le juge et le justiciable 
par une analyse des différences entre les processus, RJN, 2011, p. 22
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It is an informal model of dispute resolution, either mandatory or option-
al, conducted by a designated conciliator, usually an impartial, neutral and 
independent judge. 
During such process the conciliator has the ability to suggest a solution to 
the parties if they are not able to reach a solution themselves15. He assists the 
parties in the negotiation of their positions, rather than their interests16. The 
conciliator tends to have a directive/evaluative role.
B. Mediation
The new CPC does not include a definition of mediation either. The Swiss 
legislator took the view that the mediation process as well as the technical and 
personal skills of the mediators cannot be defined in a civil procedure law17. 
According to the doctrine18, “mediation within the meaning of the CPC 
can be defined as non-judicial means of resolving conflicts that involves an 
independent and impartial neutral third party, the mediator, helping par-
ties, causing them to resume dialogue so that they find, under their own 
responsibility, a solution to their dispute”.
Several associations have defined mediation.
According to Gemme Switzerland19 “mediation is a process of manage-
ment of communication, freely chosen by the parties, supported by a media-
tor, a person who is impartial, independent, neutral, and designated by the 
parties. It is a confidential process, during which the parties aim at making 
their own decision”.
The Swiss Bar Association20 defines mediation as “a dispute resolution 
process, during which one or several independent and impartial third per-
sons (mediators) help the parties in their dispute to resolve such dispute 
themselves and in an amicable way, through the negotiation process”.
According to the Swiss federation of mediation associations (FSM), me-
15  Christine Guy –Ecabert, Conciliation ou Médiation? Guider le juge et le justiciable 
par une analyse des différences entre les processus, RJN, 2011, p. 24
16  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article p. 7, footnote 30
17  FF 2006 6943
18  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 213 n° 4, p. 797, 
Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011.
19  Gemme Switzerland, Groupement Européen des Magistrats pour la Médiation, 
www.gemme.ch
20  Fédération Suisse des Avocats (FSA), www.sav-fsa.ch
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diation is “a dispute resolution process through negotiation under a third 
party conduct. The aim of the process is to find solutions that are acceptable 
by each party (win-win solution)”.
Lastly, the Swiss rules of the Swiss Chambers’ arbitration institution de-
fine mediation as
[…] an alternative method of dispute resolution whereby two or more parties ask a 
neutral third party, the mediator, to assist them in settling a dispute or in avoiding fu-
ture conflicts. The mediator facilitates the exchange of opinions between the parties and 
encourages them to explore solutions that are acceptable to all the participants. Unlike 
an expert the mediator does not offer his or her own views nor does he make proposals 
like a conciliator, and unlike an arbitrator he or she does not render an award. The me-
diation can be terminated at any time, if the parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory 
settlement, or if one of the parties wants to discontinue the process”21.
These definitions have all in common the responsibility of the parties to 
resolve their dispute and to find a solution by themselves22. Unlike the con-
ciliator, the mediator does not suggest a solution to the dispute; he is not 
directive, nor should he be.
The parties participate in mediation because they are willing to, the pro-
cess is confidential, autonomous and independent, the mediator is impartial 
and neutral and has the qualifications to act as mediator23.
III. The object of mediation
The judicial path should remain the last resort (“ultima ratio”); therefore 
focus on prevention, management and efficient conflict resolution is essen-
tial, mediation being one of the means of amicable resolution24. 
But can all disputes be settled by mediation? Can the parties decide on all 
issues? 
In civil and commercial matters, one can easily answer by the affirmative. 
21 The Swiss Rules of Commercial Mediation, April 2007, Introduction, p.77
22  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La Médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière civile et commerciale, p.71, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
23  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, La médiation civile dans le code de pro-
cédure civile unifié, in Revue de l’Avocat, n° 8/2010, p.330
24  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, Réflexions sur la médiabilité, in Revue 
de l’Avocat, n° 10/2010, p.412
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Indeed, parties’ autonomy to contract prevails.  The CPC does not provide for 
any limitation in what can be mediated or not. 
However, several limits, subjective, objective, moral or legal, have to be 
taken into consideration.  The judge, when ratifying a settlement agreement 
(art. 217 CPC), has to apply general principles of contract law, and ensure that 
the suggested settlement is not impossible, illegal or against the mores, and 
that it does not infringe any mandatory laws25. 
Whose role is it to assist the parties in order to ensure that the mediation 
settlement is valid and can be ratified? The mediator? The lawyers? 
As the mediator is to be neutral and impartial, and as his role is only to 
assist the parties to find a settlement, the mediator is not supposed to check 
the viability of the settlement with respect to imperative law. 
This should be the lawyers’ role, if lawyers are involved in the process. If 
there are no lawyers, then the mediator, if he has some doubts, should sug-
gest the parties to seek special advice from a specialist on specific issues at 
stake so as to ensure the settlement can be ratified. 
In federal administrative mediation (see chapter VIII. A below), the au-
thority transforms the settlement reached between the parties in the form 
of a decision. In doing so, it has to ensure that the content of its ruling is 
not defective in terms of article 49 Federal Act on Administrative Procedure 
(FAAP)26, that the decision does not infringe federal laws, i.e. there is no vio-
lation of federal law including the exceeding or abuse of discretionary powers, 
the determination of the legally relevant facts of the case is correct and com-
plete, and the ruling is adequate.
IV. Mediators in Switzerland
The profession of mediator is not regulated in Switzerland27, which means 
25  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 217 n° 3, p. 
810, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 ; Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre 
juridique suisse, La médiation en matière civile et commerciale, p. 72, Jean A. Mirimanoff 
(éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
26  Art. 49 FAAP In the appeal, the appellant may contend that: 
a. there has been a violation of federal law including the exceeding or abuse of discre-
tionary powers; b. there has been an incorrect or incomplete determination of the legally 
relevant facts of the case; c. the ruling is inadequate; a plea of inadequacy is inadmissible 
if a cantonal authority has ruled as the appellate authority.
27  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 213 n° 8, p. 
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that anybody can use the title of mediator and practice mediation. Several 
professions are represented among practising mediators, such as lawyers, re-
tired judges, psychologists, social workers, or architects, etc.
When mediation takes place during court proceedings (see chapter VI. A 
below), the mediator shall be independent. Contrary to some other jurisdic-
tions, the mediator is not part of the judicial system, i.e. a professional judge 
or a conciliator. In other words, the Swiss judicial system has externalised 
mediation28.
The CPC or other federal laws do not provide for the mediators to have 
specific qualifications or to be listed as qualified/sworn mediators, though 
they stipulate that the mediation shall be confidential and independent29 . 
In theory, the parties are therefore free to choose whoever they want. 
However, several cantons such as Canton of Geneva have published a list 
of sworn civil and criminal mediators, who had to fulfil required conditions 
to be recognised as such30. They must be at least 30 years old, hold university 
diploma, have some professional experience, have knowledge and experience 
in mediation, hold a diploma or certificate accredited by one of the Swiss as-
798, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011; Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre 
juridique suisse, Mediation-s, esquisse générale, p. 36, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing 
Lichtenhahn, 2011
28  Christine Guy –Ecabert, Conciliation ou Médiation ? Guider le juge et le justiciable 
par une analyse des différences entre les processus, RJN, 2011, p. 23
29 Art. 216 CPC Relationship with court proceedings:
1 Mediation proceedings are confidential and kept separate from the conciliation au-
thority and the court.
2 The statements of the parties may not be used in court proceedings.
30  Art. 66 and 67 Loi sur l’Organisation Judiciaire Genève.
Art. 66 Autorisation L’exercice de la fonction de médiateur assermenté est subordon-
né à une autorisation du Conseil d’Etat. 
Art. 67 Conditions d’exercice L’exercice de la fonction de médiateur est réservée aux 
personnes qui : 
a) sont âgées de 30 ans au moins; 
b) sont au bénéfice d’un diplôme universitaire ou d’une formation jugée équivalente; 
c) disposent d’une bonne expérience professionnelle; 
d) disposent d’une expérience ou de connaissances suffisantes dans le domaine d’exer-
cice de la médiation; 
e) disposent de qualifications et d’aptitudes particulières en matière de médiation; 
f) ne font l’objet d’aucune condamnation pour un crime ou un délit relatif à des faits 
portant atteinte à la probité et à l’honneur. 
ISABELLE HERING
142
sociations, such as the Swiss Bar Association31, the Swiss federation of medi-
ation associations or the Swiss chamber of commercial mediation and have a 
clean criminal record. 
The Canton of Vaud32 has also established a list of accredited mediators for 
civil matters. However, the parties are usually free to choose mediators not 
mentioned on the list. 
For mediations taking place during civil, criminal or criminal for minors 
proceedings in Canton of Fribourg, the mediator must be authorised by the 
mediation commission. The conditions are similar to these applicable in Can-
ton of Geneva33.
Authorities are of different opinions;  some believe that the existence of 
such lists should not prevent the parties from choosing whoever they want34 
while others consider that a mediator should have an authorisation35. The 
debate is certainly valid in civil procedure as the CPC does not provide for 
minimum professional requirements. 
In any event, it is advisable that the parties choose a mediator accredited 
by one of the recognized associations as mentioned above, as it ensures that 
the mediator has had a minimum of training and understands the principles 
applicable to the mediation process. 
In federal administrative mediation, the mediators do not need to be sworn 
mediators, but they are designated by the authority. In Canton of Vaud, ad-
ministrative mediators are chosen by the authorities, as well as in Geneva for 
specific matters36. 
31  Pierre Kobel, Le nouveau Règlement Médiateur FSA/Médiatrice FSA in Revue de 
l’Avocat, 3/2008
32  Vaud: Règlement sur les médiateurs civils agrées (RMCA), 22 of June 2010 
33  Fribourg: art. 6 Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale et pénale 
pour les mineurs (OMed) du 6 décembre 2010
34  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 213 n° 9, p.798, 
Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011.
35  Contra : Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La mé-
diation en matière pénale, p. 189, with the editor’s note, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing 
Lichtenhahn, 2011 
 Contra : Pierre Kobel, in Ursula Leemann , Roman Manser, Pierre Kobel, in Media-
tion, La Pratique de l’Avocat, page 1225, Stämpfli Editions, Berne, 2009 tiré à part 
36  Vaud: Loi vaudoise sur la médiation administrative du 19 mai 2009, articles 5 and ff
Geneva: Loi sur l’information du public, l’accès aux documents et la protection des 
données personnelles (LIPAD) article 30 ; mediation at school service
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In criminal mediation, the matter is not regulated by federal laws.  At the 
cantonal level, mediators are usually required to have an authorisation to 
practise as mediator when dealing with minors 37 or with adults or minors38.
V. Lawyers and judges involvement in the process of mediation
A. Lawyers
According to article 9 of the Swiss lawyers’ federation code of conduct39, 
“the lawyer tries to amicably settle all disputes, insofar as it is in the interest 
of the client. The lawyer, as representative of a party or legal advisor, takes 
into account a mediation that is currently taking place or the desire of one 
of the parties to initiate mediation”.
With regard to mediation, lawyers have different roles40: 
Prevention/promotion: a lawyer shall prevent disputes and help his cli-
ents to maintain their relationship with their business partners or family 
members, for instance by integrating alternative dispute resolution clauses in 
the agreements rather than the usual court clauses. 
Choice: when analysing a file and the issues at stake, the lawyer shall first 
identify the interests of his clients and then suggest the best alternative to 
37  Vaud: art. 60 Loi sur la juridiction pénale des mineurs, Principe
1 A tout stade de la procédure, le président peut la suspendre et charger une organi-
sation ou une personne reconnues en la matière d’engager une procédure de médiation 
lorsque les conditions de l’article 8 DPMin A sont remplies.
2 Le médiateur est soumis à une autorisation de pratiquer délivrée par le Tribunal 
cantonal.
3 Le règlement B fixe les conditions et la procédure d’autorisation, le statut, le fonc-
tionnement et la rémunération du médiateur.
38  Fribourg: art. 6 Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale et pénale 
pour les mineurs (OMed) du 6 décembre 2010, article 6
39  Fédération Suisse des Avocats, Règlement amiable des litiges Art. 9 FSA Code of 
Conduct
1 L’avocat s’efforce de régler à l’amiable les litiges, dans la mesure où l’intérêt du 
client ne s’y oppose pas. 
2 Il tient compte, comme représentant d’une partie en justice ou conseiller, d’une mé-
diation en cours ou du souhait de l’une des parties d’en instaurer une.
40  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation 
en matière civile et commerciale, p. 89, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 
2011 ; Pierre Kobel, in Ursula Leemann , Roman Manser, Pierre Kobel, in Mediation, La 
Pratique de l’Avocat, page 1230, Stämpfli Editions, Berne, 2009 tiré à part 
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resolve the dispute: courts? Negotiations? Mediation? Arbitration? For this 
purpose, the lawyer can for instance refer to recommendations prepared for 
the attention of lawyers by the mediation chamber of the Vaud lawyers’ asso-
ciation (OAV)41.
Information: a lawyer shall explain the process and the main principles of 
mediation to his clients so as to prepare them to mediation. The lawyer ex-
plains his role during mediation and understands his clients ‘expectations. If 
the mediation process is chosen by the parties, then the lawyer shall be able to 
guide his clients through the process, taking a role of coach or council during 
the mediation. 
Drafting: once the mediation has led to a settlement agreement, the lawyer 
shall be able to write the settlement agreement and assess if such settlement 
is to be ratified (217 CPC) or authenticated in order to become enforceable 
(art. 347 CPC).
In order to fulfil these roles, lawyers should have sound knowledge of ex-
isting alternatives, including mediation, and ensure they are properly trained. 
Such statement seems evident; nevertheless there are still some lawyers who 
work daily as negotiators or contract’ drafters and who believe that such 
knowledge and practice give them sufficient tools to fulfil above mentioned 
roles. However, shifting from being lawyer used to look for positions, give 
advice or be directive, to being a coach during mediation, where the parties 
search for their common interests and options, is not easy. This presupposes 
a change of mind-set, as lawyers are no longer the spokespersons for their 
clients42 .
Lawyers are still dubitative about mediation and its effects on their prac-
tice; for some of them, thinking about alternative modes of dispute resolu-
tion is not natural43. They should however understand that mediation can be 
an effective tool and seen as a complementary activity. Successful mediation 
maintains a long term relationship between lawyers and their clients and en-
ables them to offer several and diverse services. 
41  Ordre des Avocats Vaudois, check-liste pour les avocats, www.mediation-oav.ch, 
domaines d’intervention
42  Catherine Jaccottet Tissot, Contrôle de la qualité juridique de l’accord de média-
tion – le rôle du médiateur, en particulier la relation avec l’avocat, Gemme 29 mai 2013, 
www.gemme.ch/gem_contributions
43  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article, page 6.
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Indeed mediation success rate is high (about 70%)44, and profitability 
should not be a deterrent as - at least in commercial mediation - hourly law-
yers’ fees may be charged. 
B. Judges
At the early stages of the process, at least in civil or commercial cases, 
judges have the opportunity to assess which of the following paths the case 
should take: either conciliation conducted by the judge, or referral to media-
tion with an external mediator, or judgment. 
With the new CPC, the judges have now the ability to suggest mediation 
and to encourage parties to use the mediation process (art. 214 CPC) up to 
the judgment stage45. In disputes related to children, they can even urge the 
parents to try mediation (art. 297 CPC). The judges might also intervene at 
the stage of ratification (art. 217 CPC). 
Once mediation has been chosen by the parties, judges do not intervene 
in the process anymore, because of their complete independency and auton-
omy46. 
Judges must admit that, in certain circumstances – when a legal solution 
is not straightforward –, mediation might be a good solution. They must be 
ready to accept that the dispute might be resolved in another way than a clas-
sical judgment47. 
Their referral to mediation may depend on the level of success of concilia-
tion in the courts.  Indeed, if the conciliation process proves to be successful, 
then judges might not be inclined to suggest mediation and might continue 
to follow their usual path48. Why refer the matter to mediation when concil-
44  First Survey by la Fédération suisse des associations de médiation, 2009 http://
www.infomediation.ch/cms/index.php?id=229&L=1 
45  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation 
en matière civile et commerciale, p. 95, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 
2011 
46  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation 
en matière civile et commerciale, p. 91, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 
2011
47  Violaine Monnerat, L’impulsion à la médiation, l’intervention et l’impact du juge, 
Gemme, 29 mai 2013, www.gemme.ch/gem_contributions, slide 10
48  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation 




iation is free of charge (no additional fees are requested from the parties to 
conciliate) and works49? 
Now that judges have been given the legal tools and a new role - initiator 
of the mediation process - , they have to understand the process of mediation, 
recognize its advantages and the mission of the mediator. 
But above all, judges must have faith in the process of mediation in order to 
convince the parties50, who are not knowledgeable and who expect guidance. 
Such belief will only be possible if they get properly trained and informed51. 
VI. Civil and Commercial Mediation 
Mediation is available to the parties not only out of courts as a voluntary 
process, but also during the court proceedings according to the applicable 
laws. 
A. Mediation during court proceedings 
Since January 2011, Switzerland has a new CPC which replaced all canton-
al civil procedure laws and applies uniformly on the whole Swiss territory52. 
The Swiss legislator has introduced amicable settlement (mediation) in the 
CPC because “transactional solutions are more durable and subsequently 
more economical, as they can take into account factors that a court could 
not take into account”53.
The new CPC offers mediation during the proceedings as per articles 213 
to 218 CPC. These articles do not aim at regulating mediation, but only at set-
ting its interaction with the court proceedings. The process of mediation itself 
is neither described nor regulated, it is the exclusive choice of the parties (art. 
215 CPC54) (autonomy principle). 
49  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article, p. 7
50  Violaine Monnerat, L’impulsion à la médiation, l’intervention et l’impact du juge, 
Gemme, 29 mai 2013, www.gemme.ch/gem_contributions, slide 8 and 9
51  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière civile et commerciale, p. 91, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
52  Civil Procedure Code, CPC of 19 December 2008, RS 272
53  FF 2006 6860
54  Art. 215 CPC Organisation and conduct of mediation: The parties are responsible 
for organising and conducting the mediation.
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Mediation can be used alternatively to conciliation (art. 213 CPC55, see 
chapter VI. A. 1 below) or during the proceedings (in first instance or at the 
appeal stage) (art. 214 CPC56, see chapter VI. A. 2 below). 
The parties can choose their mediator, which means that the conciliation 
authority or the judge will neither impose nor nominate the mediator (see 
however the exceptions mentioned above in chapter IV above). Whatever is 
being said during the mediation will not be taken into account afterwards in 
the trial. Mediation is confidential and totally independent of the proceedings 
(art. 216 CPC)57.
If a settlement has been reached during the mediation, such settlement 
can be ratified (art. 217 CPC) either by the conciliation authority or by the 
tribunal competent at the time of mediation 58. 
Ratification can only take place if the content of settlement is not impos-
sible, illegal or against the mores, and of course only if it does not infringe 
any mandatory laws (see chapter III above). The conciliation authority or the 
competent tribunal will however not verify if the settlement reflects the true 
will of the parties or if parties had authority to enter in such agreement59. 
Once ratified, the settlement becomes executable.
The filing of the mediation request by the parties creates lis pendens (art. 
55  Art. 213 CPC Mediation instead of conciliation
1 If all the parties so request, the conciliation proceedings shall be replaced by medi-
ation.
2 The request must be made in the application for conciliation or at the conciliation 
hearing.
3 The conciliation authority shall grant authorisation to proceed if it is notified by one 
of the parties that mediation has failed.
56  Art. 214 CPC Mediation during court proceedings
1 The court may recommend mediation to the parties at any time.
2 The parties may at any time make a joint request for mediation.
3 The court proceedings remain suspended until the request is withdrawn by one of 
the parties or until the court is notified of the end of the mediation.
57  Art. 216 CPC Relationship with court proceedings
1 Mediation proceedings are confidential and kept separate from the conciliation au-
thority and the court.
2 The statements of the parties may not be used in court proceedings.
58  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 217 n° 2, p. 
809, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
59  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 217 n° 2, p. 
810, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
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62 CPC) and interrupts the statute of limitation (art. 135 ch. 2  Swiss Code of 
obligations).
1. Mediation as an alternative to conciliation (art. 213 CPC)
At the conciliation stage, the parties can voluntarily decide to submit their 
dispute to mediation instead of conciliation (art. 213 CPC).
As a reminder, civil or commercial trials  in Switzerland are all submitted 
to prior mandatory conciliation (art. 197 CPC60), with the exception of certain 
types of disputes, such as divorce proceedings61 or summary proceedings (art. 
198 CPC62). Moreover, conciliation is facultative if the dispute at stake has a 
value of more than CHF 100’000.-- or if the defendant’s seat or domicile is 
abroad63.
60  Art. 197 CPC Principle
Litigation shall be preceded by an attempt at conciliation before a conciliation au-
thority.
61  In case of divorce or separation, the conciliation is conducted by the tribunal (le 
juge du fond) and not by the conciliation authority. During the proceedings, mediation can 
either be suggested by the tribunal, or initiated by the parties themselves, or requested by 
the judge in child matters (art. 297 al. 2 CPC)
62  Art. 198 CPC Exceptions
Conciliation proceedings are not held:
a. in summary proceedings;
b. in proceedings on civil status;
c. in divorce proceedings;
d. in proceedings for the dissolution of a registered partnership;
e. for the following actions arising from the DEBA49:
1. action for release from a debt (Art. 83 para. 2 DEBA)
2. action for a declaratory judgment (Art. 85a DEBA),
3. third party action (Art. 106-109 DEBA),
4. action for participation (Art. 111 DEBA), 
5. third party actions and actions by the bankrupt estate (Art. 242 DEBA),
6. action to challenge the schedule of claims (Art. 148 and 250 DEBA),
7. action to ascertain new assets (Art. 265a DEBA),
8. action for the recovery of items that are subject to the right of retention
(Art. 284 DEBA);
f. in disputes for which a court of sole cantonal instance has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Articles 5 and 6;
g. for principal intervention, counterclaim and third party actions;
h. if the court has set a deadline for filing the action.
63  Art. 199 CPC Waiver of conciliation
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In the event where all the parties at the dispute are willing to proceed with 
mediation instead of conciliation, they can either inform the conciliator in 
their conciliation request or at the first hearing. They can choose mediation 
for as long as the conciliation authority has not granted the authorisation to 
proceed (art. 213 al. 3 CPC). 
If only one party requests mediation instead of conciliation, the concilia-
tion authority should notify such request to the other party asking the latter 
to accept or refuse mediation64, as all parties at stake must agree to go to me-
diation as a principle. 
At the stage of the request, the parties do not have yet to agree about who 
is going to act as mediator and what process will be used.  They do not have to 
provide the conciliator with the reasons of their choice to mediate. 
The conciliation authority cannot refuse the replacement of the concilia-
tion by mediation unless the request does not provide for mediation, but ne-
gotiation (for instance) or the parties manifestly try to evade the conciliation 
proceedings65.
The parties are free to choose their mediator, who does not need to be listed 
on the lists of sworn mediators (see however exceptions in chapter IV above).
They can also decide at any stage of the proceedings to stop mediation and 
resume the proceedings.
If mediation does not result in a settlement, the parties can continue the 
proceedings before the judge after the authorisation to proceed has been de-
livered (art. 209 CPC).
2. Mediation during the proceedings (art. 214 CPC)
During court proceedings (after the conciliation phase), mediation can ei-
ther be suggested by the tribunal (art. 214 al. 1) or initiated by the parties 
themselves (art. 214 al. 2).
1 In financial disputes with a value in dispute of at least 100,000 francs, the parties 
may mutually agree to waive any attempt at conciliation.
2 The plaintiff may unilaterally waive conciliation:
a. if the defendant’s registered office or domicile is abroad;
b. if the defendant’s residence is unknown;
c. in disputes under the Gender Equality Act of 24 March 1995.
64  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, La médiation civile dans le code de pro-
cédure civile unifié, in Revue de l’Avocat, n° 8/2010, p. 330
65  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 213 n° 6, p. 
797, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
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The judge is given the ability to be proactive in advising –not enjoining – the 
parties to go to mediation or to take some outside advice concerning media-
tion66. The judge can do so during the whole proceedings until a judgement is 
rendered.67 Only in cases of proceedings related to children in case of divorce, 
may the judge urge the parents to attempt mediation (art. 297 CPC68).
The parties can request mediation either in writing or orally at any hear-
ing. The judge may not refuse such request.
In both cases, the proceedings are suspended (al. 3).
The parties can request that the proceedings resume if the mediation was 
not successful or if one of the parties decides to stop the mediation process. 
If the parties were able to reach an agreement only partially, the proceedings 
will resume for the points that were not settled69.
B. Mediation out of courts
The process of mediation before or outside any proceedings is of course 
available to the parties. It is the same process than the one used during the 
proceedings.
However, the question remains about what happens with an out of courts 
settlement agreement? Can it be ratified by a judge? Can the parties use the 
ratification procedure? 
Two possible solutions are offered to the parties: they can either request 
the judge to ratify their settlement in accordance with article 217 CPC or en-
sure that such settlement is authenticated by a notary so as to ensure it be-
comes executable (art. 347 CPC).
1. Ratification by the judge (art. 217 CPC70)
66  Jean A. Mirimanoff, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière civile et commerciale, p. 81, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
67  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 215 n° 7, p. 801, 
Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011.
68  Art. 297 CPC Hearing of the parents and mediation
1 The court hears the parents in person when ruling on matters relating to a child.
2 The court may ask the parents to attempt mediation.
69  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 214 n° 24, p. 
803, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011.
70  Art. 217 CPC Approval of an agreement The parties may jointly request that the 
agreement reached through mediation be approved. An approved agreement has the 
same effect as a legally binding decision.
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Article 217 CPC is part of the civil procedure code and originally enables 
the parties to request ratification of their settlement by the judge if mediation 
has taken place in replacement of conciliation or during the court proceed-
ings. 
The question is therefore whether a settlement reached through media-
tion can be ratified by the judge if the dispute has not been submitted to such 
judge (or conciliator) before mediation has taken place.
Authorities have different views. Some believe that such settlement can 
only be ratified if the matter is pending before the conciliation authority or 
the tribunal71, as the CPC does not formally provide for the contrary. 
Others consider that the parties should be able to get their settlement rati-
fied through a written request to either the conciliation authority or the com-
petent tribunal. Enabling ratification outside any proceedings would ensure 
pragmatism and procedural economy72. It seems indeed unreasonable to re-
quest the parties to introduce a conciliation request including the settlement 
just for the purpose of ratification, although this might be formally the only 
way to ensure ratification.
Note that in divorce proceedings, the parties can settle on the effects of 
their divorce and request the judge to approve such settlement (art. 279 
CPC73), which will be valid only once ratified by the judge (article 279 al. 2 
CPC).
71  Bohnet François, in Code de Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 217 n° 7, p. 810, 
Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 (and references) ; Christine Guy –Ecabert, Conciliation 
ou Médiation ? Guider le juge et le justiciable par une analyse des différences entre les 
processus, RJN, 2011, p. 22
72  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, La médiation civile dans le code de pro-
cédure civile unifié, in Revue de l’Avocat, n° 8/2010, p. 332, Bohnet François, in Code de 
Procédure Civile commenté, ad article 217 n° 7, p. 810, Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
(and references in contra) ; Cinthia Levy , Les avantages de la médiation pour l’avocat, in 
Revue de l’avocat, 11/12 2013, p. 476 ; Ursula Leemann , Roman Manser, Pierre Kobel, in 
Mediation, La Pratique de l’Avocat, page 1207, Stämpfli Editions, Berne, 2009 tiré à part 
73  Art. 279 CPC Approval of the agreement
1 The court shall approve the agreement on the effects of the divorce if it is persuaded 
that the spouses have concluded the agreement of their own volition and after careful 
reflection, and that the agreement is clear, complete and not manifestly inequitable; the 
provisions on occupational pensions are reserved.
2 The agreement is valid only when it has been approved by the court. It must be 
included in the conclusions to the decision.
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2. Authentication by a notary (art. 347 CPC)
The parties can take the necessary steps in order for their settlement to 
become enforceable as an authentic title in accordance with article 347 CPC74. 
The settlement shall fulfil the following conditions: 
-the parties, or at least the obligee, shall declare in their settlement agree-
ment that they accept direct enforcement,
-the settlement shall mention the legal grounds for the performance due 
(execution clause), 
-the performance shall be sufficiently specified in the settlement agree-
ment, accepted by the parties and due, and
-the settlement shall be “official”, that is it must have been authenticated 
by a public officer, usually a notary.
Once authenticated, the settlement is enforceable in accordance with the 
Lugano convention, within the scope of the convention and in the member 
states signatories to such convention75. 
74  Art. 347 CPC Enforceability. Official records relating to any type of performance 
may be enforced in the same way as judicial decisions if:
a. the obligee expressly declares in the record that he or she accepts direct enforce-
ment;
b. the legal ground for the performance due is mentioned in the record; and
c. the performance due is:
1. sufficiently specified in the record,
2. accepted in the record by the obligee, and
3. due.
75  Art. 57 Lugano Convention, Authentic instruments
1. A document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic in-
strument and is enforceable in one State bound by this Convention shall, in another State 
bound by this Convention, be declared enforceable there, on application made in accor-
dance with the procedures provided for in Article 38, et seq. The court with which an 
appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 shall refuse or revoke a declaration of en-
forceability only if enforcement of the instrument is manifestly contrary to public policy 
in the State addressed.
2. Arrangements relating to maintenance obligations concluded with administrative 
authorities or authenticated by them shall also be regarded as authentic instruments 
within the meaning of paragraph 1.
3. The instrument produced must satisfy the conditions necessary to establish its au-
thenticity in the State of origin. 
4. Section 3 of Title III shall apply as appropriate. The competent authority of a State 
bound by this Convention where an authentic instrument was drawn up or registered 
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VII. Criminal mediation (victim–offender mediation)
Mediation in criminal law aims, on one hand, at placing responsibility to 
the offenders and ensuring that they understand the consequences of their 
acts and, on the other hand, at trying to repair and alleviate the suffering and 
damages incurred by the victims (restorative justice)76. As in civil matters, 
criminal mediation looks at the matter in a global way and gives some space 
for the parties to express their feelings, needs and interests, and find an ade-
quate solution.
The ability to use mediation in criminal matters as a dispute resolution 
process is not the same for minors or for adults. 
A. Mediation in criminal law for minors
Since January 2011, criminal procedure law for minors has been unified 
and is now applicable throughout Switzerland. It welcomes mediation. 
Indeed, the criminal procedure code for minors (art. 17 PPMin77) pro-
vides that mediation can be initiated by investigating authorities and tribu-
nals, and criminal proceedings may be suspended: 
-if no safeguarding measures are needed or if such measures have already 
been taken, and
-if conditions of exemption of punishment in the meaning of article 21 
DPMin (criminal law for minors) are not fulfilled. 
Mediation is therefore subsidiary to measures and exemptions.
Mediation cannot be initiated, if safeguarding measures (for instance 
placement of the minor in a detention centre) have to be taken.  Likewise, 
shall issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in 
Annex VI to this Convention.
76  Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière pénale, p. 151, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
77 Art. 17 PPMin 
1 L’autorité d’instruction et les tribunaux peuvent en tout temps suspendre la procé-
dure et charger une organisation ou une personne compétente dans le domaine de la mé-
diation d›engager une procédure de médiation dans les cas suivants:
a. il n’y a pas lieu de prendre de mesures de protection ou l’autorité civile a déjà or-
donné les mesures appropriées;
b. les conditions fixées à l’art. 21, al. 1, DPMin1 ne sont pas remplies. [in cases of 
exemptions of punishment]
2 Si la médiation aboutit à un accord, la procédure est classée.
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if the minor will be exempted from punishment (e.g. the minor has already 
been sufficiently punished for his acts), mediation is not necessary.
Mediation can be initiated at any stage of the criminal proceedings, i.e. 
also in the appeal phase or during the execution of the sentence or measures. 
The authorities or tribunals transmit the file to an association or person com-
petent in the field of mediation without having to get the agreement of the 
victim and the offender. The mediator then ensures that the parties agree to 
submit their case to mediation78 .
The proceedings are suspended when the mediation takes place, and if the 
parties come to a settlement, the proceedings are dropped (17 PPMin al. 3). 
Cantonal laws have provided for the implementation of mediation for mi-
nors79.
B. Mediation in criminal law for adults
Despite significant support aiming at introducing a clause promoting 
criminal mediation in the Swiss criminal procedure code (CrimPC), its final 
version does not include any direct mention of mediation, probably due to 
fear of high costs at the level of cantonal implementation80. However, the 
Federal office of Justice incontestably supports the use of mediation in the 
criminal proceedings81.
Although mediation is not directly provided for in the CrimPC, the use of 
mediation can be found indirectly in article 316 CrimPC82.  
78  Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière pénale, p. 173, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
79  Geneva: Directive relative à la médiation dans les juridictions pénales des mineurs 
à Genève du 17 octobre 2011 ; Fribourg: Ordonnance du 6 décembre 2010 sur la médiation 
en matière civile, pénale et pénale pour les mineurs; Vaud: Règlement du 2 février 2010 
sur la médiation dans le cadre de la procédure pénale applicable aux mineurs.
80  Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière pénale, p. 181, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
81  BO 2007 N 1389 and letter of 21 September 2007
82  Art. 316 CrimPC Private Settlements 
1 Where the proceedings relate to an offence that is prosecuted only on complaint, the 
public prosecutor may summon the complainant and the accused to a hearing with the 
aim of achieving a settlement. If the complainant fails to attend, the complaint
is deemed to have been withdrawn.
2 If consideration is being given to an exemption from punishment due to reparation 
being made in accordance with Article 53 SCC, the public prosecutor shall invite the per-
son suffering harm and the accused to a hearing with the aim of agreeing on reparation.
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This disposition allows the public prosecutor to summon the parties to a 
hearing with the aim of achieving settlement. Such possibility is limited only 
to offences prosecuted on complaint. The claim is deemed to have been with-
drawn (al. 1), if the complainant does not show up at the hearing. 
In such hearing, authorities are of the opinion that the prosecutor can sug-
gest mediation to the parties83 and suspend the proceedings (art. 314 al. 1 lit. 
c CrimPC)84. If the complainant does not appear at the mediation session, 
given the voluntary process of mediation, the claim will not be deemed to 
have been withdrawn85.
For offences prosecuted ex officio or on complaint, when consideration is 
being given to an exemption from punishment due to reparation being made 
in accordance with article 53 Swiss Criminal Code86, the public prosecutor 
has the obligation to invite the victim and the offender to a hearing with the 
aim of agreeing on reparation (art. 316 al. 2 CrimPC). Authorities are of the 
opinion that during this hearing the prosecutor can also suggest mediation87.
3 If an agreement is reached, this shall be placed on record and signed by those in-
volved. The public prosecutor shall then abandon the proceedings.
4 If the accused fails to attend a hearing in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2 or if no 
agreement is reached, the public prosecutor shall immediately proceed with the investi-
gation. In cases where it is justified, it may require the complainant to provide security 
for costs and damages within ten days.
83  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, Réflexions sur la médiabilité, in Revue de 
l’Avocat, n° 10/2010, p. 414, Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, 
La médiation en matière pénale, p. 183, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
84  Art. 314 CrimPC Suspension
1 The public prosecutor may suspend an investigation, in particular if:
c. private settlement proceedings are ongoing and it seems appropriate to await their 
outcome;
85  Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière pénale, p. 183, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
86  Art. 53 Code Pénal Suisse: Reparation. If the offender has made reparation for 
the loss, damage or injury or made every reasonable effort to right the wrong that he 
has caused, the competent authority shall refrain from prosecuting him, bringing him
to court or punishing him if:
a. the requirements for a suspended sentence (Art. 42) are fulfilled; and
b. the interests of the general public and of the persons harmed in prosecution are 
negligible.
87  Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière pénale, p. 184, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
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For offences prosecuted on complaint, the public prosecutor shall aban-
don the proceedings when the parties reach a settlement (art. 316 al. 3). 
For offences prosecuted ex officio, the prosecutor may either issue an order 
stating that no proceedings are being taken (in the event where the mediation 
took place before the instruction is opened) or that the on-going proceedings 
have been abandoned (in the event where the mediation took place after the 
opening of the instruction) 88. 
If mediation took place at the stage of judgment, then an order stating that 
the on-going proceedings have been abandoned can be issued (art. 329 al. 4 
CrimPC).
Cantonal laws on the application of the CrimPC have taken the opportu-
nity to expressly provide for mediation in the criminal procedure for adults. 
For instance, in Geneva, the public prosecutor can invite the offender and the 
victim to engage in a mediation process instead of conciliation89. Canton of 
88 Art. 8 CrimPC Waiving prosecution
1 The public prosecutor and courts shall waive prosecution if the federal law so per-
mits, in particular subject to the requirements of Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Swiss Crim-
inal Code (SCC).
2 Unless it is contrary to the private claimant’s overriding interests, they shall also 
waive prosecution if:
a. the offence is of negligible importance in comparison with the other offences with 
which the accused is charged as regards the expected sentence or measure;
b. any additional penalty imposed in combination with the sentence in the final judg-
ment would be negligible;
c. an equivalent sentence imposed abroad would have to be taken into account when 
imposing a sentence for the offence prosecuted.
3 Unless it is contrary to the private claimant’s overriding interests, the public prose-
cutor and courts may waive the prosecution if the offence is already being prosecuted by 
a foreign authority or the prosecution has been assigned to such an authority.
4 In such cases, they shall issue an order stating that no proceedings are being taking 
or that the ongoing proceedings have been abandoned.
89  Geneva : Art. 34A Loi d’application du Code Pénal Suisse et d’autres lois fédérales 
en matière pénale: Médiation
1 En lieu et place d’une conciliation (art. 316, al. 1, phr. 1, et al. 2, CPP), le Ministère 
public peut inviter le prévenu et le plaignant ou le lésé à engager une médiation au sens 
des articles 66 et suivants de la loi sur l’organisation judiciaire, du 26 septembre 2010.
2 L’article 316, alinéa 3, CPP s’applique par analogie.
3 Le Ministère public peut également procéder selon l’alinéa 1 lorsqu’une exemption de 
peine au titre de l’absence d’intérêt à punir selon l’article 52 CP entre en ligne de compte.
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Fribourg also provides for mediation instead of conciliation90.
Despite the fact that mediation is available and welcomed for criminal 
matters, one has to note that it might not help the primary goal of criminal 
law that is general prevention. Indeed mediation being confidential, the pub-
lic will not be informed if the matter is resolved by settlement. It might be 
satisfactory for the involved parties but it does not serve the public interests, 
particularly in the context of certain criminal acts, such as sexual offenses or 
offences against life91.
VIII. Administrative mediation
Administrative mediation has the particularity that it will attract private 
parties on one side (users of the public goods) and public authorities on the 
other, the latter having a stronger position because of its status and the obli-
gation to apply the law. The parties are therefore in unequal positions from 
the outset92. 
The settlement or positive outcome of administrative mediation does not 
aim at replacing administrative decisions taken by public authorities, but 
aims at reaching a decision acceptable by all parties. 
During the mediation, parties will be able to get better information of the 
situation, ensure some kind of collaboration in order to find a solution and 
enable a long term acceptation of the decisions93. There will indeed be a de-
cision taken by the authorities, but such will be based on the outcome of the 
mediation. 
90  Fribourg: Art. 41 Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale et pénale 
pour les mineurs (OMed) 
Médiation en procédure pénale des adultes, Procédure 
1 Pour les infractions pénales poursuivies sur plainte, la médiation pénale peut inter-
venir dans le cadre de la procédure de conciliation de l’article 316 du code de procédure 
pénale suisse. 
2 Dans les affaires pénales poursuivies d’office, les parties peuvent recourir à la mé-
diation en ce qui concerne les aspects civils ou la réparation de l’article 53 du code pénal 
suisse, à la condition que l’autorité judiciaire saisie accepte la médiation.
91  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, Réflexions sur la médiabilité, in Revue 
de l’Avocat, n° 10/2010, p. 415
92  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, Réflexions sur la médiabilité, in Revue 
de l’Avocat, n° 10/2010, p. 413
93  Alexis Overney, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière administrative, p. 192, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011
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Such mediation can take place at any time in the process of decision, either 
before the decision is taken, during the decision phase, after the decision has 
been made, or in the appeal phase against such decision.
Not all administrative cases can be submitted to mediation. In order to 
consider mediation in administrative cases the following conditions must be 
fulfilled94:
- There is a conflict between a public authority and users,
- Mandatory laws do not exclude a negotiated solution. If mandatory laws 
impose a solution, no mediation can take place (legality principle) (see chap-
ter III above),
- The public authority has discretionary powers,
- All parties have an interest to reach a negotiated settlement and have the 
will to engage in a mediation,
- Powers between the parties are not too excessively imbalanced.
It seems that administrative mediation is more successful in non-conten-
tious matters (“procédures gracieuses”), when positions are not crystallised 
and the disputes are not yet legally formalised95.
A. Mediation in the federal administrative law
The Federal Act on Administrative Procedure (FAAP) applies to the pro-
cedures in administrative matters that are to be dealt with by rulings of Swiss 
federal administrative authorities of first instance or on appeal.
Article 33b FAAP96 enables the authorities to suspend the proceedings if 
94  Alexis Overney, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière administrative, p. 197-201, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
95  Guy Ecabert Christine, Examen de la question à partir de quelques arrêts du tri-
bunal administratif fédéral, in Juria, Mediationstagung Verwaltungsrecht – Ueberblick in 
« Justice-Justiz-Giustizia » 2010/4, p. 3
96  Art. 33b FAAP Amicable agreement and mediation
1 The authority may suspend the proceedings with the consent of the parties in 
order that the parties may agree on the content of the ruling. The agreement should 
state that the parties waive their right of appeal and how the parties intend to allocate 
the costs.
2 In order to encourage an agreement, the authority may appoint a neutral and suit-
ably qualified natural person to be a mediator.
3 The mediator shall be bound only by the law and his mandate from the authority. 
He may take evidence; for inspections, reports from experts and the examination of wit-
nesses, he shall require prior authorisation from the authority.
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the parties agree to, in order for them to come to an agreement regarding the 
content of the decision to be taken by the authorities. It covers all decisions 
to be taken in first instance or appeal by the federal authorities and is open to 
proceedings opposing at least two parties (not counting the authority)97. 
The authority may nominate a mediator. As the appointment of a media-
tor is discretionary to the authority – parties have no right to mediation98 -, 
the parties cannot request that mediation takes place. The mediator will be 
chosen on a case by case basis, as there are no federal mediators.  In order to 
encourage an agreement, the authority may appoint a neutral and suitably 
qualified natural person to be a mediator.  The FAAP does not mention that 
the person must be a sworn mediator.
The mediator shall be bound only by the law and his mandate from the 
authority (al. 2). The process is confidential (art. 16 al. 1 bis FAAP) as the 
mediator can refuse to testify in future proceedings99. The mediator may take 
evidence; however, for inspections, reports from experts and the examination 
of witnesses, he shall require prior authorisation from the authority (al.3), 
which means that the mediator is under close control by the authority100.
The authority shall make the agreement reached with the help of the me-
diator the content of its ruling, unless the agreement is defective in terms of 
article 49 FAAP101 (see chapter III above).
4 The authority shall make the agreement the content of its ruling, unless the agree-
ment is defective in terms of Article 49.
5 If an agreement is reached, the authority shall not charge any procedural fees. If no 
agreement is reached, the authority may dispense with imposing the costs of mediation 
on the parties, provided the interests involved justify this.
6 A party may at any time request that the suspension of the proceedings be revoked.
97  TAF arrêt A- 6085/2009, du 22 janvier 2010, c.3.2
98  TAF arrêt A- 6085/2009, du 22 janvier 2010, c.3.2 and A-710/2007 c. 3.1
99  Art. 16 FAAP 1bis The mediator is entitled to refuse to testify on matters that have 
come to his attention in the course of his activities in terms of Article 33b.
100  Florence Pastore/Birgit Sambeth Glasner, Réflexions sur la médiabilité, in Revue 
de l’Avocat, n° 10/2010, p. 413
101 Art. 49 FAAP: In the appeal, the appellant may contend that:
a. there has been a violation of federal law including the exceeding or abuse of dis-
cretionary powers;
b. there has been an incorrect or incomplete determination of the legally relevant 
facts of the case;
c. the ruling is inadequate; a plea of inadequacy is inadmissible if a cantonal author-
ity has ruled as the appellate authority.
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Unfortunately, despite the welcomed integration of mediation at the fed-
eral level, such process does not seem to attract the authorities, as art 33 b is 
rarely applied102. One of the reasons might be again that mediation has not 
been promoted or that the authorities lack information or proper training.
B. Mediation in the cantonal administrative laws
At the cantonal level, mediation is offered for administrative matters, al-
though it is sometimes mixed with other types of alternative dispute resolu-
tion. 
Some cantons provide for services of  an “ombudsman” (who fulfils the 
role of an administrative supervisor)103, some other offer administrative me-
diation104, some other conciliation105. 
IX. The process of mediation
Not differently from other jurisdictions and applicable to civil, criminal 
or administrative106 matters, mediation follows a process in different phases:
A. The opening phase 
The mediator receives the parties and seats them. He may have met them 
separately, or spoken to them before. It is very much a personal decision and 
of course it depends on the type of dispute at stake.
After the usual introductions, the mediator begins with his opening, during 
which he explains the mediation principles, his role, and may discuss other 
102  Alexis Overney, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière administrative, p. 205, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
103  Bâle-Ville: Loi sur le traitement des doléances face à l’Etat par un ombudsman ; 
Zurich: Verwaltungsrechtsplflegegesetz, Zoug: Gesetz uber die Ombudstelle
104  Vaud: Loi sur la médiation administrative ; Règlement sur la promotion de la 
santé et la prévention en milieu scolaire, article 30 and art. 41 and ff
Genève: Loi sur l’information du public, l’accès aux documents et à la protection des 
données, 
Fribourg: Art. 119 Constitution Le Conseil d’Etat institue, en matière administrative, 
un organe de médiation indépendant.
105  Genève : Loi sur la procédure administrative, articles 65 A and ff
106  Alexis Overney, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en 
matière administrative, p. 194, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
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considerations such as pointing to the fact that being in mediation is a unique 
chance to dialogue, to bring an end to the dispute, and for the parties to ex-
press their views/feelings about the case the way they wish. At this stage, the 
parties also confirm their authority to settle and sign the mediation contract, 
if it has not been done before (which would be advisable).
B. Exploration phase
During this phase, the parties present their opening statements, their cas-
es, topics that they wish to discuss or issues that might be clarified. It is usual-
ly done in a joint meeting; it can also be done in private meetings (caucuses). 
Once again, it is very much dependent on the issues at stake, the behaviors of 
the parties and the style of the mediator.
The mediator will ask clarification questions, in order to understand the 
issues at stake. He will try to identify the underlying interests, distinguish 
the real issues from the apparent ones, and find out parties’ perception of the 
case.
C. Bargaining/negotiation phase 
This phase aims at first brainstorming options, without evaluation, then 
analyzing and evaluating them. Then parties select the options that can bring 
them to a settlement. The parties, with the help of the mediator, discuss dif-
ferences, identify items of different values, prioritizing parties’ concerns and 
aspirations. The mediator may use reality testing questions, when necessary 
and appropriate, checking their BATNA and their WATNA107, taking into ac-
count the costs of continued litigation or arbitration, and closing the gap.
D. Concluding phase 
If parties have settled their dispute, then a settlement agreement will pref-
erably be written down, either by the parties themselves, or by their lawyers if 
they have hired any. In any event the mediator neither drafts the agreement 
nor does he verify its enforceability. He may only check that all settled points 
and issues are covered in sufficient details. 
E. Ratification phase
Once signed, the parties can request that the settlement agreement be rat-
107  BATNA : Best alternative to a negotiated agreement.  WATNA: Worse alternative 
to a negotiated agreement
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ified by the judge (art.217 CPC) or authenticated (art. 347 CPC). In adminis-
trative mediation, the settlement is ratified by the authority in its decision.
X. Costs of Mediation
A. Civil and commercial mediation
In civil or commercial mediation, the CPC stipulates that costs of mediation 
are borne by the parties, with the exception of cases concerning non-financial 
matters of child law. In such cases and under some conditions, the parties 
are entitled to cost-free mediation108. However, cantons have the ability to 
legislate and provide for exemptions (art. 218 al. 3 CPC). This unfortunately 
results in different situations, some cantons allowing cost free mediation and 
therefore encouraging mediation and some other denying any financial help 
in this regard.
In the Canton of Geneva, costs of mediation taking place out of courts or 
during a judicial process can be borne by the state if legal assistance has been 
granted and if the mediator is a sworn mediator109. In the Canton of Vaud, 
civil mediation is chargeable110. In Canton of Fribourg, it depends on the ap-
plicable procedural law111. In civil mediation, the costs are usually borne by 
108  Art. 218 CPC Costs of mediation
1 The parties shall bear the costs of mediation.
2 In non-financial matters of child law, the parties are entitled to cost-free mediation if: 
a. they do not have the necessary financial resources; and 
b. the court recommends mediation.
3 Cantonal law may provide for further exemptions from costs.
109  Geneva : Règlement sur l’assistance juridique et l’indemnisation des conseils ju-
ridiques et défenseurs d’office en matière civile, administrative et pénale
Art. 2 Objet L’assistance juridique est réservée aux procédures relevant des juridic-
tions étatiques du canton. Elle peut inclure le recours à un médiateur assermenté au sens 
des articles 66 et suivants de la loi sur l’organisation judiciaire, du 26 septembre 2010
Art. 63 Loi sur l’Organisation Judiciaire, Conditions d’octroi de l’assistance juri-
dique extrajudiciaire 1 Toute personne physique, domiciliée dans le canton de Genève et 
susceptible d’intervenir comme partie dans une procédure, dont la fortune ou les revenus 
ne sont pas suffisants pour lui assurer l’aide ou les conseils d’un avocat, d’un avocat 
stagiaire, ou d’un médiateur assermenté en dehors d’une procédure administrative ou 
judiciaire, peut requérir l’assistance juridique.
110  Vaud : Règlement sur les médiateurs civils agréés : article 7 al. 2
111  Fribourg, Art. 127 Loi sur la justice, Frais 
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the parties, unless one of the parties has obtained legal assistance and the 
mediation has been requested by the judicial authority112.
B. Administrative mediation
With regard to federal administrative mediation, it is free of charge if the 
parties have come to an agreement. If they have not, the authority can re-
nounce to charge them if the interests involved justify such renunciation (art. 
33 al. 5 FAAP113). On a cantonal level, administrative mediation is free of char-
ge in Canton of Vaud114 as well as in Canton of Geneva for matters related to 
data protection115 or if legal assistance has been granted116.
C. Criminal Mediation
In criminal mediation there is no regulation at the federal level concerning 
costs of mediation. Only costs of conciliation (conducted by the public prose-
cutor) are borne by the state117 unless the offender has been convicted118.
1 Les frais de la médiation sont répartis selon le droit de procédure applicable. 
Lorsque la médiation a abouti à un accord, cela peut être pris en considération dans la 
fixation des frais de procédure. 
2 Dans les affaires non pécuniaires relevant du droit de l’enfant et de la famille, la 
médiation est gratuite si les parties ne disposent pas des moyens nécessaires et que le 
tribunal recommande le recours à la médiation. 
112  Fribourg, Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale ou pénale pour 
les mineurs, article 40 
113  See footnote 95 (art. 33b FAAP)
114  Vaud : Loi sur la Médiation administrative, article 22
115  Geneva : Loi sur l’information du public, l’accès aux documents et la protection 
des données personnelles, article 30 al. 6
116  See footnote 108
117  Art. 423 CrimPC Principles
1 The procedural costs shall be borne by the Confederation or the canton that con-
ducts the proceedings, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
Art. 427 al. 3 CrimPC Liability to pay costs of the private claimant and the complainant
If the complainant withdraws the criminal complaint as part of a settlement ar-
ranged by the public prosecutor, the Confederation or the canton shall normally bear 
the procedural costs.
118  Article 426 al. 1 CrimPC Liability to pay costs of the accused and parties to sepa-
rate measures proceedings
1 The accused shall bear the procedural costs if he or she is convicted. Exempted 
therefrom are the costs of the duty defence lawyer; Article 135 paragraph 4 is reserved.
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Different regulations can however be found in the cantonal laws. In Can-
ton of Vaud, the costs of mediation in cases implying minors will be handled 
the same way as the costs of the procedure, i.e. either taken in charge by the 
minors, or their parents, or the victim, or by the state119. For mediation in 
cases implying adults, there is no specific regulation. 
In the Canton of Geneva, the situation is the same as in civil mediation, i.e. 
the costs of a sworn mediator will be borne by the state if legal assistance has 
been granted120. In the Canton of Fribourg, mediation in criminal procedure 
for minors is free of charge121. For adults, the cantonal law122 expressly refers 
to articles 422 and following of the CrimPC concerning the costs of concilia-
tion123, which shall apply by analogy to the costs of mediation.
As one can see, costs of mediation are handled in different ways depending 
on the canton and the subject matter. This certainly does not help the promo-
tion of mediation. 
In order to increase the use of mediation, it would be appropriate to en-
sure that mediation is cost free, at least when the parties have obtained legal 
assistance. 
XI. Conclusion
Despite of its welcomed and recent introduction in several federal laws 
and its presence in cantonal laws, there is still a lot to do in Switzerland to 
promote mediation124 and increase its use out of courts and within the judicial 
process. 
Great efforts are made to sensitize the population about mediation through 
119  Vaud : Loi sur la juridiction pénale des mineurs, articles 34 et 65
120  Geneva : Loi d’application du code pénal suisse et d’autres lois fédérales en ma-
tière pénale, article 34A, Loi sur l’Organisation Judiciaire, Conditions d’octroi de l’assis-
tance juridique extrajudiciaire, article 63 ;
Florence Pastore, in La médiation dans l’ordre juridique suisse, La médiation en ma-
tière pénale, p. 187, Jean A. Mirimanoff (éd.), Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011 
121  Fribourg : Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale ou pénale pour 
les mineurs, article 38 
122  Fribourg : Ordonnance sur la médiation en matière civile, pénale ou pénale pour 
les mineurs, article 42
123  See footnotes 116 and 117
124  Cinthia Levy, La médiation commerciale en Suisse, 10 ans de Gemme, 2014, for-
thcoming article, p. 1
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the existence of multiple associations, the organisation of numerous conferences 
and workshops, as well as the integration of mediation seminars in the univer-
sity programs, but the results unfortunately do not yet fulfil the expectations.
We still need to raise awareness of this form of dispute resolution in order 
to increase the number of mediations. Changing minds and reflexes will not 
be induced without the active direct support, encouragement and participa-
tion of the business community and the promotion of mediation by the judges 
and the lawyers. Legal professions, business world, top management need to 
be convinced and mediation clauses inserted in contracts.
We have the tools, to some extent the law; we have the professionals and 
the perfect place.
We must continue to promote and believe in mediation so as to “become 
young”.

RECONOCIMIENTO Y EFICACIA DE LOS ACUERDOS
DE MEDIACIÓN MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL
Juliana Loss de Andrade
1. Introducción 
En la última década se observa un aumento del número de mediaciones 
realizadas en el campo mercantil internacional. Aunque, en dicha esfera, el 
modelo consensual esté lejos de alcanzar la aceptabilidad ya consolidada del 
modelo arbitral, el progreso camina a pasos largos y exige respuestas prácti-
cas y normativas que contribuyan a su evolución.
Precisamente en una reciente propuesta norteamericana en la Comisión 
de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional (CNUDMI) 
para la construcción de una convención sobre eficacia ejecutiva de los acuer-
dos de mediación, se ha destacado la vinculación de los acuerdos obtenidos 
en la mediación (Mediation Settlement Agreement - MSA). 
Dicha propuesta se basa en la supuesta necesidad de crear un sistema nor-
mativo específico con un mínimo de uniformidad en el ámbito internacional, 
ya que los ordenamientos internos de los países tienen abordajes legislativos 
distintos y muchos no han tampoco legislado1 sobre el tema. Por lo tanto, 
el intento busca dar una respuesta jurídica del MSA, aunque esa respuesta 
pueda ser incluso no conferir ningún status jurídico especial por tratarse de 
medio esencialmente consensual, soft, como argumentan algunos que no ven 
como positiva la eficacia ejecutiva al MSA. En otra óptica, argumentos su-
gieren que el no cumplimiento del acuerdo obtenido en mediación resultaría 
un retorno de las partes al punto de partida, es decir, una mera vinculación 
contractual inter partes, y una consecuente pérdida de tiempo.
De igual manera se cuestiona la eficacia de los acuerdos para mediar (Agree-
ment to Mediate - AM), pues adquiere fibra el movimiento que afirma la nece-
sidad de conferir más seguridad jurídica a las clausulas para mediar (AM). 
1  Como ilustración, Brasil, un país económicamente relevante en el escenario inter-
nacional no ha legislado todavía sobre la mediación, ni a nivel interno ni internacional. De 
hecho, el primero abordaje sobre la mediación se infiere en el nuevo Código Procesal Civil 
recientemente aprobado. No obstante, una reglamentación más específica está en vías de 
preparación con un proyecto de ley que trata de la mediación judicial, privada y pública. 
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Para tanto, aquí se buscará una visión internacional, sin perder de vista 
lo que ocurre en el sistema europeo y en algunos ordenamientos jurídicos 
internos.
2. Procesos de resolución de disputas
Son casi infinitos los métodos disponibles para resolución de disputas2. Aquí 
nos interesan la negociación, la mediación, el arbitraje y el proceso judicial. 
La negociación supone un diálogo directo entre las partes con el fin de 
solucionar la divergencia enfrentada por ellas. No obstante todos negociemos 
en nuestra vidas cotidianamente, eso no quiere decir que todas las negocia-
ciones se desarrollen de una manera estructurada ni tampoco de una forma 
colaborativa. Al contrario, las estrategias comunes de negociación no siempre 
generan satisfacción. En ese contexto, el proceso de negociación, al menos en 
el campo de la literatura mercantil internacional se orienta hacia un proceso 
cuya base esta en principios e intereses. 
Si bien las negociaciones ancladas en posiciones y conductas duras de 
regateo representen todavía el perfil mayoritariamente adoptado, la tenden-
cia es de progreso de los perfiles colaborativos en que las partes abandonan 
posturas adversariales y atacan el problema en conjunto3. Cada disputa es 
diferente, pero los elementos esenciales de la negociación son constantes, lo 
que permite el uso de la negociación basada en principios en diversos casos 
(FISHER, et al., 2011). 
La mediación, a su vez, contempla en sí misma un genuino proceso de 
negociación. No obstante, en la mediación hay la intervención de un tercero 
neutral e imparcial que facilita la comunicación entre las partes por medio de 
técnicas y conduce el proceso de creación de consenso. El papel del mediador 
implica sobre todo el impulso de una postura de buena-fe y de colaboración 
en la búsqueda de soluciones creativas substanciales y procesuales4. Por con-
2  Algunos autores hacen distinción entre disputa y conflicto. Disputas serian diver-
gencias que son pasibles de resolución con base en intereses, mientras conflictos serian 
divergencias más profundas, de largo termino sobre materias no negociables. Sin embar-
go, para efectos didácticos, los dos términos son tratados como sinónimos en este trabajo. 
3  La evolución de la colaboración y la visión de win-win, en detrimento de posiciones 
de regateo o win-lose, es evidente con la observación de ese tipo de enseñanza en las ca-
rreras de derecho y también carreras de naturaleza mercantil. 
4  En la mediación son debatidas cuestiones substanciales (directamente relacionadas 
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siguiente, la distinción entre los últimos métodos comentados es justamente 
la actuación de ese profesional, que será detallada en un tópico más adelante. 
Aún entre los medios privados, el arbitraje tiene una perspectiva diferen-
te: implica una solución impuesta por medio de una heterocomposición. En 
ese caso, el tercero imparcial, pasa a tener, además del controle del proceso, 
también el control del resultado. Este método tiene por fin una decisión al-
canzada en un proceso más flexible que el judicial y más rígido que la media-
ción y puede basarse no solamente en derecho, pero también en equidad5. 
Algunos de los beneficios de la mediación también están presentes en el 
arbitraje, como la voluntariedad y la confidencialidad, que impiden que las 
informaciones y el procedimiento sea posteriormente utilizados como mate-
ria de prueba en un proceso judicial (COLE, et al., 2005 p. 319). Esas distin-
ciones funcionan como atractivo para asuntos que exigen una mayor reserva 
y envuelvan secretos mercantiles. 
Por fin, el proceso judicial es la vía de resolución de disputas estatal por 
excelencia, que representa el Estado-juez como tercero imparcial que tiene el 
poder- deber de decir el Derecho por medio de una decisión impositiva. Como 
un proceso heterocompositivo, rígido y de grande formalidad, el proceso judi-
cial, diferentemente del arbitraje, posee además del papel decisorio, también 
la fuerza estatal para la ejecución de sus deliberaciones (CINTRA, et al., 2003 
pp. 30-31) . 
Los distintos niveles de formalidad y rigidez se incrementan en la medida 
que se reduce el control del proceso, como podemos ver en el cuadro siguiente 
inspirado en el espectro de resolución de Dwight Golann e Jay Folberg (2011 
p. 11).
a la disputa) y también procedimentales (relacionadas con elecciones de procedimientos 
para la resolución de cuestiones negociables incidentes). En aquellos casos que no sea 
posible la creación de valor o el acuerdo en la substancia, es común que las partes con-
cuerden en utilizar medios o procedimientos considerados “justos’’ y/o imparciales para 
llegar a una decisión, a ejemplo de la evaluación de un experto o de la técnica de la división 
de la tarta “I cut you choose’’.
5  La posibilidad del arbitraje por equidad no se aplica a todos los tipo de arbitraje. En 
varias legislaciones, arbitrajes que traten de derechos sobre los cuales las partes no pueden 
disponer, solo pueden basarse en el derecho. En Brasil, donde el arbitraje involucran-
do la Administración Pública no está previsto en la ley, el Proyecto de Ley (PL 7.108/14) 
conducido por el Ministro Luis Felipe Salomão, propone la inserción del arbitraje en ese 
ámbito, pero con la exigencia de que sea basada en derecho y no en equidad. 
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Resultados no vinculantes Resultados vinculantes
Máximo control del proceso Mínimo control del proceso
<                                                                                                                                                                                                               >
Negociación             Mediación             Arbitraje             Proceso Judicial
Bastante utilizado en el medio mercantil internacional, el arbitraje posee 
como atractivo la garantía de un proceso rápido, imparcial y que garantiza un 
alto nivel de seguridad jurídica en la mayoría de los Estados, o por lo menos 
en todos de grande relevancia económica. 
Imagínese dos contratantes en diferentes países que no hablan el mismo 
idioma, son culturalmente diferentes y desconocen la realidad jurídica na-
cional de su coparticipe comercial. Estar sujeto a esas diferencias causa una 
enorme inseguridad en las partes en el caso de eventual incumplimiento por 
alguna de ellas, y en no raras ocasiones llega a impedir la propia concreción 
de contratos o lazos comerciales. Por ello, el arbitraje sirve como forma de 
asegurar que existirá un medio de lograr una respuesta idónea, conocida por 
todas las partes y flexible para que las mismas elijan idioma, local, derecho 
aplicable, entre otros factores. 
Normalmente cuando no son cumplidas espontáneamente, el reconoci-
miento y cumplimiento de los laudos arbitrales descansan sobre la Conven-
ción de Nueva York de 1958 o Convención sobre el reconocimiento y ejecución 
de sentencias arbitrales extranjeras6 (CNY). Por lo tanto, independientemen-
te de la localidad donde fue realizado el arbitraje, la CNY crea un sistema 
internacional uniforme en el momento de conferir eficacia a las decisiones 
arbitrales. Lo mismo no ocurre con la mediación, cuyos MSA no poseen un 
status jurídico de reconocimiento internacional uniforme y son tratados por 
ópticas jurídicas completamente distintas por diferentes países como se pon-
derará en un tópico adelante. Asimismo, la obligación creada por una clau-
sula arbitral es completamente sistematizada en los ordenamientos, pero lo 
mismo no ocurre con el MA.
Es importante, entonces, comprender con un poco más de precisión la es-
tructura de los métodos comentados y las respectivas distinciones que pue-
den justificar la diferencia de tratamiento jurídico. 
6  El texto de la Convención de Nueva York está disponible en: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf
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2.1 Como la mediación se distingue de una simples negociación y de un 
arbitraje?
Para tratar de la problemática referente a la eficacia ejecutiva del MSA y su 
comparación con el acuerdo obtenido en una simple negociación y con el lau-
do arbitral, veamos cuáles serían las razones para crear un sistema específico 
de cumplimiento del MSA. 
Las principales diferencias, como se ha anticipado, resultarían de las ga-
rantías ofrecidas por la actuación del mediador. La inserción de un mediador 
en una negociación que no progresa o que encuentra obstáculos cognitivos 
tiene el efecto de promover la optimización del resultado del proceso con-
sensual por medio de un aumento de la sensación de justicia, estímulo a una 
aproximación cooperativa entre las partes identificación de intereses y nece-
sidades, además de facilitar el intercambio de informaciones con las debidas 
garantías de confidencialidad e imparcialidad. Normalmente, la mediación 
tiene una estructura, agenda y dinámica diferente de una negociación ordina-
ria (GIORDANO CIANCIO, 2013 p. 1). 
Por otro lado, el carácter específico del laudo arbitral si es comparado 
frente al MSA es evidente: este último refleja una solución convenida por las 
partes, mientras que el primero una decisión impuesta por un tercero. Ade-
más, el efecto vinculante necesario del laudo arbitral se distingue del valor 
contractual a priori atribuido al MSA. 
No obstante se haga referencia a la mediación como un método muy anti-
guo de resolución de conflictos, la mediación tal cual conocemos hoy supone 
un proceso estructurados en fases – aunque sean flexibles – y que requiere 
unas técnicas y una formación específica del profesional que interviene como 
facilitador. El perfil básico de esa mediación, ‘’vedette’’ de las más recientes 
alteraciones normativas en el campo de los métodos alternativos de trata-
miento de disputas7, posee en cierta medida el siguiente soporte (KOVACH, 
2005 p. 306)8:
7  El término “alternativo”, constantemente criticado por varios autores, da paso en 
la literatura reciente a otros más precisos como “complementarios’’, “adecuados’’, “apro-
piado’’, etc. Aquí la elección se debe al hecho de ser la traducción más utilizada para el 
término inglés Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
8  Traducción propia del inglés para: “Preliminary arrangements; Mediator’s Intro-
duction; Opening remarks/Statements by parties; Venting (optional); Information Gath-
ering; Issue and Interest (optional); Caucus (optional); Option generation; Reality testing 
(optional); Bargaining and negotiation; Agreement; Closure’’.
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Arreglos Preliminares 
Introducción del Mediador 
Discursos de apertura de las partes
Ventilación (opcional) 
Colecta de informaciones
Identificación de temas e intereses
Definición de la agenda (opcional)
Caucus (opcional)
Construcción de opciones




Aún sea flexible, el proceso de mediación está relativamente estructurado 
y tiene un fin determinado, así como las técnicas que son implementadas por 
el mediador. Además, el proceso de mediación, aunque no resulte en acuerdo, 
funciona como una base de preparación para cualquier otro método que sea 
aplicado en la secuencia, pues en el son aclarados intereses, barreras al acuer-
do que tal vez antes no estuviesen tan visibles. 
En realidad, hoy muchos contractos mercantiles contienen cláusulas que 
prevén no uno solo, sino una variedad de procesos diferentes y con aplicación 
secuencial: negociación, mediación y arbitraje (A persisting aberration: the 
movement to enforce agreements to mediate, 2008). Igualmente, la búsque-
da por soluciones negociadas – intermediadas o no por terceros – es cada vez 
más adoptada. Posteriormente en la mediación las partes están más prepa-
radas para definir en medio adecuado y alcanzar resultados más satisfacto-
rios. Por esa razón, la mediación funciona también como un primer método 
automático y permite una mejor gestión del conflicto, aunque no se llegue al 
acuerdo. 
3. Cláusula o acuerdo para mediar (Mediation Agreement – MA)
El término “acuerdo de mediación” puede adquirir dos significados. El 
primero correspondería al termino en inglés Agreement to Mediate (AM), 
referente al acuerdo previo a la existencia de la disputa para que, en el caso 
de divergencias entre las partes, el método utilizado para resolución sea la 
mediación. El segundo significado sería el propio acuerdo obtenido como re-
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sultado de la mediación, en inglés, Mediation Settlement Agreement (MSA), 
como ya se ha señalado anteriormente. 
Si bien la discusión sobre la eficacia del AM es un tema importante, este 
estudio se ha concentrado más en el segundo significado de los acuerdos de 
mediación, es decir, los MSA. Con todo, los resultados demostrados en una 
reciente investigación de la Universidad de Missouri, llaman la atención para 
estudios en ese campo, pues retrata que, en la visión de los profesionales, es 
más probable que ocurra una mediación mercantil internacional por previ-
sión contractual (cláusulas escalonadas de negociación, mediación y arbitraje 
o cláusulas de mediación) (STRONG, 2014 p. 18).
Así mismo, como la mediación es un proceso voluntario, la eficacia de la 
cláusula de mediación – o AM – puede tener un impacto reducido, toda vez 
que las partes no están obligadas a continuar en el proceso de mediación, y 
aunque estuviesen, probablemente la buena fe y el ambiente colaborativo es-
taría afectado por la ausencia de voluntad.
En este caso, la cláusula de mediación no puede ser comparada a una cláu-
sula de arbitraje previa a la disputa, ya que, no obstante la opción de utilizar 
el procedimiento arbitral sea también objeto de un acuerdo de voluntades 
previo, una vez iniciado el procedimiento, no se exige participación volunta-
ria de las partes.
4. Resultado del proceso de mediación 
La mediación puede o no resultar en acuerdo. Si se llega al acuerdo, este 
puede ser parcial o total, dependiendo si se pone fin a una parte o a la totali-
dad del conflicto. Véase que el contenido del acuerdo puede incluso explicitar 
previsiones de naturaleza no jurídica (GISBERT POMATA, et al., 2014 pp. 
171-173), lo que no puede ser objeto de una ejecución forzada ante un tribu-
nal. Con todo, por lo menos en ámbito mercantil internacional, la mayor par-
te de las disposiciones de los MSA tienen correspondencia con obligaciones y 
deberes jurídicos que pueden ser objeto ejecución judicial.
En lo que respecta al cumplimiento de los MSA, se suele decir que hay 
unas tasas elevadas de cumplimiento. Eso se explicaría por el hecho de que 
el contenido de los MSA es objeto de decisiones reflexionadas en un proceso 
en que incluso se testa la viabilidad de los compromisos y, sobre todo, porque 
son las propias partes que han decidido con base en la satisfacción de sus pro-
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pios intereses. También por ello se insiste en la distinción del mediador como 
simple facilitador, sin un papel más directivo o evaluativo9 en la búsqueda del 
consenso. 
Así, como son las partes las que controlan el resultado del proceso, natu-
ralmente no tendrían por qué incumplir lo que fue por ellas mismas acordado. 
Sin embargo, si bien la mayoría de los acuerdos se concreten espontáneamen-
te, siempre habrá una pequeña parte de acuerdos que no serán cumplidos 
voluntariamente, sea porque las circunstancias han cambiado, sea por propia 
decisión de la parte incumplidora. 
Para evitar arrepentimientos que culminen con un posterior incumpli-
miento, el proceso de mediación puede permitir incluso que las parten tomen 
un período de reflexión o para consultar otros profesionales y consolidar lo 
que se decidió (ORTUÑO MUÑOZ, et al., 2007 p. 43). De ordinario, ese pe-
riodo puede ser de tres días, pero naturalmente queda a la elección de las par-
tes ese periodo de reflexión o no y su extensión. Nada impide, sin embargo, 
que las partes tengan una respuesta definitiva ya al fin de la sesión, principal-
mente si las partes vienen acompañadas de sus consultores jurídicos. 
Una vez acordados los términos de la solución encontrada por las partes, 
es necesario identificar las formas jurídicas en las cuales ese acuerdo se enca-
jará en el ordenamiento jurídico. Hoy, las posibles respuestas son asentadas 
en seguida.
4.1. Acuerdo como contrato 
La forma jurídica más común de un acuerdo de mediación, es la de un 
contrato, pues todos los requisitos necesarios son rellenados. De ahí la con-
clusión de que mismo en las disputas originadas de un contrato, la solución 
podría surgir de otro contrato, especialmente si las partes tienen entre ellas 
9  Aún hay mucho debate sobre el papel de los mediadores y posibles límites a las 
actividades directivas y de evaluación. Algunos autores incluso incluyen el carácter es-
trictamente facilitador (no evaluador) en el concepto mismo de la mediación, rechazando 
cualquier acción de este tercero que proponga salidas, lo que a menudo se le permite al 
profesional que actúa como conciliador. Sin embargo, no hay límites claros, e incluso los 
términos propios de conciliación y la mediación se confunden bastante en la literatura 
internacional, ya que pueden tener significados opuestos en función los sistemas naciona-
les en que se insertan. Aquí, por mediación entendemos un proceso de facilitación, pero 
tampoco dejamos de considerar como mediación un proceso solamente por una eventual 
intervención directiva o evaluativa del profesional. 
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una relación de confianza. José Roberto de Castro Neves (2013 pp. 326-331) 
en una interesante interpretación jurídica del contrato en una de las piezas de 
Shakeaspeare10 retrata la intolerancia del derecho con la falta de lealtad y la 
importancia de la buena fe en las relaciones contractuales. De esa manera, si 
existe esa relación de confianza recíproca o si esa relación puede ser recons-
truida durante el proceso de mediación, sería natural que las partes se satisfa-
gan con el vínculo contractual. La protección y el privilegio de esa naturaleza 
consensual (STULBERG , 1998) es el argumento más utilizado por aquellos 
que entienden que el derecho contractual ya ofrece un sistema jurídico sufi-
ciente para reglamentar los acuerdos de mediación. 
La cuestión, sin embargo, se encuentra en el hecho del ordenamiento jurí-
dico atribuir a la negociación no asistida el mismo rango de una negociación 
asistida por un profesional como en la mediación ( DIATHESOPOULOU, 
2013 p. 5). Y a partir de esa preocupación repercuten otras relacionadas a la 
protección de cuestiones inherentes a la mediación como la confidencialidad 
y consiguientes límites de utilización de informaciones en la producción de 
prueba judicial. En Estados Unidos, país donde la mediación es un método ya 
consolidado, cuestionamientos de esa misma naturaleza ya son observados 
en la jurisprudencia que parece no presentar una uniformidad si comparados 
precedentes de diferentes Estados de la Federación, aunque exista un movi-
miento normativo federal en la búsqueda de elementos mínimos de uniformi-
zación con el Uniform Mediation Act. 
El contrargumento afirma que la interferencia del mediador puede, incluso, 
ser ella misma la supuesta fuente del vicio contractual alegado, especialmente 
si la conducta del tercero neutral ultrapasa los límites de la facilitación. Los 
remedios jurídicos disponibles para forzar el cumplimiento de un acuerdo de 
mediación considerado como mero vínculo contractual serán los mismos ofre-
cidos a cualquier otro contrato y, en varios ordenamientos, eso implica en un 
proceso judicial largo y complejo que no garantiza la misma certeza que un títu-
lo ejecutivo, cuyas materias de impugnación tienen un espectro más reducido. 
Por otra parte, el gran riesgo de tratar el acuerdo de mediación como una 
forma equivalente a los contratos en general es el de hacer con que las partes 
retornen al punto de partida, es decir, al problema inicial de incumplimiento 
o divergencia a que enfrentaban en el momento en que se inició la mediación 
(WOLSKI, 2014 p. 94).
10  El autor se refiere a la pieza All’s well that ends well (Todo está bien cuando acaba 
bien). 
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Del mismo modo, hay diferencias entre la mediación intrajudicial y la 
mediación realizada sin que haya sido iniciado cualquier procedimiento ju-
risdiccional, o sea, una mediación extrajudicial sin cualquier conexión con 
los tribunales. Partiendo de esa distinción, surge una perspectiva más radical 
que comprende que la mediación extrajudicial no sería propiamente un mé-
todo de resolución de disputas como el proceso judicial o el arbitraje, pero un 
mero proceso de facilitación contractual (Enforceability of mediation outco-
me, 2010 p. 18).
Es difícil determinar hasta qué punto la autonomía de la voluntad implica 
que el resultado obtenido sea limitado a la esfera contractual o no. Por otro 
lado, las mediaciones realizadas durante el curso de un proceso judicial, no 
obstante su resultado sea tratado como simple contracto para algunos siste-
mas, en varios otros puede ser convertido en título ejecutivo.
La inserción y el fomento del uso de la mediación con algún tipo de cone-
xión con los tribunales y también otros tipos de ADR involucran cuestiones 
interesantes, porque crean realidades jurídicas nuevas. Evidentemente, la 
mediación que se lleva a cabo en una estructura estatal adquiere formatos 
diferenciados: aunque mantenga su carácter flexible, ciertamente tendrá más 
rasgos de formalidad que la mediación estrictamente privada. Por lo tanto, 
es interesante observar algunas figuras jurídicas y sus niveles de formalidad 
atribuidos al resultado de la mediación. 
4.2. Acuerdo como contrato elevado a escritura pública por acto notarial 
Una versión un poco más formal y que atribuye un cierto nivel de seguri-
dad y facilidad en el momento de la ejecución del acuerdo derivado de media-
ción es la posibilidad de dotar el documento de eficacia ejecutiva por medio 
de un acto notarial, es decir, por medio de una escritura pública. Si la mano 
del Estado es la que confiere un status jurídico más alto a un acuerdo de vo-
luntades, la vía notarial es una opción. No obstante no fuera esa la perspectiva 
durante la preparación del marco legislativo de la mediación civil y mercantil 
en España, la Ley 5/2012 de 6 de julio en su artículo 23 deja a la elección 
de las partes la posibilidad de elevar o no a escritura pública el acuerdo de 
medicación extrajudicial. También la legislación alemana contiene idéntica 
permisión. Ambos ordenamientos poseen, además de la opción por elevar a 
público, otras formas de conversión del acuerdo en título ejecutivo en lo que 
respecta al acuerdo obtenido en una medición conectada con los tribunales. 
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El acto notarial supone una vigilancia de legalidad del contenido del acuer-
do. Una de las razones para la permisión inserta en la ley española es que ella 
invita a respetar la autonomía de las partes (que pueden decidir por ellas 
mismas si convierten o no en escritura pública), al mismo tiempo que retira 
del aparato judicial la apreciación de cuestiones que no contienen verdaderas 
lides. Con todo, puede haber una implicación negativa con relación al coste11 
que dicho trámite puede representar para las partes y los límites del acto no-
tarial cuanto al contenido del acuerdo. 
Otras formas de convalidación estatal del acuerdo son identificados en la 
recientes normativas nacionales que confieren eficacia ejecutiva al contrato 
de mediación por medio de otros actos/registros como es el ejemplo del or-
denamiento griego que, al transponer la Directiva 52/2008/CE a través de la 
ley 3898/2010, determina los requisitos necesarios al acuerdo (nombre de las 
partes, fecha, etc.) y admite que cualquier de las partes solicite al mediador 
que presente el MSA en la secretaria del órgano judicial de primera instancia 
competente, con lo que el acuerdo será dotado de fuerza ejecutiva automá-
ticamente. La legislación griega, va más allá de las direcciones previstas en 
la normativa comunitaria y dispensa que la solicitud sea realizada por todas 
las partes y también por prever un trámite sencillo para conversión en título 
ejecutivo con base en la presentación del mediador. 
Como se ha demostrado, las opciones legislativas para la concesión de efi-
cacia ejecutiva al MSA puede realizarse de distintas formas jurídicas como la 
escritura pública y otros tipos de ‘’registros públicos’’ ha sido adoptada por 
algunas legislaciones europeas. 
4.3. Acuerdo convertido en laudo arbitral 
Si bien el arbitraje no es un proceso consensual, su procedimiento com-
porta – así como en proceso judicial – la posibilidad de que el acuerdo rea-
lizado entre las partes sea homologado o convertido en laudo. En el lugar de 
decidir e imponer sus decisiones, el árbitro en ese contexto sólo confirma la 
solución encontrada por las propias partes. 
Así, la vía arbitral también es una forma de dotación de eficacia ejecutiva 
al MSA. Ahora bien, esa posibilidad puede enredar diferentes efectos y nive-
11  El factor de cálculo de los importes a pagar por la elevación a escritura pública del 
acuerdo y la posibilidad de actuar como mediadores notarios son cuestiones sobre las que 
diverge doctrina.
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les de reconocimiento en ciertos ordenamientos, dependiendo de la existen-
cia o no de un proceso de arbitraje pendiente o, por lo menos, de la existencia 
de clausula arbitral previa. 
4.3.1. Proceso de mediación realizado sin cláusula de arbitraje previa
Consideremos un escenario en que una mediación iniciada sin que exista 
una convención o cláusula de arbitraje entre las partes para que la disputa 
sea llevada a un arbitraje. Y que en dicha mediación se origina un acuerdo 
que pone fin a la disputa. Si en ese caso, las partes buscan una concesión de 
mayor certeza y seguridad jurídica del acuerdo, especialmente para que el 
mismo sea reconocido y ejecutable en diferentes sistemas jurídicos, no parece 
tan absurdo que las partes intenten que el acuerdo sea convertido en un laudo 
arbitral, principalmente si la mediación ha sido realizada en un centro que 
ofrece ambos servicios.
Sin embargo, si por un lado la conversión de un acuerdo realizado durante 
el curso de un arbitraje es bastante común, por otro, las búsqueda de la vía 
arbitral solamente como medio de convalidación para la solución encontrada 
previamente es algo más reciente, lo que crea un discusión jurídica originada 
especialmente con el incremento del uso de la mediación en disputas mercan-
tiles internacionales.
Ese “supuesto’’ arbitraje que se instaura sin que, en realidad, exista cual-
quier pretensión resistida de alguna parte, puede ser considerado por algunos 
como un arbitraje simulado. En efecto, lo que ocurre es que en ciertas cáma-
ras que promocionan ambos servicios (mediación y arbitraje) es facilitada la 
indicación del mediador como árbitro con el único y exclusivo fin de convali-
dar el acuerdo como laudo arbitral. Esa condición es permitida, por ejemplo, 
en Estocolmo12, California y en Corea del Sur (WOLSKI, 2014 p. 97). En estos 
casos, la elección del derecho aplicable es de gran importancia para garanti-
zar que la ejecución del laudo arbitral pueda ser concretada, pues podría ser 
en muchos ordenamientos impugnada. 
El reconocimiento y cumplimiento de un MSA convertido en laudo arbi-
12  El art. 12 del Reglamento del Instituto de Mediación de la Cámara de Comercio de 
Estocolmo prescribe que, alcanzado el acuerdo, las partes pueden, con el visto bueno del 
medidador, ponerse de acuerdo para indicarle como árbitro y requerir la confirmación 
del acuerdo en laudo arbitral. El contenido del reglamento está disponible en inglés en: 
http://www.sccinstitute.se/filearchive/1/12753/web_A4_Medling_eng.pdf. 
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tral en estos moldes encuentra, incluso, barreras en lo que respecta la posi-
bilidad de aplicación de la CNY, que es sin duda, hoy, la vía más difundida 
internacionalmente por su larga aceptación y adopción internacional. 
4.3.2. Proceso de mediación realizado con cláusula de arbitraje previa 
La existencia de una cláusula de arbitraje implica un acuerdo previo entre 
las partes sobre el objetivo de discutir una eventual disputa por medio de este 
tipo de procedimiento y no por medio de un proceso judicial. Las ventajas de 
recurrir al arbitraje son variadas y por eso es uno de los medios preferidos 
para la resolución de disputas de naturaleza mercantil internacional. Países 
como Brasil13, por ejemplo, han progresado bastante en esa esfera, sea porque 
posee un sistema jurisdiccional poco atractivo si consideradas la incertitud y 
tardanza de sus resultados, sea porque ha habido avances en el campo de la 
legislación. 
Si hay una manifestación previa al conflicto para entrar en un arbitraje, la 
conversión del MSA por el árbitro es menos cuestionable que en las situaciones 
en que las partes en ningún momento han pensado en someterse al arbitraje. 
Por consiguiente, es más probable que se logre un nivel más alto de eficacia de 
ese acuerdo convalidado por la vía arbitral si hay cláusula previa que justifique 
la utilización de esa vía si comparado a casos en que no existe ninguna mani-
festación previa en este sentido, o sea, que el arbitraje se instaura única y exclu-
sivamente con el fin de dar fuerza a la resolución alcanzada por la mediación. 
4.3.3. Proceso de mediación realizado durante el curso de un arbitraje 
No es ninguna novedad la posibilidad de que la disputa objeto de un ar-
bitraje pueda ser solucionada por medio una solución acordada común entre 
las partes. Si ya no subsiste divergencia entre las partes, no hay materia sobre 
la cual deba incidir una decisión del árbitro. Es bastante común que la activi-
dad conciliatoria del árbitro sea estimulada en los reglamentos concernientes 
a los procedimientos arbitrales. 
13  Además de elevar el número de arbitrajes realizados en el país, Brasil impresiona 
por ascender al cuarto lugar en el listado de países que más aparecen como parte en ar-
bitrajes conducidos en la Cámara de Comercio Internacional en Paris (CCI) y del mismo 
modo por el hecho de que en la misma institución el Derecho Brasileño es el sexto más 
utilizado como régimen jurídico aplicable por elección de las partes involucradas. 
JULIANA LOSS DE ANDRADE
180
En este sentido, la ley modelo de arbitraje de la CNUDMI14 contiene la 
siguiente previsión: 
Artículo 30. Transacción 
1) Si, durante las actuaciones arbitrales, las partes llegan a una transacción que resuel-
va el litigio, el tribunal arbitral dará por terminadas las actuaciones y, si lo piden ambas 
partes y el tribunal arbitral no se opone, hará constar la transacción en forma de laudo 
arbitral en los términos convenidos por las partes. 
2) El laudo en los términos convenidos se dictará con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artí-
culo 31 y se hará constar en él que se trata de un laudo. Este laudo tiene la misma natura-
leza y efecto que cualquier otro laudo dictado sobre el fondo del litigio.
Dicha previsión encuentra comandos semejantes en la mayoría de las le-
gislaciones internas sobre arbitraje, de la misma manera que también en el 
proceso judicial es permitida la transacción en temas de naturaleza pasible 
de transacción, lo que ya es supuesto en el arbitraje ya que eso sería requisito 
para la arbitrabilidad de la materia. 
El reglamento de arbitraje de la CCI, en su apéndice IV menciona técnicas 
para la conducción del procedimiento y en la línea ‘’h’’ menciona la infor-
mación a las partes sobre la posibilidad de buscar un acuerdo por medio de 
negociación o mediación, y, si así fuera estipulado por las partes y el tribunal, 
este podrá adoptar medidas para facilitar la obtención del acuerdo, desde de 
que todo lo posible sea hecho para asegurar que el laudo arbitral sea poste-
riormente ejecutable según la ley15. 
Es cada vez más común la utilización de diferentes métodos combinados, 
y como ya se ha mencionado, la inclusión de cláusulas escalonadas para la 
resolución de disputas mercantiles internacionales. A ejemplo de la experien-
cia de China (East Meets West: An International Dialogue on Mediation and 
Med-Arb in the United States and China, 2009 p. 1), algunos países presentan 
una mayor tendencia a optar por métodos híbridos.
Véase que algunas de esas combinaciones hibridas que facilitarían la con-
validación de acuerdos de mediación por medio de laudos arbitrales enfren-
tan cuestiones inevitables que surgen de la tensión entre a) la confidenciali-
14  Disponible el 15/12/201 en: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf
15  Disponible en 15/12/2014 en: 
file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/ICC%208650%20ENG_Rules_Arbitration_Me-
diation%20(1).pdf
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dad y el dialogo abierto de la mediación y b) las garantías del debido proceso 
como la protección del contradictorio que imperan en el arbitraje. En este 
sentido, Edna Sussman (2011 p. 383) destaca las siguientes combinaciones: 
(1) MED-ARB: si se llega a un impase insuperable, la misma persona sirve como ár-
bitro; (2) ARB-MED o ARB-MED-ARB: el árbitro apuntado intenta mediar (o conciliar) 
el caso, pero si no tiene éxito, retorna a su papel de árbitro; (3) CO-MED-ARB: el media-
dor y el árbitro oyen juntos a las presentaciones de las partes, pero el mediador entonces 
procede al intento de resolver la disputa sin el árbitro, quien solamente es llamado de 
vuelta para convalidar el acuerdo en laudo o para servir como árbitro si la mediación no 
es exitosa; (4) MEDALOA (Mediation and Last Offer Arbitration): si la mediación falla, 
al mediador (ahora ya árbitro) son presentadas propuestas de resolución por ambas las 
partes y tiene que decidir entre las dos como en ‘’baseball arbitraje’’. (traducción propia)
Si para muchos la mezcla entre métodos puede representar un riesgo16 
para las características esenciales de la mediación y del arbitraje, como sería 
el caso de la confidencialidad y autodeterminación de las partes en la media-
ción; para otros, se fortalece la idea de un análisis del campo de ADR como 
un nuevo mundo a ser explorado abiertamente con el objetivo de atender a 
los intereses de las partes. 
Así, siguiendo esa última línea, si existe la intención de las partes de ob-
tener la eficacia ejecutiva de los acuerdos de mediación, ni siquiera el vacío 
legislativo internacional es capaz de detener la creatividad de los juristas, lo 
que más tarde llegará a las discusiones en los tribunales internos. 
4.4. Acuerdo de mediación homologado judicialmente
Diversos ordenamientos han preferido ofrecer a las partes la posibilidad 
de homologación judicial del acuerdo para que, así, obtengan eficacia eje-
cutiva. En España, para las mediaciones realizadas en el curso del proceso 
judicial, la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC) en el Artículo 415 permite la 
homologación del acuerdo logrado en mediación intrajudicial.
Como ha sido mencionado anteriormente, la vía utilizada para dotar el acuer-
do de fuerza ejecutiva dependerá entonces si se trata de mediación intra o ex-
trajudicial. En el primer caso el acuerdo puede tener un status contractual o de 
título ejecutivo, ya en el segundo, el acuerdo podrá ser homologado por el juez.
16  Para un estudio más profundo en las ventajas e inconvenientes de los métodos 
híbridos entre mediación y arbitraje, véase (SAIZ GARITAONANDIA, 2013 pp. 94-98). 
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Con la transposición de la Directiva 52/2008/CE en Francia17, además de 
la posibilidad de homologar el acuerdo obtenido en mediación intrajudicial, 
el legislador también ha abierto la posibilidad de homologación para la me-
diación extraprocesal. El procedimiento requiere una petición conjunta de las 
partes o de una con el acuerdo de la otra. En suma, en la mayoría de los países 
europeos existe la posibilidad de conversión del acuerdo en título ejecutivo18, 
lo que se les facilita la ejecución.
La homologación judicial de los acuerdos podría, en el ámbito internacio-
nal, permitir la ejecución en el otro país como una sentencia extranjera, lo 
que dependería de acuerdos internacionales. De toda forma, la idea de una 
convención específica que sea ampliamente ratificada podría, a lo mejor, faci-
litar en un nivel aún más profundo esa eficacia internacional. 
A partir de esa noción es que se discute más allá del plan interno de cada 
país, un documento internacional que ofrezca respuesta a otras formas nor-
mativas que impulsen una uniformidad del tratamiento de la eficacia del 
acuerdo obtenido en mediación mercantil. 
5. Propuesta de Convención sobre eficacia ejecutiva de los acuerdos obte-
nidos en mediación mercantil internacional 
En febrero de 2015 el grupo de trabajo en arbitraje y conciliación de la 
CNUDMI discutirá la consideración de una convención sobre reconocimiento 
y ejecución de los acuerdos obtenidos en mediación mercantil internacional. 
La idea está en cierta manera basada en el mencionado progreso de la media-
ción y también en el éxito de la CNY, texto también originado en la CNUDMI 
pero que incide sobre los laudos arbitrales.
El debate se basa en el argumento de que la mediación sería potencializada 
por el hecho de existir un documento normativo que estimule la uniformiza-
ción de un sistema facilitado de ejecución de los acuerdos de mediación mer-
17  Antes de la transposición de la directiva, el ordenamiento francés no era iguali-
tario en lo que respecta al acuerdo obtenido en mediación privada (al cual se concedía la 
naturaleza de contrato de transacción) y el acuerdo obtenido en mediación intrajudicial 
(al cual la ley autorizaba la homologación por el juez si así solicitasen las partes).Con la 
norma de transposición de la Directiva, el tratamiento legal de los dos tipos de acuerdo fue 
uniformizado.
18  Hay países que van más allá, en Bulgaria por ejemplo, la homologación otorga al 
acuerdo incluso efectos de cosa juzgada.
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cantil internacional. Es común el argumento de que la general falta de eficacia 
ejecutiva de los acuerdos tendría contribuido para el uso menos constante de 
la mediación para disputas internacionales (Desirability of a New Interna-
tional Legal Framework for Cross-Border Enforcement of Certain Mediated 
Settlement Agreements, 2014 p. 121). 
Si el arbitraje ha llevado bastante tiempo en el camino para consolidarse 
internacionalmente, la mediación parece dar pasos más largos, lo que es co-
herente con un contexto pos-moderno en que la comunicación y los cambios 
ocurren de una forma inmensamente más rápida. 
Con base en esa futura discusión, el International Mediation Institute 
(IMI) ha conducido un rápido estudio con el objetivo de obtener una perspec-
tiva de los profesionales sobre el impacto que tendría esa posible convención. 
A principio, llaman la atención algunos datos. Por ejemplo, más de la mitad 
de las respuestas apuntan que será mucho más probable la participación de 
esos profesionales en una mediación con otra parte de otro país si este fuera 
signatario de una convención sobre reconocimiento y ejecución de los MSA. 
Asimismo, más de la mitad confirmaron la existencia de esa posible conven-
ción que facilitaría el uso de la mediación si ella fuera largamente ratificada 
por los países (International Mediation Institute, 2014). 
Toda esa fuerza de opiniones de los profesionales que participaron de la 
encuesta, sumada al estímulo de la literatura incita bastante el debate de una 
Convención por las Naciones Unidas, a priori provocada por Estados Unidos. 
Otro estudio realizado por la Universidad de Missouri, también como base 
para análisis de la convención propuesta, a pesar de sus resultados demostra-
ren una necesidad de impulso en el mismo sentido de garantizar la eficacia 
ejecutiva del acuerdo, también destaca otro elemento importante que es la 
existencia de visiones completamente distintas entre aquellos profesionales 
que trabajan con mediación mercantil internacional en la teoría y aquellos 
que la vivencian en la práctica (STRONG, 2014 p. 25). Además, en el campo 
de la mediación aún es bastante común que se trabaje más con el tema en la 
literatura que en la experiencia.
Aún si existe todo un movimiento positivo para la creación de un sistema 
para la uniformidad de la eficacia ejecutiva, hay unas preocupaciones cuanto 
a la propia naturaleza de autodeterminación de las partes y principalmente 
sobre el principio de consenso en que se basa la mediación. Es justamente en 
la suavidad y ausencia de coerción e imposición que la mediación encuentra 
su fuerza. Por otro lado, al lado de la suavidad y del consenso, otro pilar cru-
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cial de la mediación es la flexibilidad, entonces permitir que à las partes sea 
dada la oportunidad de elegir la fuerza y las eventuales formas de ejecución 
de sus deliberaciones parece una buena salida que resguarda la confianza de 
las partes en el proceso.
Si el tema merece tratamiento por medio de una pauta internacional, eso 
sólo se confirmará con el avance de las discusiones, que deben tratar desde 
su real necesidad, campo de aplicación y la forma de la norma, es decir si por 
convención u otro medio. No se puede ignorar que la propia CNUDMI en 
2002 ya ha avanzado con la ley modelo de conciliación y su respectiva guía de 
implantación en los ordenamientos internos19. Sin duda, no basta que el do-
cumento exista, es imperante que los países identifiquen las mismas dificul-
tades, del contrario la no aceptación del documento internacional implicara 
en una ausencia de efectividad de la deliberación. 
Independiente de los resultados de los debates, hay una necesidad clara 
de medidas educacionales, comprobada incluso por medio de las primeras 
encuestas realizadas en el tema (STRONG, 2014) y que pueden tener un im-
pacto muy positivo. La medición, aunque sea largamente utilizada en algunos 
sistemas, es una novedad en tantos otros, lo que requiere un cierto tiempo de 
madurez jurídica que pueda permitir una aplicabilidad de mejores prácticas y 
que esas sean más fácilmente adecuadas a cada sistema nacional.
6. Consideraciones finales 
La mediación ha protagonizado los mayores avances en el ámbito de 
ADR con alcance globalizado principalmente en los últimos quince años. Ese 
‘’boom’’ es observado en diferentes campos como la literatura científica (so-
cial, jurídica y mercantil), reformas legislativas (nacionales, comunitarias e 
internacionales), así como en la esfera educacional en distintos niveles. 
Ese cambio hacia la perspectiva de resolución de conflictos basada en con-
senso ha implicado en una mudanza en la manera de arreglar disputas ori-
ginadas en los negocios internacionales. El consecuente aumento en el uso 
de la mediación mercantil internacional es evidente y se produce en paralelo 
ciertos cambios identificado en otro mecanismo ya consolidado que es el ar-
bitraje. La búsqueda por ventajas típicas de ese último, como la seguridad 
19 La versión en castellano está disponible en:
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/spanish/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/03-90956_Ebook.pdf
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jurídica y eficacia de la resolución es una realidad y de la más alta creatividad 
los medios encontrados sea por legisladores, sea por juristas en la práctica. 
Como ilustración, hemos visto las casi infinitas formas de modelos híbridos 
encontrados para moldear las resoluciones a los intereses de las partes. 
Hoy en el escenario internacional, el territorio es un poco nebuloso y no 
es posible conferir una harmonía, tampoco un medio completamente idóneo 
para garantizar la eficacia ejecutiva de manera más amplia internacionalmen-
te. Todo dependerá de cada sistema normativo interno y las diferencias de 
tratamiento son grandes con el acuerdo representando figuras jurídicas com-
pletamente distintas: desde contratos hasta sentencias judiciales con efecto 
de cosa juzgada material. 
La tensión entre principios importantes como la confidencialidad y au-
todeterminación de las partes de la mediación y sus versiones adoptadas 
producen ventajas e inconvenientes. El hecho de que sea un mecanismo en 
diferentes niveles de consolidación en los países contribuye para una dificul-
tad de consonancia, pero los debates en el seno de las Naciones Unidas en 
su Comisión para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional parecen apuntar para 
avanzar en intercambios productivos en ese ámbito. 
Por fin, la puesta del tema para debate ya tiene por lo menos un efecto bas-
tante positivo que es la provocación del interés de la comunidad jurídica y sus 
consecuentes investigaciones y promociones educacionales. Si eso ya sería 
esencial en cualquier materia, la importancia es aún más evidente en lo que 
respecta a la mediación, un método tan flexible y comprehendido de forma 
tan distinta en las culturas jurídicas. 
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THE USES OF MEDIATION1
Lela P. Love and Joseph B. Stulberg
Imagine a time you negotiated with someone and it ended in an impasse. You 
walked away from the discussion even though you sensed that a negotiated out-
come was in your best interests. Perhaps you were called a name or accused of 
something you did not do. Maybe an insulting offer was made. You may have 
been tired or depressed and working on a “short fuse.” Perhaps it was simply too 
hard to establish a time to meet again with your counterpart. For whichever rea-
son, the negotiation did not succeed. In that same scenario, something different 
might have happened if you had added a mediator.
Why add a mediator to negotiations?
Negotiations are neither self-generating nor self-sustaining. One party might 
want to talk, but others refuse to do so. Some talks never start—or collapse—be-
cause participants lack effective negotiating skills. Other discussions reach im-
passe due to misunderstandings, hostile comments or perceived rigidity. These 
familiar dynamics can disserve parties whose interests lie in resolving their dis-
pute. Understandable—all too human—reasons cause negotiation melt down.
Negotiators can be trapped by other pitfalls. Sometimes parties refuse to ini-
tiate direct negotiations (or to request mediation) for fear that their counterpart 
interprets that move as a sign of weakness. Some take extreme public positions to 
protect themselves and their reputation, but in so doing eliminate workable op-
tions. Some make inaccurate assumptions about aspects of the situation or their 
counterpart’s motivation. Some fail to determine their priority interests. And 
some, because of such psychological phenomena as loss aversion or overconfi-
dence in their own judgment, make sub-optimal decisions. [Russell Korobkin & 
Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table] 
A skilled mediator can defuse or transform these roadblocks into building 
blocks for movement by promoting constructive participation, minimizing misun-
derstandings, crystallizing significant interests, framing issues thoughtfully, urging 
parties to be realistic, and expanding discussion of possible outcomes. How?
1  "The Uses of Mediation" by Lela P. Love and Joseph B. Stulberg, excerpted from 
The Negotiator's Fieldbook, 2006, edited by Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Christopher 
Honeyman, published by the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution. 
Copyright © 2006 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. 
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What does a mediator do?
A mediator is a neutral intervenor committed to assist each negotiating party 
to conduct constructive conversations. She helps structure discussions. She stabi-
lizes dialogue. She injects an attitude of hope and “going the distance.” She prods 
participants to clarify interests, establish priorities and transform rhetoric into 
proposals. She develops discussion strategies that minimize misunderstandings 
when tensions run high. She helps parties understand one another when ill cho-
sen words create bitterness between them. She uses reframing and reality testing 
to encourage parties to examine and evaluate their assumptions and conclusions. 
She performs these basic tasks in order to help stakeholders enhance their collec-
tive understanding, spark creative problem solving, and settle their controversy. 
A Posture of Optimism
George Mitchell, when referring to his intervention as a mediator in North-
ern Ireland and the Middle East, states, “Conflicts are created and sustained by 
human beings. They can be ended by human beings.”2 In mediating the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, Mitchell describes 700 days of failure followed by one fi-
nal day of success. Though he became disheartened at times, he did not give up. 
The mediator is the very last person to give up. Desmond Tutu, the Nobel Peace 
Laureate who helped negotiate the transition of South Africa from the horrors of 
apartheid towards black political leadership and racial dignity, concludes that: 
“no problem anywhere can ever again be considered to be intractable.”3 A media-
tor is not naïve, but she is persistently optimistic that negotiations—even difficult 
and stalled negotiations—can be set on course. 
Most of us faced with a negotiation that is not working tend to feel that the 
other person involved is stubborn, selfish, uncooperative, or unreasonable. The 
presence of an upbeat, optimistic third person can transform the environment 
of a negotiation. Once the mood is changed, positive momentum can be created.
A Variety of Applications
From disputes on the Internet to controversies erupting on city streets or in 
school settings to cases filed in court, mediation is increasingly used to address 
and resolve problems. Situations in very diverse arenas—divorce, labor and em-
ployment, construction, landlord-tenant, commercial matters, public policy, and 
international disputes—all regularly benefit from mediation.
2  George Mitchell, Peace Can Prevail, Dispute Resolution Magazine, Winter 2002 at 
4, 6.
3  Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, in The Impossible Will Take a 
Little While, p. 396, Paul Rogat Loeb (ed.)(2004).
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Consider the following:
•	 A single parent with teenagers moves into an apartment above an elderly 
couple. The teenagers make noise walking around their apartment, playing loud 
music and entertaining friends, sometimes late at night. When the downstairs 
neighbors complain to the teenagers, they respond with crude comments. The 
elderly couple bangs a broom against the ceiling to signal that the sounds should 
stop, but this results in the volume increasing. When one of the downstairs neigh-
bors goes upstairs to try to talk with the parent, no one answers the door despite 
the presence of sounds in the apartment. Vigorous knocking on the door results 
in a door panel breaking. The upstairs neighbor demands money to replace the 
door. When the neighbors do talk, conversation results in angry accusations. 
How will the spiral stop?
•	 Cheryl is an associate in a large law firm. An African American, she is 
the only lawyer in the group who is not Caucasian. When other office attorneys 
socialize, gossip and chat in the corridors, she feels excluded and isolated. She 
notices that she is not given training opportunities that others are offered and she 
is not called on in meetings as frequently as others. After her supervising attorney 
tells her that “B+ work is ok,” when an assignment is slightly late, Cheryl believes 
that she is being set up to fail. When she raises any of these issues, she is given 
an unsatisfactory explanation. Is her only option to file a racial discrimination 
complaint against her employer? 
•	 In an Eastern European town, members of the Roma (gypsy) community 
regularly go through the town dump to scavenge for useable material that has 
been discarded by others. Various ethnic and religious groups in the town are 
upset because such scavenging results in the garbage being strewn in disarray, 
thereby making it impossible for recycling efforts to succeed. Feelings of distrust, 
hostility, and discrimination create a tinderbox environment capable of explod-
ing instantly into violence. Efforts to identify a Roma group to talk with have 
proven futile. Is this situation simply a “law enforcement” problem? 
For each situation noted, using a mediator would be helpful. How? A short 
list of negotiating dynamics that result from a mediator’s intervention includes:
•	 The presence of an energizing, yet calming, optimistic intervenor. 
•	 A meeting site and environment that is safe, equitable, comfortable and 
inspiring for all participants.
•	 An opportunity for voices to be heard in a respectful way.
•	 A discussion format and agenda that guides participants to “tell their sto-
ry” and organizes discussion topics in a clear, targeted manner. 
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•	 Procedural and communication tools designed to enhance understand-
ing and movement. Examples of such tools include separate meetings (caucuses) 
and active listening or reframing.
It is easy to envision how a mediator’s attentive presence at a comfortable 
meeting site would enhance communications between the upstairs and down-
stairs neighbors. In the second scenario, the mediator transforms an adversarial 
contest over allegations of racial or gender discrimination into a constructive ne-
gotiation discussion by simply and accurately identifying the negotiating issues 
to include social interaction at the worksite, training opportunities, professional 
meeting protocols, and performance standards – i.e., items about which the par-
ties can, indeed, bargain. And a mediator’s affirmative intervention in the final 
scenario – often by meeting separately with the various stakeholders to identify 
the necessary parties to a resolution and explore the concerns that must be ad-
dressed to secure stability and respect—can be the first step towards addressing 
differences. Sometimes such separate meetings provide a constructive “safe hav-
en” through which persons with a history of profound conflict can communicate 
forcefully with one another without violence erupting.
Different Destinations and Many Paths
In one sense, mediation can be boiled down to a simple target shared by all 
mediators. Mediators help parties to negotiate more effectively. That often means 
to help parties communicate more constructively and, in many cases, reach 
agreements. Beyond that simple target, though, mediators have different goals 
and different means for achieving them. 
What goals—or destinations—do different mediators and different schools of 
mediation have? Among the most often cited mediation goals are:
•	 Better understanding for each party of her own goals and interests (em-
powerment)
•	 Better understanding among parties (recognition of each other)
•	 Creative problem solving and option generation
•	 Agreements that are durable and optimal
•	 Settlements acceptable to all parties4
One school of mediation only embraces the first two goals (empowerment and 
recognition). Other mediators only target settlement—an end to the dispute. And 
others will include all of these goals. Here is a continuum of mediation approach-
es (above the line) together with a continuum of goals (below the line). The con-
4  With respect to the effects of these goals on perceptions of mediator neutrality, see 
Honeyman, Understanding Mediators, in this volume.
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tinuum roughly matches mediation approaches or schools with corresponding 
goals or targets. In real cases, however, it is important to note that any linear 
depiction is a simplification of a dynamic and complex process. 
Let’s examine these goals.
Empowerment and recognition means that disputing parties come away from 
mediation stronger in two important respects. They “experience a strengthened 
awareness of their own self-worth and their own ability to deal with whatever dif-
ficulties they face” and they “experience an expanded willingness to acknowledge 
and be responsive to” the other party.5 These goals are closely linked to the goal of 
understanding the overall situation better. It is easy to understand how Cheryl, in 
the employment scenario, imagined she was being excluded. Through mediated 
discussion about this potentially volatile situation, she can come to realize that 
others in the office wanted her participation in social life, but her own frequently 
closed office door deflected attempts to include her. Also, it might be that Cheryl’s 
supervisor’s comment about “B+ work” was meant to lessen any pressures Cheryl 
felt to get things perfect. The supervisor, in turn, might come to understand the 
adverse impact of his remark. Each party can feel sufficiently safe in mediation 
to “tell their story”—a more “empowered” state than letting confusion and anger 
fester. And each can come to understand the other.
The mediator who has problem solving as a goal hopes to engage participants 
in a forward looking exercise of developing options to address the concerns raised 
by the parties. Ideally, these options will represent creative—sometimes “out of 
the box”—solutions to the concerns raised. If the amount of money that a de-
fendant will pay in a personal injury situation is an issue, the mediator might 
encourage the parties to determine whether there are things the defendant can do 
for the plaintiff in lieu of money—provide a job, insurance, housing, a vehicle, as a 
partial or total alternative to an immediate payment or payment over time—that 
will cost the defendant less and still promote the plaintiff’s interests. Or, in the 
Roma situation described above, perhaps the parties can achieve an arrangement 
where needy Roma citizens can help the recycling effort while obtaining neces-
sary items for themselves. Any such resolution would build a better relationship 
and a capacity to engage in future problem solving should other issues arise.
For many mediators, agreement among the parties is a goal of mediation so 
long as agreement provisions are “reality tested” by the mediator to ensure that 
commitments are as durable [Wade & Honeyman, Negotiating Beyond Agree-
5  RobeRt a. baRuch bush & Joseph p. FolgeR, the pRoMise oF MeDiation: ResponDing to 
conFlict thRough eMpoweRMent anD Recognition 84, 84-5 (1994).
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ment] and optimal as possible. For example, the upstairs and downstairs neigh-
bors might quickly agree to the following terms: “no communication, the upstairs 
neighbors will wear soft-soled shoes walking around in their apartment, the teen-
agers will have parties only on Saturday nights, no music after 11 pm, and no 
banging on the ceiling.” Given the parties’ proximity as neighbors, some of these 
proposed arrangements appear implausible (no communication between neigh-
bors?), even if well-meaning, so many mediators would want to test these terms 
for precision (what does “parties” mean?) and workability (will soft-soled shoes 
alone solve the problem?) and explore a solution that provides the neighbors with 
some method of communication and constructive interaction.
Other mediators keep a sharp focus on settlement—coming to a resolution 
with respect to contested matters, so long as the settlement is acceptable to all 
parties. Mediators in pursuit of this goal might use a very forceful style to achieve 
the goal of settlement. One scholar has described that approach as mediator 
“trashing” and “bashing.”6 “Trashing” means tearing apart each party’s case to 
encourage them to put realistic numbers on the table.7 “Bashing” means trying 
to get parties to move from their entry settlement offers to some mid-point.8 Set-
tlement-oriented mediators consider the mediation successful if the parties can 
reach a number they will both endorse.
How Goals are Linked to Process Design
Different mediator strategies and techniques follow from different goals. 
•	 Will the mediator encourage active participation by the parties, instead 
of allowing the lawyer or other professional representatives to dominate the ses-
sion? If the goal is empowerment and recognition or creative problem solving, 
the mediator would want to maximize party participation.
•	 Will the mediator use the caucus (individual meetings with each side)—
never, sometimes, or exclusively? If the goal is for the parties to have an enhanced 
understanding, some schools of mediation encourage no caucus at all. 
•	 What types of settings and time frames should be employed? In a settle-
ment approach, twenty minutes in the hallway of a courtroom might be deemed 
an adequate attempt at mediation by mediators who are “trashing and bashing” 
their way toward a settlement.
What mediator should you add?
You must be clear about your goal before choosing a mediator to help you 
6  James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out, 19 Fla. st. u. l. Rev. 47 (1991).
7  Id. at 66.
8  Id. at 69.
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achieve it. Various benefits outlined above may not be available from all medi-
ators. Some mediators stress stakeholder participation to generate understand-
ing and collaboration, even when hostile responses might jeopardize settlement. 
Some convert controversies to a discussion of money damages only and try to 
help parties find an acceptable “number” in a forced march to settlement, thereby 
minimizing opportunities to enhance understanding and improve relationships. 
In addition to inquiring into a particular mediator’s approach, other questions 
should be given consideration. For example, should parties and their representa-
tives select a mediator who is an “expert” in the field? Does the mediator’s gender, 
race or age matter? Is cost a consideration? How does the mediator address the 
questions of process design? For example, does the mediator discourage “face-to-
face” conversation (or joint sessions) in favor of “separate” meetings? Some are 
comfortable with party representatives assuming a primary role in the discussion 
while others are not. A careful negotiator can find the type of mediator – and 
mediation – she wants.9 
Mediation and Justice
Mediation allows parties to find resolutions that are in keeping with their own 
preferences and values. 
Some mediator approaches—transformative or facilitative—systematical-
ly support democratic dialogue and decision-making, improving relations and 
building communities. Imagine:
•	 upstairs and downstairs neighbors able to communicate respectfully 
with one another, developing both an added degree of sensitivity and tolerance;
•	 an office which can set a precedent for displaying inter-racial and in-
ter-gender cooperation, with Cheryl communicating more clearly her desire for 
inclusion and training, and a supervisor who comes to understand her perspec-
tive; and
•	 a community where different ethnicities find ways to appreciate their dif-
ferences and resolve issues that are potentially divisive. 
Other approaches to mediation, such as when an evaluative mediator presses 
parties to settle, are designed to secure speedy and cost-saving closure, thereby 
advancing administrative goals of a justice system.
Conclusion—an experiment worth trying
Perhaps the most important thing that negotiators should know about medi-
ation is that it works. Frequently, it brings disputing parties a better understand-
ing of each other and closure to their dispute. Given the emotional and financial 
9  For more on why mediators differ so much, see Honeyman, supra note 3.
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costs that conflict can levy, a thoughtful negotiator should not ignore that media-
tion might provide a promising road out of a dispute.
President Theodore Roosevelt was the first American to be awarded a Nobel 
Prize for Peace. Like many recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, he tackled a dis-
pute which seemed intractable and was immensely costly—the war between Rus-
sia and Japan at the dawn of the 20th century. Writing to his son in 1905 about his 
efforts as a mediator, Roosevelt said:
I have finally gotten the Japanese and Russians to agree to meet to discuss the 
terms of peace. Whether they will be able to come to agreement or not I can’t say. 
But it is worthwhile to have obtained the chance of peace, and the only possible 
way to get this chance was to secure such an agreement of the two powers that 
they would meet and discuss the terms direct. Of course, Japan will want to ask 
more than she ought to ask, and Russia to give less than she ought to give. Per-
haps both sides will prove impracticable. Perhaps one will. But there is a chance 
that they will prove sensible, and make a peace, which will really be for the inter-
est of each as things are now. At any rate[,] the experiment was worth trying.10
Thanks to Roosevelt’s persistent efforts, enormous tact, and thoughtful prod-
ding, an agreement was reached that ended the war. As testament to the signif-
icance of the accomplishment, the mayor of Portsmouth, NH, where the treaty 
was signed rang the town bells for a full half hour.11
While we should not expect town bells to toll when private disputes are re-
solved, we can nonetheless celebrate the impact on neighbors when a tense and 
volatile situation—like that of the upstairs and downstairs neighbors—is trans-
formed into a neighborly relationship. We can celebrate the impact on a work-
place when employees feel understood, included and supported by their col-
leagues and supervisors. And, for public disputes, we can celebrate the impact 
on a community when diverse ethnicities can collaborate with one another to 
address issues that divide them. 
In many scenarios, mediation—a way to generate a possibility for negotiating 
success—is, as Teddy Roosevelt said, an experiment worth trying.
10  Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt (June 11, 1905), in XXi the 
woRks oF theoDoRe Roosevelt at 595 (Hermann Hagedorn ed., Mem’l ed. 1923-1926).
11  See James E. Fender, Roosevelt, The Mikado and The Czar: Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Mediation o f the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, n.h. b. J. Summer 2005, at 68, 72. citing 
Peter E. Randall, There Are No Victors Here! A Local Perspective on the Treaty of Ports-
mouth 53 poRtsMouth Maine society 8 (1985).
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL MEDIATION
Paul E. Mason1
Q: What is multi-dimensional mediation?
A: Multi-dimensional mediation goes beyond the usual concept of 
multi-party mediation, although it can and often does include more than one 
party. As the term suggests, multi-dimensional mediation involves mediating 
beyond the normal two-party scenario where many other factors come into 
play. These can include any of the following: more than one party; several 
entities participating in the mediation whether formal parties or not; a large 
number of participants in the mediation; employment of co-mediators, as-
sistant mediators or experts consulting with the mediator; different media 
utilized to conduct the mediation; participants coming from different coun-
tries; cultural and negotiating traditions; use of more than one language for 
the mediation; and more than one organization involved in administrative 
aspects of the mediation.
Q: Is it really possible for a mediator to juggle all these balls at the same 
time?
A: Yes, although the mediator needs to keep his or her eye on all the balls 
and not drop the most important one, which is getting the parties on the right 
track to settlement.
Q: Have you been involved as a mediator with any of these scenarios, 
and how have they turned out?
A: I have mediated at least five of these and acted as counsel in another 
1  Copyright © 2014, Paul E. Mason. All rights reserved. Mr. Mason is a neutral with 
the BAC (Beijing Arbitration Commission), CCBC (Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce), 
CPR, HKIAC, ICC, ICDR, and WIPO. He was the first mediator in Brazil certified by the In-
ternational Mediation Institute/The Hague (www.IMImediation.org) and is founder and 
Co-Coordinator of IMI – Brasil. He specializes in mediating complex high-value cases, 
especially those with an international dimension. Several involve parties from Latin Amer-
ica. He also sits as an arbitrator in these kinds of cases where he plays a different role. He 
was formerly Latin American Legal Director in-house for Digital Equipment, Oracle, and 
3Com/Palm corporations and is based in Miami and Rio de Janeiro. More biographical 




one, all successfully as it turned out. Although the total number of such medi-
ations is not large, the cases were all complex and high value. 
The first one was an environmental dispute for about $50 million between 
a U.S. state Attorney General’s office and eight multinational oil companies in 
a sharp conflict over responsibility for an underground gasoline plume which 
polluted groundwater in a residential area.
The second was an international commercial dispute over reinsurance 
coverage for a public bid bond on an Argentine government contract, worth 
about $5 million which was referred to mediation by the U.S. Federal District 
Court in Miami.
The third was an international business dispute in the energy sector where 
a Brazilian executive’s bonuses were tied to performance in renegotiating en-
ergy project financing for his company, which was owned at the time by a 
large energy multinational. It was an ICDR administered case.
The fourth was an ICDR international business conflict involving post-
M&A environmental and tax liabilities of a Brazilian oil company which was 
sold by its Brazilian owners to a multinational oil company. This IDCR ad-
ministered case was valued at about $3 million.
The fifth was an ICC administered international business dispute between 
companies in Central America over insurance and reinsurance coverage for 
business interruption flowing from damage to energy producing equipment. 
This one had claims of about $6 million.
The sixth was an ad hoc mediation between Russian and American com-
panies in the shipping and agribusiness sectors with a value of several million 
dollars.
Q: What were the multi-dimensional aspects of each of these cases?
A: The Attorney General case had nine parties. The Argentine public bid 
bond case had seven participants on one side and just two on the other, and 
I mediated it in both English and Spanish. The Brazilian post-M&A case like-
wise had unbalanced numbers of participants with six on one side and three 
on the other, and I mediated that one in both Portuguese and English. The 
Central American case had eleven participants from six countries and six dif-
ferent companies, not all of whom were formally named in the claim.
We conducted that mediation in both English and Spanish. Since the 
Russian-American case had some Ukrainian elements as well, I invited a 
Ukrainian colleague fluent in Russian to assist in the mediation.
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Q: You have mentioned ten factors which make these experiences inter-
esting or unusual.
Can we briefly touch on each, beginning with the first one: how do a large 
number of participants alter the mediation dynamics?
A: It is important to note that the number of participants as a dynamic-in-
fluencing factor is separate from the number of formal parties involved in the 
mediation. With numerous participants, the main concern is ensuring mean-
ingful dialogue as opposed to cacophony and confusion. There are various 
ways to do this, and in this situation the mediator has to be aware from the 
outset of this challenge and meet it head on. 
Another thing to bear in mind is needing to remind all the individuals 
participating of their duty to keep the mediation confidential – this is easier 
to accomplish with one or two people on each side.
Q: What about the second factor – different roles of various participants?
A: It is key to immediately note and match their respective levels and areas 
of responsibility to ensure there can be meaningful dialogue. For instance, if 
one party sends their Executive VP, Finance Director and General Counsel 
but the other party sends a purely technical delegation, chances for meaning-
ful exchange and agreement are not very high. The mediator needs to keep a 
keen eye on identity of the participants and ensure a match even before the 
formal mediation session begins.
Q: And the third factor – attorneys acting as clients?
A: This usually depends on the status of the conflict. If it comes from a case 
already filed in court or even arbitration, you have a greater chance of seeing 
attorneys come into the mediation to do at least some of the negotiating. This 
is what happened in the Attorney General case, where all the oil companies 
were represented by their General Counsel and senior litigation attorneys. 
With all due respect, since I am an attorney myself, one risk here is that with 
attorneys only, the mediation can fall into the trap of arguing over legal points 
only without sufficiently exploring underlying client interests.
Q: Four, speaking of attorneys – have you mediated cases with an attor-
ney on one side only?
A: Yes. The attorney on one side was outside counsel accompanied by the 
Chairman of the Board and Executive VP of her client. The other side had 
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executives of insurance and reinsurance companies who understood the basic 
legal concepts by trade but were not lawyers. One came from London with a 
European LL.M. although he was not a practicing attorney. In this scenario, 
there was of course some legal posturing by the parties as there almost always 
is, but we were able to go beyond this and settle the case.
Q: Five, what about balancing the numbers if one party brings just a few 
people but the other side wants to bring a delegation?
A: This is primarily a matter for each party to decide. As mediator, I prefer 
not to exclude participants based on numbers alone because one never knows 
before a mediation session how they may contribute. Some parties may per-
ceive a difference in numbers as an unbalanced power situation while others 
see it as a challenge. In many cases there may be several participants on one 
side, but only one or two with authority to make the final decisions.
Q: Six, how do physical/logistical arrangements change with many par-
ticipants?
A: The recent Central American mediation provides a good example. 
There were eleven participants. The mediation facility had only the usual long 
rectangular tables aligned in the typical “U” pattern, really more suitable for 
arbitration than mediation. So we rented a smaller round table to fit only the 
decision-makers on each side and myself as mediator. 
We put the round table in the middle of the “U” for the joint sessions, and 
also used it for the decisive mini-sessions which included only the key exec-
utives when it came time to see where the hard decisions had to be made. So 
the others were in position to observe the mediation sitting around the larger 
“U” rectangular table which mostly surrounded the round table in the middle. 
We provided Wi-Fi access so the observers could access the internet and not 
interrupt the main mediation. This arrangement worked very well.
Another example is comfort vs. discomfort as a stimulus to settle. In the 
Attorney General case, the morning sessions were held in the Attorney Gen-
eral’s personal office with a gorgeous view of the coastline. However he had to 
use it in the afternoon so we were relegated to the law library which was being 
remodeled with boxes and books all over the place, dusty, and no windows. A 
quick settlement followed.
A further dimension of this is when you have more than one organization 
involved in the administration of the mediation. This can happen when the 
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case is filed with one ADR group but the space for the mediation is rented 
from a different ADR organization, for example. Sometimes this is necessary 
but adds some administrative overhead to coordinate. Best is to have a good 
assistant available for this purpose.
Q: Seven, what about using co-mediators, assistants or experts?
A: In very complex cases, the mediator may need to use one or more of 
these. 
Co-mediators are normally indicated when different disciplines are 
brought into the mediation such as family cases with a lawyer and family 
counselor or psychologist as co-mediators. However it can be suggested in 
business cases as well, especially those with a large highly technical compo-
nent of the dispute. The ICC Central American mediation did contain a large 
technical component on the condition of the energy equipment, so I decided 
to retain a technical expert rather than assistant mediator as such. He helped 
frame a very helpful set of technical questions in Spanish which we sent out 
to each party prior to the mediation session to help understand and frame the 
precise issues to resolve.
But it is necessary to understand the motive and basis for asking for co-me-
diators. For example I was invited to co-mediate a $50 million dollar energy/
shipping case involving parties from the U.K. and Brazil. Their lawyers in-
sisted that each side pick its “own” mediator, in a procedure not unlike party 
appointed arbitrators. There, each side was asking the mediator to “protect” 
its own interests rather than act as an independent neutral.
As mentioned earlier, the Russian-American shipping/agribusiness case 
had some Ukrainian documents which led me to contract with a Ukrainian 
colleague to help with these. But beyond that, the Russian side was repre-
sented by a Russian businessman coming to Miami alone while the Ameri-
cans had two business representatives and their lawyer. Therefore another 
function of my Ukrainian colleague was for her to sit and converse casually 
with the Russian representative during my caucuses with the American side 
so that he would not feel isolated. This was several years before the recent 
outbreak of hostilities in the Ukraine with Russian separatists, so I am not 
sure how well this scenario would work today.
Q: Eight, you have referred to “different media for the mediation”. What 
do you mean by this?
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A: Almost all mediations are conducted in person in real time. However 
in today’s globalized computerized world there are other options available in 
case in-person meetings are not possible. This can happen because of sched-
uling conflicts and for international mediations, difficulties in obtaining visas 
to travel. In the Brazilian energy executive case, we could not get all the exec-
utives together at the same time. So I suggested taking a leap of faith and try 
videoconferencing because the cost of the technology had fallen steeply while 
video quality had improved significantly. We had sites in New York, another 
U.S. city, and São Paulo. There were a number of technical and privacy issues 
to overcome, but we did it and settled the case. I was told that it was the first 
international commercial mediation where videoconferencing was used suc-
cessfully.2 
Q: Nine, you mentioned strategies of the mediator to avoid getting 
bogged down with so many people participating.
A: There are a number of these which come to mind. One is the small round 
table approach noted earlier. Another is having something at the session to 
keep the others busy when they are not needed, such as wireless internet ac-
cess for email etc. which we provided in the Central American multi-party 
electrical energy reinsurance dispute. Another involves giving time dead-
lines to speak, especially after the initial venting stage so as to avoid running 
overtime and risking losing the settlement when people need to catch flights 
home. And when people start to repeat their points, it is helpful to remind 
them that this is not necessary.
Q: Ten, what about the language and locale issue in international medi-
ations?
A: As in many mediations, circumstances may change from the time the 
initial request is filed until the mediation session actually occurs. In one case, 
the original request was quite pointed and rigid – the parties specifically 
asked for mediation to be conducted in their Central American country in 
Spanish. However on researching the laws of the Central American country 
involved, I found the relevant law on mediation to have several problems and 
exclusions so we moved the mediation to Miami. 
2  For anyone interested in further information, I have written a chapter on this in the 
book International Commercial Arbitration Practice: 21st Century Perspectives (Horacio 
Grigera-Naón and Paul E. Mason, Co-Editors, Lexis-Nexis books, 2010).
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Although the parties had originally asked for Spanish only, late in the 
game one of them brought a key decision-maker from Europe who did not 
speak Spanish. So we decided to let each person speak in the language they 
were most comfortable with, holding more of the mediation in English to ac-
commodate the European executive. We asked each one if they could under-
stand English well, but having those preferring Spanish to speak Spanish in 
order to express their thoughts and feelings more accurately. If language is 
an issue in your mediation, I would suggest carefully polling each side’s list 
of participants about their respective language abilities and preferences well 
before the mediation session begins and arrange for high quality translators 
(for documents) and interpreters (for speaking) if necessary.
Q: Finally, how do you address multiple cultural styles in the mediation?
A: Negotiation is really at the heart of mediation, and negotiating style can 
be heavily influenced by culture. In the recent Central American mediation, I 
found one side to be very crisp and decisive but far less flexible, while the oth-
er side was slower, indirect, flexible and elliptical. When I saw the first side 
growing impatient with the indirection of the other side, I counseled patience 
with them because that is the way things are done in that particular part of the 
world. Likewise when the indirect side asked me whether I thought the other 
side would accept a much larger offer than had previously been indicated, I 
advised caution not to insult them and to consider the lack of flexibility which 
is characteristic of that region’s negotiating style. In short, while not revealing 
any specific negotiating information to either party without the other party’s 
prior consent, I did compare with each one the general parameters of their 
and the other side’s respective negotiating styles. This seemed to help each 
side be more realistic about what they could accomplish and drive them to-
wards a settlement. 

“ITALY IS DOING IT – SHOULD WE BE ?”
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN ITALY
Giovanni Matteucci1
1 . Italy is doing it – should we be?
Mandatory Mediation in Italy – Reloaded: “The ‘Italian mediation explo-
sion’ attracted a lot of attention from the international mediation communi-
ty. The mediation explosion came to a sudden halt in December 2012, when 
the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that the provisions had been uncon-
stitutional. Just recently, on September 20, 2013, a new regulation came 
into effect, again opting for mandatory mediation, but with several import-
ant modifications”; Rafal Morek, Kluwer Mediation Blog, October 9th, 2013 2. 
These words appeared at the beginning of October 2013 on a blog connected 
with a prestigious name in international publishing. 
Some weeks later. Italy is doing it - should we be? : “When mandatory 
mediation was first introduced in Italy in 2011, over 220,000 mediations 
were started. Of these almost 50% settled. Not bad for a country where it is 
estimated that 5.4 million disputes are currently pending before the Courts! 
It will be interesting to follow the progress made over the next 12 months 
and see what lessons we can learn and possibly bring to the UK”; Gemma 
Bowen, Linkedin ADR Professionals, October 23rd , 2013 3.
Reading that English professionals were following the Italian experience on 
commercial mediation to “learn and possibly bring it to the UK” puzzled me. 
As an Italian, and as a commercial mediator, I was pleased. But the statement 
1  Giovanni Matteucci was born in Rome in 1949. He graduated in Law and Economics 
& Commerce at “La Sapienza” University of Rome and earned a “Diploma in Economics” 
from the University of York (UK). He attended the postgraduate specialization courses in 










“over 220,000 mediations were started. Of these almost 50% settled” did not 
accord with the statistical figures issued by the Italian Ministry of Justice. Be-
tween the second quarter of 2011 and the fourth quarter of 2012 (roughly the 
period in which mediation was compulsory), 215,689 mediation proceedings 
were started in Italy; of these, 26,822 ended with an agreement. Therefore 
12% were settled, not 50%. Moreover, while 15% of mediations were settled at 
the beginning of the period, the figure dropped to 8% at the end. 
Why?
Last but not least, 215.689 mediation precedures is a very small number in 
terms of the 4.3 million court proceedings started, the 4.5 million ended and 
the 5.5 million pending (in 2012).
The European Parliament commissioned a study, Rebooting the media-
tion directive, published at the beginning of 2014, contributed to by 816 ex-
perts from all over the EU.
Among other results:
Table 1.- Estimated number of mediation per year
More than 10 000 Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK
between 5 000 and 10 000 Hungary, Poland
between 2 000 and 5 000 Belgium, France, Slovenia
between 500 and 2 000 Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Romania Slovakia, Spain
less than 500 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, 
Sweden
Table 2.- Top-Ranked, Most Effective Legislative Measures to Increase 
Mediation Use (by number of preferences expressed)
Make mediation mandatory in certain categories of cases 132
Require mandatory mediation information sessions before litigation 110
Provide incentives for parties who choose to mediate 97
Require counsel to inform parties of mediation as an alternative to litigation 72
Impose sanctions for parties’ refusals to attend mandatory mediation 54
Grant judges the power to order litigations to mediation 51
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Moreover :
“… only a certain degree of compulsion to mediate (currently allowed but not re-
quired by the EU law) can generate a significant number of mediations. In fact, all of 
the other pro-mediation regulatory features mentioned in the study’s terms of reference, 
such as strong confidentiality protection, frequent invitations by judges to mediate and 
a solid mediator accreditation system, have not generated any major effect on the occur-
rence of mediations. 
“… elements of mandatory mediation can have a positive effect on voluntary media-
tion as well. In Italy, for example, when mediation was not mandatory (until 2011), there 
were no more than 2 000 mediations per year. At the time mediation became mandatory 
(March 2011-October 2012), the number of voluntary mediations climbed to almost 45 
000, out of over 220 000 proceedings as a whole. When mediation ceased to be manda-
tory (October 2012 – September 2013), along with that of mandatory mediations also 
the number of voluntary mediations fell to almost zero. Now that mediation is again a 
pre-requisite to litigation in certain cases (since September 2013), both mandatory and 
voluntary mediations are being initiated at a rate of tens of thousands per month.
“ Italy, actually, features a ‘mitigated’ mandatory mediation system. Indeed, in cer-
tain categories of cases litigants are only required to sit down with a mediator for a 
preliminary meeting, at no cost, in lieu of having to go through, and pay for, a full-blown 
mediation. If any of the parties is not persuaded that mediation has good chances to suc-
ceed, they can ‘opt-out’ from the process during the preliminary meeting and go directly 
to court without negative consequences. Amongst other advantages, this model reduces 
to the minimum concerns about the litigants’ right of access to justice” 4 . 
The Italian experience thus provides a very interesting case for study.
2 . The overall situation
According to Cepej 5 figures for 2010, compared to 47 other European 
Countries, Italy had:
4  European Parliament, Directorate General for internal policies, Policy department 
citizens’ rights and constitutional affairs, Legal Affairs, “Rebooting the mediation direc-
tive” pag. 6 and 8, 2014 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493042/IP-
OL-JURI_ET(2014)493042_EN.pdf 
5  Cepej, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, set up by the Committee 
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- high number of litigation cases 7
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6  Figure 2.4
7  Figure 9.5 
8  Figure 9.12






- a huge number of lawyers9







Croatia 4.133 94 2
France 51.758 80 7
Germany 155.679 190 8
Italy 211.962 350 32
Poland 29.469 77 3
Spain 125.208 272 27
Average /// 128 10
According to the Italian Ministry of Justice, there were a tremendous number 
of pending civil litigation cases in the overall judicial system: 5.532.216 in 2010. 
All these problems did not arise in the last decades. Indeed, they have ex-
isted for over a century.
3 . A bit of history
Giovanni Giolitti, one of the most important figures in Italian political his-
tory, who was elected prime minister many times in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, once said: “In Italy, a country of very low wages...; the 
overall tax burden has become so high as to sometimes constitute a real con-
fiscation of property;...justice...is slow, very expensive, and does not provide 
sufficient guarantees ” 10 - 1899.
9  Table 12.1
10  “In Italia, paese di salari bassissimi …; il complesso delle imposte è giunto a tale 
altezza da costituire talora una vera confisca della proprietà;…; la giustizia …, è lenta, 
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Giuseppe Prezzolini, a journalist and author, wrote in his book Codice del-
la Vita Italiana: “It is not true...that there is no justice in Italy. Instead, it 
is true that one should not ask the judge for justice, but rather the influen-
tial deputy, minister, journalist, lawyer, etc. You can find it: the address is 
wrong” 11 – 1921. 
Piero Calamandrei, one of Italy’s leading jurists of the twentieth century, 
wrote in a book titled Troppi avvocati (Too many lawyers), published by La 
Voce: “In Italy today the number of legal professionals surpasses by far the 
existing social needs; this pathological elephantiasis affecting the Bar en-
tails, as its natural consequence, unemployment and economic hardship for 
the vast majority of professionals, followed by the gradual intellectual and 
moral degradation of the profession. Public opinion, even without exactly 
understanding the causes of this degradation, is aware of it and judges it 
severely” (page 38).
“It is important to keep in mind that the liberalization of the legal pro-
fession ... presents a serious danger, i.e. the possibility that the regime of 
beneficial competition among freelance professionals morphs into a desper-
ate struggle for existence when, as the number of legal counsels becomes in-
creasingly disproportionate to the number of lawsuits, normal professional 
work starts running short” (page 35) – 1921 12 .
In the more recent article “Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the Suppli-
er-Induced-Demand Hypothesis for Italian Courts of Justice”, Fondazione 
Enrico Mattei, Nota di lavoro 2010, Paolo Buonanno (University of Bergamo) 
costosissima e senza sufficienti garanzie;...”- 1899
11  “… 18. Non è vero … che in Italia, non esista giustizia. E’ invece vero che non 
bisogna chiederla al giudice, bensì al deputato, al Ministro, al giornalista, all’avvocato 
influente ecc. La cosa si può trovare: l’indirizzo è sbagliato” - 1921
12  “In Italia, oggi, i professionisti legali sono in numero enormemente superiore 
ai bisogni sociali; questa elefantiasi patologica degli ordini forensi porta con sé, come 
naturale conseguenza, la disoccupazione e il disagio economico della gran maggioranza 
dei professionisti, e quindi il progressivo abbassamento intellettuale e morale della pro-
fessione, del quale la pubblica opinione, pur senza intenderne esattamente le cause, si 
rende conto con tanta severità di giudizi” (pag. 38).
“Non bisogna dimenticare che il sistema della libera avvocatura … presenta un grave 
pericolo, nella possibilità che il regime di benefica concorrenza tra i liberi professionisti 
si trasformi in una esasperata lotta per l’esistenza quando, aumentando il numero dei 
patrocinatori in misura sproporzionata al numero delle cause da patrocinare, il normale 
lavoro professionale venga a scarseggiare per tutti” (pag. 35) – 1921.
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and Matteo Maria Gallizzi (University of Brescia) state the following: “We 
explore the relationship between litigation rates and the number of lawyers 
in a typical supplier-induced demand (SID) frame. Drawing on an original 
panel dataset for the 169 Italian courts of justice between 2000 and 2007, 
we first document that the number of lawyers is positively correlated with 
different measures of litigation rate. Then, using an instrumental variables 
strategy, we find that a 10 percent increase in lawyers over population is 
associated with an increase between 1.6 to 6 percent in civil litigation rates. 
Thus, our empirical analysis supports the SID hypothesis for Italian law-
yers: following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit 
their informational advantage to induce clients to access courts even when 
litigation is unnecessary or ineffective.” – 2010 13.
Each of these analyses reached the same conclusion: too many lawyers, 
too many unnecessary and ineffective litigations. 
Since 2008 / 2010 the situation has worsened in Italy: 
- the Italian litigation “market” has shrunk; the number of new civil pro-
ceedings has decreased due to the economic crisis, starting in 2008, and the 
increase in court fees 14:
Table 7 Civil proceedings per legal year (numbers x 1,000) 15
justice of the peace trial courts total *
2009
Registered 1.948 2.835 5.012
Defined 1.706 2.800 4.717
Pending 31.12 1.744 3.540 5.826
2010
Registered 1.477 2.725 4.437
13  A study by the Bank of Italy found similar results: Carmignani Amanda and Gi-
acomelli Silvia, “Too many lawyers? Litigation in Italian Civil Courts”, Working Paper 
(Tema di discussione) n.745, February 2010, http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/
econo/temidi/td10/td745_10/td_745_10/Sintesi_745.pdf .
14  According to the Italian Bar Council (Consiglio Nazionale Forense) + 180% from 
2005 to 2012; CNF January 24th,2014 http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/site/
home/naviga-per-temi/in-evidenza/articolo8457.html .
15  Source: “Relazione del Ministero su amministrazione della giustizia” .
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Defined 1.748 2.742 4.706
Pending 31.12 1.485 2.742 5.532
2011
Registered 1.509 2.678 4.409
Defined 1.561 2.703 4.479
Pending 31.12 1.554 3.452 5.566
2012
Registered 1.379 2.671 4.267
Defined 1.512 2.761 4.500
Pending 31.12 1.367 3.372 5.285
2013
Registered 738 1.499 2.326
Defined 775 1.547 2.447
Pending 30.06 1.320 3.328 5.159
Variations % 2012 / 
2009
29 - 11 - 22 6 - 1 - 5 15 - 5 - 9
* Justice of the peace (Giudice di pace), Trial courts (Tribunale ordinario), Juvenile 
court (Tribunale minorenni), Court of Appeal (Corte d’Appello), Supreme Court of Cassa-
tion (Corte di Cassazione) 






- lawyer revenues have decreased: average taxable income for social secu-
rity purposes amounting to EUR 40,333 in 2012; 13% decrease, 2012 / 200816. 
16  Federica Micardi, “Dai notai agli ingeneri redditi in forte calo”, Il Sole 24 Ore 
11.3.2014, pag. 22 http://www.banchedati.ilsole24ore.com/EstrazioneDoc.do?product=-
BIG&doctype=HTML&iddoc=SS20140311022BAA
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
213
Therefore, most Italian lawyers read the acronym ADR not as Alternative 
Dispute Resolution but as “Alarming Drop in Revenues”. 
4 . 2010: Mandatory mediation approved 
 
According to the Italian Ministry of Justice, in 2010 there were a tremen-
dous number of pending civil litigation cases in the overall judicial system: 
5.532.216. Mandatory mediation came into force.
Legislative Decree 28/2010 and Ministerial Decree 180/2010, both en-
forced since March 21st, 2011, established compulsory mediation in many civ-
il matters; mediation became a mandatory first step before going to court. 
Mandatory mediation was met with furious opposition by most lawyers. 
Moreover, the ADR training course proved inadequate: it consisted of only 
50 hours of lectures, including the final exams (with a pass rate of 99,99999 
… % !!!).
Training can thus be seen as the Achilles heel of Italian mediation pro-
ceedings 17 .
In Italy, certified mediators are required to: 
- hold a BA degree in any subject, or membership in a professional associ-
ation (in this second case, mediators are only allowed to manage proceedings 
related to their professional competences);
- complete a 50 hour training course on theory and practice, designed for 
a maximum of 30 trainees, consisting of: 
- Italian, European and international laws on mediation; 
- facilitative and adjudicative mediation procedures, and mediation or-
dered by a judge;
- conflict management techniques; 
- communication techniques; 
- mandatory mediation contract clauses;
- form, content and effects of mediation demand and agreement;
- mediator’s duties and responsibilities; 
- simulated mediation sessions;
17  Matteucci Giovanni, “Mediazione avanti tutta ma … la formazione?”, January 30 
th, 2012 http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=16703 




- final 4 hour test; 
- refresh their training every two years with an 18 hour advanced train-
ing course on the above mentioned subjects, including simulated mediations, 
and attend 20 mediation procedures.
Certified ADR trainers in Italy are required to: 
- publish works on ADR theory: 3 articles or books on ADR, issued by a 
national based publisher, with ISBN code for books and ISSN for serial is-
sues; alternatively, ADR scientific issues published by public bodies; online 
publications are not admitted; 
- practice ADR: management of 3 mediation procedures; 
- give lectures on ADR to professional associations, public bodies, Italian 
or foreign public universities; 
- refresh their training every two years with a 16 hour training course run 
by professional associations, public bodies, Italian or foreign public univer-
sities.
Mediation is a multidisciplinary science; a 50 hour course is enough to 
inform, but not to form professionals. Moreover, most teachers and partic-
ipants were lawyers; therefore, lectures mainly focused on civil procedure 
laws as applied to mediation. And approximately 99,99999 … % of candidates 
were successful in the exams !!!
On March 21st, 2011, mandatory mediation took off. The initial results 
were encouraging: only 26 – 30% of proceedings saw all parties present (un-
derstandably so, not only because of the lawyers’ hostility, but also due to the 
novelty of the procedure), but, when all parties were present, the success rate 
was 59 – 51%. A final agreement was achieved in only 15% of mediations. Not 
too bad. And, overall, three to four months were required to reach the deal.
Over time, the number of proceedings increased as well as the percentage 
of proceedings where all parties were present. But the success rate of the lat-
ter started to decline, continuously, constantly, and stubbornly, until the end 
of 2012 (see table 10, column C). 
Why?
The mediator’s fee doubles when an agreement is reached. This acts as 
an incentive to the professional, who will try to ensure that the proceeding 
results in a positive solution; however, in some (if not many) cases, the par-
ties left the mediation just before its final session, where the deal was to be 
signed. 
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Moreover, it is my opinion that, at the beginning of 2011, mediators were 
professionals with expertise in the subject, with many years of training be-
hind them, and able to understand the causes of conflict and how to manage 
them. Later on (also because of the economic crisis), people who jumped on 
the bandwagon were arriving on the scene; the consequences were deteriora-
tion in the quality of the mediation process management and worse results.
Legislative Decree 28/2010 and Ministry Decree 180/ 2010 regulated me-
diation.
According to the Italian law, mediation is the procedure, conciliation the 
result (the agreement). It can only be used for disputes over alienable rights 
(“diritti disponibili”). 
Mediators (trained according to the law) operate within organizations 
(“Organismi di mediazione”, mediation bodies) under the control of the 
Ministry of Justice; they manage the proceeding, without the power to make 
binding decisions or judgments for the recipients of the service itself. Nev-
ertheless, the mediator may make a written proposal (even if the parties do 
not require it and even in the absence of a party). Within the following seven 
days, the parties are free to accept or decline the proposal, but in the sub-
sequent trial, should the judgment be the same as the refused proposal, the 
claimant must pay all judicial costs, including those paid by the losing party. 
Proceedings must remain secret. 
The final agreement is enforceable if it does not violate mandatory reg-
ulations or it is not contrary to public policy, and when it is approved upon 
examination by the president of the court. 
The parties may participate in mediation alone or assisted by a profession-
al (lawyer, engineer, etc.). These are the regulations for voluntary adminis-
tered mediation.
Mediation can also be requested by the judge (delegated mediation) in dis-
putes over alienable rights (“diritti disponibili”). But the judiciary has shown 
a “benign neglect” of mediation, which is regarded as “the daughter of a less-
er God”. 
Legislative Decree 28/2010 also introduced mandatory (by law) admin-
istered mediation for a large range of disputes. The plaintiff, before turning 
to the court, was to undergo mediation proceedings in litigations relating to:
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since march 20th, 2011
“diritti reali” rights in rem
“divisione” division of assets
“successioni ereditarie” inheritance
“patti di famiglia” family estates
“locazione” lease
“comodato” gratuitous loans
“affitto di aziende” business lease
“risarcimento del danno derivante da res-
ponsabilità medica e diffamazione a mezzo 
stampa o con altro mezzo di pubblicità”
civil liability for medical malpractice and 
defamation in the press and other media
“contratti assicurativi, bancari e finanziari” insurance, banking, and financial contracts
since march 20th, 2012
“condominio” condominium
“risarcimento del danno derivante da cir-
colazione di veicoli e natanti”
civil liability for damage caused by vehicles 
or ships
Interim and preventive procedures were exempted from the mandatory 
attempt at mediation.
Proceedings were to be concluded within four months time. Tax relief was 
to be provided to the parties involved in the mediation procedure, and dou-
bled when the agreement was reached.
Legal advisers to the parties were to inform their clients about the media-
tion process. 
Legislative Decree 28/2010 also recognized the existence of voluntary ne-
gotiations and peer mediation in civil and commercial disputes, complaint 
procedures for service users (as set out in complaints policies), and two other 
kinds of ADR in the banking and financial sector: the “Arbitro Bancario e Fi-
nanziario” and the “Camera Arbitrale e di Conciliazione”, two independent 
bodies, the former of the Bank of Italy, the latter of the Italian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Consob)18.
More than 200,000 disputes were expected to be transferred from the 
courts to mediation (one million in five years). There was a “mediation ex-
18  In the Italian banking and financial sector there are at least five different types of 
ADR.
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plosion”, or, to be precise, the expectation of a “mediation explosion”: due to 
the economic crisis, many professionals, mainly lawyers, rushed to attend 
courses on mediation (for a duration of 50 hours, roughly 4 week-ends). As a 
consequence, there were about 1,000 “Organismi di medizione” (mediation 
bodies) and -while no one knows the exact number – approximately 40,000 
mediators (mainly lawyers). There were more mediators (mainly lawyers) 
than mediations.










2nd quarter n.a. 18.138 n.a n.a.
3rd “ n.a. 15.670 n.a n.a.
4th “ n.a. 27.002 n.a n.a.
21.3 / 31.12 742 60.810 40.162 21.390
2012
1st quarter 21.390 30.880 19.131 33.139
2nd “ 33.139 51.634 39.758 45.015
3nd “ 45.015 45.040  n.d  n.d
4th “  n.d. 27.325  n.d 23.638
Year 21.390 154.879 152.631 23.638
2013
1st quarter 23.638 4.785 9.711 18.712
2nd “ 18.712 4.485 1.118 22.078
3rd “ 22.078 6.369 3.572 24.875
4th “ 24.875 25.965 9.618 41.222
Year 23.638 41.604 24.019 41.222
2014



















2nd quarter 18.138 26% 59% 15% 2.811
3rd “ 15.670 30% 51% 15% 2.397
4th “ 27.002 36% 49% 18% 4.860
21.3 / 31.12 60.810 31% 54% 17% 9.912
2012
1st quarter 30.880 36% 44% 16% 4.860
2nd “ 51.634 26% 43% 11% 5.783
3rd “ 45.040 22%  40% 9% 3.963
4th “ 27.325 21% 38% 8% 2.213 
Year 154.879 26% 42% 11% 16.727
2013
1st quarter 4.785 31% 43% 13% 646
2nd “ 4.485 34% 62% 21% 946
3rd “ 6.369 23% 58% 14% 866
4th “ 25.965 36% 32% 12% 3.064
Year 41.604 31% 49% 15% 6.365
2014
1st quarter 58.389 40% 28% 11% 6.598

















21.3/31.12 40.162 31% 53% 16% 6.586
2012.
1st quarter 19.138 36% 44% 16% 3.004
2nd “ 39.758 26% 43% 11% 4.453
3rd “ n.a. 22% 40% 9% ==
4th “ n.a. 21% 3% 8% ==
Year 152.631 26% 41% 11% 16.484
2013
1st quarter. 9.711 31% 43% 13% 1.311
2nd “ 1.118 34% 62% 21% 236
3rd “ 3.572 23% 58% 14% 486
4th “ 9.618 36% 32% 12% 1.135
Year 24.019 31% 49% 15% 3.675
2014
1st quarter. 33.349 40% 28% 11% 6.936













21.03 / 31.12 77% 20% 2% 1%
2012 Year 86% 11% 3% 0,03%
19  Table 7 and tabel 8 differ in the content of the first column (proceeding registered 
/ defined); contents of colums B and C are identical. It’s difficult that the mediations, al-
though very fast, end in the same quarter, in which they are started. Therefore two differ-




1st quar. 53% 43% 4% 1%
2nd “ 43% 54% 2% 1%
3rd “ 25% 70% 1% 3%
4rd “ 64% 39%  2% 1%
Year 55% 42% 1,9% 1,4%
2014
1st quar. 84% 13% 2% 0,8%
Statistics based on data by Italian Ministry of Justice
https://webstat.giustizia.it/_layouts/15/start.aspx#/SitePages/Home.aspx 
5 . Lawyers’ strike, Constitutional Court decision, mandatory mediation 
revoked
Even if most mediators were lawyers, Italy’s national lawyers union (Organ-
ismo Unitario dell’Avvocatura Italiana) called for a national strike 20 . Most 
lawyers feared “Alarming Drops in Revenues”; many of them rightly pointed 
out the low quality of the service offered by many mediation bodies; some in-
20  “ Italian Lawyers Strike Because of Mandatory Mediation - Believe it or not, the 
Italian Bar Association is calling on its members to strike in opposition to a mandato-
ry mediation law. According to the website for the Organismo Unitario dell’Avvocatura 
Italiana (the Italian bar association- www.oua.it), lawyers are being asked to partici-
pate in a strike from March 16-22, and a public protest demonstration on March 16th. 
The strike is aimed at a new law commencing March 21st, requiring mandatory media-
tion in certain cases. Lawyers are being asked to attend the protest and to cease work on 
all cases during that period.
“ Interestingly, the timing of the strike blankets a national holiday (March 17-18) and 
a weekend (March 19-20), effectively extending what is already a four day weekend.
“ Now that mediation is an accepted part of the civil litigation process, we forget that 
in other parts of the world, lawyers are still fighting against measures that may settle 
cases and reduce legal fees. Even though there is a significant backlog of cases in Italy, 
lawyers are obviously not taking this new law lying down.
“ That said, it is interesting that the Government passed the law notwithstanding 
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voked the constitutional right to defense in a trial (but they were locked in their 
ivory tower: can a res judicata, after 10 – 15 years, still be called “justice”?). Nu-
merous appeals against the legislative decree 28/2010 were made, needless to 
say, by lawyers themselves. On December 12th, 2012, the Constitutional Court 
declared the unconstitutionality of compulsory mediation, due to overdelega-
tion (the Government went beyond its powers in creating the delegated legisla-
tion) and not because of the breach of a citizen’s right to defense. 
Table 13 Outcome according to type of proceeding
settled proceedings 
according to type of 
mediation
A
success rate all 
parties present
B




Mandatory by law 78% 45% 35%
Voluntary 18% 65% 12%
Ordered by judge 3% 33% 1%
Year 2013
Mandatory by law 56% 30% 17%
Voluntary 42% 64% 27%
Ordered by judge 2% 22% 0,5%
2014 1st quarter
Mandatory by law 85% 22% 20%
Voluntary 13% 62% 8%
Ordered by judge 2% 14% 0,32%
 
Statistics based on data by Italian Ministry of Justice
https://webstat.giustizia.it/_layouts/15/start.aspx#/SitePages/Home.aspx 
The number of mediation proceedings dropped, even as there were almost 
1,000 mediation bodies, almost 40,000 mediators, and still an enormous 
number of legal disputes. Why? In Italy, where there has never been a liberal 
or an industrial revolution, but only a bourgeois revolution managed by Beni-
to Mussolini, almost everything is expected to come from the State, from the 
public sector (Italian public debt is one of the highest in Europe). Therefore, 
no mandatory mediation by law, no mediations!
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Nevertheless, voluntary mediation survived, with a much higher success 
rate than that of compulsory mediation.
6 . 2013 - Mandatory mediation reloaded
Under pressure from the European Union, the so called “To Do” Law de-
cree 69/ 2013, reintroduced mediation as a mandatory first step before going 
to court, starting September 20th, 2013. The most efficient mediation bodies 
have always been those run by private entrepreneurs and the Chambers of 
Commerce; the less efficient, those run by lawyers.
But the heavy pressure exerted by lawyers on the members of Parliament 
(many of whom are lawyers as well) led to significant changes from the pre-
vious law:
- “risarcimento del danno derivante da circolazione di veicoli e natan-
ti” - civil liability for damage caused by vehicles or ships was exempted from 
mandatory mediation; civil liability for medical malpractice was extended to 
include all forms of health care malpractice;
- accredited mediation bodies must be chosen within the territorial juris-
diction of the court over which the judge presides;
- the settlement agreement reached before an accredited mediation body 
can be enforced either when undersigned by the lawyers representing the 
parties or when approved by the court; mediation proceedings are to be con-
cluded within a three months period;
and, more importantly, 
- COMPULSORY LAWYERS’ ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES;
- THE FIRST “INFORMATIVE” MEETING FREE OF CHARGE (except 
for a 48,00 euro fee – the mediator works for free, the lawyer hired by the 
party is paid); the invited party, according to lawyers’ misinterpretation, can 
abstain from the proceeding by not attending the mediation meeting (with 
the plaintiff and the mediator) or, present at the first informative meeting, 
can “op-out” from the process 21.
21  “These elements, which were not part of the June 21st, 2013 decree, were vigorously 
advocated for by members of the Italian bar during the process of converting the decree 
into law. Parliament eventually accepted them” Giuseppe De Palo, “Mandatory mediation 
back in Italy with new Parliamentary rules”, Mondoadr, October 22nd, 2013, http://www.
mondoadr.it/cms/articoli/mandatory-mediation-italy-parliamentary-rules.html
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The behaviour of most lawyers has been (and still is) almost a form of 
boycott: when invited to take part in a mediation proceeding, they refuse to 
do so. Oftentimes, lawyers attend the first informative meeting (without the 
party they represent) only to declare: “We are not interested in proceeding”. 
The same behaviour is adopted by many banks and insurance companies.
The practical result consists of 3,064 agreements where all parties were 
present in the fourth quarter of 2013, and 6,598 in the first quarter of 2014; 
in percentage terms: 12% and 11% of the registered proceedings (see Table 
10, column D). A huge hustle and bustle of paper work and very poor results, 
especially when compared to the more than 5 million pending civil litigations. 
Furthermore, the Law Decree has conferred upon ALL lawyers the qualifica-
tion of mediators “ope legis” and entrusted their representative bodies with de-
cisions about training. The following training requirements were established: 
- a 15 hour training course, with a maximum of 30 trainees (5 hours on 
Italian legislation; 10 hours on conflict management techniques and media-
tion skills);  
- 2 attendances of mediation procedures. 
This perfectly exemplifies the coherence of those, who had criticized the 
inadequacy of the 50 hour courses, and shows a very poor knowledge of me-
diation and its techniques.
With regards to this issue, Calamandrei’s words still ring true a century later: “… these 
two hundred lawyers who, for fifty years, have formed the unchangeable basis of our 
Chamber, whenever some bolder minister confronted them with the issue of judicial re-
form, allowed themselves to be guided by a parochial or class politics, rather than by a 
national politics; and so it seems, though it is sad to admit it, that the large number of 
lawyers sitting in Parliament has been so far the most formidable obstacle against a rad-
ical reform of our legal system and our procedural law” (“… questi duecento avvocati che 
da cinquanta anni costituiscono la base immutabile della nostra Camera, tutte le volte 
che da qualche ministro più audace sono stati messi dinanzi ai problemi della riforma 
giudiziaria, si sono lascati guidare anziché da una politica nazionale, da una politica 
campanilistica o addirittura da una politica di classe: sicché sembra, è triste doverlo 
confessare, che il gran numero di avvocati sedenti in Parlamento sia stato fin’ora il più 
formidabile ostacolo contro una riforma radicale del nostro ordinamento giudiziario e 
del nostro diritto processuale” - Calamandrei Piero, “Troppi avvocati (Too many law-
yers)”, Ed. La Voce, page 86, 1921.
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 82 15.916 38% 50%
Private 569 28.768 35% 51%
Professional 
not lawyers 
59 214 34% 29%
Bar 
association
 103 14 394 30% 34%




87 3.902  30% 40%
Private 699 12.882 32% 49%
Professional 
not lawyers 
85 336 43% 47%
Bar 
association
115 6.900 35% 30%




86 4.040 40% 26%
Private 643 19.033 40% 33%
Professional 
not lawyers 
86 114 453 27% 9%
Bar 
association
9.824 33.349 41% 21%
924 40% 28%
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Table 15 - Legal assistence













81% 19% 81% 19%
2011 Year 84% 16% 79% 21%
1.1 / 30.9.2013 72% 28% 65% 34%
in the voluntary mediation *
2014 1° quarter 35% 65% 26% 74%
 
* Untill September 19th, 2013 legal assistance in mediation was not compulsory.
Statistics based on data by Italian Ministry of Justice 
https://webstat.giustizia.it/_layouts/15/start.aspx#/SitePages/Home.aspx 
 
7 . “Il diavolo fa le pentole ma non i coperchi”, truth will out – The judi-
ciary.
One of the most interesting phenomena in the context of mediation in Ita-
ly, since the end of 2013, is the role of the judiciary.
As already mentioned, according to Legislative Decree 28/2010 mediation 
could also start at the invitation of the judge. But very few judges made use of 
this opportunity (see Table 12, column C).
Dr. Massimo Moriconi acted as a pioneer and, in the 2012 – 2013 period, 
achieved a reduction of at least 10% of the disputes entrusted to him 22 by 
using this strategy.
Moreover, Law decree 69/2013 established: 
- the possibility for judges (since June 2013) to make a solution proposal 
based on equity (ex art. 185-bis civil procedure code) in ALL subjects related 
to alienable civil rights which the parties may accept or not (not binding ar-
bitration);
- the possibility for judges (since September 2013) to ORDER litigants to 





mediation). In many cases, the judges blended these two options: they made 
a solution proposal; and if the proposal was rejected, they ordered mandatory 
mediation (arbitration – then – mediation).
From June 2013 to June 2014, only about ten judges have used these op-
portunities in about fifty cases 23. Very few. But with very interesting results: 
in most cases lawyers, though reluctant to do so, joined the mediation pro-
cedure and litigants reached an agreement. Last but not least, judges have 
opposed the practice of those lawyers who do not attend the first informa-
tive meeting, or attend it (without the party) only to declare that they are 
not interested in proceeding with the mediation. Judges are condemning this 
behavior, remarking that: “lawyers are mediators ‘ope legis’, therefore ‘ope 
legis’ they know mediation, the necessity of the parties’ presence and of a 
real interaction among them”. 
“Il diavolo fa le pentole ma non i coperchi”, truth will out!
Since September 2013, the above cited Dr. Moriconi has used the tactic 
of “arbitration-then-mediation” and in almost 50% of cases the parties have 
reached an agreement 24 .
8 . New rules beeing approved
In August 2014, pending civil litigations in Italy are still more then 5mil-
lions. The Prime Minister on June 30, 2014 announced 12 goals to be reached 
in the reform of Justice. Two days later the Ministry of Justice started on in-
ternet a public confrontation on the new rules, to be adopted in Semptember 
2014 25 .
As far as mediation is concerned:
- transfer before the arbitrator the cases pending before the court, upon 
the parties’ agreement ;
23  For further information see www.adrmaremma.it , Italian section, News.
24  “Il Tribunale di Roma raggiunge il 58% di accordi a seguito della proposta del 
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- assisted negotiation by lawyers: for an application for payment in any 
case up to € 50,000; in a lot of disputes on disposable civil rights (in matters 
not subject to mandatory mediation); for the separation between husband 
and wife (provided there are no children under age or anyway dependant), 
the litigants, assisted by their lawyers, will be able to reach an agreement, 
that is enforceable; as mediation, this procedure will be a pre-condition to 
assesment in court 26;
- equating judicial proposal to the judgment, for the purpose of assessing 
the productivity of the judge;
- compulsory judicial proposal in all pending court cases lasting for more 
than three years.
Also, finally, “focus on interest, not position” :
- who loses in court will refund the expenses of the process, limiting the 
possibility of compensation; 
- those who do not voluntarily pay their debts will have to pay more; a high 
statutory rate of interest for late payment will be provided, to an extent at 
least equal to the market price; therefore the debtor, who forces the creditor 
by applying to the court to get the amount back, will not make money out of 
the lengthy procedures. 
What is predictable? 
- Explosion of judicial proposals and (to a lower degree) delegated medi-
ation by judges; 
- greater caution in taking legal action carelessly; 
- lawyers’ attempt to extend -surreptitiously- the assisted negotiation also 
to the subject matter of mandatory mediation. 
If this last point doesn’t come true, Italy will be the European Country with 
the largest number of ADR methods (and, as already happens, procedures).
 
What it will also involve: 
- satisfactory knowledge of mediation (and, now, collaborative law, which 
is not mediation) with proper taining; 
- issue by the ministry of certificates of the expenses incurred for mandato-
ry mediation, so as to benefit from the tax reduction provided by law.
26  Decreto legge (Law Decree) 132, September 12nd, 2014 art. 1 and art.2.
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P.S. – Needless to say: mandatory mediation in Italy is no “mediation” at 
all ! 27
27  Matteucci Giovanni, “E non chiamatela mediazione! – And do not call it 
mediation” Chamber of Commerce of Milan, 11.12.2013 http://blogconciliazione.
com/2013/12/e-non-chiamatela-mediazione-anche-perche-ha-una-funzione-paragiuris-
dizionale/ 
LIMITES DOS MEIOS ALTERNATIVOS DE CONFLITO
José Marinho Paulo Junior
“Devemos estar conscientes de nossa responsabilidade: 
é nosso dever contribuir para fazer que o direito e os remé-
dios legais reflitam as necessidades, problemas e aspirações 
atuais da sociedade civil: entre essas necessidades estão 
seguramente as de desenvolver alternativas aos métodos e 
remédios, tradicionais, sempre que sejam demasiado caros, 
lentos e inacessíveis ao povo: daí o dever de encontrar alter-
nativas capazes de melhor atender às urgentes demandas 
de um tempo de transformações sociais em ritmo de veloci-
dade sem precedente”.
CAPPELLETTI, Mauro. GARTH, Bryant. Access to Jus-
tice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective—a 
General Report. Access to Justice: A World Survey. Milan: 
Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1978.
O espírito conciliatório a cada novo dia inspira mais e mais o meio judiciá-
rio, seus métodos e modos. A resolução alternativa de conflitos, um dos bas-
tiões dos novos tempos, evolui de forma multifacetada, podendo dar-se por 
inúmeros meios, nenhum deles impassível de falhas, desafios e erros; todos 
sempre em evolução. Entre os extremos opostos da autotutela e do deslinde 
judicial, têm os estudiosos do Direito Processual buscado alternativas mais 
eficazes que, ao tempo em que reduzam o impacto de volumosas demandas 
desaguarem nas mesas já abarrotadas de nossos Tribunais, consubstanciem 
verdadeira e abreviada pacificação social.
Aplaude-se efusivamente a difusão de práticas (extrajudiciais ou, ainda 
quando judiciais) inconvencionais de resolução de conflito, sem se cerrarem 
os olhos aos limites destas inovadoras alternativas de resolução de conflito. 
Antes, reconhece-se: não necessariamente conduzem à obtenção de resulta-
dos superiores aos daqueles oriundos de meios tradicionais (ainda que em 
crise1). E a facilitação de processos, individuais ou coletivos, no âmbito judi-
cial ou fora dele, não é a cura para todos os males do processo.
1 Sobre a crise do Processo e do Direito, em um contexto global, mais amplo e comple-
xo, vide JOSÉ MARINHO PAULO JUNIOR (O Poder Jurisdicional de Administrar. Rio 
de Janeiro: Lumen Iuris, 2005).
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Ao contrário de ser uma panacéia para todos os males, qualquer destas 
alternativas, por mais promissora ou messiânica que seja, consagrar-se-á 
sempre e sempre a enfrentar apenas uma parte desta crônica realidade con-
flitual, jamais se pretendendo que combata cega e debilmente todo e qualquer 
problema confrontado2. Bem ao revés, assevera-se categoricamente sua im-
propriedade para uma ampla diversidade de conflitos.
Não se trata, no entanto, de abandonar uma alternativa que tem se mos-
trado concretamente viável em inúmeros casos. Trata-se sim de se manter à 
disposição um leque de opções de resolução de conflito, sabendo os limites 
que cada uma destas enfrenta. Sob tal enfoque, sem em uma linha sequer 
se perfilhar aos que decretaram, de afogadilho, a morte da neófita técnica, 
reconhece-se, ao revés, a utilidade de sua adoção (ou antes, de sua difusão), 
passando-se a criteriosamente refletir sobre os limites que, enfim, qualquer 
método de pacificação há de aqui ou ali enfrentar.
Uma das primeiras constatações acerca dos limites que reduzem o alcance 
de meios de facilitação atine ao fato de que estas também estão condiciona-
das pelo ambiente socioeconômico em que estão inseridas. Direito, Processo 
e meios alternativos, nenhum está isento ou acima dos efeitos nefastos de 
uma crise de uma sociedade cujos conflitos pretenda resolver e que nele será 
necessariamente replicada. Noutros termos, a crise social e a subsequente ca-
rência de meios estruturais (tal como um corpo de peritos adequado) afetarão 
indistintamente meios tradicionais e alternativos de facilitação de conflito. 
Não é por outra que ROSHAN DANESH, Professor de Direito Constitu-
cional da University of British Columbia e Doutor pela Faculdade de Direi-
to de Harvard, enxerga a mediação e os demais meios de resolução de con-
flito como de caráter não apenas interdisciplinar, mas sim – e muito além 
- TRANSDISCIPLINAR, composto e influenciado pela saúde de todas suas 
partes. Assim escreveu:
“Clearly, it (the field of conflict resolution) is an interdisciplinary field, but it is also 
more than that (…) Because conflict not only has a unique presence and is distinct in a 
number of fields of knowledge – such as physics, biology, psychology, sociology, law, 
political science – but also has common elements in all its formulations, it might be bet-
ter to think of conflict resolution as a transdisciplinary field. It denies the borders that 
modernity has imposed on knowledge, but not simply by being between (interdisciplin-
2  Aliás, nas palavras de Ortega y Gasset, das meditações de Quixote: “Do querer ser 
ao crer que já se é vai a distância do trágico ao cômico. Esse é o passo entre o sublime e 
o ridículo”.
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ary) existing borders. It also transcends those borders, drawing upon and integrating 
knowledge and practices from across borders, and thus in important ways calls for a 
redrawing of the knowledge map.”3
Assim, não é demasiado antecipar que a impropriedade curricular das fa-
culdades de Direito e a carência de especialistas de apoio para juízes e pro-
motores em tutelas complexas não tem por única vitima o processo, mas tam-
bém imputam danos significativos à eficiência de todos os meios de resolução 
de conflito. Bem mais, fica tal debilidade aprofundada quando no campo da 
mediação, por somar-se à crítica intrínseca ao treinamento ambivalente de 
facilitadores quanto ao uso de manipulação ou coerção:
“The training is ambivalent about manipulation and coercion (…) the contradiction 
between letting the disputants provide their solution to their problem and the media-
tor’s responsibility to maneuver the disputants into making an agreement plagues many 
dispute processing programs and may be hard for trainees to assimilate when it is not 
confronted directly in training.”(TOMASIC e FEELEY. 1982, p. 117)
O treinamento prático ofertado pelas principais instituições acadêmicas 
nesta área oscila entre identificar a facilitação como uma técnica ou uma arte, 
mas admite sempre que a INTUIÇÃO deve fazer parte do acervo de instru-
mentos do facilitador. E nisto há outra crítica tecida a partir de pesquisa da 
Universidade de Yale, conduzida pelo renomado Professor Shane Frederick, 
havendo sido por este desenvolvido teste em que a intuição se mostra falível 
de forma consistente4. O facilitador é encorajado a confiar em sua intuição, 
quando inúmeros estudos de economia do comportamento recomendam o 
3  Em igual sentido, vide por todos MEDIATION LEVEL I (13 ed. New Westminster, 
BC: Justice Institute of British Columbia, Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2009): “Medi-
ation is a multidisciplinary and eclectic practice, combining theoretical bases and ap-
proaches from many different disciplines.” (op. cit., intro).
4  Vide por todos Frederick, S. Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2005, 19(4), 25-42). Alguns exemplos destes testes: “A bat and a 
ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? / If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 ma-
chines to make 100 widgets? / In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch 
doubles in size.If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake?” Se a resposta foi dada intuitivamente, sugere 
o autor que se refaçam calmamente seus cálculos: a resposta da primeira é $0,05 (e não 
$0,10!); a segunda, 5 minutos (e não 100!); a última, 47 dias (e não 24!). 
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inverso – precisamos, sem cinismos, sempre desconfiar daquilo que nos vem 
como intuitivo5. 
Tampouco restam ilesos às críticas dos autores acima nominados os facili-
tadores e seus limites socioculturais, não se podendo cientificamente atestar 
que sejam mais apropriados que os juízes que presidem as ações afins. 
“Our third conclusion concerns the influence of social organization on mediation (…) 
mediators are strangers – their values and life experience are unknown. Institutional-
ized mediation is unfamiliar and its use is exceptional.” (pp. 129 e 146-148)
A latere, críticas ácidas se tecem quanto ao PARADOXAL fato de inúme-
ras iniciativas de desjudicialização de conflitos se darem a partir das Cor-
tes, constituindo, em reflexo, muitas vezes uma singela “roupagem nova” de 
meios não mais alternativos em sua essência6. Bem pior, em países em que 
alternativas como tais têm sido adotadas, verifica-se uma gradual captação 
deste movimento por advogados7-8.
5  Vide por todos DAN ARIELY em The Upside Of Irrationalionality – The Unexpect-
ed benefits of defying Logic. New York: Harper Perennial, 2012, p. 288). No mesmo sen-
tido, tenha-se o artigo daHarvad Law School: “We realize that our recommendations run 
counter to the implicit trust and confidence that many of us have in our intuition. How-
ever, the data is clear: with the use of intuition comes the potential for significant psycho-
logical biases that lead to irrationality. By accepting this gift, you can learn to overcome 
bias and think more rationally during your most important negotiations” (Strategies 
for Negotiating More Rationally, edited By PON_Staff on April 16th, 2013 / Negotiation 
Skills, Program on Negotiation, Harvad Law School. Disponível em http://www.pon.
harvard.edu/?p=34724/?mqsc=E3503954& utm_source=WhatCountsEmail&utm_me-
dium=PON%20Harvard+Negotiation%20Insider%20Tuesday&utm_campaign=Negoti-
ation_Insider_04152013. Consultado em 29/04/2013).
6  Vide por todos TOMASIC, ROMAN. FEELEY, MALCOLM M. Neighborhood Justice 
– Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: Longman Inc., 1982, p. 242-244.
7  Vide por todos ROSHAN DANESH inHas Conflict Resolution Grown Up? toward a 
developmental model of decision making and conflict resolution. 2012. The International 
Journal of Peace Studies. Volume 7. www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol7_1/Danesh.
html, p. 01: “One vehement strand of criticism has been the perceived cooptation of the 
movement by a particular subculture – lawyers (Goldberg, 1997). A movement that was 
once driven by a substantive and communitarian desire to create layers of social justice, 
equality, and peace, it is argued, has now been overtaken by procedural, liberal, and 
efficiency concerns”.
8  Aliás, o transplante da mediação para as exigências de celeridade da Justiça provo-
ca, por certo, impactos negativos naquela. Tenha-se por todos MEDIATING CIVIL AND 
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
233
Adrede, em curioso estudo acerca do motivo pelo qual a mediação era pre-
ferida à Corte9, revelou-se que a impropriedade desta e não a proprieda-
de daquela era o que influenciara os envolvidos. Noutras palavras, não os 
méritos da facilitação, mas os deméritos do rito judicialiforme afastavam os 
jurisdicionados dos Tribunais, a trazer a lume os limites da mediação. E tal 
constatação descortina um notável problema que qualquer cientista do Direi-
to há de enfrentar: entre o vale das imperfeições e o cume das conquistas, não 
é simplório avaliar qual dos caminhos – clássico ou alternativo – trilhar. Isto 
porque, ao menos até a presente data, não há dados estatísticos seguros sobre 
elementos objetivamente aquilatados. Noutros termos, adstringe-se a análise 
de custos e benefícios a percepções subjetivas despidas de dados confiáveis.
Atentos à lição de ARIELY no sentido de que é um erro capital em qual-
quer análise de comportamento a teorização anterior à aquisição de dados10, 
volvam-se os olhos uma vez mais a TOMASIC e FEELEY, cabendo transcre-
ver o seguinte excerto:
“The lack of adequate cost data is particularly unfortunate with respect to essentially 
comparable processes, such as litigation and arbitration. Assuming for the moment that 
arbitration would produce results as acceptable as litigation – a premise that is even 
more difficult to verify – would cost considerations justify the transfer (at least in the 
first instance) of some entire categories of civil litigation to arbitration, as has been done 
in some jurisdictions for cases involving less than a set amount of money? (…) The defi-
ciency of sophisticated data concerning the costs of different dispute resolution processes 
also extends to the factor of speed.(op. cit. p. 34)
Há quem advogue que há sim dados estatísticos que provariam a superio-
ridade qualitativa dos meios alternativos. Sandy Heierbacher, em seu Delibe-
ration by the Numbers: A DDC Fact Sheet, embora reconhecendo a fragilida-
de de mensuração qualitativa neste campo, assim sustentava:
“It is true that quantitative measurement hasn’t been a strong suit of the field. It is 
COURT-BASED CASES (2 ed, Justice Institute of British Columbia, Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, 2008, p. 19): “A time-limited mediation suggests a more directive style may 
be necessary on the part of the mediator. This means the mediator takes a more active 
role in guiding and moving the process and the communication, but still leaving control 
over the substance and outcome to the parties”.
9 Vide por todos TOMASIC, ROMAN. FEELEY, MALCOLM M. Neighborhood Justice 
– Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: Longman Inc., 1982, p. 129.
10  The Upside Of Irrationality, p. 294.
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also true that some of the most significant impacts, such as policy changes, are inherently 
difficult to quantify. But at this point, enough scholarly research and evaluative work 
has been done that is possible to pull together a concise statistical glimpse of the kinds of 
things these projects accomplish.Matt Leighninger, executive director of the Deliberative 
Democracy Consortium (an NCDD organizational member) has done just that! The DDC 
fact sheet “Deliberation by the Numbers” is available on the DDC website. On this 3-page 
document, Matt lists quantifiable results from reports of deliberation projects and sur-
veys, with the sources to the right. A few notable examples:94% either strongly agreed or 
agreed that the process would result in better decisions about the city’s budget and goals 
(Community Forum on Budget Priorities in Bell, CA, Amsler 2012); External political 
efficacy (the extent to which people feel that government is responsive to their interests) 
increased by 31% (“United Agenda for Children,” Charlotte, NC, Nabatchi 2007); 75% of 
the communities report that since the project, decisions about what happens in the com-
munity involve more people; 77% report that there are now more partnerships among 
local community organizations (“Horizons” seven-state project in the Northwest, More-
house 2009).” (www.deliberative-democracy.net/index.php?option=com_docman& Ite-
mid=92, consultado em 27/08/2012)
Vale rememorar o hercúleo esforço envidado pelo renomado Internatio-
nal Restorative Justice Institute no sentido de coletar dados acerca dos be-
nefícios da adoção da Justiça Restaurativa (vide “Findings From Schools Im-
plementing Restorative Practices” -International Institute for Restorative 
Practices. Bethlehem, US: 2009). A despeito desta valorosa iniciativa, fato 
é que substancialmente ainda se restringe a campos tais como o do “Safer-
Saner Schools” em apenas 03 países (Estados Unidos, Canadá e Inglaterra), 
sendo temeroso, sem cautelas e ajustes, extrapolar conclusões daí extraídas 
para outras áreas sequer tangentes e de natureza díspar.
Ante a ausência de dados empíricos seguros, questiona-se se o elevado 
“nível de satisfação” dos mediandos entrevistados, superior ao anotado por 
partes de processos judiciais, atém-se única e simplesmente ao grau de envol-
vimento emocional e psicológico dos envolvidos nesta alternativa. Vide por 
todos TOMASIC e FEELEY:
“Our first reaction to mediation is that mediation’s capacity to produce positive re-
sults is more a function of the level of emotional investment than of the subject of a dis-
pute (…) it does seem to us that mediation is more successful in family than neighbour-
hood disputes, in landlord-tenant than consumer disputes, in dog bite than assault cases. 
The difference, rather, is between those cases where problems lie close to the surface, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, disputes that reflect personal scripts, psychic pre-dispo-
sitions or social conditions that have become part of an ingrained response to the dispute 
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or the other disputant.In the ideology of mediation, courts deal only with presenting 
complaints while mediation confronts underlying causes. Court dispositions therefore 
tend towards irrelevance while mediation strikes for permanent solutions (…) our res-
ervation is that “underlying cause” is a complicated concept and mediation’s power to 
identify and affect underlying causes is a function of the kind of underlying causes that 
are present in a particular case. Disputes submitted to mediation may be influenced by 
several kinds of attitudes, events and conditions. There may, of course, be nothing more 
at issue than the presenting complaint. The disputants may just differ about facts or 
norms or values concerning a naked incident. There may be no history to the neither 
disagreement norbehaviour patterns related to it.(…) Our point is that mediation is not 
that mediation does not do enough, nor even that its proponents are not careful enough 
in distinguishing between what it can or cannot do. It is, rather, the mediation is not 
psychotherapy and that is what many of the disputes that come to mediation require, if 
any form of social intervention would be helpful. The problem, then is not mediation as a 
process, but either its intake or referral when confronted with problems beyond its pow-
er to address.” ( Neighborhood Justice – Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: 
Longman Inc., 1982, pp. 242-246)
E não pode ser menosprezada a influência das expectativas sobre tal cam-
po. ARIELY rememora ramificações curiosas deste mecanismo psicológico 
que tanto afeta nossas decisões. Em um experimento em que um novo sabor 
de cerveja era oferecido e avaliado por clientes escolhidos ao acaso em bares, 
avaliações foram amplamente favoráveis quando antecedidas por sugestivas 
(e irreais) descrições do produto e, ao revés, absolutamente pejorativas quan-
do esclarecido que o novo ingrediente era uma generosa dose de vinagre11. A 
experiência foi reproduzida em restaurantes onde pratos continham ingre-
dientes exóticos12com resultados semelhantes. Noutro experimento, mediu-
se o grau de satisfação de transeuntes ao ouvirem um músico de rua e os 
de ouvintes de um espetáculo de gala com um célebre violinista, obtendo o 
último avaliação imensamente mais favorável do que o primeiro, a despeito 
de, pasme-se, o músico ser o mesmo nas duas situações13. Em todos os casos, 
com consistência perturbadora, a expectativa prévia influenciava a avaliação 
final. E assim também há de ser com aquelas pesquisas qualitativas, cuja cre-
dibilidade, portanto, deve ser contextualizada. 
Fato é que o EFEITO PLACEBO, estudado há décadas por profissionais da 
medicina, deturpa avaliações de acordo com expectativas, impactando não 
11 op. cit., p. 206.
12 op. cit., p. 208.
13 op. cit., p. 219.
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apenas o etéreo mundo dos pensamentos, mas também o corpo físico, o me-
tabolismo, a saúde, em uma clara demonstração da importância das expecta-
tivas em e para nossas vidas. 
ARIELY desenvolveu um experimento em que buscava entender o motivo 
pelo qual medicamentos genéricos produzem efeitos inferiores aos de marcas 
tradicionais. Para tanto, divulgou o mesmo medicamento a preços ora irrisó-
rios, ora absurdamente elevados, obtendo, como era de se esperar, avaliações 
melhores pelos que inadvertidamente pagaram mais pelo mesmo. Assim con-
clui:
“… not only that beliefs and expectations affect how we perceive and interpret sights, 
tastes, and other sensory phenomena, but also that our expectations can affect us by 
altering our subjective and even objective experiences – sometimes profoundly so. (…) 
2 mechanisms: beliefs and conditioning (the body builds up expectancy after repeated 
experiences and releases various chemicals to prepare us for the future) (…) Almost all 
our participants experienced pain relief from the pill. But when the price was dropped 
to 10 cents, only half of them did. (…) Most commonly, the patient expects to walk out 
with a prescription. It is right for the physician to fill this psychic need?” (PREDICTABLY 
IRRATIONAL – The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions. 2012. P. 228-241)
Mas não se trata apenas de se entrever limites comuns ou prévios ao uso 
do instrumento alternativo em si. O amplo território em que a medição reina 
soberana encontra fronteiras inerentes à sua própria topografia. Voltando-se 
os olhos à MEDIAÇÃO especificamente, várias pedras já foram contra esta 
jogadas. Já houve, como dito, quem decretasse a morte da neófita técnica14, 
14  Tenham-se as eloqüentes palavras de ADLER: “The End is Coming! Brothers and 
sisters, mediators and facilitators, consensus-builders and collaboration gurus: let us 
gather down by the river. We have much to discuss, not the least of which is that the 
end of mediation is upon us. In the words of William Butler Yeats, ‘Things fall apart; 
the centre cannot hold.’ And, per the words of T.S. Eliot’s famous postscript a few short 
years later, “This is the way the world ends: Not with a bang but a whimper.” Should we 
grieve or cry in despair? Should we clench our fists and curl our lips in anger? Or should 
we simply adjourn to the bar? I say no to the first two and yes to the third. Friends, un-
cork your favorite beverage, drink to the best of our past, and toast to the big things we 
thought we were going to do when all this started. Then, tomorrow when you wake up 
and shake the snakes and bugs out of your head, it will be time to go to work with re-
newed energy. Our new job will be to pass the flame of possibility forward and help light 
new campfires in territories not yet fully explored! I can already hear the protests and 
denials. Mediation is just getting started, not ending. After years of experimentation, 
a thousand flowers have finally bloomed. Look at where we have come from in the last 
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enxergando novas linhas de facilitação que haveriam de sucedê-la, superan-
do seus tantos limites. E não faltaram “mitos” acidamente criticados pela 
Doutrina especializada: 
“1- mediation is able to deal with the roots of the problems; 2- mediation improves the 
communicative capacities of disputants; 3- mediators are not strangers but are friends 
of the disputants; 4- unlike adjudication, mediation is noncoercive; 5- mediation is vol-
untaristic as it allows disputants to solve their own problems themselves; 6- mediation 
centers provide easier access to the legal system (page 229:due to their close associa-
tion with the justice system, these centers seem to be more points of EXIT rather than 
of ENTRY); 7- disputants want to get away from the courts and into mediation centers; 
8- there is such a thing as a sense of community; 9- unlike judges, mediators represent 
the community and share its values; 10- the use of mediation is a means of reducing 
tension in the community; 11- mediators are not professionalized and do not require 
long periods of training; 12- mediation centers are nonbureaucratic and are flexible and 
responsive; 13- mediation is able to deal with a wide range of disputes; 14- mediation is 
speedier than adjudication; 15- mediation is less costly than adjudication; 16- mediation 
is fairer than adjudication; 17- mediation can reduce court congestion and delay; 18- 
mediation is more effective than adjudication in dealing with recidivism” (TOMASIC, 
ROMAN. FEELEY, MALCOLM M. Neighborhood Justice – Assessment of an Emerging 
Idea. New York: Longman Inc., 1982, p.221, 242 e 244)15
three decades and all the innovative adaptations that are taking place as thousands of 
mediators help tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of disputants bring their con-
flicts to a close by decisions they themselves made.” (The End of Mediation: An Unhur-
ried Ramble On Why The Field Will Fail And Mediators Will Thrive Over The Next Two 
Decades!. ADLER, Peter. Disponível em http://www.mediate.com/articles/adlerTheEnd.
cfm. Consultado em 22/04/2013.) 
15  Contraponha-se a aridez destas críticas ao entusiasmo de SKINNER em seu artigo 
Nine Reasons to Mediate Your Conflict: “1. Mediation keeps you in control. In mediation, 
parties retain 100% control over their agreement, unlike court which puts matters into 
the hands of a stranger who may or may not share their values. The mediator does not 
determine the outcome of the dispute – the parties do.2. Mediation is private. No one 
needs to know that you have gone to mediation. Though there are a few exceptions (like 
child abuse or threats of violence), pretty much nothing said during a mediation can be 
held against a party later in court. 3. Mediation is cost effective. Both parties split the 
cost of the mediator as well as any experts that are required. But also, because it de-fuses 
conflict and help parties work together instead of against each other, mediation most 
likely requires fewer paid hours. 4. Mediation resolves the dispute . The parties to medi-
ation generally agree that their agreement is enforceable in court, and there are fewer 
enforcement actions because a voluntary agreement is less likely to be challenged. 5. 
Mediation saves relationships. Gain the satisfaction of knowing that a disagreement has 
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Se, por um lado, a tese basilar colaborativa de que há sempre um interesse 
maior a fundamentar posições menores, a visibilidade destas contrapondo 
a sutil presença daquele, mostra-se frágil, ante a constatação de que, ainda 
quando o interesse venha a ser desvendado e atingido, o conflito muitas ve-
zes possui desdobramentos demasiadamente complexos para uma simplória 
sessão de mediação desvendar verdadeiramente o que move uma pessoa16.
Acresça-se aí a impropriedade de se buscar mediar “conflito monocêntri-
co”: neste, um bem escasso constitui, de fato, o objeto do conflito, que inadmi-
te solução outra em que não haja um vencedor e um perdedor. Por exemplo, 
numa disputa eleitoral para uma única cadeira no Legislativo, nada justifica 
buscar-se mediar tal conflito.
Policentrismos e monocentrismos não são como preto e branco. Há 
incontáveis tons de cinza. Embora, por vezes, ao disputarem uma laranja, uma 
parte queira a casca para o bolo e a outra, o sumo para o suco, tantas e tantas 
vezes as partes desejaram somente e tão somente o sumo, tal como a última 
bóia lançada ao mar para salvar a vida de apenas um dos dois náufragos.
been resolved in a peaceable manner. 6. Mediation is at your own pace. Parties might 
reach agreement in one session, scheduled almost immediately. On the other hand, some-
times people need time to mull things over and adjust to ideas. So long as the parties are 
moving forward with progress, mediations can be scheduled over several sessions, thus 
enabling all parties to sort out all options and come to peace with various solutions.7. 
Mediation enables parties to be creative. Mediation enables parties to address root caus-
es of conflict through every means available, including options or strategies that would 
not be available by way of court order.8. Mediation allows you to communicate your 
position. Unlike court, in which testimony is tightly controlled, mediation allows parties 
to air their dispute fully in a process which is designed to encourage each other to really 
listen, hear, and understand. 9. Mediation is low risk Mediation has an easy exit. If ei-
ther party feels mediation isn’t working, the parties can return to the old way of doing 
things”.(disponível em http://02e1cd2.netsolhost.com/wordpressDE/2010/07/25/nine-
reasons-to-mediate-your-conflict/. Consultado em 25.07.2010)
16  Vide por todos TOMASIC, ROMAN. FEELEY, MALCOLM M. Neighborhood Jus-
tice – Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: Longman Inc., 1982, pp. 122 e 146): 
“Naïve understanding of conflict – if special consideration is given to these causes, the 
conflict can be resolved by an agreement; if the agreement is followed, the social rela-
tions will function well and without conflict (…) We do not mean to imply that the uni-
verse of interpersonal disputes is split into practical and deep problems and that any fool 
can easily tell the difference. On the contrary, practical problems may have complicated 
strands, deep problems can sometimes be helped with surface adjustments, and at the 
margins one type of problem shades gradually into the other.”
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
239
Some-se a tal complexidade a dificuldade de se divisarem interesses e 
justificadores, que se confundem (e confundem) em profusão, não havendo 
linha nítida que os divida, a desafiar a percepção arguta dos mediadores e 
negociadores colaborativos. Neste sentido, tenha-se:
“Interests as JUSTIFIERS. Interests can be met in many possible ways. 
An interest becomes a justification for a position if the other person posits 
that there is only one way to meet that interest”(Shifting from positions to 
interests. 3 edition. New Westminster, BC: Justice Institute of British Co-
lumbia, Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2012, p. 22)
TOMASIC e FEELEY afirmam que, quando nos extremos de uma situação 
de conflito, entre o insignificante atrito rotineiro facilmente contornável ou 
o embate violento ou criminoso, a mediação e afins mostram-se impróprios. 
Em se tratando de causas gravíssimas, estudos estatísticos demonstram que a 
mediação mostra-se ineficaz e que eventuais acordos eventualmente obtidos 
por meio desta são usualmente violados17. Noutra banda, conflitos em que 
uma ou ambas as partes estejam intoxicadas ou incapacitadas por psicopatias 
graves são absolutamente incompatíveis com tais meios alternativos. Vale a 
nota: 
“But mediation is not, nor should be it expected to be, a panacea for all the problems 
of people in relationships that have deteriorated to the point of criminal acts of aggres-
sion. Our findings (about the BROOKLYN EXPERIMENT) suggest that mediation is no 
more effective than prosecution in preventing recidivism (…) For example, FELSTINER 
and WILLIAMS (1979) suggest that mediation (because of the brief time involved) is not 
an appropriate means of dealing with deep-seated, underlying problems that give rise 
to hostile acts between individuals. Still they believe it may be useful in cases in which 
disputants’ problems lie close to the surface (…) Cases we found to be least amenable to 
mediation involved disputes between inmates where there was also a deep-seated pat-
tern of serious hostilities. Here people were likely to continue to maintain regular contact 
after the precipitating incident, and, hence, the probability of continued friction between 
the disputants remained high. But where there was greater relational distance between 
the disputants, complainants were more likely to desire reconciliation(…) Conversely, 
less complex cases, where disputants have only surface problems may – as FELSTINER 
AND WILLIAM argue – be the most appropriate for mediation. Yet (…) it should be rec-
ognized that these disputants may often choose simply to avoid each other rather than to 
17  Vide por todos TOMASIC, ROMAN. FEELEY, MALCOLM M. Neighborhood Jus-
tice – Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: Longman Inc., 1982, p. 112.
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avail themselves of the opportunity for mediation. Moreover, avoidance in these cases is 
usually successful (as judged by the standard of recidivism), because the relationship is 
often expandable. (1982. Neighborhood Justice – Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New 
York: Longman Inc., p. 169)
Outra ácida crítica que se tece contra a mediação é a de que esta seria 
imprópria para conflitos em que as partes não apõem qualquer valor ao elo 
que as une. Assim, ao passo que a mediação serve para melhorar relações, tal 
ganho, se desprezado pelos envolvidos, não traduzirá qualquer vantagem ou 
incentivo para que tal meio alternativo seja adotado18. De acordo com a em-
blemática obra Getting to Yes, escrita pelos criadores do método colaborativo 
WILLIAM URY e ROGER FISHER:
“In single-issue negotiations among strangers where the transaction costs of explor-
ing interests would be high and where each side is protected by competitive opportuni-
ties, simple haggling over positions may work fine. But if the discussion starts to bog 
down, be prepared to change gears.” (op. cit., p. 152)
Neste sentido, situações em que se anotam abusos relacionais mostram-se 
inadequados para meios alternativos. Leia-se:
“Mediation is not a solution in all family cases. Relationship abuse is a key factor 
to consider and a screening protocol is essential. If you are the mediator you should 
meet separately with each party and ask specific questions to identify if abuse is present 
before proceeding to a joint session. It is possible that hostility and aggression can be 
misused by one party in the mediation to overwhelm, intimidate and exhaust another. 
Where abuse is present, mediation is not likely to be a viable option for safety reasons”.
(Introduction to Family Law. New Westminster, BC: Justice Institute of British Columbia, 
Conflict for Conflict Resolution, 2012, intro). 
Nesta exata direção, leia-se LINDA K. GIRDNER:
“Why can’t a mediator deal with abuse if and when it is indicated in the course of 
mediation? Due to denial and fear, in a joint session neither party is likely to assert that 
spouse abuse has occurred in the marriage. It is difficult for a mediator to ascertain 
abuse from the dynamics in a mediation session, since the abuser may use subtle cues to 
inform the abused spouse that she has gone too far. The parties may seem quite agree-
able because the abused spouse anticipates the abuser’s needs and is willing to comply 
with them in exchange for her safety. The mediator then becomes an unknowing party to 
18 Vide por todos LON FULLER (p. 30/31).
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an agreement based on coercion and submissiveness.”(Mediation Triage: Screening For 
Spouse Abuse In Mediation Mediator. MEDIATION QUATERLY, vol. 7, n. 04, 1990. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc., p. 366)
Umbilicalmente ligada a esta crítica, esta a alegação de risco de “group 
thinking”, fenômeno psicológico pesquisado originalmente pelo psicólogo 
IRVING JANIS, da Yale University, na década de 1970. Tal ocorre quando, 
em um grupo de pessoas, o desejo por vezes inconsciente de harmonia torna 
turva a análise realista de alternativas, levando à desastrosa escolha coletiva, 
com custos negativos primários de perda de criatividade individual, origina-
lidade e independência de raciocínio. Como dito por SCOTT PAGE (2007):
“An implication of what we have covered so far is that when people see a problem the 
same way, they’re likely all to get stuck at the same solutions—if we look at a problem 
with the same perspective, we’re all likely to get stuck at the same local peaks. As we saw 
in the Ben and Jerry’s example, someone who represents the problem differently(and not 
as well) probably has different local optima—a different peak. This person can help the 
group get unstuck. We might ask, Why, other than lack of imagination, would people rely 
on the same perspective? People may sharea perspective because it’s useful.If someone 
hasa better perspectiveonaproblem, copyingit would seemtomake sense.As counterin-
tuitive as this advice sounds, copying better perspectives may not be such a good idea. 
Collectively, we may be better off if some of us continue to use less effective but diverse 
perspectives(…) Although common perspectives arise because of imitation and the need 
to communicate, they also arise for less productive reasons. People are social, and inse-
cure, animals. Members of a group sometimes lock into a common perspective because 
they feel more comfortable thinking about the world the same way that other people do. 
These common perspectives can be a type of groupthink.(…) The logic of groupthink rests 
on our desire to conform. If a majority of people thinks of a problem one way, they often 
compel others to do so. That way could be a good perspective and, if so, the group will do 
well. Groupthink need not be bad. But it could mean that everyone has adopted an un-
productive perspective, and this can lead the group to make bad decisions. Most relevant 
for our investigation, groupthink— whether good or bad—reduces perspective diversity 
and stifles the collective ability of the group to find good solutions”. (PAGE, Scott E. . The 
Difference: How The Power Of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, And So-
cieties. Princeton university press, 2007, p. 49 e 51)
Segundo Resolving Conflict In Group Levels 1: Effective Team Dynamics:
“Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within groups of people, in 
which the desire for harmony in a decision-making group overrides a realistic appraisal 
of alternatives. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision 
JOSÉ MARINHO PAULO JUNIOR
242
without critical evaluation of alternative ideas or viewpoints. Antecedent factors such 
as group cohesiveness, structural faults, and situational context play into the likelihood 
of whether or not groupthink will impact the decision-making process. The primary so-
cially negative cost of groupthink is the loss of individual creativity, uniqueness, and 
independent thinking. As a social science model, groupthink has an extensive reach and 
influences literature in the fields of communication studies, political science, social psy-
chology, management, and organizational theory. The majority of the initial research on 
groupthink was performed by Irving Jánis, a research psychologist from Yale Universi-
ty.In an influential 1972 book, his original definition of the term was “A mode of thinking 
that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise al-
ternative courses of action.”(op. cit., p. 14)
Outra força oculta age em desfavor das partes que usam a mediação: a 
aversão humana a perdas. Em uma simplória definição, seria esta um recor-
rente estado psicológico pelo qual o ser humano, ao ter como seu algo (como, 
por exemplo, dinheiro, carro ou o sucesso de uma mediação), buscaria in-
conscientemente evitar a dolorosa perda. DAN ARIELY escreveu um interes-
sante e surpreendente livro sobre a irracionalidade, quando abordou, dentre 
outras, a aversãoà perda:
“Loss aversion is a powerful idea that was introduced by Danny Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky (…) for this work, Danny received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics 
(…) Loss aversion is the simple idea that the misery produced by losing something that 
we feel is ours- say, money – outweighs the happiness of gaining the same amount of 
money”. (The Upside Of Irrationalionality – The Unexpected benefits of defying Logic. 
ARIELY, DAN. New York: Harper Perennial, 2012, p. 32)
Em sua obra How We Decide (Boston: Mariner Books, 2012, pp. 76/77). 
LHERRER faz referência a um teste aplicado a inúmeros médicos nos Esta-
dos Unidos em que o mesmo quadro médico de um paciente era descortinado 
ora sob aspectos de perda (morte), ora sob aspecto de ganhos (sobrevivencia), 
em alternativas de tratamento que se mostravam diametralmente opostas. 
E, sem estranheza, os respeitáveis profissionais majoritariamente optavam 
por alternativas diametralmente opostas de acordo com o risco de perda ou a 
chance de sobrevivência, embora, matematicamente, estas se equivalessem e 
pudessem ser calculadas em um breve segundo19.
19  Para maiores detalhes do teste, leia-se DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ganhador do Prêmio 
Nobel em Economia: “An experiment that Amos carried out with colleagues at Harvard 
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E não se trata, nem de longe, de uma força isolada. De fato, há muitas ou-
tras que modelam, em complexa interação, nossas decisões. PETERS e WA-
TERMAN correlacionam às irracionalidades de tais fenômenos psicológicos, 
tendo por escopo a excelência das melhores empresas americanas: 
“The central problem with the rationalist view of organizing people is that people 
are not very rational (…)all of us are self-centered, suckers for a bit of praise, and gen-
erally like to think of ourselves as winners. But the fact of the matter is that our talents 
are distributed normally – none of us is really as good as he or she would like to think, 
but rubbing our noses daily in that reality doesn’t do us a bit of good (…) as information 
processors, we are simultaneously flawed and wonderful. On the one hand, we can hold 
little explicitly in mind, at most a half dozen or so facts at one time. Hence there should 
be enormous pressure on managements – of complex organizations especially – to keep 
things very simple indeed. On the other hand, our unconscious mind is powerful, accu-
mulating a vast storehouse of patterns, if we let it. (…) we all think we’re tops. We’re 
exuberantly, wildly irrational about ourselves.(…)The most intriguing finding – in an-
other major area of psychological research, called “attribution theory” – is the so-called 
fundamental attribution error postulated by Stanford’s LEE ROSS. Attribution theory 
attempts to explain the way we assign cause for success or failure. (…) the fundamental 
attribution error that so intrigues the psychologists is that we typically treat any success 
as our own and any failure as the system’s. (…)The old adage is “NOTHING SUCCEDS 
LIKE SUCCESS”. It turns out to have a sound scientific basis. Researchers studying moti-
vation find that the prime factor is simply the self-perception among motivated subjects 
that they are in fact doing well. Whether they are or not by any absolute standard doesn’t 
seem to matter much (…)And so it goes through a wealth of experimental data, now 
thousands of experiments old, showing that people reason intuitively. They reason with 
simple decision rules, which is a fancy way of saying that, in this complex world, they 
trust their gut. We need ways of sorting through the infinite minutiae out there, and we 
start with heuristics – associations, analogues, metaphors, and ways that have worked 
for us before. (…)Analogously, what’s called “foot-in-the door research” demonstrates 
the importance of incrementally acting our way into major commitment. For instance, 
in one experiment, in Palo Alto, California, most subjects who initially agreed to put a 
Medical School is the classic example of emotional framing. Physician participants were 
given statistics about the outcomes of two treatments for lung cancer: surgery and ra-
diation. The five-year survival rates clearly favor surgery, but in the short term surgery 
is riskier than radiation. Half of the participants read statistics about survival rates, the 
others receive the same information in terms of mortality rates. The two descriptions of 
the short-term outcomes of surgery were: “The one-month survival rate is 90%”; “There is 
10% mortality in the first month”. You already know the results: surgery was much more 
popular in the former frame (84% of physicians chose it) than in the latter (where 50% 
favored radiation)” (Thinking Fast and Slow. Canada: Doubleday Canada, 2011, p. 367).
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tiny sign in their front window supporting a cause (traffic safety) subsequently agreed to 
display a billboard in their front yard, which required letting outsiders dig sizable holes 
in the lawn. On the other hand, those not asked to take the first small step turned down 
the larger one in ninety-five cases out of a hundred. The implications of this line of rea-
soning are clear: if you get people acting, even in small ways, the way you want them to, 
will they come to believe in what they’re doing (…) The leading mathematician ROGER 
PENROSE says, “The world is an illusion created by a conspiracy of our senses” (...) We 
are fairly sure that the culture of almost every excellent company that seems now to be 
meeting the needs of the “irrational man”, as described in this chapter, can be traced by 
transforming leadership somewhere in its history (…) (In Search Of Excellence – Lessons 
From America’s Best-Run Companies. New York: Warner Books, 1982, p. 56-74).
E uma centena de outras forças psicológicas ocultas poderiam ser e usual-
mente são elencadas como obstáculos a qualquer modelo de deliberação, afe-
tando o modo pelo qual nós, seres humanos, decidimos20. CALAMANDREI 
como sempre antecipava: 
“Na realidade, no tabuleiro do juiz, as peças são homens vivos, que irradiam invisí-
veis forças magnéticas que encontram ressonâncias ou repulsões, ilógicas, mas huma-
nas, nos sentimentos do judicante. Como se pode considerar fiel uma fundamentação que 
não reproduza os meandros subterrâneos dessas correntes sentimentais, a cuja influên-
cia mágica nenhum juiz, mesmo severo, consegue escapar?”(Eles, os juízes, vistos por nós 
os advogados. São Paulo: Livraria Clássica, 2000, p. 175/176)
Se tudo antes não bastasse, a mediação colaborativa (aí incluída a cons-
trução colaborativa de consenso) sofre críticas também por implicitamente 
adotar, sem ressalvas, a ideia de que qualquer decisão tomada por mais de 
uma pessoa seria superior à tomada isoladamente por esta. 
Uma estória bastante inusitada pode ilustrar a falibilidade desta ideia. 
“GARRY KASPAROV CONTRA O MUNDO” foi o nome dado a um jogo de 
xadrez realizado em 1999, via internet, em que o mestre enxadrista, com as 
peças brancas, enfrentou cerca de 50.000 internautas, de mais de 75 países, 
que decidiam o movimento das peças pretas pela maioria de votos. Após 62 
jogadas, KASPAROV venceu. 
ELI MINA, igualmente resistente à ideia de que a maioria estaria sempre 
certa, escreveu “IS THE MAJORITY ALWAYS RIGHT?”, abaixo transcrito:
20 Em uma perfunctória pesquisa no Wikipedia, listam-se mais de uma CENTENA 
destes gatilhos psicológicos!
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“With numbers-based democracies, the end (getting enough votes) justifies the means, 
which may prompt some people to make pre-meeting deals on how they’ll vote. On the 
other hand, with knowledge-based democracies, members refuse to commit their votes 
in advance of a meeting. Instead, they arrive at meetings with fully open minds, listen 
to everyone, and treat “minorities” as partners in decision-making.With numbers-based 
democracies, assertive and persuasive advocates tend to prevail. With knowledge-based 
democracies, the people with the most relevant information and the most astute analysis 
are listened to. The group has a culture that promotes learning, inquiry and excellence 
in decision-making. Ultimately, democracies that are primarily focused on the number 
of votes are more likely to produce flawed and risk-prone decisions. On the other hand, 
knowledge-based democracies are more likely to produce informed decisions that in-
crease opportunities and minimize risks for the affected organizations. (...) So, is the 
majority always right? Is four the most important number on a Council of seven? Only 
if the four have knowledge on their side; only if members come to meetings with open 
minds and are prepared to learn from the discussions; and only if the meeting environ-
ment is kept safe. Yes, the numbers are important, but they should be backed by objec-
tivity and knowledge. (consultado em 21.02.2013 em http://www.elimina.com /insights/
shared-jun12.html)
MARK McCORMACK é visceralmente contra decisões tomadas por gru-
pos:
 “Group decisions are rarely good decisions. Something happens to people’s skepti-
cism when they’re gathered in a room with the stated goal of achieving consensus. They 
become too agreeable. They’re intimidated by the boss and take positions they think the 
boss wants to hear. They’re reluctant to challenge their allies. After a while, with every-
one echoing the same opinion, a group euphoria that psychologists call “groupthink” 
takes over. This surreal euphoria often leads people to conclusions that fly in the face 
of reality” (What They Still Don’t Teach You At Harvard Business School – More Notes 
From A Street-Smart Executive. Toronto, Canada: Bantam Book, 1989, p. 76-77)21
Tudo sem contar a distorção matemática que usualmente vitimizam vo-
tações. Noutros termos, pela combinação matemática de inúmeros votos em 
cenários diversos, nem sempre a maioria obtém o que a maioria deseja. Tal 
dilema foi percebido no final do século XVIII por MARQUÊS DE CONDOR-
21 SCOTT E. PAGE desafia tal noção, sustentando, ao revés, ser sim cientificamen-
te comprovável que decisões tomadas por grupos superam em qualidade de indivíduos 
ou grupos com menor diversidade, ainda que com maior Q.I.. Vide The Difference: How 
The Power Of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, And Societies. Princeton 
university press, 2007. Em igual sentido,ROB CORCORAN em Trustbuilding - An Honest 
Conversation On Race, Conciliation And Responsability (p. 126). 
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CET, estudioso de probabilidades, que observou que, por meio de votação 
estratégica, poderia ser subvertida a vontade majoritária. Esta conclusão con-
traintuitiva foi objeto de profunda pesquisa pelo Professor KENNETH AR-
ROW, que foi laureado com o prêmio Nobel pelo que chamou de “teorema da 
impossibilidade”.
Segundo o Paradoxo de Arrow, quando eleitores possuem 3 ou mais dis-
tintas alternativas, uma votação sem ordem de preferência pode converter 
subpreferências individuais em preferências primárias coletivas, sem que, de 
fato, o sejam.
Em um exemplo simplório, se perguntarmos a 10 pessoas, qual o sabor 
preferido de sorvete (morango, chocolate, creme ou abacaxi), dando-lhes a 
oportunidade de votarem em três sem explicitarem grau de preferência, a 
votação poderá ser subvertida se, mesmo chocolate sendo o sabor por qual 
nove sejam loucamente apaixonados (com a exceção de um votante que op-
tasse pelos demais sabores), morango for a escolha majoritária quando posto 
como (distante) terceiro por todos, ainda quando assim somente lá estivesse 
circunstancialmente pela indiferença entre os demais sabores ou quaisquer 
outros (simplesmente para não deixarem uma opção em branco). E o mesmo 
pode ocorrer, por evidente, em eleições plurinominais para Procurador-Geral 
de Justiça.
E mesmo a suposta vantagem de tais meios alternativos trazerem à mesa 
opções para além daquelas que individualmente elucubrassem as partes tem 
sido alvo de questionamentos à luz do “paradoxo da escolha”. Conforme sus-
tentado por ERICH FROMM, em seu “Escape From Freedom”, em uma de-
mocracia moderna, as pessoas são oprimidas não por escassez de escolhas, 
mas por sua superabundancia. BARRY SCHWARTZ aduz:
“Autonomy and Freedom of choice are critical to our well-being, and choice is critical 
to freedom and autonomy. Nonetheless, though modern Americans have more choice 
than any group of people ever has before, and thus, presumably, more freedom and au-
tonomy, we don’t seem to be benefiting from it psychologically.” (The Paradox of Choice 
- Why More Is Less. 2004. Harper Perennial)
LHERRER (2012) assim reverbera tal tese: 
“Herbert Simon said it best: “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” 
(…) This is a counterintuitive idea. When making decisions, people almost always as-
sume that more information is better (…) but it’s important to know the limitations of 
this approach, which are rooted in the limitations of the brain. The prefrontal cortex can 
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handle only so much information at any one time, so when a person gives too many facts 
and then asks it to make a decision based on the facts that seem important, that person 
is asking for trouble.(…) this is the danger of too much information: it can actually in-
terfere with understanding. When the prefrontal cortex is overwhelmed, a person can no 
longer make sense of the situation. (…) sometimes, more information and analysis can 
actually constrict thinking, making people understand les about what’s really going on”. 
(How We Decide. 2012. Boston: Mariner Books, 2012, pp. 159-165).
A mediação colaborativa em larga escala (ou construção colaborativa de 
consenso) padece de limites que não são poucos, já havendo quem decretasse 
o colapso ontológico de instrumentos deste naipe. ALVIN TOFLER, in Future 
Shock - The Third Wave, na década de 80, afirmava categoricamente: 
“Built to the wrong scale, unable to deal adequately with transnational problems, 
unable to deal with interrelated problems, unable to keep up with the accelerative drive, 
unable to cope with the high levels of diversity, the overloaded, obsolete political tech-
nology of the industrial age is breaking up under our very eyes” (op. cit. NY: BANTAM 
BOOKS. 1980, p. 411)
SUSSKIND et alii aditam que há temas que simplesmente não permitem 
a construção de consenso e há hipóteses em que obstrucionistas podem con-
cretamente impedir o sucesso da empreitada, além de identificar obstáculos 
estruturais e externos ao modelo: 
“Some issues don’t lend themselves to consensus building because thy deal with what 
we call fundamental beliefs. They are simply too hot and too closely linked to people’s 
sense of their own identity. To cite an extreme example: abortion rights is usually a 
non-negotiable issue for people on both sides (…) sometimes, though, non-negotiable 
items are open to discussion once people realize they are not being asked to compromise. 
Instead, they are being asked to consider different questions, different ways of refraim-
ing the initial issue. At the other end of the spectrum, some issues don’t generate enough 
interest to sustain a consensus building effort (…) Perceptual barriers to consensus build-
ing – (…) “difficult, costly, too time-consuming, or of uncertain efficacy” (…) External 
barriers to consensus building- (…) one is that an individual determined to disrupt the 
process can, indeed, cause serious trouble. The second is that the media tend to take a 
neutral-to-negative stand, vis-à-vis CBA. The third is that people worry about liability 
or otherwise running afoul of the law. (…)”22
22  Vide SUSSKIND, LAWRENCE E.. CRUIKSHANK, JEFFREY L. Breaking Robert’s 
Rules – The New Way To Run Your Meetings, Build Consensus, And Get Results. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 44 e 155.
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Com base no modelo proposto por BRUCE TUCKMAN23, há quem enxer-
gue enormes dificuldades praticas de evitar que um grupo com centenas de 
pessoas alcance o estágio de performing, permanecendo, no mais das vezes, 
em constante storming, com saída e entrada constante de novos atores, a 
impedir o sucesso da empreitada. 
Há quem não poupe mesmo a inflexibilidade ideológica dos que sustentam 
ser sempre a medição ou a construção de consenso a primeira alternativa a se 
pensar, devendo ser descartada somente quando inepta. Acusam, ao revés, de 
ser a participação obrigatória uma tirania travestida. COOKE and KOTHARI 
(2001) assim escreveram em sua provocante obra “Participation: The New 
Tyranny”, ipsis litteris:
“A critical challenge to established interpretations - Contributors argue forcefully 
that the term participation is being mobilized to serve a wide variety of political agen-
das, many of which are not very radical; that participatory approaches can impose, not 
overcome, power relations when delivered as a technocratic cargo; that practitioners 
have erroneously imagined local communities as discrete and socially homogeneous; 
that local knowledge has been romanticized , intracommunity divisions underempha-
sized, and the positive contribution of external agents underplayed; the local-scale action 
has been prioritized while links to wider processes and institutions have been neglected; 
and finally that participation is no panacea and has its own practical and theoretical 
tensions. (…) Participation is a form of power and when it really does tyrannize it must 
be resisted” 
Inúmeros autores ponderam a respeito da perda inútil de tempo, recursos 
humanos e financeiros para se apor o epíteto “participativo” a conflitos cujo 
objeto atém-se a demandas amplamente repetitivas a que são aplicados prin-
cípios universalmente adotados em um numero amplíssimo de casos idênti-
cos. 
Partindo, aliás, da trilogia escrita24sublimemente por ARIELY, inúmeras 
outras críticas, fundadas em larga e profunda pesquisa científica pelas Uni-
versidades de Duke, M.I.T. e Harvard, poderiam ser tecidas quanto ao pro-
cesso decisório que se pretende adotar alternativamente ao modelo judicial 
clássico.
A um, o chamado “IDENTIFIABLE VICTIM EFFECT”:
23  Vide por todos Resolving Conflict In Group Levels 1: Effective Team Dynamics.
Tenha-se a dinâmica de grupo vislumbrada por BRUCE TUCKMAN, fragmentado em eta-
pas de forming, storming, norming e performing (e ainda, adjourning).
24 Vide dados bibliográficos ao final da pesquisa.
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“Though we possess incredible sensitivity to the suffering of one individual, we are 
generally (and disturbingly) apathetic to the suffering of many (…) First, there’s your 
proximity to the victim – a factor psychologists refer to as closeness (…) The second fac-
tor is what we call vividness (…) the opposite of vividness is vagueness (…) The third 
factor is what psychologists call the drop-in-the-bucket effect, and it has to do with your 
faith in your ability to single-handedly and completely help the victims of a tragedy” 
(The Upside Of Irrationalionality – The Unexpected benefits of defying Logic, p. 239-244)
A dois, o processo decisório encampado pela mediação, pela construção 
de consenso, pretende ser RACIONAL, quando, muitas vezes, bem ao revés, 
a IRRACIONALIDADE é quem previsível e verdadeiramente define como sa-
tisfatória ou não a decisão final a ser tomada. Como bem ensina ARIELY:
“When I mention the RATIONAL economic model, I refer to the basic assumption that 
most economists and many of us hold about human nature – the simple and compelling 
idea that we are capable of making the right decisions for ourselves (…)we are not only 
irrational, but predictably irrational – that our irrationality happens the same way, 
again and again (…) we are all far less rational in our decision making than standard 
economic theory assumes. Our irrational behaviors are neither random nor senseless – 
they are systematic and predictable. We all make the same types of mistakes over and 
over, because of the basic wiring of our brains. (…)we are pawns in a game whose forces 
we largely fail to comprehend (…) just as we can’t help being fooled by visual illusions, 
we fall for the decision illusions our minds shows us (…) in essence we are limited to the 
tools nature has given us, and the natural way in which we make decisions is limited 
by the quality and accuracy of these tools (…) it does not necessarily mean that we are 
helpless. Once we understand when and where we may make erroneous decisions, we 
can try to be more vigilant, force ourselves to think differently about these decisions, or 
use technology to overcome our inherent shortcomings”(PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL – 
The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions, p. xix-xx, 317, 321-322)
E disse ainda:
“Many studies in behavioral economics have shown that people make decisions based 
on a sense of fairness and justice. People get angry over unfairness, and, as a conse-
quence, they prefer to punish the person making the unfair offer. Following these find-
ings, brain-imaging research has shown that receiving unfair offers in the ultimatum 
game is associated with activation in the anterior insula – a part of the brain associated 
with negative emotional experience. Not only that, but the individuals who had stronger 
anterior insula activity (stronger emotional action) were also more likely to reject the 
unfair offers. (…) Emotions can easily affect decisions and that this can happen even 
when the emotions have nothing to do with the decisions themselves. We’ve also learned 
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that the effects of emotions can outlast the feelings themselves and influence our long-
term decisions down the line” (The Upside Of Irrationalionality – The Unexpected bene-
fits of defying Logic, pp. 266-276)
Nesta esteira de ideias, já se pronunciaram igualmente SUSSKIND et alii 
(1987), compreendendo o papel fundamental e o impacto irracional de emo-
ções de partes em conflito, in verbis:
“It is important for disputants to recognize that emotions can overwhelm logic: (…) 
the dollar bill auction. In this experiment, the researcher announces to the test group that 
he intends to auction off a dollar bill to the highest bidder. He also establishes 4 seem-
ingly innocuous ground rules. First, bidding must be proceed in ten-second increments. 
Second, the highest bidder will win the dollar, but the second-highest bidder must pay the 
auctioneer the amount of his or her losing bid. Third, bidders are not allowed to commu-
nicate with each other during the course of the auction. Fourth, the auction is over when 
a minute passes without a new bid being made.(...) now, there are bidders not only with 
an investment in winning, but also with a stake in not losing. (…) how is this relevant to 
public dispute resolution? The participants in the auction were “trapped by choice””. (op. 
cit. p 89-91).
LHERRER, embora conferindo imensa racionalidade a emoções, atesta a 
sua influencia involuntária e muitas vezes inconsciente em atos diários, sim-
ples ou complexos:
“Plato, as usual, was there first. He liked to imagine the mind as a chariot pulled by 
horses. The rational brain, he said, is the charioteer; it holds the reins and decides where 
the horses run. If the horses get out of control, the charioteer just needs to take out his 
whip and reassert authority. One of the horses is well bred and well behaved, but even 
the best charioteer has difficulty controlling the other horse. “He is of an ignoble breed,” 
Plato wrote. “He has a short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin, and bloodshed white eyes; 
companion to wild boasts and indecency, he is shaggy around his ears – deaf as a post – 
and just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined”. According to Plato, this horse 
represents negative, destructive emotions. (…) Unlike his teacher Plato, Aristotle realized 
that rationality wasn’t always in conflict with emotions.(…) one of the critical functions 
of the rational soul was to make sure that emotions were intelligently applied to the real 
world. (…) Patient ELLIOT-neurologist Antonio Damasio- a few months earlier, a small 
tumor had been cut out of Elliot’s cortex, near the frontal lobe of his brain. (…) Elliot felt 
nothing. How grotesque or aggressive the picture, his palms never got sweaty. He had 
the emotional life of a mannequin. This was a completely unexpected discovery. At the 
time, neuroscience assumed the human emotions were irrational. A person without any 
emotions – in other words, someone like Elliot – should therefore make better emotions. 
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His cognition should be uncorrupted. The charioteer should have complete control. What, 
then, had happened to Elliot? Why couldn’t he lead a normal life? To Damasio, Elliot’s pa-
thology suggested that emotions are a crucial part of the decision-making process. When 
we are cut off from our feelings, the most banal decisions became impossible. A brain 
that can’t feel can’t make up its mind. (…) While Plato and Freud would have guessed that 
the job of the OFC (orbitofrontal cortex) was to protect us from our emotions, to fortify 
reason against feeling, its actual function is precisely the opposite. From the perspective 
of the human brain, Homo sapiens is the most emotional animal of all. (…) The result 
is that the uniquely brain areas of the mind depend on the primitive mind underneath. 
The process of thinking requires feeling, for feelings are what let us understand all the 
information that we can’t directly comprehend. Reason without emotion is impotent (…) 
So far, we’ve been exploring the surprising intelligence of our emotions. (…) but emotions 
aren’t perfect. They are a crucial cognitive tool, but even the most useful tools can’t solve 
every problem. In fact, there are certain conditions that consistently short-circuit the 
emotional brain, causing people to make bad decisions. The best decision-makers know 
which situations require less intuitive responses (…) While the emotional brain is capable 
of astonishing wisdom, it’s also vulnerable to certain innate flaws.”(HOW WE DECIDE. 
LHERRER, JOHN. 2012. Boston: Mariner Books, p. 9,10, 14, 18, 23, 26 56, 61 e 105-107)
E não basta lembrar que já se concedeu um premio Nobel ao criador do 
SMORC (Simple Model of Rational Crime), segundo o qual crimes, decisões 
e desvios de conduta ocorreriam de acordo com uma análise de custo/benefi-
cio. Em termos psicológicos corriqueiros, o custo (dano à nossa autoimagem) 
haveria de ser menor que o ganho com um “deslize” em nosso próprio favor. 
Ocorre que, em pesquisas recentes conduzidas para justamente desafiar tal 
festejado modelo, tem comprovado sua falibilidade. ARIELY assim arremata: 
“If we all lived in a purely SMORC-based world, we would run a cost-benefit analysis 
on all our decisions and do what seems to be the most rational thing (…) Essentially, we 
cheat up to the level that allows us to retain our self-image as reasonably honest individ-
uals (…) For starters, the finding that the level of dishonesty is not influenced to a large 
degree (to any degree in our experiments) by the amount of money we stand to gain 
from being dishonest suggests that dishonesty is not an outcome of simply considering 
the costs and benefits of dishonesty. Moreover, the results showing that the level of dis-
honesty is unaltered in the probability of being caught makes it even less likely that the 
dishonesty is rooted in a cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the fact that many people cheat 
just a little when given the opportunity to do so suggests that the forces that govern dis-
honesty are much more complex (and more interesting) than predicted by the SMORC. 
(…) In a nutshell, the central thesis is that our behavior is driven by 2 opposing forces. 
On the one hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people (…) on the other 
hand, we want to benefit from cheating and get as much money as possible (this is the 
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standard financial motivation). Clearly these two motivations are in conflict (…) this is 
where our amazing cognitive flexibility comes into play. Thanks to our human skill, as 
long as we cheat by only a little bit, we can benefit from cheating and still see ourselves 
as marvellous human beings” (THE HONEST TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY – How we 
lie to everyone – especially ourselves. 2012, pp. 4/5, 23, 26/27)
Por sua vez, MATTHEW LEIGHNINGER (2006), em sua obra THE NEXT 
FORM OF DEMOCRACY: how expert rule is giving way to shared gover-
nance”, assim acrescenta:
“Your plight is shared by local leaders all over the country: most would-be democra-
cy-builders have narrow citizen involvement needs, they have few democratic structures 
to lean on, and they have trouble finding people with skills to mobilize citizens effectively” 
page (…) If you don’t allow participants to explore all the ways they can be citizens, you 
cut short the larger potential of well-rounded, active citizenship, and you may just leave 
people frustrated” (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006, pp. 47-56)
LEIGHNINGER sustenta que a maioria dos esforços cívicos para cons-
trução de diálogo e consenso usualmente falham em atrair participantes, por 
terem agendas pré-definidas e baseadas em estereótipos cívicos. Quase todas 
as iniciativas enfrentam carencia de recrutamento de pessoal e diversidade 
sócio-étnica, sobrecarregando e ciclicamente perdendo seu próprio grupo de 
colaboradores mais próximos. Tudo sem falar em falta de estrutura física ou 
financeira para longos termos25.
E também há limites dos novos meios tecnológicos para engajamento VIR-
TUAL em massa. Nem mesmo a mais inovadora tecnologia criada na mídia 
social está livre de limites ou problemas. Anonimato, assimetria temporal ou 
espacial, falta de estrutura dialógica (seja da plataforma, seja de quem abre 
o diálogo e não dispõe de pessoal ou recursos suficientes) são apenas alguns 
dos muitos percalços enfrentados.Em The Promise and Problems of Online 
Deliberation, LAURA W. BLACK lista os inúmeros problemas relacionados 
com a deliberação online26.
25  DAVE MESLIN, em sua palestra “O Antídoto para a Apatia”, discorre brilhante-
mente sobre os obstáculos práticos e conjunturais para que a colaboração se concretize. 
Em um discurso de poucos minutos, cobre, com notável extensão, os percalços para um 
efetivo engajamento cívico. (Disponível em http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/pt-br/dave_
meslin_the_antidote_to_apathy. html?source=email#.UXneazHz5KF.email. Consultado 
em 29/04/2013).
26 A autora apresenta quadro em que analisa uma a uma as tecnologias virtuais em 
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KADLEC et alii vislumbram também aqui fenômenos psicológicos que al-
teram substancialmente o conteúdo da discussão virtual:
“By having users submit ideas and vote at the same time, the team experienced a 
phenomenon introduced earlier as the early submission bias. Ideas that were submitted 
on the first day and received a high number of votes were more visible and therefore 
more likely to receive more votes and stay on top. Additionally, ideas that are similar 
in nature, but submitted separately, detracted from each other’s total score. Since the 
process was based on an idea-generation model, these two effects led to a significant 
bias. Separating phases for submitting ideas, followed by combining and refining them 
through collaborative editing, and prioritizing and rating the ideas afterwards might be 
a concept to prevent this issue.” 
Comum a todos, aliás, está o fato de que a dinâmica de poder em que es-
tão inseridas e que deve ser enfrentada é tudo menos pueril ou simplória. De 
acordo com BERNIE MAYER:
“Altering power imbalance and addressing power dynamics in a mediation process 
require that the mediator be able to detect and understand how power manifests itself. 
This is not a simple task” (apud BALMER, Joan. DYNAMICS OF POWER)
Reconheça-se, pois, uma obviedade: há sim limites aos meios alternativos 
de resolução de conflito. Mais: tais limites, longe de ser simplórios, são ab-
solutamente complexos. Mais ainda: nem mesmos as bases filosóficas de tais 
alternativas são imunes a críticas ácidas e incisivas. 
Nada disto, porém, afasta a constatação igualmente óbvia de que a adoção 
e a utilidade de tais meios não podem ser descartadas enquanto PARTE IN-
TEGRANTE E COMPLEMENTAR de um todo, de um sistema de resolução 
de conflito, que não detém, aliás, solução única infalível para todo e qualquer 
conflito27. A simplória exclusão de meios alternativos por conta de sua falibi-
lidade28 significaria o mesmo que excluir os meios judiciais clássicos por igual 
voga, destacando seus limites. Disponível seu artigo em http://kettering.org/publica-
tions/the-promise-and-problems-of-online-deliberation/, consultado em 17/04/2013.
27  Neste mesmo sentido, vide Reaching Resolution - A Guide to Designing Public 
Sector Dispute Resolution Systems (British Columbia, Canada: Ministry of Attorney Gen-
eral, 2003, p. 1-9)
28  Nãoé por outra que:“Both approaches have qualities as well (…) Each conflict 
style has its appropriate uses, but the appropriateness of a particular style may differ 
between cultures (…) a collaborative style is neither a panacea nor appropriate in all 
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motivo. De acordo com ILAN GEWURZ29, criador do conceito de “multi-door 
Court House”, a variedade de meios de processamento de conflito, ainda 
quando nenhum destes seja infalível, reduz o grau de falibilidade do sistema 
de resolução de conflito30. O todo (falível) fica mais rico e menos falível por 
contar com cada uma de suas variadas partes.
Viva, pois, a mediação! 
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NEW PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN BRAZIL
Humberto Dalla bernarDina De PinHo1
1. Evolution of Brazilian Law on Mediation
In Brazil, starting from the 1990’s, interest began to grow concerning the 
institute of mediation, especially under the influence of the Argentinean leg-
islation enacted in 19952.
Over here, the first lawmaking initiative took shape with Bill No. 4,827/98, 
arising from a proposal by Congresswoman Zulaiê Cobra, and the initial draft 
submitted to the House contained a concise text, setting out the definition of 
mediation and listing some pertinent provisions. 
In the House of Representatives, as far back as 2002, the bill was approved 
by the Commission for the Constitution and Justice and sent to the Federal 
Senate, where it was given the number PLC 94, of 2002. 
However, the Federal Government, as part of the “Republican Package” 
that followed Constitutional Amendment No. 45, dated December 08, 2004 
(known as the “Judiciary Reform”), presented various Bills modifying the 
Code of Civil Procedure, which led to a new report for PLC 94. 
The Substitute (Amendment No. 1-CCJ) was approved, which impaired the 
initial bill. The substitute was sent to the House of Representatives on July 11, 
2006. On August 01 the bill was forwarded to the CCJC, which received it on 
August 07. After that, there were no further news of it until mid-2013, when 
it was once again addressed, probably inspired by the bills already under dis-
cussion before the Senate. 
In 2010 the National Council of Justice published Resolution No. 125, 
based on the premise of the right of access to Justice, laid down in art. 5, 
XXXV, of the Federal Constitution. 
Art. 1 of the Resolution institutes the National Judiciary Policy for han-
dling conflicts of interests, seeking to ensure everyone with the right to resolve 
1  Associate Professor of Civil Procedural Law at UERJ. Public Prosecutor for the 
State of Rio de Janeiro. http://www.humbertodalla.pro.br
2  PINHO, Humberto Dalla Bernardina de [organizer]. Teoria Geral da Mediação à 
luz do Projeto de Lei e do Direito Comparado, Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2008.
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disputes by suitable means, making it quite clear that it falls to the Judiciary 
Branch – not only via a resolution awarded by judicial decision - to afford 
other mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, in particular the so-called 
consensual means, such as mediation and conciliation, while also providing 
the citizens with attention and guidance. 
To achieve these targets, the Courts were to set up Permanent Centers for 
Consensual Methods of Resolution of Disputes, and install Judiciary Centers 
for Reolution of Disputes and Citizenship. 
The Resolution also addresses qualification of the conciliators and medi-
ators, the registry and statistical monitoring of their activities and manage-
ment of the Centers3. 
2. Legal Initiatives
2.1. The Project of the Civil Procedure Code
In 2009 a Commission of Jurists was set up, chaired by Justice Luiz Fux, 
with the aim of presenting a new Code of Civil Procedure. 
In record time a Preliminary Bill was presented, converted into a Legis-
lative Bill (No. 166/10), submitted to discussion and examination by a Com-
mission especially constituted by Senators, within the realm of the Federal 
Senate Commission for the Constitution and Justice. 
In December 2010 a Substitute was presented by Senator Valter Pereira, 
which was approved by the Plenary Session of the Senate with two minor 
changes. The text was then sent on to the House of Representatives, where it 
was identified as Bill No. 8046/104. 
Early 2011 saw the first initiatives of reflection on the text of the new CPC, 
broadening the debate with civil society and the juridical milieu, with activ-
ities held jointly by the Commission, the House of Representatives and the 
Ministry of Justice. 
In August, a special commission was created to examine the text, chaired 
by Congressman Fabio Trad. 
In the year 2013, under the chairmanship of Congressman Paulo Teixeira, 
3  PELUSO, Antonio Cezar. RICHA, Morgana de Almeida [coordinators]. Conciliação 
e Mediação: estruturação da política judiciaria nacional, Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2011.
4  All the steps of handling the Project for the New CPC can be followed on our blog: 
http://humbertodalla.blogspot.com and at http://www.facebook.com/humberto.dalla.
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a Substitute was presented in the month of July and an Overall Cumulative 
Amendment in October. At the moment that this text is being concluded, the 
activities of revising the text have still to be completed. 
In the wording at present available of the Project for a new CPC, we can 
identify the Commission’s concerns with the institution of conciliation and 
mediation, specifically in articles 166 to 176. 
The Project shows special concern with the activity of mediation done 
within the structure of the Judiciary Branch, although it does not rule out 
prior mediation or even the possibility of using other means of dispute reso-
lution (art. 176). 
The fundamental principles of conciliation and mediation were safeguard-
ed, to wit: (i) independence; (ii) neutrality; (iii) autonomy of will; (iv) confi-
dentiality; (v) oral expression; and (vi) informality. 
It is important to stress the relevance of the activity to be conducted by a 
professional mediator. In other words, the function of mediating should not, 
as a rule, be accumulated with other professions, such as judges, public de-
fenders and prosecutors. 
In art. 166, 3rd and 4th paragraphs, the Commission of Jurists, after noting 
that conciliation and mediation must be stimulated by all the players in the 
process, established an objective distinction between these two mechanisms. 
The differentiation comes about through the posture of the third party and 
the type of dispute.. 
Thus, the conciliator may suggest resolutions for the dispute, whereas the 
mediator assists the persons in conflict to identify, by themselves, alterna-
tives of mutual benefit. Conciliation is the best suited tool for disputes involv-
ing material interests, whereas mediation is recommended in cases where it 
is sought to preserve or restore ties. 
It is important to note that the original version of PLS 166/10 required the 
mediator to be registered as a member of the OAB (Brazilian Bar Association). 
The Report and Substitute presented on November 24, 2010 prioritized the 
understanding that any professional can exercise the functions of mediator. 
There will be a judicial record with information on the mediator’s perfor-
mance, indicating, for example, the number of cases in which he/she took 
part, the success or failure of the activity and the issue involved in the dispute. 
This data will be published periodically and systematized for statistical pur-
poses (art. 168 of the Project). 
The Commission, using some of the provisions already present in the Bill 
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of the Mediation Law, was also concerned with the ethical aspects of the me-
diators and conciliators, and in this regard made provision for the hypotheses 
of exclusion of names from the Court’s record and providing for the opening 
of an administrative procedure to investigate the conduct (art. 174). 
As to remuneration, art. 170 of the Bill states that a table of fees will be 
published by the National Council of Justice (CNJ). 
As we see, the concern of the Commission is with judicial mediation. The 
Bill does not forbid prior or out-of-court mediation, but merely opts not to 
regulate it, making it clear that interested parties may make use of this mo-
dality, resorting to the professionals available on the market. 
2.2. The Project of the Mediation Bill
With the advent of the Project for the Code of Civil Procedure, in the year 
2011 Senator Ricardo Ferraço presented to the Senate Legislative Bill 517/11, 
proposing the regulation of judicial and out-of-court mediation, so as to create 
a system aligned with both the future CPC and with CNJ Resolution No. 125. 
In 2013 two more legislative initiatives were attached to PLS 517: PLS 
405/13, the outcome of the work performed by the Commission instituted by 
the Senate, and chaired by Justice Luis Felipe Salomão, of the Superior Court 
of Justice (STJ), and PLS 434/13, result of the works of the Commission in-
stituted by the CNJ and the Ministry of Justice, chaired by Justices Nancy 
Andrighi and Marco Buzzi, both of the STJ, and by the Secretary of Judiciary 
Reform at the Ministry of Justice, Flavio Croce Caetano. 
We shall first address the text of PLS 517. 
With CNJ Resolution 125 already in effect, faced with the prospects of reg-
ulation of judicial mediation by the new CPC, and given the need to deal with 
issues concerning the integration between adjudication and self-composing 
forms, in August 2011 we had the opportunity to submit suggestions to Sen-
ator Ricardo Ferraço, then involved with the works of the third edition of the 
Republican Pact. 
We made up a working group alongside Professors Tricia Navarro and Ga-
briela Asmar and devoted ourselves to the task of drafting a new Preliminary 
Bill for a Law of Civil Mediation. After examination by the Senate Consultan-
cy, the Senate Bill was presented, taking the number 5175, and which is now 
following the legislative procedure in the Federal Senate. 
5  The text can be consulted on the Federal Senate site, at: http://www.senado.gov.br.
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The Bill works with concepts more updated and adapted to Brazilian re-
ality. For example, in art. 2 it states that “mediation is a decision-making 
process conducted by an impartial third party, with the aim of assisting the 
parties to identify or develop consensual resolutions”. 
With regard to modalities, art. 5 admits prior and judicial mediation, 
which in both cases may, chronologically, be prior, incidental or even subse-
quent to the procedural relationship. 
Also according to the text of the Bill, the judge must “recommend judicial 
mediation, preferably, in disputes in which it is necessary to preserve or 
make good an interpersonal or social relationship, or when the decisions of 
the parties entail material consequences for third parties” (art. 8). 
On the other hand, if mediation should prove unsuitable for resolving that 
dispute, the occasion may be transformed into a hearing for conciliation, pro-
vided that all of the involved parties agree to it (art. 13). 
In closing, without going into the specific questions of the Bill, it is im-
portant to stress the intent of making the provisions of the new CPC and CNJ 
Resolution No. 125 uniform and compatible, regulating the points that still 
lacked legal treatment. 
Early 2013 also saw the constitution of a commission chaired by Justice 
Luis Felipe Salomão, a member of the Higher Court of Justice, with the aim 
of presenting the preliminary bill for the New Law of Arbitration and Medi-
ation6.
This Bill was given number 405/13 and addresses only out-of-court face-
to-face and electronic mediation (on-line mediation). 
In the text, mediation is defined in art. 1, sole paragraph, as “the technical 
activity performed by an impartial third party, with no decision-making 
power, who, chosen or accepted by the interested parties, hears them and 
encourages them, without imposing resolutions, seeking to allow them to 
prevent or resolve disputes by consensual means”. 
Art. 2 states that any issue that admits a settlement may be the subject 
to mediation. However, agreements that involve inalienable rights must be 
addressed in judicial ratification, and if interests of incapable parties are in-
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Art. 15 determines that mediation is deemed to be instituted on the date 
in which the initial terms of mediation are signed, while art. 5 states that “the 
parties interested in submitting the solution of their dispute to mediation 
shall sign terms of mediation document, in writing, once the conflict has 
arisen, even if mediation was provided for in a contractual clause.” 
The final terms of mediation - signed by the parties, their attorneys and 
the mediator - constitutes an out-of-court title to execution, irrespective of 
the signature of witnesses (arts. 22 and 23); the parties may request judicial 
ratification of the final terms of mediation, so as to constitute an out-of-court 
title to execution. 
Lastly, art. 21 authorizes holding mediation via the internet or other form 
of remote communication. 
In May 2013, the Ministry of Justice, through the Secretariat of Judiciary 
Reform, in partnership with the National Council of Justice, set up a commis-
sion of specialists to submit a preliminary bill on judicial, out-of-court, public 
and on-line mediation7. 
In its art. 3, the text determines that any issue that addresses available 
rights or inalienable rights that are subject to a settlement may be the subject 
to mediation. If the agreements address inalienable rights, they will only be 
valid after consulting with the Public Prosecutors and going through judicial 
ratification. 
On the other hand, there will be no judicial mediation in cases of: a) fili-
ation, adoption, paternal power, and annulment of matrimony; b) restraint; 
c) judicial recovery and bankruptcy; and d) injunctive relief. This is, some-
how, a consequence of the system adopted by art. 26, “the initial petition will 
be distributed simultaneously to the court and the mediator, stopping the 
counting of the statute of limitations and lapse”.
As to out-of-court mediation, art. 19 determines that the parties interested 
in submitting their disputes to mediation are to sign initial terms of media-
tion, in writing, once the dispute has arisen, even if mediation was provided 
for in a contractual clause. Also, art 25 states that the final terms of media-
tion enjoy the nature of an out-of-court title to execution and, once ratified in 
court, they become a judicial title to enforcement, similar to a final judgment 
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With regard to public mediation, art. 33 authorizes the agencies of the 
direct and indirect Public Administration of the Federal Union, the States, 
Federal District and Municipalities, and also the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and Public Defender’s Department, to submit disputes to which they are par-
ties to public mediation. 
Thus, public mediation may take place in disputes involving: a) public en-
tities ; b) public entities and a private party; c) homogeneous individual, col-
lective or diffused rights. 
Lastly, on-line mediation, as set forth in art. 36, may be used as a means 
for resolution of conflicts in cases of sales of goods or provision of services 
via the internet, with the aim of resolving any domestic consumer disputes . 
In November 2013, public hearings were scheduled to discuss the three 
bills and go into the controversial issues that still surround the theme. The 
Reporter for the subject in the Senate, Senator Vital do Rego, presented a 
substitute for PLS 517/11, seeking to bring together what is best in the three 
initiatives. Then, two amendments were presented by Senator Pedro Taques 
and three by Senator Gim Agnello. The first amendment from Senator Taques 
was accepted in full, and the second, partially. The three amendments pre-
sented by Senator Agnello were rejected8. 
Thus, the final text that was approved and sent to the House of Represen-
tatives, where it was identified as Project of Law 7.169/14. In June 2014, Con-
gressman Sergio Zveiter presented a substitute for this Project with some ad-
justments, but maintaining the general idea idealized at the Senate`s version.
3. New Perspectives for Brazilian law
Even though this paper has concentrated on the procedural issues pertain-
ing to mediation, we hold the opinion that the best model is the one which 
urges the parties to seek a consensual resolution, making every effort before 
filing a lawsuit. A resolution extolling only a system of very well-equipped 
incidental mediation mechanisms after a lawsuit has already been initiated 
does not appear to be ideal, as the judicial machinery will already be in mo-
tion, when, in many cases, this could have been avoided9. 
8  http://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/materias/2013/12/11/projeto-que-discipli-
na-a-mediacao-judicial-e-extrajudicial-e-aprovado-pela-ccj.
9  PINHO, Humberto Dalla Bernardina de. PAUMGARTTEN, Michele Pedrosa. A ex-
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On the other hand, we do not agree with the idea of obligatory mediation 
or conciliation. The voluntary nature is the essence of such procedures. This 
feature can never be compromised, even with the argument that it is a form of 
educating the people and implementing a new form of public policy. 
However, we are forced to acknowledge that, in certain cases, mediation and 
conciliation must be regulatory stages of the procedure, to the extent that such 
tools prove to be the best suited to the outcome of that particular dispute.
Thinking of a prior and obligatory instance of conciliation, in cases in 
which only property issues are being discussed, or imposing sanctions for 
not accepting a reasonable settlement (such as payment of the costs of the 
proceeding or the attorneys’ fees, even if the party is successful, when that 
amount is exactly what was decided by the judge in the decision), may be 
valid solutions. They are examples from English law10 and U.S. law11, which 
deserve to be studied. 
But should never be applied in a mediation where there are profound emo-
tional issues - quite often unconscious - that require time, maturity and mu-
tual trust to be exposed and resolved12. 
However, we are obliged to acknowledge that it is necessary to seek a reso-
lution for cases in which mediation is the most suitable solution, yet rejected 
by the parties for no plausible reason. 
The Judiciary cannot be allowed to be used, abused or manipulated at the 
whim of litigants who quite simply want to fight or push the dispute to new 
frontiers. 
periência ítalo-brasileira no uso da mediação em resposta à crise do monopólio estatal 
de solução de conflitos e a garantia do acesso à justiça, in Revista Eletrônica de Direito 
Processual, volume 8, available at http://www.redp.com.br.
10  ANDREWS, Neil. The Three Paths of Justice. Cambridge: Springer, 2012, p. 197
11  As an example, we may mention Rule 68 of the F.R.C.P.: “Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 68. OFFER OF JUDGMENT. (a) MAKING AN OFFER; JUDGMENT ON 
AN ACCEPTED OFFER. At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending 
against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified 
terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing 
party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and 
notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment. (...)”. Text 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov, access on Sep. 12 2013.
12  PINHO, Humberto Dalla Bernardina de. PAUMGARTTEN, Michele Pedrosa. Os 
efeitos colaterais da crescente tendência à judicialização da mediação, in Revista Eletrôni-
ca de Direito Processual, volume 10, Jan-Jun. 2013.
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We reassert here our opinion that the parties should have the obligation to 
demonstrate to the Court that they have tried, in some way, to seek a consen-
sual resolution for the dispute. 
We support, as already stated13, expanding the procedural concept of in-
terest to act, welcoming the idea of adaptation, within the binomial need-use-
fulness, as a way to rationalize the measure of jurisdiction and avoid unneces-
sary resort to the Judiciary Branch, or even abuse of the right of action. 
This view may lead to a difficulty of harmony with the principle that ju-
risdiction may not be delegated; that the judge may not evade his function 
of judging, that is to say, if a citizen knocks at the door of the Judiciary, his 
access shall not be denied or hindered, pursuant to article 5, sub-item XXXV 
of the 1988 Constitution. 
What must be clarified is the fact that a party under jurisdiction requesting 
measures from the state does not mean that the Judiciary must, always and 
necessarily, offer a response of imposition, doing no more than applying the 
law to the case in point14.It may be that the judge understands that those par-
ties must be submitted to a conciliatory, pacifying stage, before any technical 
decision should be issued15. 
This is made very clear in the legislative bill for the new CPC, to the extent 
that art. 139 grants the judge a whole series of powers, especially with regard 
to steering the proceeding, expressly mentioning adaptation and mitigated 
flexibility as tools for attaining effectiveness. 
On this point, obviously the judge’s paramount concern will be with the 
actual pacification of that dispute, rather than with merely rendering a judg-
ment, as a form of technical-juridical answer at the urging of the party under 
jurisdiction. 
If the new CPC requires from the judge absolute fidelity to the Consti-
tutional Principles, converting him/her, beyond question, into an agent 
of preservation of the constitutional guarantees, on the other hand, it also 
grants him/her with instruments to acquire profound knowledge of the con-
13  PINHO, Humberto Dalla Bernardina de Pinho. A Mediação e a necessidade de sua 
sistematização no processo civil brasileiro, in REDP – YEAR 4 – 5th volume – January - 
June 2010, available at http://www.redp.com.br, p. 147.
14  MANCUSO, Rodolfo de Camargo. A resolução dos conflitos e a função judicial no 
Contemporâneo Estado de Direito. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2009.
15  PINHO, Humberto Dalla Bernardina de. Mediação: a redescoberta de um velho 
aliado na solução de conflitos, in: Acesso à Justiça: efetividade do processo (org. Geraldo 
Prado). Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2005, pp. 105/124.
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flict, encompassing its reasons, albeit-meta-legal, so to as to effect its paci-
fication. 
In this regard, it is necessary to establish a system balanced between judi-
cial and out-of-court mediation, so as to firmly guarantee access to justice and 
maintain a Judiciary that is agile, speedy and effective. Once a lawsuit has 
been filed, just as we have developed a system of filters for repetitive cases, we 
also have to think of a multi-door system that adapts to each type of dispute. 
Another point that strikes me as vital is the construction of a collabora-
tive network16, involving the entities of the Judiciary Branch and sectors of 
organized civil society possessing the structure necessary to offer this service 
under a regime of cooperation. I am referring to out-of-court registry offices, 
the public and private universities, professional associations, the Public De-
fenders and Prosecutors, and Public Advocacy. 
Thinking of judicial mediation alone will not resolve the problem of the 
overload of work that currently presses down on the judges’ shoulders. On 
the contrary, it will most likely cause a new “boom” of cases, just as happened 
with enactment of the CDC (Consumer Defense Code) in 1990 and institution 
of the Civil Special Courts, in 1995. 
Faced with this, we are obliged to recognize that, before enacting our fu-
ture law of mediation, we have to build this network and prepare it for the 
volume of cases to come, in order to avoid the risk of compromising this insti-
tution before it even comes into effect. 
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In the field of dispute resolution, mediators and scholars have invested a 
lot of time, efforts and ink in the discussion about the neutrality of mediators 
and arbitrators.
While neutrality may be an ideal to be pursued, it is an unattainable goal. 
There is no such a thing as a neutral human being. Neutrality would require 
mediators with no previous history, experience, ideas, and assumptions. 
On the other hand, impartiality may be a more reasonable and attainable 
goal. Impartiality, however, can only be achieved by mediators through the 
self-knowledge and awareness of the assumptions that inform their decisions 
and behavior. 
In order to achieve such impartiality, mediators must relentlessly pursue 
knowledge and awareness of lenses he/she uses when intervener in a dispute. 
The lenses through which each mediator or arbitrator see the dispute will 
determine his/her vantage points, and, therefore, will have significant impact 
on how the dispute and its resolution is managed. 
Different lenses will necessarily determine different approaches and per-
spectives. Consequently, understanding how different lenses will dictate dif-
ferent conflict management approaches and outcomes is critical for success-
ful mediations.
The objectives of this paper are to:
1. Compare the underlining assumptions and principles that inform two 
different theoretical lenses: Game Theory and Conflict Transformation The-
ory; and
2. Analyze how the use of different theoretical lenses impacts the media-
tors’ choices in the conduction of mediation.
Game Theory vs. Conflict Transformation Theory
In mediation, depending on which theoretical lenses is adopted by the me-
diator, the approach, choices, and likely results of the process will be signifi-
cantly different. 
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In order to preserve its impartiality and apply the right lenses to the right 
practical cases, a mediator must understand the assumptions that are condi-
tioning her/his actions. 
Comparing two different theoretical lenses is, in this scenario, a useful ex-
ercise to exemplify the practical impact of the adoption of different theoreti-
cal lenses to the same dispute. To this end, this paper focuses on the compar-
ison between Game Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory.
It could be argued that Game Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory 
represent two opposite and competing theoretical lenses in the field of dis-
pute resolution. As demonstrated in this paper, these different lenses imply in 
conflicting assumptions and value that impact and inform the way a dispute 
is seen, approached and managed.
Game Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory differ in the assump-
tions related to the conflict vision; the perceived reality; the perception of 
time; the notion of human nature; the human nature; the motivations and 
actions; the social interactions; the conflict outcomes; and the effective strat-
egy to manage disputes.
Conflict Visions
Game Theory adopts a problem-solving orientation. In Game theory, a 
conflict is a fixed problem that calls for a solution that can be found though 
the application of a one-size-fits-all dispute resolution process. Conflict reso-
lution is, therefore, content centered (Lederach, 2003).
Conflict Transformation Theory, on the other hand, takes the view that 
conflicts are normal and recurrent in human relations and an opportunity for 
change and improvement (Lederach, 2003). Conflicts are not a problem to be 
solved, by rather an elastic, changeable process (Tidwell, 2001).
A natural consequence of this world view is that, since conflicts are a nat-
ural consequence of social interactions, conflict resolution process is viewed 
as relationship centered (Lederach, 2003).
Perceived Reality
Game Theory perceives reality as fixed, objective and measurable. Reality 
is equally perceived by all the stakeholders involved in the conflict.
Conflict Transformation Theory, on the other hand, assumes that reality is 
socially constructed; always changing and subjective. Therefore, each of the 
stakeholders involved in the conflict will perceive it differently.
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Time Frame
In Game Theory, a conflict is linear and defined. According to these lenses, 
it is possible to determine with precision the beginning and the endpoint of a 
given conflict or dispute (Mitchel, 2002). 
A natural consequence of this worldview is that, in Game Theory, conflicts 
must be resolved within a measurable and defined timeframe in the shortest 
period of time (Lederach, 2003).
Conflict Transformation, however, adopts a non-linear vision of conflict. 
The conflict’s beginning and endpoint are not determined, precise or objec-
tive (Mitchel, 2002). Consequently, conflict transformation is a process with 
mid to long range time frame (Lederach, 2003), which often is open ended.
Human Nature
Game Theory follows the Hobbesian paradigm according to which the hu-
man being is naturally individualistic, rational and self-serving. Human be-
ings will analyze and decide on their course of actions exclusively based upon 
their individual and quantifiable interests.
In Game Theory, human beings will use language to precisely communi-
cate truth. Game Theory assumes that language is an efficient media to ex-
press truth about a fixed reality (Gergen, 2001).
Conflict Transformation assumes that relationships are important and, 
since reality is socially constructed, rationality will vary with cultural context 
in which the conflict is inserted. 
Human beings, according to Conflict Transformation Theory, have the ca-
pacity for both consciousness of the human experience; and for relating to 
the experience of others (Folger, 1994). Language, in this world view, creates 
context and shapes reality (Gergen, 2001).
Motivation/Actions
Since, as demonstrated above, human beings are rational, the parties in a con-
flict, according to Game Theory, will naturally calculate the payoffs of they every 
move and decide rationally on the basis of the expected payoff (Rigney, 2001).
Furthermore, since, according to Game Theory, human beings are individ-
ualistic, the parties in a conflict will, according to its theoretical lenses, aim at 
the maximization of their individual respective payoffs without any concern 
for the well-being of others. In other words, the decision making process is 
based on individualistic rational choices (Rigney, 2001).
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Conflict Theory uses different paradigms to assess the actions in motiva-
tions in a conflict. Its approach is based on two principles (Lederach, 2003): 
a positive orientation toward conflicts, according to which conflicts are not a 
problem, but rather may represent opportunities for growth and innovation; 
and the belief, that the parties may be willing to use the conflict to engage in 
an effort to produce constructive change and growth. 
Consequently, in Conflict Transformation Theory, the focus must always 
be on transforming relationships at the personal, relational; structural and 
cultural levels (Lederach, 2003).
Social Interactions
In Game Theory, parties will choose their own moves according to their 
expectations of the other party’s movies in the future. In this scenario, coop-
eration would only be possible when the payoffs for cooperating are larger 
than those of not cooperating (Rigney, 2001).
In Conflict Transformation Theory, the parties are naturally social beings 
whose identity, behavior and culture are shaped by society. Social coopera-
tion, therefore, is part of human nature. Consequently, the key to a satisfacto-
ry outcome for a conflict is the relationship between the parties.
Outcomes
In Game Theory, conflict resolution and settlement are synonymous. Con-
flicts are resolved through settlement with two possible outcomes (Rigney, 
2001): (i) win-win, in which the total payoff expands and parties enjoy part of 
the prosperity; and (ii) Zero-Sum, in which the gain of one party comes at the 
expense of the other party.
Conflict Transformation Theory could not be more different. According to 
this paradigm, the conflict resolution objective is the transformation of the 
relationships, interests, discourses and structures in order to establish a con-
structive conflict dynamics (Miall, 2003).
Effective Strategy
According to Game Theory, Tit-to -tat, is it the most effective strategy for 
dispute resolution. In the Tit-to –tat strategy, the party/player (i) cooperates 
in the first round and imitates the other players/behavior in the next rounds; 
will cooperate when the other party/player cooperates and punish the other 
party/player when there is no cooperation (Rigney, 2001).
CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES IN MEDIATION
275
In Conflict Transformation Theory, on the other hand, a successful strat-
egy contains other requirements (Mitchel, 2002): multi-level participation; 
empowerment of the disenfranchised; outcomes controlled by those involved 
in the conflict (self-determination); focus on traumas, hurts and sense of 
past injustices; interveners must understand cultural and social structures; 
co-creation of a new understanding of the conflict; creation of structures that 
maintain, deepen and continue positive changes; and mutual, inter-active ed-
ucation of the adversaries about the nature of the conflict.
The Differences between the models and their assumptions are summa-
rized in the table below:
Game Theory ConfliCT TransformaTion
Conflict Vision -Conflict is a fixed problem 
that must be solved (Prob-
lem solving orientation).
-Same conflict resolution 
processes apply in all cases 
and social settings.
-Conflict resolution is con-
tent centered (Lederach, 
2003)
-Conflicts are normal in human 
relations and an opportunity for 
change and improvement (Led-
erach, 2003).
-Conflicts are an elastic, change-
able process (Tidwell, 2001).
-Conflict resolution process is 
relationship centered (Lederach, 
2003).
Perceived Reality -Reality is fixed, objective 
and measurable.
-Reality is socially constructed; 
always changing and subjective-
Time Frame -Linear vision of the conflict 
with clearly defined begin-
ning and endpoint (Mitchel, 
2002).
-Conflicts must be resolved 
within a short term time 
frame (Lederach, 2003).
-Non-linear vision of conflict 
where beginning and endpoint 
are not determined (Mitchel, 
2002).
-Conflict transformation is a 
process with mid to long range 
time frame (Lederach, 2003).







-Language as a truth bearer 
(Gergen, 2001).
-Relationships are important.
-Rationality varies with cultural 
context.
-Human beings have both the 
capacity for consciousness of the 
human experience; and for relat-
ing to the experience of others 
(Folger, 1994).
-Language creates context and 
shapes reality (Gergen, 2001).
Motivation/Actions -Parties/Players accurately 
calculate their payoffs and 
rationally decide based on 
them (Rigney, 2001).
-Maximize payoffs through 
strategy and deception with-
out concern for the well-be-
ing of others (Rigney, 2001).
-Decision based on individ-
ualistic rational choices (Ri-
gney, 2001).
-Approach based on two princi-
ples (Lederach, 2003): Positive 
orientations toward the con-
flict; Willingness to engage in 
an effort to produce constructive 
change and growth.
-Focus on transforming relation-
ships at the personal, relation-
al; structural and cultural levels 
(Lederach, 2003).
Social Interactions -Social interaction involv-
ing strategic play: parties/
players will continuously 
choose their own moves ac-
cording to their expectation 
of the other parties/players´ 
moves in the future (Rigney, 
2001).
-Cooperation increases only 
when payoffs for cooperating 
are larger than those of not 
cooperating (Rigney, 2001).
-Humans are naturally social be-
ings and their identity, behavior 
and culture are shaped by soci-
ety.
-Social cooperation is part of hu-
man nature.
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Outcomes -Conflict is resolved by 
achieving a settlement: Win-
win: the total payoff expands 
and all parties/players en-
joy part of the prosperity; 
Zero-sum: the gains of one 
party/player come at the 
expense of the other players 
(Rigney, 2001).
-Objective is the transformation 
of the relationships, interests, 
discourses and structures in or-
der to establish a constructive 
conflict dynamics (Miall, 2003).
Effective Strategy -Tit-to -tat, where (Rigney, 
2001): The party/player co-
operates in the first round 
and imitates the other play-
ers/behavior in the next 
rounds; The party/player 
will always cooperate when 
the other party/player coop-
erates and punish the other 
party/player when there is 
no cooperation.
-Successful strategy must con-
tain (Mitchel, 2002): Multi-level 
participation; Empowerment of 
the disenfranchised; Outcomes 
controlled by those involved in 
the conflict (self-determination); 
Focus on traumas, hurts and 
sense of past injustices; Inter-
veners must understand cultural 
and social structures; Co-cre-
ation of a new understanding of 
the conflict; Creation of struc-
tures that maintain, deepen and 
continue positive changes; Mu-
tual, inter-active education of 
the adversaries about the nature 
of the conflict.
Practical Consequences of Theoretical Lenses
Ultimately, the success in mediation is defined by the mediator’s ability to 
work with the parties in order to resolve the dispute that brought them to the 
mediation table. In order to do so, the mediator will apply his/her expertise 
to each case.
Although the dispute resolution techniques and theoretical orientation 
typically claim to be effective in all disputes, it seems to be a fact of life that, in 
dispute resolution, once size does not fit all. The choice of the right approach 
is, therefore, critical to mediation’s success.
Definition of Conflict: Problem Solving vs. Relationship Building
A mediator adopting Game Theory approach will necessarily believe that 
the dispute before him/her is a finite problem, objective problem with de-
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fined beginning and ending points. According to this worldview, the best path 
to resolve a conflict is to focus on the content and substance of the dispute. 
A mediator adopting Conflict Transformation Theory would, in contrast, 
see the conflict as a natural result of human interactions. Conflicts are not a 
problem to be resolved, but rather an elastic process that has no clear begin-
ning or ending point. Therefore, according to this worldview, the best path to 
resolve a conflict is to focus the mediation on relationships and context.
Two practical consequences follow from these differences. The first conse-
quence is that the use of Game Theory will be more effective when applied to 
cases that are low in conflict and objective in nature. Conflict Transformation 
Theory, on the other hand, will be more effective when values, identity, cul-
ture and emotions are important factors in the dispute.
The second consequence is that mediators using Game Theory will most 
likely believe that all aspects of the dispute can be resolved during the medi-
ation sessions, whereas mediators using Conflict Transformation will have a 
more open ended approach to the dispute. Such differences will significantly 
impact the mediation dynamics and time management.
Dispute Resolution Process: Rationalize Emotions vs. Include Emotions
A Game Theory paradigm will prompt the mediator to attempt to ratio-
nalize every step of the process. His/her actions will be underlined by the 
belief that the parties are rational and, therefore, resolving a dispute is just 
a matter of finding a solution that maximizes each party’s objective payoff. 
Consequently, emotions are obstacle to reaching resolution and, therefore, 
should be rationalized in order to make settlements possible.
Conflict Transformation Theory paradigm, on the other hand, will prompt 
the mediator to believe that emotions not only are an integral and natural 
part of the process, but also that they should be incorporated in every step of 
the dispute resolution. Rather than being an obstacle, emotions may be an 
important tool in mediation.
Consequently, given these differences, mediators using Game Theory will 
adopt processes that define the dispute in narrow terms and will address it 
using rational and objective approaches; whereas mediators using Conflict 
Transformation will address dispute in broader terms and assume that a con-
flict will be transformed into a more productive form of human interaction 
that can improve the parties’ relationships.
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Outcome: Settlement vs. Transformation
Different theoretical orientations necessarily lead to different ideas on the 
successful outcome of mediation. Consequently, Game Theory and Conflict 
Transformation Theory have different standards for mediation success.
A mediator adopting a Game Theory paradigm will equate success with 
the achievement of a settlement. It is a natural consequence of Game Theo-
ry’s problem solving orientation. If conflict is a problem to be resolved with 
a clear beginning and ending points, the settlement is the evidence that the 
conflict has been resolved.
The use of Conflict Transformation Theory lenses, on the other hand, will 
define success using different standards. According to this worldview, conflict 
is not a problem and, therefore, does not call for resolution. The relationships, 
interests and structures should not be transformed in order to eliminate con-
flict, but rather to make conflict a more productive form of constructive inter-
action that creates opportunities for the parties’ growth.
Conclusions
As demonstrated above, different theoretical orientations have a decisive 
impact on the way the conflict is approached, defined and addressed by the 
mediator. Overall, it is the features of each dispute that will determine the 
best and/or most effective theoretical approach.
It is incumbent upon the mediator to choose the right approach for each 
conflict and conduct the mediation with impartiality. In order to do so, a me-
diator must both know his/her theoretical assumptions when addressing a 
conflict and, at the same time; and be able to identify the best theoretical 
lenses to be used in each case.
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DEVELOPMENT AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH EUROPE
JUSTICE SYSTEMS TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Helena Soleto1
It is not clear where to situate the start of Restorative Justice; Restorative 
Justice is said to have been born through social and legal trends in Northern 
European countries, and, above all, in Canada and the United States: initia-
tives in Ontario in the seventies, academic constructions or social develop-
ments with roots in ancient legal cultures or native justice produced this way 
of delivering Justice.
Mediation and Restorative Justice currents have had limited efficacy in 
Southern European countries, and namely in Spain; over the last years, the 
European contribution has been crucial to their development.
This paper focuses on the origins and models of Restorative Justice (here-
inafter: RJ), the European contributions in developing RJ, the factors that 
hinder assimilation of RJ in civil law systems, as well as the principles which 
I view as fundamental in a RJ framework.
1. Genesis and models of Restorative Justice
1.1. Factors of change in traditional Criminal Justice triggering the genesis 
of Restorative Justice
We can summarize five factors which have been calling for change, 
throughout the 20th century, in different levels of the traditional occidental 
Criminal Justice systems; these factors have allowed for the bloom of RJ ele-
ments in various countries:
a) Retributive currents 
b) Social empowerment currents
c) Inefficiency and quest for satisfaction with the Administration of Justice
d) Reinsertion aims
e) Importance of the victim
1  Prof. Helena Soleto, PhD, University Carlos III Madrid, Instituto Alonso Martínez, 
Director of the Court Connected Mediation Program, Getafe and Leganes, Madrid. orcid.
org/0000-0001-8283-7354
Translation from Spanish by Maria Orfanou Mediator PhD Candidate University Car-





The beginnings of RJ amount to currents initiated in the 60’s in the United 
States; on one hand, the traditional judicial system was proving insufficient 
to economically repair the harm done to the victims, and, on the other hand, 
society claimed participation in matters such as criminal justice, traditionally 
delegated to the State.
It is important to mention that participation of victims in the anglosaxon 
system is less intense in procedural terms (as it is known, participation of the 
private accuser is an exceptional characteristic of the Spanish system in terms 
of comparative law); however, in practice there is a higher interest for the vic-
tim, probably so because of the vindicative aim this is imbued with.
In the US system, the initially dominant interest for the victim with a re-
tributive aim wound down in mid-nineteenth century; from the 70’s on, in the 
twentieth century, the concept of restitution2 was recovered, and it was made 
absolutely relevant after the presidential report on this matter, President’s 
Task Force Final Report, 1982. Before this report, the necessary restitution 
to the victim as part of the conviction was regulated in no more than 8 States. 
From this initiative on, multiple policy changes took place in federal and na-
tional level, gathering together rights of the victim.
b) Social empowerment currents
During the 60’s, as well, new ways to understand coexistence and living in 
a society were developed in the United States. They resulted in initiatives that 
promoted empowerment of the society and the development of programs al-
lowing citizens to participate in the Administration of Justice. 
These programs are based on the belief that the parties in conflict must 
actively participate in its resolution and mitigate its negative consequences. 
They are also based, in some cases, on the will to return to local decision-
making and community development. Such approaches are also seen as a 
means to encourage the peaceful expression of conflicts, to promote tolerance 
and integration, to encourage respect for diversity and to promote respon-
sible community practices.
Thus, different forms of RJ have been developed, ones that offer commu-
nities new means of conflict resolution3. In many countries, the idea of par-
2  TOBOLOWSKY et allii, Crime victim rights and remedies, North Carolina, USA, 
2010, pp. 153 et seq.
3  Vid. paragraph 1.3.
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ticipation of the community is a commonly accepted idea; it seems that RJ 
practices can help strengthen the capacity of the existing system of justice, 
especially so when society includes components which are culturally condi-
tioned in very different ways, affecting their vision of justice and their partici-
pation therein. This may be the case in New Zealand, where the use of circles 
has constituted a significant progress.
Finding a way to effectively mobilize participation in the civil society, while 
at the same time assuring protection for the rights and interests of victims 
and criminals is a fundamental challenge for participatory justice.
c) Inefficiency and quest for satisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice
In many countries, insatisfaction and frustration with the official system 
of justice have led to a demand for alternative responses to delinquency and 
social unrest.
The main reason for the insatisfaction is that societies have viewed the 
courts as the only way of resolving every conflict, and not all conflicts are 
identical. Every conflict has its own characteristics, specialties, context, rea-
sons, parties, emotions and background. For this reason, when it comes to 
resolving a conflict, perhaps one should start with studying these factors, in 
order to decide on the best way for resolution, and not send it directly to the 
court to be resolved by the Judge.
In the so-called – famous indeed – Pound conference, “1976 National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice”, Professor Sander indicated that the use of the most adequate 
resolution means for each conflict should be enabled; the concept of “multi-
door courthouse” emerged thereof, each door of which would be a means of 
resolution, such as litigation, mediation, arbitration, expert evaluation, etc4.
Thus, there emerged, on one hand initiatives promoting reparation and, 
on the other hand, initiatives promoting conflict resolution from within the 
community. Reparation panels would be an example of reparation initiatives. 
In relation to community activity, the work of community justice centers 
supported by the follow-up workgroup of the Pound conference is still and al-
4  Vid. SANDER, “Varieties of dispute processing” (address before the National Con-
ference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice – 
Pound Conference, Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R,D. 79, 1976, pp. 111 et seq.
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ways relevant5. These centres, which would treat conflicts between neighbors, 
family members or even civil law conflicts, or minor criminal law conflicts, 
would be community centres created by social initiative, called “community 
centers” or “community boards”. Currently, a big part of the mediatory activ-
ity originates in referral of cases by the courts.
d) Reinsertion aims
Many mediation and RJ programs are largely justified on the basis of the 
idea that the mediation process has to favor reeducation of the offender, espe-
cially when it comes to a juvenile one, and for this reason recidivism therein 
should be smaller compared to cases in which there is no mediation.
On the basis of several research studies from the United States6 and the Unit-
ed Kingdom it has been observed that juvenile offenders who have participated 
in a mediation program are less likely to recidivate, and that the mediatory for-
mulas with joint participation of victim and offender lead to a better result7.
Studies on recidivism should probably be broadened and elaborated more 
in depth, since there may exist other factors which influence varying recidi-
vism rates – such as selection of cases to be mediated, considering that, in 
general, mediation is only carried out when the offender seems capable of 
emotionally taking on the damage done, among other things. 
According to the UN Handbook on Restorative Justice, RJ programs may 
offer to offenders the opportunity to:
- Assume responsibility for the offense and understand its impact on the 
victim; 
- Express emotions, and even regret, with respect to the offense;
- Receive support in order to repair the damage caused to the victim or to 
oneself and to the family;
- Correct attitudes, provide restitution or reparation;
- Showing repentance to victims (“apologize” as indicated in the original 
text, which in Spanish could be translated as “pedir perdón”, although this 
does not mean actually expecting an apology from the victim);
5  IZUMI, The use of ADR in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases, in ADR for 
judges, Washington, USA, 2004, pp. 202 et seq.
6  SCHNEIDER, “Restitution and recidivism rates of juvenile offenders: results from 
four experimental studies”, Criminology, vol. 24, nº 3, 1986, pp. 553 et seq.
7  UMBREIT, COATES and VOS; Victim offender mediation, in Handbook of dispute 
resolution, BORDONE (coord.), pp. 455 et seq.
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- Restoring relationship with the victim, when deemed appropriate;
- Reaching closure.
e) Importance of the victim
General criminal theory and the subsequent structures of Justice are fo-
cused on the breach of law, paying little or no attention to issues concerning 
the victims further than and beyond their procedural situation, such as their 
emotional or economic needs.
In his work Conflicts as property, in 1977, Nil Christie was defending the 
need to include the victim in the delivery of Justice: “criminology to some 
extent has amplified a process where conflicts have been taken away from 
the parties directly involved and thereby have either disappeared or become 
other people’s property”8.
In most criminal law systems, the victim is entitled to claim financial repa-
ration, and is often allowed to participate in the process, without, however, 
being offered precisely the key role that would be necessary, emotionally 
speaking.
In countries such as the United States, the victim has various rights9, such 
as to be notified on processes and their results, to be present in the process, to 
be heard in relation to presentation or withdrawal of an accusation, as well as 
in relation to plea bargaining, the judgment and suspension of the proceed-
ings. In addition to these procedural rights, systems pointing to an economic 
restitution of the victim have been spreading since the presidential report in 
the 80s.
In western systems, rights of information, participation and protection of 
the victim have been spreading. In the European Union, the 2001 Frame-
work Decision, which we will be mentioning below, established the standing 
of the victim in criminal proceedings, and the Directive of October 2012 has 
come to consolidate and strengthen such standing.
The 21st century implies, in terms of Criminal Justice, an effort to approach 
administration of justice through a new lens: the victim’s one. As we said, 20th 
century justice achieves the highly needed guarantee for the rights of the ac-
cused, whose fundamental freedoms may be found diminished through due 
8  CHRISTIE, Conflicts as property, The British Journal of Criminology, vol. 17, n.1, 
1977, p. 1 et seq.




process. In the 20th century, in the more developped countries the situation 
is evolving towards obtaining justice of a higher quality, which shall also take 
into account the situation of the victim.
The increasing appearance of texts on the status of the victim internation-
ally – either in general or for certain unlawful acts that are especially signifi-
cant to society nowadays, such as terrorism, violence again women or chil-
dren or vulnerable groups – constitutes an expression of this new approach.
Thus, the United Nations has developed rules and basic texts concerning 
the victim in general, as well as concerning victims of terrorist attacks, wom-
en as victims, children as victims and, more generally, vulnerable groups as 
victims.
The Council of Europe has developed rules such as the European Conven-
tion on the Compensation of Victims of violent crimes, the Council of Europe 
Conventions on prevention of terrorism, on action against human traffick-
ing, on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse, and the 2006 Recommendation on assistance to crime victims, the 
2002 Recommendation on the protection of women against violence, the 
Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers in March 2005; through the European Committee 
on legal co-operation, it works on the assimilation of rules by Member states.
The European Union has also shifted its focus on victims in the last de-
cade, developing the Green paper on compensation of crime victims and the 
corresponding 2004 Directive, and, in terms of participation in the process, 
the 2001 framework Decision, replaced by a wider Directive treating the 
same matter, in October 2012.
Restorative justice offers benefits to the victims, such as, according to the 
UN Handbook on Restorative Justice, the possibility to:
- Directly participate in resolving the situation and establishing the conse-
quences of the offense;
- Receive answers to their questions on the crime and the offender;
- Express oneself with respect to the impact caused to them by the offense;
- Receive restitution or reparation;
- Receive an apology;
- Restore, when deemed appropriate, a relationship with the offender;
- Reach closure.
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1.2. Restorative justice models depending on the relationship with the 
Courts
Regarding the conceptualisations of RJ, it is interesting the Johnstone and 
Van Ness approach,who argue that RJ is mainly used in three different ways10:
- Encounter conception, where the parties met to discuss the crime, its 
consequences and the restoration
- Reparative conception, where the main issue is the restoration of the 
crime with RJ
- Transformative conception, wich focuses on the structural injustice
More specifically, and depending on the relationship between the Crimi-
nal justice system and the RJ instruments developed in a State, we may dis-
tinguish three kinds of systems11:
a) Systems complementary to Courts
b) Systems alternative to prosecution 
c) Initiatives outside the sphere of the Justice system 
a) Systems complementary to Courts
Systems hereby classified as “complementary” to Courts correspond to the 
more traditional criminal justice systems, which choose to bind RJ systems to 
the Courts. They are marked as Court-connected programs, and they may or 
may not belong to the system of administration of justice.
In these systems, development of a RJ process concluding with a repara-
tion agreement may bring procedural benefits to the accused or defendant; 
these will usually consist in a different classification of the crime or a reduc-
tion of the proposed penalty taking into account an extenuating circumstance, 
or, after the judgement, the suspension or replacement12 of the penalty, and 
even prison-related benefits.
The time of referral to mediation by the judicial authority may greatly vary 
10  JOHNSTONE, G. and VAN NESS, D. (2007). The meaning of restorative justice. 
In G. Johnstone and D. Van Ness (Eds.), The Handbook of Restorative Justice (pp. 5-23). 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing, cit. By ZINSSTAG, TEUKENS and PALI, Conferencing: a 
way forward for Restorative Justice in Europe, European Forum of Restorative Justice, 
2011, p. 32
11  Vid. Author, Sobre la mediación penal, Aranzadi, 2012.
12  See the contribution of PERULERO, “Hacia un modelo de Justicia restaurativa: la 
mediación penal”, in Sobre la mediación penal, Garciandía y Soleto (dirs.), 2012.
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for each program, the general idea being that the earlier the cases are re-
ferred, the better.
In anglosaxon countries where RJ is highly developed, referral may take 
place at different moments, depending on programs: before the accusation, 
after the accusation but before conviction, subsequently to conviction but be-
fore a judgment containing the penalty, subsequently to the judgment and 
before reintegration into society, and after incarceration and before reinte-
gration into society. Depending on the time of referral, the body conducting 
it will vary: the police, the Prosecution, the Court, the prison authorities…13
b) Systems alternative to prosecution
There exist programs which, in terms of Criminal Justice, represent a real 
alternative to prosecution, thus being structured as a true alternative dispute 
resolution form.
In such a structure, certain crimes or crimes committed by people of cer-
tain characteristics (age, ethnicity…) may be treated through RJ processes, 
without entering the Criminal justice system.
In these cases, an authentic referral of cases takes place even before they 
could be judicially processed; they are mostly organized in countries with an 
anglosaxon culture. Continental States view this RJ pattern reluctantly be-
cause of their strong and traditional criminal justice systems, which belong 
to the State.
In the United States and Northern European countries this kind of pro-
grams are developed in some judicial districts with minors, or in cases of 
shoplifting. Most of them are run by the police or by public entities, and ex-
clude recidivism.
In the case of Spain, mediation carried out in programs for minors could 
be said to be an alternative system when it takes place at an early moment and 
the case is closed, although we understand this system to be mainly comple-
mentary rather than alternative.
c) Initiatives outside the sphere of the Justice system
There is an increasing appearance of RJ initiatives with no relevance to 
the proceedings and to enforcement, the uppermost purpose of which is emo-
tional restoration.
I am referring to RJ activities that can be carried out subsequently to con-
13  Vid. Handbook of Restorative Justice, UN.
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viction, and that may or may not be relevant to the administrative status of 
the prisoner, such as, for example, the restorative process between an offend-
er and a victim’s family member in order to apologize for the damage caused.
Restorative processes between people who do not wish criminal proceed-
ings to be initiated by the system of justice could also be included here; this 
may be the case of conflict between parents and children, the latter being the 
offenders.
Lastly, restorative processes with no procedural relevance, but which bring 
about an emotional restoration, would also be included here.
1.3. Restorative justice processes
We gather here a description of different restorative processes, the use of 
which is spreading in recent years14.
The most usual mediatory style RJ processes in the field of criminal law – 
meaning that a neutral interacts with the offender and other people, who may 
be the direct victim of the offense or other people from within the community, 
using facilitation techniques – vary, depending on the participants, the action 
plan and the aim.
a. VOM: victim-offender mediation 
Victim-offender mediation is the most widespread RJ instrument. Obvi-
ously, participants include the offender, the victim and the mediator, and, 
unlike civil mediation, dialogue here is more important than agreement; the 
aim is to empower the victim, allowing for accountability of the offender and 
reparation of the damage caused15.
The rationale for these programs is based on the restitution of the victim 
and rehabilitation of the offender. Furthermore, as IZUMI notes, most vic-
tims support restitution as an alternative to incarceration in property crimes, 
where rates of satisfaction for victims and offenders are very high16. This is 
the most widespread restorative process in Spain and the European Union 
countries, as well.
14  Ibidem.
15  IZUMI, “The use of ADR in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases”, in ADR for 
Judges, pp. 195 et seq.
16  Ibidem, p. 197.
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b. Family group conference
Family group conference or community conference is a mediatory style 
form of facilitation which includes participation of people from the family, 
school and social background, in addition to the offender and the victim. The 
process consists in a facilitation in which people engage in conversations 
about the damage and about ways for achieving reparation.
These conferences can take place in community centers, schools, and even 
in police or child protection centres, or referral from the Court, and they can 
have no procedural relevance, i.e. the matter does not enter the justice system 
and the courts are not involved17. This model comes from New Zealand and is 
used in the United States, especially in cases involving minors in foster care 
and in general as a way of preparing hearings with the judge in the non-crim-
inal field, but also in minor criminal matters such as shoplifting. ZINSSTAG, 
TEUKENS and PALI, refere to the use of Conferencing in USA and Western 
Europe for dealing with almost all offences, with the exception of murder18.
c. Circle sentencing
Circle sentencing is similar to a group conference, but it involves partic-
ipation of the judicial authority; the court forwards cases, and it monitors 
cases and compliance with the rules.
Participants may belong, as in the case of group conferences, to the social 
background of the victim and the offender; consensus is sought in order to 
understand what happened and how to achieve reparation.
It is even possible that the judge participates in the circle, but this partici-
pation does not, in principle, confer a key role or a facilitator one. The judge’s 
activity focuses on embodying the agreed plan in the judgment, although par-
ticipation may be more active when consensus is not achieved.
This model is used in some programs in the United States for unlawful 
acts committed by minors, but also adults, and is used for all types of crime, 
even against life and sexual integrity in Canada19, and ZINSSTAG, TEUKENS 
y PALI describe a similar situation in other countries20.
17  Ibidem.
18  ZINSSTAG, TEUKENS and PALI, Conferencing: a way forward for Restorative 
Justice in Europe, European Forum of Restorative Justice,  2011, p. 49.
19  Vid. IZUMI, “The use of ADR…”, cit., p. 200,
20  Vid. ZINSSTAG, TEUKENS and PALI, “Conferencing…”, cit., pp. 82 et seq.
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d. Restorative justice panels
These panels are the community response to the failure of the public sys-
tem to bring about reparation in the framework of the proceedings.
In the United States, these panels or groups are structured differently, although 
in general the victim is not included in their meetings with the offender, and the 
offender plays a minor role. This is considered the least restorative of processes.
Generally, once the offender admits guilt in criminal proceedings, the 
judge offers them access to the restorative panel, which, after meeting with 
them, discusses reparation with the victim. The panel is set up with participa-
tion of citizens.
This form of complementing the justice system has been rated as the least 
restorative, as it is focused on reparation, and the participation of victim and 
offender is limited, although depending on how it is carried out several re-
storative purposes may be reached. It is a form of organization similar to con-
ditional release panels.
The panel has broad discretion in establishing reparation, which may be 
economic, but which usually combines restitution with measures such as 
community work, letters to the victim or apologizing.
Typically, follow-up meetings are held after about 3 months in order to 
monitor compliance with the measures. Have they been met, the panel con-
gratulates the offender; otherwise, the case is forwarded to the judge to deter-
mine the sentence, which may include imprisonment21.
e. Community mediation
We have already referred to the emergence of alternative dispute resolu-
tion and RJ forms since the 70s, and the convergence of reparative require-
ments and social empowerment of the 60s.
Thus, community centers working in neighborhoods and schools were cre-
ated, providing training in conflict resolution to students, teachers and vol-
unteers. The San Francisco Community boards stand out among community 
centers.
The follow-up workgroup of the Pound conference recommended that 
community centers be developed to allow a variety of methods for processing 
conflict and interacting with the courts of justice22. 
21  Vid. IZUMI, “The use of ADR…”, cit., pp. 200 et seq.
22  TAMM and REARDON, “Warren E. Burger and the Administration of Justice”, 
Brigham Young University Law Review, 1981, p. 513.
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There is an estimated 500 community mediation centers in the United 
States, which are funded by Federal Government grants, contracts with the 
government (for example, in order to facilitate matters concerning foster 
children, such as the Concord Center in Nebraska), with the courts, or di-
rectly with mediation users, as well as by donations.
Community centers conduct mediations and facilitations in non court-
connected school and neighborhood areas, but also civil and criminal law 
mediations and facilitations forwarded by the court23.
2. European contributions to the development of Restorative Justice
I believe that we can find three major types of “contributions” of Europe 
to Restorative Justice:
- Firstly, a legal and practical impetus from the EU and the Council of 
Europe;
- Secondly, the comparative experiences drawn from other countries;
- Thirdly, and lastly, the influence of strong activist NGOs, the European 
Forum for Restorative Justice and the European Association of Judges for 
Mediation (GEMME). 
2.1. Legal and practical impetus by the Council of Europe and the EU 
Among regional regulation, Recommendation 99 (19) of the Council of 
Europe on mediation in penal matters and a subsequent study and support 
work on behalf of the CEPEJ have produced one of the pillars which actively 
sustain RJ through mediation, and which is explained and detailed in the EU 
regulation.
Restorative Justice is also a funding aim of the European Commission in 
the field of the Directorate Justice, which has, for this reason, funded numer-
ous actions linked to mediation or RJ, as a policy in the last 10 years.
Initiatives in a European Union level are especially relevant, in addition to 
texts promoted by the United Nations, which are probably a result of broader 
international experiences, such as those of the United States and New Zea-
land and Australia, all of which offer a wider and more flexible approach.
23  The State of Community Mediation-2011 reports an association of more than 400 
US Based programs. National Association for Community Mediation. Nafcm.org. Vid. also 
IZUMI, “The use of ADR…”, cit., p. 203. 
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Among the UN texts, Resolution 2002/12 of 24 July 2002, 37th plenary 
meeting, entitled “Basic principles on the use of Restorative Justice pro-
grammes in criminal matters”, is a result of previous resolutions and the Vi-
enna Declaration. In this Resolution, the basic concepts of RJ are described 
in a very accurate and flexible way, and principles of use are listed in the 
same way, establishing guidelines which allow for deviation from the general 
criteria when deemed appropriate, safeguarding, in any case, the rights estab-
lished by national regulation relating to the victim and the offender.
2.1.1. Recommendations of the Council of Europe and the work of CEPEJ
As Perulero indicates, various Recommendations of the Council of Europe 
urge States to introduce specific reparation measures and even to develop 
victim-offender mediation systems.24
Since the 80s, the Council of Europe has been issuing Recommendations 
insisting on the relevance of the victim in criminal proceedings, such as nº R 
(85) 11, R (87) 18 , R (87) 21, R (87) 20, R (889 6, R (929 16, R (95) 12, R (98) 
1, and, more recently, R (2006) 8, which replaces R (87) 21, but it is in Recom-
mendation nº R (99) 19 of 15 September 1999 of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, on mediation in penal matters, where an effort has 
been made to give impetus to mediation in this field among Member states.
The Recommendation promotes development of penal mediation by Mem-
ber states on the basis of the principles listed in the Annex to the Recommen-
dation, which includes 34 guides or principles that could serve as a guide to 
the States with various aims; general principles of mediation, ethical duties of 
mediators, safeguards for protection of the victim, quality of the mediation…
The Council of Europe, through CEPEJ, the European Commission on the 
Efficiency of Justice, has carried out a significant follow-up of the level of 
implementation of the Recommendation (99) 19, and as a result of this sev-
eral documents have been published; among these, it is worth mentioning 
the Analysis on assessment of the impact of Council of Europe recommenda-
tions concerning mediation and the Guidelines for a better implementation 
of the existing recommendation concerning mediation in penal matters.
The content of the report on the impact of the Recommendations on media-
tion, CEPEJ (2007) 12, is very negative: most States do not fill in questionnaires, 
24  PERULERO, “Hacia un modelo de Justicia restaurativa: Mediación penal”, and 
also ROMERA, “Principios y modelo de mediación en el ámbito penal” in Sobre la media-
ción penal, Garciandía y Soleto (dirs.), 2012.
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and information is very limited. The limited impact of the Recommendation, as 
well as the general situation of mistrust and lack of information of citizens, users 
of justice and, above all, of the judges, are highlighted as a basic conclusion in 
regard with the Recommendation concerning mediation on penal matters.
The Guidelines for a better implementation of the existing recommenda-
tion concerning mediation in penal matters, CEPEJ (2007) 13, establish cri-
teria concerning three concepts: availability, accessibility and awareness.
Relating to availability, support of States for mediation projects is ad-
dressed, as well as the role of judges and prosecutors, and also of other au-
thorities and NGOs, of lawyers, whose codes of conduct must include a duty 
or recommendation to suggest mediation to their clients, the quality of me-
diation systems, and mediator qualification, among other issues.
Concerning accessibility, it is noted that mediation should not be used if 
there is a risk that a disadvantage is caused for either party, among other 
things, such as the cost of mediation which should be for free.
Lastly, concerning mediation awareness, CEPEJ indicates that there is a 
need to extend awareness of mediation for the general public, for victims and 
offenders, the police, the judges and prosecutors, lawyers and social workers.
In the year 2012, a Report on the Quality of Justice (with data from 2010) 
was published, including a chapter on mediation, and where one can see the 
inadequacy of data (for example, there is no data on Spain and Germany), 
and small impact of penal mediation in terms of numbers. Only Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Poland offer figures, but obviously the reality is very differ-
ent, as other countries have also developed a state of mediation.
2.1.2. Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 25 October 2012
Concerning the European Union, since 2001 we have relevant rules which 
mention victim-offender mediation, in the Council framework decision of 15 
March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/
JAI), namely in article 10: 
“Penal mediation in the course of criminal proceedings
1. Each Member State shall seek to promote mediation in criminal cases for of-
fences which it considers appropriate for this sort of measure.
2. Each Member State shall ensure that any agreement between the victim and 
the offender reached in the course of such mediation in criminal cases can be taken 
into account.”
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These rules, very brief, have recently been replaced by the Directive 
2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection 
of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/
JAI.
Article 12 of the 2012 Directive25:
“Right to safeguards in the context of restorative justice services 
1. Member States shall take measures to safeguard the victim from secondary and 
repeat victimization, from intimidation and from retaliation, to be applied when pro-
viding any restorative justice services. Such measures shall ensure that victims who 
choose to participate in restorative justice processes have access to safe and compe-
tent restorative justice services, subject to at least the following conditions: 
(a) the restorative justice services are used only if they are in the interest of the 
victim, subject to any safety considerations, and are based on the victim’s free and 
informed consent, which may be withdrawn at any time; 
(b) before agreeing to participate in the restorative justice process, the victim is 
provided with full and unbiased information about that process and the potential 
outcomes as well as information about the procedures for supervising the implemen-
tation of any agreement; 
(c) the offender has acknowledged the basic facts of the case; 
25  Draft Directive. Art. 11. 1. Member States shall establish standards to safeguard 
the victim from intimidation or further victimization, to be applied when providing me-
diation or other restorative justice services. Such standards should as a minimum in-
clude the following:
a) mediation or restorative justice services are used only if they are in the interest of 
the victim, and based on free and informed consent; this consent may be withdrawn at 
any time;
b) before agreeing to participate in the process, the victim is provided with full and 
unbiased information about the process and the potential outcomes as well as informa-
tion about the procedures for supervising the implementation of any agreement;
c) the suspected or accused person or offender must have accepted responsibility for 
their act;
d) any agreement should be arrived at voluntarily and should be taken into account 
in any further criminal proceedings;
e) discussions in mediation or other restorative justice processes that are not conduct-
ed in public are confidential and are not subsequently disclosed, except with the agree-
ment of the parties or as required by national law due to an overriding public interest.
2. Member States shall facilitate the referral of cases to mediation or other restor-




(d) any agreement is arrived at voluntarily and may be taken into account in any 
further criminal proceedings; 
(e) discussions in restorative justice processes that are not conducted in public 
are confidential and are not subsequently disclosed, except with the agreement of the 
parties or as required by national law due to an overriding public interest. 
2. Member States shall facilitate the referral of cases, as appropriate to restor-
ative justice services, including through the establishment of procedures or guidelines 
on the conditions for such referral.”
The phrasing of the draft Directive was not favorably received by RJ prac-
titioners and scholars26, precisely because of obstructing the development of 
Restorative Justice, because of introducing some distorting elements and be-
cause of figuring an underlying mistrust of the institution.
After arduous preparation, the final phrasing of the Directive has improved 
but there is still some criticism to be made, since it seems Restorative Justice 
is excluded in cases where the victim is not willing to participate.
RestoRative justice veRsus penal mediation
In much the same way as the 2001 Framework decision, the 2011 draft 
Directive expressly referred to mediation in the title of its article 11 “Right to 
safeguards in the context of mediation and other restorative justice servic-
es”; in the final phrasing, this reference was removed, replaced by a more gen-
eral reference to Restorative Justice, whereby article 12 provides for “Right to 
safeguards in the context of restorative justice services”.
Several changes have been made in the same regard, in order to refer to 
RJ in general, such as in paragraph 2 of the abovementioned article, which 
affirms the idea that working on RJ implies a broader and better established 
field compared to mediation.
measuRes veRsus standaRds
The wording of the Directive improves the phrasing of the draft, since it 
no longer provides, in paragraph 1, for standards, as previously indicated by 
the draft, but rather for measures, safeguarding the situation of the victim, on 
one hand, and highlighting the importance of the quality of reparative justice 
services, on the other hand.
Possibly, the new approach – probably a more advanced one – brought 
26  Vid. in this regard the views expressed by the European Forum for Restorative 
Justice in www.euroforumrj.org
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about by the 2012 Directive in relation to the 2001 one, could be due to that 
the 2001 decision can be said to be outdated, and that States do not need 
mediation to be promoted by European rules, and also that legislation in the 
second decade of the century should aim to specify procedural aspects of me-
diation.
However, the reality does not currently support such an argument, since, 
on one hand, penal mediation has only been consolidated in some countries, 
and, on the other hand, a detailed regulation of mediation could be an ob-
stacle for its development.
Going into too much detail in a framework text such as a Directive in rela-
tion to something as flexible as mediation or RJ ought to be is not the most 
adequate thing to do, since each State, and even, each Court or judicial dis-
trict shall specifically develop the legal, ethical and practical environment of 
the mediation. The details relating to the mediation process are to adapt to 
all structural needs and to offer flexibility for a possible readjustment to the 
circumstances.
Replacing the terms “establish standards” by “take measures” during pro-
cessing of the Directive is not a trivial issue. The previous wording meant a 
necessary regulating activity on behalf of States, and this is contrary to the 
spirit and aim of RJ, which does not have to be limited by rules, since it needs 
to be able to adapt to the needs of each field, each case and each moment. In 
general, in countries which have more and better experience in RJ, regula-
tion through rules is very rare, while in least advanced countries if regulation 
exists it is wider; for this reason, the final wording of the Directive is a huge 
success for the good development of RJ.
This same idea has led to changing paragraph 2 of article 12 of the draft, 
finally referring to the establishment of “procedures or guidelines” to make 
referral easier.
paRticipation of the victim in the RestoRative justice pRocess
One of the problems during the passing procedure of the Directive was 
that it could be understood by readers that paragraph 1.a) establishes par-
ticipation of the victim in the RJ process as a necessary element. This could 
exclude RJ process with surrogates or without victim.
This requirement is based on the need for the victim’s consensus, which 
may be withdrawn at any time during the process.
Such a limitation, although it could initially make some sense, is not justi-
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fied: at times the attitude of the victim does not allow constructive participation 
in the mediation process; and, in other cases, for example, when there is no 
specific victim, the offender would be deprived of the possibility to obtain the 
personal and procedural benefits which come with the mediation agreement.
In practice, in many mediation programs a mediation will continue when 
this is observed to be beneficial to the offender and non participation of the 
victim responds to elements which are not significant to the mediation pro-
cess; for example, the victim is afraid and does not want to maintain any rela-
tion with the offender, or wants no contact with the issue at hand, etc. We also 
referred to the absence of a specific victim, for example, in crimes related to 
drug trafficking, or other crimes in which the victim does not exist or is not 
available (because of living in another district or State, etc.). In these cases, it 
is quite usual that the mediation or RJ process continues with the participa-
tion of a “surrogate”, that is, a person replacing the position of the victim in 
the restorative process. Also, in case mediation has begun and the victim no 
longer wishes to participate, the process can be continued with the partici-
pants deemed appropriate by the mediator, and the victim being informed 
about the issues that shall be agreed on with the mediator.
It seems that the Directive goes beyond its original purpose, and that it 
tackles matters which will have to be decided upon and regulated by other 
operators, such as the States themselves, or even the courts, mediator orga-
nizations, etc. Excluding issues related to mediation is negative for its devel-
opment, since in practice a given case will be evaluated at different times by 
different operators and the issue of appropriateness of the conflict resolution 
method for the specific conflict needs to persist during the entire process. 
The Directive regulates the standing of the victim in Restorative Justice, 
but RJ can also be developed and regulated when the victim does not partici-
pate, such as in cases similar to the ones we mentioned. However, the word-
ing of the Directive can be received by States as an absolute regulation of RJ, 
above all in those States with less know-how and experience in this field.
acknowledgment of the facts
In paragraph c of article 12 of the Directive it is noted that “the offender has 
acknowledged the basic facts of the case”. This matter has fuelled a big debate 
throughout processing of the Directive, since a strong requirement of acknowl-
edgment covering the facts and intention, or even the penalty that could be 
imposed, could prevent the development of many restorative processes.
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The word of the draft Directive was too litigation oriented in this regard, 
indicating that “the suspected or accused person or offender must have ac-
cepted responsibility for their act”. 
In general, most RJ programs require some grade of acknowledgment of 
the facts in order to begin the process, and a process ended successfully will 
normally mean that the offender acknowledges their responsibility during the 
process or in the reparation agreement; in this regard, the wording of the Di-
rective is much more accurate than the draft was, and broadens the spectrum 
of cases that are possibly susceptible of starting a RJ process.
voluntaRy and confidential chaRacteR veRsus Res judicata
According to paragraphs d and e, agreements are arrived at voluntarily 
and may be taken into account in any further proceedings, while discussions 
shall be confidential, except in cases of public interest that are included in the 
national regulation or ethical limitations.
It seems that the mediation agreement is not protected by the confiden-
tiality prevailing in mediation sessions, a reasonable issue if we take into ac-
count the tinge of public interest in this matter taking us away from the avail-
able area which in the private field allows for confidentiality to extend to the 
agreement or even to the fact of having reached an agreement.
The possibility of linking the agreement to other proceedings is not to be 
understood as an ex legem consequence of the res judicata27. 
Paragraph d simply establishes non confidentiality on its existence and 
content in other possible proceedings, obtaining in each case the importance 
awarded to specific circumstances in each States, being this co-defendant tes-
timony, witness testimony, confession… depending on the requirements of 
the different legal orders and jurisprudence.
appRopRiateness of the case veRsus geneRalization
In paragraph 2 of article 12, the final phrasing includes a reference to case 
referral “as appropriate”. This contains the idea of appropriateness of the 
case to the RJ process, moving away from the traditional automatism that 
criminal proceedings are imbued with; we shall refer to this matter below.
27  Res judicata can produce a material effect on future procedures: a fact declared 
so by the resolution of the first procedure can be assessed as a fact on a second procedure 
without the need to develop further evidence over that fact. 
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2.2. Comparative experience drawn from other countries 
In Europe, we have great variability in relation to the development of RJ; 
among Northern European countries, such as Norway, we can find experi-
ences in the 70s that are pioneers on a global level; others, such as the United 
Kingdom, have many ongoing programs; the Central European countries 
have worked, in recent times, on RJ, with positive results 28; and, lastly, it is 
in Southern European countries where a greater resistance can be observed 
with regard to introduction of mediation or RJ programs, and where, in gen-
eral, basic elements are not adequately regulated, sometimes underregulated 
but –and more harmful- sometimes tending to overregulation.
Concerning the pioneer, Norway, mediation between victim and offender 
has been developed since the 70s, first with juvenile offenders and then incor-
porating cases of adults in the programs. As in most countries, the system is 
monitored by the Prosecutor, and in order to start a restorative process there 
has to be a strong evidence of guilt. 
Since 1991, RJ has been regulated, first in the National Mediation Service 
Act, then in the code of procedure (1998), the Execution of Sentences Act 
(2001) and the Penal Code (2003), and in other, more flexible rules, such 
as notices of the State Prosecutor’s Office, and orientation guides explaining 
to legal operators which crimes are more adequate for mediation to be at-
tempted, such as theft or vandalism29. 
The United Kingdom is also among the countries which have started with 
pilot programs early, dating back to 1979. In the UK there are various RJ 
programs and tools, a great diversity of RJ projects, a lot broader than in the 
other countries. There are even programs developed by the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, and this includes criminal conflict diversion programs, although 
referral and reintegration ones, too30. One can notice the commitment to flex-
28  Vid. Information concerning Restorative Justice in Northern and Central Euro-
pean countries in the document European Best Practices of Restorative Justice in the 
Criminal Procedure, 2010.
29  Vid. ERVO, “La conciliación en materia penal en los países escandinavos”, in La 
mediación penal para adultos, Barona Vilar (dir.), pp. 148 et seq.
30  Vid. the interesting work of MONTESINOS in La mediación penal para adul-
tos, Barona Vilar (dir.), concerning mediation in the United Kingdom, as well as So-
bre la mediación penal, Garciandía y Soleto (dirs.), and CEPEJ document CEPEJ-GT-
MED(2007)6 Restorative Justice: the Government’s strategy: Contribution by the Unit-
ed Kingdom.
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ibility and the reluctance to regulate mediation in this country, which is prob-
ably the one that has understood and developed RJ in the best way in Europe. 
France began mediation practices in the 80s, with a law of 1993 regulating 
mediation and another one of 2004 boosting the institution.
In Belgium, programs with juvenile offenders were initiated in the 70s, al-
though there was no express regulation. Victim-offender mediation was first 
regulated in 1994, and at present the prosecutor and court may refer cases 
with regard to all unlawful acts. In the Belgian case, mediation is possible 
even during police inquiry, controlled by the prosecutor, thus established as a 
real alternative to the process. For court-connected mediation, the system is 
controlled by a liaison prosecutor, a special advisor and a case manager. The 
development of RJ in Belgium is a model for the rest of continental countries. 
In Germany, victim-offender mediation began in 1984 with juvenile of-
fenders and in minor cases, and is currently well-developed, but operators 
indicate prosecutors show little trust in the institution31.
In Austria, the beginning of pilot programs dates back to 1980 with ju-
venile offenders, extending in the 90s to cover adults, officially regulated in 
1999 for crimes entailing less than 5 years of imprisonment32.
2.3. Activity of non-governmental organizations
In the European field there are two NGOs whose activity has contributed 
in the development of mediation and RJ, favoring sharing of know-how, sup-
port for new projects and influence on national regulation and practice.
GEMME is the European Association of Judges for Mediation33  its aims 
include studying mediation systems, sharing experiences among judges and 
promoting research and dissemination initiatives.
Most European countries have a section in GEMME, which has in many 
cases been the principal driving force behind development of mediation in 
these countries. This has been the case of the Spanish section of GEMME, 
which in turn has been established as a national association. Judges have car-
31  BARONA, “Situación de la justicia restaurativa y la mediación penal en Alemania”, 
in Mediación penal para adultos (Barona dir.), p. 235 et seq.
32  Vid. MIERS, An International review of Restorative Justice, Crime Reduction 
Research Series, Home Office, UK, 2001, pp. 7 et seq.
33  http://www.gemme.eu/, GEMME, principally consisting of judges, prosecutors 
and clerks, also includes some mediation practicioners and scholars.
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ried out a dissemination work and have provided support to different media-
tion initiatives conducted in Spain, participating actively therein.
The European Forum for Restorative Justice34 consists of research-
ers, practitioners, judges, prosecutors, and in general, operators who are in 
contact with RJ. This organization, unlike GEMME, specializes in criminal 
matters, develops a high level in literature and experimenting and promotes 
the dissemination of knowledge, the sharing of experiences and of research, 
training and dissemination initiatives.
According to the European Forum of RJ, Restorative Justice needs are cur-
rently educating society to accept RJ, generalizing the training for judges and 
legal practitioners for acceptance and proper use, allocating of resources to 
development of programs, assuring quality in the development of programs 
and expanding the use of RJ instruments beyond mediation.
3. Resistance of South continental systems to Restorative Justice and cri-
teria in Restorative Justice
The formalistic legal culture that affects Sourthern European countries is 
widely known, and, facing Restorative Justice, we can find a number of objec-
tions from the operators35.
The first objection that RJ is faced with comes from those defending that it 
is not a right method to treat issues that are of interest to Criminal Law. Their 
main argument is based on the idea that the State holds the right to punish, 
and is therefore the only entity with a right to enforce criminal law. The rea-
son lies in that the State has the duty to safeguard security, and the victim’s 
attitude is but an insignificant issue; the State has to punish each time it is 
informed that a crime has been committed.
Within this approach, leaving decision in the hands of the victim is im-
possible, since the imposition and enforcement of punishment are actions 
belonging to the State on the basis of the need to safeguard security, and in 
order to assure that no crime is left unpunished, or that there is no “privati-
34  http://www.euforumrj.org/
35  In the Report “The Restorative Justice: an agenda for Europe. Supporting the 
implementation of restorative justice in the South of Europe”, p. 81 and following, the 
principal challenges for RJ development in South Europe, concerning the legal system, 
are described: formalistic legal culture, positivism and mandatory prosecution. CASADO 
CORONAS et allii and European Forum for Restorative Justice, 2008.
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zation of justice” which would give rise to impunity of the people with more 
economic resources, that is, to sum up, safeguarding equality of citizens be-
fore the law.
However, we consider that these opinions disregard basic elements of RJ.
The importance attributed to the victim in the 21st century is obvious, and 
in any case, RJ allows for an improvement in relation to criminal proceed-
ings, above all with regard to the victim. If RJ programs are well designed, 
privatization of justice – meaning that those with a greater purchasing power 
could avoid criminal penalties in exchange for higher compensations – will in 
no way be allowed; on the contrary, only participation based on the willing-
ness to repair the damage caused to the victim, mostly in emotional terms, is 
allowed.
3.1. Resistance of South Europe systems to Restorative Justice
Furthermore, moving beyond this initial exclusionary vision, we can gath-
er objections of operators of traditional justice to restorative justice in two 
big groups: 
- The tendency of continental systems to apply principles of the criminal 
justice process and the criminal justice proceedings to RJ
- The tendency to exhaustively or broadly regulate mediation and RJ 
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3.1.1. Tendency to apply procedural principles to Restorative Justice
We believe there is a tendency to apply procedural principles to RJ, such 
as the principle of legality, the principle of equality, the bilateral structure 
principle and the right to a defense, and that this tendency is erroneous.
Thus, for example, some people consider that, on the basis of applying 
the principle of legality, punishment of unlawful acts belongs to the State, 
through the Courts of Justice, and that it is not possible to modify the ele-
ments of the proceedings as a consequence of RJ activities, since this would 
violate the principle of legality.
This argument means ignoring the practice of both Criminal Justice and 
Restorative Justice: on one hand, in practice, a large part of unlawful acts 
are not persecuted, both because of lack of economic means and because of 
rationality.
On the other hand, in almost all legal orders there exist mechanisms for 
making criminal proceedings more flexible, allowing for the use of restorative 
instruments which can have an impact on the proceedings even when no RJ 
form is expressly regulated. Specifically in the Spanish case, plea bargaining 
– of increasing importance in recent times – embraces anglosaxon tendencies 
to deemphasize the principle of legality and to replace it by the principle of 
discretionary prosecution with legal limitations.
Some also believe that mediation or RJ demand a bilateral structure, 
meaning that if the victim does not agree to participate, or in case there is no 
victim, it is not possible to carry out the activity. This idea could be reinforced 
with a narrow understanding of paragraph (a) of art. 12 of the 2012 Directive.
This position goes against logic and the practice of many programs: in 
many cases there is no victim, or the victim does not want to participate in the 
mediation process, for whatever reasons, however there is regret and the will-
ingness to repair on behalf of the offender, and many programs allow for me-
diation or the restorative method deemed adequate, sometimes with partici-
pation of a person who will act as a substitute of the victim. Other times, the 
restorative process is developed with a facilitator and the result is notified to 
the victim. On other occasions, the offender of a certain victim is unknown or 
is not available and other offenders of similar crimes act as surrogate offend-
ers in the mediation, with the objective of carrying out reparative activities 
towards strangers, people who have not been their victims but who have also 
suffered an offense. It would be a pity to exclude numerous cases for which 
RJ is still a positive instrument, on the basis of this erroneous interpretation. 
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Moreover, interpreting the principle of equality, it is believed that RJ has 
to be regulated as a right, as part of the criminal proceedings, and that every-
one should have a right of access to RJ, in all cases and in the entire national 
territory.
RJ instruments have to be considered as elements which are to be used 
only when certain conditions are met, and not in all cases: for example, the 
existence of a strong evidence of guilt, such as an in flagrante delicto or ac-
knowledgment of the facts, the willingness to restore, the lack of recidivism 
etc. will favor that a restorative process begin, and this is something that has 
to be assessed in each case.
Moreover, legislation on RJ as a right for everyone in all judicial districts 
would be absurd, for the aforementioned reasons, but also a matter hard to 
put in practice.
One of the major advantages of RJ is adaptability of its processes to the 
necessities of each local, judicial, and cultural milieu, and generalizing the 
right of access to RJ could be at odds with this.
We believe that it is more appropriate to regulate the possibility of devel-
oping RJ instruments, as well as their efficacy in the proceedings, and, on the 
other hand, to make sure there are policies aimed at promoting RJ across 
the entire national territory, offering to all citizens the possibility of access to 
such instruments, should the circumstances be adequate.
We are referring to a vision similar to that of the right to an effective rem-
edy: if, according to the Spanish Constitutional Court, citizens are entitled 
to a judgment on the merits as long as the procedural prerequisites are met, 
citizens will be entitled to participate in a RJ process if the adequate circum-
stances occur.
Lastly, as a point of resistance to RJ, some people believe that the appli-
cable right of defense, particularly the right not to incriminate oneself, is vio-
lated by participation of the defendant or the accused in a restorative process.
Obviously, if RJ processes are conducted with no respect for the funda-
mental rights of the parties, and, above all, of the defendant or accused, they 
would result in nothing more but failure. On the contrary, RJ programs re-
quire, in practice, the concurrence of a strong evidence of guilt, such as an in 
flagrante delicto, acknowledgment of facts, a defense which is not based on 
denial of the acts, mutual aggression, etc. Furthermore, all operators of the 
restorative process and the criminal proceedings in general will monitor re-
spect for fundamental rights.
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In any case, it is obvious that development of RJ programs has to pay spe-
cial attention to what may have an impact on the rights of the accused, assur-
ing confidentiality in all levels, even when the RJ process is unsuccessful. The 
initiation and development of a RJ process is a circumstance which should be 
preferably not communicated to the Court rendering the judgment if the RJ 
process is unsuccessful and the defense of the offender is not going to admit 
the facts36
3.1.2.  Tendency to regulate comprehensively 
In the assimilation of a new institution such as mediation by legal sys-
tems, a tendency can be observed, consisting in regulating RJ circumstances 
in a way that is analogous to a legal rule. See, for example, the tendency to 
establish definitions, processes, rights, exclusion of crimes or circumstances 
for dealing with RJ. This kind of regulation produces a lack of flexibility in RJ 
instruments, which may entail their inefficacy.
This tendency can probably be explained on the basis of a lack of aware-
ness of RJ in general, as well as a legal view awarding a key role to the prin-
ciple of legality and the principle of equality in the field of Criminal justice.
Often, we can find systems that exclude RJ or mediation for serious mat-
ters such as crimes, or serious crimes, or in cases where the victim withdraws 
their participation, or at enforcement stage. Such exclusion may be reason-
able for some cases, but there will still be others where mediation or another 
RJ instrument may be the most appropriate way to have an impact on the 
conflict.
On the contrary, instead of regulation it is much more appropriate to es-
tablish referral and working methods by means of other flexible instruments, 
such as protocols or internal Court rules or rules specific to the RJ services, 
allowing for appropriateness to the background circumstances and to the 
specific case, and which enabling modifications – should there be any – in a 
flexible way.
This is a common tension in continental systems, especially in Southern 
countries, a lot more prone to overregulating institutions of legal relevance. 
36  It is the same idea that balances the right to negotiate and the right to plead inno-
cent, and the unawareness of the Court with regard to the dealings between defense and 
prosecutor in case the agreement is not reached. If the Court is aware that the defense 
tried to negotiate, its neutrality could be affected if the negotations fail and the Court has 
to resolve the case.
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On the contrary, anglosaxon systems accept variability and flexibility of regu-
lation of RJ systems in the various programs37.
It is a great error to apply traditional justice criteria, procedural principles 
of proceedings, to an activity of an eminently diverging nature, and doing so 
may lead to an inefficacy or withdrawal of restorative instruments, and even 
to obtaining negative results.
On the contrary, we consider that a different series of principles should be 
applied in RJ in terms of its relation to the proceedings, given it is shaped in 
a way dramatically different to traditional Justice.
3.2. Criteria for use in Restorative Justice
We understand that criteria for use of RJ could be encompassed in two 
categories:
- Adequacy of the RJ procedure to the specific conflict
- Protection of participants, especially the victim
3.2.1. Adequacy of the RJ procedure to the specific conflict
The principle of appropriateness or adequacy of the RJ procedure to the 
specific conflict, which would be opposed to this of a right to mediation, is a 
basic principle which in turn includes the principle of protection of the par-
ties.
Protection of parties, especially the victim, is a fundamental principle en-
tailing interruption and termination of the restorative process in case there is 
a risk of secondary victimization or severe damage to the parties.
In contrast to the right that the citizen may have to a resolution by the 
Courts, which may entail the right to a judgment on the merits, should the 
procedural conditions be met, it is not possible to establish an absolute right 
to mediation or to RJ: in the same way that the right to a resolution is as-
sured when the procedural conditions are met, the parties will have a right 
to mediation or to participation in a RJ process when the necessary prereq-
uisites are fulfilled; those will consist in that the legal requirements and the 
prerequisites of the program are met, in case there is a service able to take on 
the subject. 
37  Even if the procedures are flexible, SHAPLAND et allii  “Situating restorative jus-
tice within criminal justice”, in Theoretical criminology, Sage, 2006, p. 510, explain that 
RJ within the criminal system cannot be characterized as completely informal as opposed 
to other restorative justice settings.
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Even if there is not a right to mediation or RJ, governements should assure 
access to RJ services in the whole territory, understanding that the adequacy 
of the RJ procedure to every possible case has to be controlled in different 
stages by different operators.
As appropriateness or adequacy circumstances taken into account by 
many programs, we could indicate the following:
- Offender’s capacity and attitude 
- Good faith and ability to admit responsibility, to be evaluated by dif-
ferent operators, such as members of the referring court, the mediator, 
the psychosocial teams.
- Victim’s capacity and attitude
- Adequacy stricto sensu
- Lack of recidivism
- Appropriate participation of the parties
- Participation of third parties
- Instrument efficacy in the conflict
3.2.2. Protection of participants, especially the victim
In practice, operators look at adequacy of the RJ process for the conflict in 
several moments.  Here I describe, for example, the control system of many 
mediation programs in Spain, in the majority of which mediation is designed 
as a tool that is complementary to the Courts.
Time in which legal operators control adequacy or appropriateness in Victim-Offend-
er Mediation in programs in Spain.
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Firstly, forwarding or referring a case to mediation is generally not auto-
matic when it comes to criminal matters; normally, court operators – that is, 
the Judge, the Clerk, staff of the judiciary – control, jointly or individually, 
compliance with a series of factors, such as the apparent guilt, like the exis-
tence of an in flagrante delicto or defense which is not based on denial of the 
criminal acts, lack of recidivism and the offender’s attitude.
The matter of apparent guilt is tricky in terms of defense of the accused, 
for which reason most programs take over mediation or RJ cases when there 
is an in flagrante delicto, or when defense of the accused is based on a crite-
rion other than non participation in the punishable facts.
In most programs, participation in RJ processes is not allowed when the 
offender is a habitual offender or a repeat one. This is justified on the fact 
that RJ is not established as an automatic benefit for the offender, but rather 
as a form of restoration and re-education, which is normally not achievable 
for habitual offenders. Another important reason is the existence of limited 
resources for RJ procedures; establishing priorities, for cases in which me-
diation would have more impact and success, would provide the program 
with a higher efficiency rate. However, as I was indicating earlier, excluding 
such circumstances by policy could in practice exclude the use of mediation 
or other restorative methods for cases in which operators will estimate them 
to be highly useful and positive; for this reason, it is more adequate to estab-
lish such criteria in guidance documents or protocols for developing RJ, and 
they may be general or, even better, specific for each judicial district or Court.
Secondly, in the field of criminal law, the mediator controls victim protec-
tion and appropriateness of the process, taking into account the circumstanc-
es to which we referred earlier, and primarily the defendant’s ability to as-
sume the responsibility and the defendant’s lack of intent to harm the victim.
The mediator performs a continuous monitoring of the viability of the me-
diation or other restorative process and the appropriateness of the process to 
the circumstances. Thus, if, for example, they believe that the offender does 
not intend to empathize with the victim or to take responsibility, they may 
terminate the procedure with no result; the mediator can also do so if they 
consider that there is a danger of victimizing the victim, or even if they con-
sider that the victim’s attitude is not adequate.
For legal operators it is hard to accept ceding power to the mediator, who 




Thirdly, the lawyer of the parties has the corresponding duties of protect-
ing the interests of their clients, ensuring that mediation and its results fall 
within the law and respect the rights of the participants.
Lastly, when the prosecutor, lawyer, judge or other legal operator incorpo-
rate the reparation agreement or other specific agreement into the proceed-
ings, they further check the appropriateness of the mediation for the matter, 
and, above all, the legal consequences of the reparation agreement.
4. Conclusions
The origin and major development of RJ corresponds to the anglosaxon 
countries, mainly the United States and Canada, with an increasing role of 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom over the last years. 
The international, namely European, contributions are being decisive for 
the development of RJ in the European countries that are more resistant to 
change, such as the Southern European countries.
The Council of Europe is the pioneer international organization in pro-
moting mediation in various fields, including the criminal one; however, 
its efforts have not had a great impact on national practices. The European 
Union, with its victim-related rules, is directly influencing States, above all by 
means of instruments such as the recent Directive of October 2012, but also 
by means of policies supporting research and national actions relating to RJ.
NGOs such as GEMME or the European Forum for Restorative Justice are 
organizations which have participated and do participate actively in the dis-
semination of mediation and RJ, bringing together experiences and knowl-
edge necessary to their development. 
Concerning situation of RJ in the various countries, we can observe that 
in most cases programs began with regard to crimes committed by juvenile 
offenders, and have been evolving to develop programs for adults.
In most programs, cases are referred previously to trial, and one can ob-
serve an increasing tendency to refer cases at the stage of trial or enforce-
ment, as well.
In conclusion, it can also be said that in countries where victim-offender 
mediation (VOM) is consolidated other RJ tools are being introduced, and a 
better understanding is gained by scholars, legal practitioners and even citi-
zens. These countries include the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands 
and Belgium.
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Resistance of the most conservative countries – legally speaking – such as 
Spain, before the relative novelty of mediation or RJ, is based on the lack of 
awareness of the basics of this subject.
Taking into account the need to regulate the traditional proceedings, and 
the application of the traditional principles, the applicable principles in the 
field of RJ are those of adequacy, flexibility, minimum regulation and protec-
tion of participants in the process, especially the victim.

